>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Jacquie ALBRIGHT, AS Parent and NEXT Best FRIEND OF Child DOE, Plaintiff - Appellant v. MOUNTAIN HOME SCHOOL DISTRICT; Debbie Atkinson, Director of Special Education; Susanne Belk, BCBA Consultant, Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3298\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Jacquie Albright, As Parent and Next Best Friend of Child Doe\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nMountain Home School District; Debbie Atkinson, Director of Special Education;\\n Susanne Belk, BCBA Consultant\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Arkansas - Harrison\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: December 13, 2018\\n Filed: June 12, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jacquie Albright alleges that her daughter Child Doe, a young student with\\nautism and significant intellectual deficits, was not provided a free appropriate public\\neducation (FAPE) by Mountain Home School District (the District), as required by\\nthe Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et\\nseq. When her administrative challenge was rejected, Albright appealed that decision\\n\\fin federal district court and brought additional claims for constitutional violations\\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983, disability discrimination and retaliation under § 504 of the\\nRehabilitation Act, disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with\\nDisabilities Act (ADA), and violations of Arkansas law. The district court1 affirmed\\nthe administrative decision, granted summary judgment to the District on the\\nremaining federal claims, and then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over\\nAlbright’s state law claims. We affirm.\\n\\n Child Doe has been educated within the District from kindergarten to the\\npresent in accordance with an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) formulated\\npursuant to the IDEA. The IEP sets forth the educational accommodations approved\\nfor Child Doe, as well as a behavior intervention plan (BIP) to address any\\nproblematic behaviors. An IEP team periodically discusses and revises Child Doe’s\\nIEP as needed. Albright and appellee Susanne Belk, a Board Certified Behavior\\nAnalyst employed as a consultant by the District during the relevant period, are\\nmembers of Child Doe’s IEP team. The highly contentious relationship between\\nAlbright and the District, complicated further by Albright’s employment with the\\nDistrict, has made it difficult for Albright and the remainder of the IEP team to agree\\non many aspects of Child Doe’s IEP.\\n\\n Albright has filed four due process complaints against the District challenging\\nChild Doe’s education. The first two complaints were resolved by settlement\\nagreements in August 2012 and March 2014. On October 20, 2014, early in Child\\nDoe’s fourth-grade year, Albright filed the due process complaint at issue, alleging\\nthat the District had denied Child Doe a FAPE between November 15, 2013, and\\nOctober 17, 2014. Events after October 17, 2014, are the subject of a separate due\\nprocess complaint.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the\\nWestern District of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f After Albright filed the third due process complaint, the parties proceeded to\\nan eleven-day hearing held between March and September of 2015. A hearing officer\\nemployed by the Arkansas Department of Education presided and heard testimony\\nfrom witnesses, including Albright, Belk, and an expert hired by Albright. The\\nhearing officer thereafter issued a forty-page decision setting forth findings of fact\\nand conclusions of law. Relevant here, the hearing officer addressed whether\\nAlbright was denied the opportunity to participate in developing the IEP, whether\\nChild Doe benefitted academically from the IEP, and whether the BIP adequately\\naddressed Child Doe’s behaviors or exacerbated them by permitting the use of\\nsensory integration techniques.\\n\\n The hearing officer found that Albright had not been denied the opportunity to\\nparticipate in the IEP process, citing the following facts: During the period in\\nquestion, Albright attended all IEP conferences until September 2014, when she\\nchose not to attend a meeting, and there was no evidence to substantiate Albright’s\\nclaims that other IEP conferences were held in her absence. Although the District did\\nnot agree to or satisfy all of Albright’s requests regarding Child Doe’s education,\\nthere was no evidence indicating that the District had hampered Albright’s active\\nparticipation in developing Child Doe’s IEP. Hundreds of pages of emails and\\ntranscripts of IEP meetings demonstrate that Albright actively participated in the IEP\\nprocess.\\n\\n The hearing officer also found that the IEP itself was working. More\\nspecifically, he found that in light of Child Doe’s significant disabilities, the evidence\\nshowed that the IEP did provide her with educational benefits. The hearing officer\\nalso found, however, that Albright believed that Child Doe was capable of greater\\nacademic achievements than indicated by the assessments. Nevertheless, he credited\\nBelk’s testimony that Child Doe had shown academic improvement during the\\nrelevant period.\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f To complicate matters, Child Doe’s disability was originally identified as\\nintellectual deficits, but was changed to autism during the period in question. Despite\\nthe changed diagnosis, the hearing officer found that the BIP in place at the time\\naddressed the same maladaptive behaviors identified by the psychologist who had\\ndiagnosed Child Doe with autism. Albright’s expert testified that the BIP was\\ninadequate, but the hearing officer found that his testimony was refuted by the\\nDistrict’s behavior data and Belk’s testimony regarding her understanding of Child\\nDoe’s behaviors.\\n\\n In sum, the hearing officer determined that after “reviewing the elicited\\ntestimony and the evidence in this case it is clear that the District attempted to focus\\non what they believed to be the unique needs of [Child Doe] even prior to changing\\nthe primary handicapping condition from intellectual deficits to autism.” The hearing\\nofficer concluded that the District “recognized and accepted the additional challenge\\nof addressing the maladaptive behaviors [Child Doe] exhibited as a consequence,\\nmore likely than not of her autism, as well as her intellectual deficits and the\\nchallenges that she presented to the educators,” and it thus did not deny Child Doe\\na FAPE.\\n\\n Albright appealed the hearing officer’s decision in federal district court (Count\\nI) and brought several related claims under federal and state law (Counts II-VI),\\nwhich were subsequently bifurcated. In her IDEA appeal, Albright specifically\\ncontested three of the hearing officer’s conclusions: that she had participated\\nmeaningfully in the IEP process, that it had been unnecessary to develop a new BIP\\nfor Child Doe, and that the District had used evidence-based practices in Child Doe’s\\nIEP. The district court decided the appeal on the briefs, affirming the hearing\\nofficer’s decision on each issue, and “wholeheartedly agree[ing]” with the hearing\\nofficer’s determination that Albright had participated meaningfully in the IEP\\nprocess. D. Ct. Order of July 5, 2017, at 6 [hereinafter July 5 Order]. The court also\\nfound that “the BIP that was already in place was working well.” Id. Finally, the\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fcourt determined that it “ha[d] not found any evidence in the record that sensory\\nintegration treatment is not based on peer-reviewed research, nor . . . that the\\nDistrict’s use of sensory integration treatment somehow prevented the District from\\nutilizing services that are based on peer-reviewed research.” Id. at 8.\\n\\n Albright moved to alter or amend the judgment, asserting that the district court\\nhad made manifest errors of law or fact. The court denied Albright’s motion,\\nconcluding that any errors it had made did not affect its disposition and that\\nAlbright’s motion raised new arguments that she had not raised in her initial appeal\\nbrief.\\n\\n At the close of discovery, the District moved for summary judgment on Counts\\nII through VI. Under local rules, Albright’s response was due fourteen days after the\\nDistrict’s motion was filed on April 28. Albright moved for leave to file an amended\\ncomplaint on May 4.2 The next day, she requested an extension of time to file her\\nsummary judgment response, contending that the motion for summary judgment\\nwould be moot if the court allowed her to file an amended complaint. The court\\ndenied her motion for an extension on May 7. On May 10, Albright requested\\nanother extension, asserting that her counsel had obligations in other cases and that\\nher counsel would need to attend to family medical issues over the following weeks.\\nThe court denied the motion that same day. On May 22, ten days after the deadline\\nhad passed, Albright began filing her summary judgment response, accompanied by\\na motion to accept her response out of time.\\n\\n In its summary judgment order, the district court denied Albright’s out-of-time\\nfiling request, struck her filings from the record, and granted the District’s motion for\\nsummary judgment. In her motion to alter or amend the judgment, Albright\\ncontended that the court had applied the incorrect standard when evaluating her out-\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The district court denied this motion as moot in its July 5 order.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fof-time motion. Although the court agreed that it had applied the wrong standard, it\\nconcluded that the motion failed under the correct standard. Albright thereafter filed\\nthis appeal.\\n\\n Albright first appeals the district court’s order affirming the hearing officer’s\\ndetermination that Child Doe was provided a FAPE. We review de novo whether the\\nDistrict provided Child Doe with a FAPE. See I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-\\nEagan Pub. Sch., 863 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 2017). In so doing, we must afford due\\nweight to the outcome of the administrative proceedings, see id., and accept the\\ndistrict court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, see Gill v. Columbia\\n93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1035 (8th Cir. 2000). “Our duty is to interpret and\\napply the law, not to substitute our own notions of sound educational policy for those\\nof the school authorities which we review.” Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis\\nPub. Sch. v. R.M.M. ex rel. O.M., 861 F.3d 769, 771-72 (8th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).\\n\\n The IEP is “the centerpiece of the [IDEA]’s education delivery system for\\ndisabled children.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). Albright asserts that\\nthe District denied Child Doe a FAPE by implementing an IEP that was inadequate,\\nin no small part because Albright herself was denied the opportunity to meaningfully\\nparticipate in the formation process. The district court and hearing officer thought\\notherwise. Our independent review of the record leads us to conclude that Albright\\nhas failed to show that Child Doe’s IEP was inadequate.\\n\\n “To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP\\nreasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the\\nchild’s circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE–1,\\n137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017). “The Act contemplates that this fact-intensive exercise\\nwill be informed not only by the expertise of school officials, but also by the input of\\nthe child’s parents or guardians.” Id. “Any review of an IEP must appreciate that the\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fquestion is whether the IEP is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.”\\nId.\\n\\n At the due process hearing, and again before the district court, Albright argued\\nthat the IEP’s behavior intervention plan was not working. She asserted that the BIP\\nincluded the use of pseudoscientific practices prohibited under the IDEA, such as\\n“sensory integration techniques,” and that the BIP required revision in light of Child\\nDoe’s apparently escalating patterns of behavior. Quoting Belk’s testimony, the\\ndistrict court found that “the BIP that was already in place was working well.” July\\n5 Order, at 6. Albright argues that this finding was clearly erroneous in light of her\\nexpert witness’s testimony that the plan in place would not improve Child Doe’s\\nbehaviors. As proof of Child Doe’s worsening behaviors, Albright notes that between\\nJanuary 2013 and October 2014 the BIP was updated to include a revised and slightly\\nlonger list of “problem behaviors.”\\n\\n The hearing officer found Belk’s testimony credible, giving her testimony\\ngreater weight than that of Albright’s expert. See Bradley ex rel. Bradley v. Ark.\\nDept. of Educ., 443 F.3d 965, 974 (8th Cir. 2006) (“We recognize that the hearing\\nofficers ‘had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses,’ and we are\\nmindful that it is not the place of the courts to ‘substitute [our] own notions of sound\\neducational policy for those of the school authorities that [we] review.” (alterations\\nin original) (quoting Strawn v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 210 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir.\\n2000))). The hearing officer and district court both credited Belk’s testimony that she\\nbelieved the IEP was working. The lists of problem behaviors alone do not contradict\\nBelk’s testimony, because they do not include important information, such as the\\nbehaviors’ frequency, that would be relevant in determining whether Child Doe’s\\nbehavior was worsening. Nor do the lists themselves purport to be exhaustive\\nchronicles of Child Doe’s behaviors. In light of Belk’s testimony, which was based\\non her extensive experience working with Child Doe, we conclude that the district\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fcourt did not clearly err in finding that the BIP was “working well” or that it was\\nadequate.\\n\\n Albright also argues that sensory integration techniques are pseudoscientific\\ntreatments that violate the IDEA’s requirement that services be “based on peer-\\nreviewed research to the extent practicable.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). The\\ndistrict court found no evidence “that sensory integration treatment is not based on\\npeer-reviewed research, nor [did] it f[ind] any evidence in the record that the\\nDistrict’s use of sensory integration treatment somehow prevented the District from\\nutilizing services that are based on peer-reviewed research.” July 5 Order, at 8.\\nAlbright contends that this finding was clearly erroneous, again citing the testimony\\nof her expert witness and asserting that “the opportunity cost of the District’s decision\\nto use a pseudoscientific practice is that it foregoes use of other, peer-reviewed\\ntreatments.” Appellant’s Br. 19. Albright does not object to the district court’s\\nfinding that “it is abundantly clear from the record that the District made extensive\\nuse of evidence-based practices to educate Child Doe.” July 5 Order, at 7. Even\\nputting aside the question whether sensory integration techniques are based on peer-\\nreviewed research, the district court’s other findings, which are not clearly erroneous,\\nare sufficient to refute Albright’s claim. Alongside the “extensive” use of peer-\\nreviewed practices, the use of sensory integration techniques, which were specifically\\nrecommended by Child Doe’s occupational therapist, did not deny Child Doe a\\nFAPE. Cf. Bradley, 443 F.3d at 975 (“[T]he Act does not require ‘the furnishing of\\nevery special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s potential.’”\\n(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 199 (1982))).\\n\\n Albright next argues that the IEP’s failure to produce any academic progress\\ndenied Child Doe a FAPE. Albright notes that despite being in fourth grade, Child\\nDoe was still instructed on kindergarten-level subject matter. She also argues that\\nChild Doe’s score in IQ testing had decreased between 2010 and 2014. As a\\npreliminary matter, Albright’s due process complaint concerns the period between\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fNovember 2013 and October 2014. Evidence pertaining to Child Doe’s performance\\nover a four-year period is thus overbroad and does not establish that she was denied\\na FAPE during the period in question. Belk testified that Child Doe appeared to be\\nimproving academically. The District supports her testimony with standardized tests\\nadministered periodically throughout 2014 that show Child Doe’s progress during the\\nperiod at issue. The testing revealed that Child Doe’s scores in English, Reading, and\\nMath increased between January 2014 and August 2014. Although the test scores\\nvaried within the period, in total they demonstrate academic improvement. See\\nBradley, 443 F.3d at 973 (upholding factual finding of academic improvement based\\non standardized test scores). Tests on first-grade subject matter administered in\\nOctober 2014, however, revealed that Child Doe was not yet prepared to advance to\\nmore complex material.\\n\\n The hearing officer observed in his decision that Albright believed Child Doe\\nwas capable of greater academic achievements than the assessments indicated. The\\ndistrict court echoed that sentiment, finding that “[i]t is also undoubtedly true that Ms.\\nAlbright disagrees with other members of Child Doe’s IEP team about what Child\\nDoe’s true academic potential is.” July 5 Order, at 9. However regrettable the\\ndisagreement between Albright and the remainder of the IEP team on this matter, the\\nIDEA requires that an IEP be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make\\nprogress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at\\n999. The “IDEA does not require that a school either maximize a student’s potential\\nor provide the best possible education at public expense.” Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist.\\nv. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir. 1997). Based on the results of the District’s\\ntesting, Child Doe made progress in a curriculum that was appropriate in light of her\\ncircumstances.\\n\\n Finally, Albright contends that she was denied the opportunity to meaningfully\\nparticipate in the formation of Child Doe’s IEP. “The Act contemplates that [IEP\\ndrafting] will be informed not only by the expertise of school officials, but also by the\\n\\n -9-\\n\\finput of the child’s parents or guardians.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999. Although\\nparents generally must be afforded the opportunity to participate in every IEP\\nmeeting, a meeting may be conducted without them “if the public agency is unable\\nto convince the parents that they should attend.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.322(d) (2006); see\\nLathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray, 611 F.3d 419, 427 (8th Cir. 2010). As the district\\ncourt found, voluminous evidence in the record demonstrates Albright’s extensive\\ninvolvement throughout the IEP process. Albright argues, however, that the IEP team\\nconspired to hold an IEP meeting without her on September 15, 2014. But as the\\nrecord clearly reveals, Albright chose not to attend the September 15 meeting despite\\nthe District’s efforts to persuade her to attend. Moreover, to the extent there was a\\ntechnical violation of the Act’s notice requirements, “it did not affect the IEPs or\\notherwise deprive [Child Doe] of educational benefit.” Id. The District did not\\nprevent Albright’s active participation in the IEP process.3\\n\\n In sum, “a profoundly toxic lack of trust” between Albright and the District has\\nrendered it nearly impossible for the parties to agree on an education program best\\nsuited for Child Doe’s needs, despite both parties’ seemingly earnest desire to provide\\njust that. July 5 Order, at 9. Nonetheless, having found no clear error in the district\\ncourt’s factual findings and having given due weight to the hearing officer’s\\ncredibility determinations, we conclude that Child Doe was not denied a FAPE.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Although Albright also appears to argue that the District withheld information\\nfrom her, she does not point to anything in the record to which she was entitled but\\nwhich was originally withheld from her. She seems to argue instead that the District\\nfailed to keep adequate records regarding Child Doe’s behavior, thus denying her\\naccess to information. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 19 (“This caution points to the\\nDistrict’s real failure – it never gathered any data to evaluate the effectiveness of\\nsensory integration or the January 2013 BIP.”). In light of our conclusion that Child\\nDoe’s IEP was adequate, the District’s record-keeping practices did not result in the\\ndenial of a FAPE.\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f Albright appeals the district court’s denial of her motions for extensions of time\\nand her motion to accept her summary judgment response out of time. A district\\ncourt has “considerable discretion” to grant or deny a party’s motion for an extension\\nof time to file a summary judgment response. See Soliman v. Johanns, 412 F.3d 920,\\n921-22 (8th Cir. 2005). A court may grant a party’s timely motion for an extension\\nupon a showing of good cause, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A), or may for good cause\\ngrant a party’s request for an extension of time “after the time has expired if the party\\nfailed to act because of excusable neglect,” id. 6(b)(1)(B). The district court found\\nthat Albright had not shown good cause for an extension prior to the deadline, instead\\nfinding “contumacious . . . disregard for deadlines and procedural rules” in light of\\nAlbright’s repeated failure to meet deadlines throughout the case. D. Ct. Order of\\nSeptember 15, 2017, at 4 (quoting Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781,\\n784 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that “[w]e have rarely, if ever, excused”\\ncontumacious disregard for deadlines)). “The primary measure of good cause is the\\nmovant’s diligence” in attempting to meet deadlines. Rahn v. Hawkins, 464 F.3d\\n813, 822 (8th Cir. 2006) (considering motion to amend pleadings under Rule 16(b)).\\n“We generally ‘will not consider prejudice [to the nonmovant] if the movant has not\\nbeen diligent . . . .’” Hartis v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 935, 948 (8th Cir.\\n2012) (first alteration in original) (quoting Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532\\nF.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 2008)).\\n\\n Albright argues that she had established good cause by providing evidence of\\nher counsel’s busy work schedule and her counsel’s need to attend to family health\\nconcerns. Albright requested a three-week extension after twelve of her fourteen days\\nto respond had elapsed, explaining, in part, that her counsel had many upcoming\\nobligations in other cases. She did not explain, however, why she could not have\\ncompleted her response in the preceding twelve days, nor did she provide evidence\\nof any diligent efforts on her counsel’s part to meet the original deadline, such as\\nattempting to reschedule upcoming obligations. The district court thus did not abuse\\nits discretion in denying Albright’s motions prior to the deadline.\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f Although Albright’s counsel thereafter attempted with some diligence to\\ncomplete her response, her filing it ten days after the deadline did not create good\\ncause where none previously existed. Nor could Albright establish excusable neglect\\nif good cause were found. Excusable neglect encompasses four factors: prejudice to\\nthe non-moving party, the length of the delay, the movant’s good faith, and the reason\\nfor the delay. See In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig.,\\n496 F.3d 863, 866-67 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick\\nAssoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). The reason for the delay is a key\\nfactor in the analysis. Id. at 867. Albright argues that “[w]hat the district court\\ndescribes as a lack of diligence could just as easily be described as a ‘mistake’ by\\ncounsel in managing her caseload, and thus, should be considered excusable neglect.”\\nAppellant’s Br. 35. We disagree, as we have previously held that preoccupation with\\nother hearings does not constitute excusable neglect. See Hawks v. J.P. Morgan\\nChase Bank, 591 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 2010). In addition, the district court\\nfound that Albright had not acted in good faith, having made little effort to meet the\\noriginal deadline despite the court’s repeated warnings. We conclude that Albright’s\\nlate filing was not excusable, notwithstanding the relative insubstantiality of the delay\\nand of the danger of prejudice to the District.4 The district court thus did not abuse\\nits discretion in denying Albright’s motion and striking her response.\\n\\n The district court concluded that Albright had failed to exhaust her\\nadministrative remedies with regard to the majority of her allegations that arose\\noutside the period covered by her third due process complaint. The claims arising\\nbefore November 2013 had been resolved by settlement agreement, rather than by\\nway of a due process hearing. Albright argues that settlement constitutes exhaustion\\n\\n 4\\n Albright argues that the district court should have explicitly analyzed the\\nPioneer factors. Such a failure “does not mandate an automatic reversal.” Guidant,\\n496 F.3d at 866 n.3. The district court’s decision to focus on the reason for delay and\\nAlbright’s bad faith was “reasonable under the facts of this case.” Gibbons v. United\\nStates, 317 F.3d 852, 854 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n -12-\\n\\funder the IDEA, or, in the alternative, that exhaustion in her case would have been\\nfutile.5 We have not heretofore decided whether settlement constitutes exhaustion\\nunder the IDEA. We review de novo whether exhaustion of administrative remedies\\nwas required. See J.M. v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir.\\n2017).\\n\\n The IDEA requires a claimant to exhaust her administrative remedies at the\\nstate level before filing a civil suit under its provisions. See 20 U.S.C.\\n§ 1415(i)(2)(A). Had Albright sought to sue only under the IDEA, subsection (i)\\nwould have required that she be “aggrieved by the findings and decision made under\\nsubsection (f).” Id. Subsection (f) sets forth the requirements for impartial due\\nprocess hearings. Because Albright filed suit under other laws in addition to the\\nIDEA, however, she was required to exhaust the administrative procedures “under\\nsubsections (f) and (g) . . . to the same extent as would be required had the action\\nbeen brought under [the IDEA].”6 Id. at § 1415(l). Subsection (g), which governs\\nstate administrative appeals, does not apply here.\\n\\n Albright was thus required to exhaust the procedures set forth in subsection (f)\\nto the same extent required by subsection (i), which by its plain language permits\\nappeals only from “the findings and decision” resulting from a due process hearing.\\nId. at § 1415(i)(2). It necessarily follows that like-extent exhaustion requires the\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Albright also argues that even if her pre-November 15, 2013, claims are barred\\nfor failure to exhaust, materials in the record from that period nonetheless support her\\nremaining claims because those materials would be admissible at trial. See Fed. R.\\nCiv. P. 56(c). We need not consider this argument, because once it struck Albright’s\\nsummary judgment response, the district court considered only the record materials\\ncited by the District.\\n 6\\n Albright does not contest the district court’s determination that her allegations\\nconcerned the denial of a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l); Fry v. Napoleon Comm.\\nSchs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 (2017).\\n\\n -13-\\n\\fentry of administrative findings and a decision. A pre-decision settlement thus fails\\nto satisfy the IDEA’s requirements.\\n\\n Albright argues that this reading is inconsistent with Congress’s purported\\nintent to encourage settlement, particularly in light of the IDEA’s 2004 amendment\\nallowing claimants the option of mediating their claims. As the Tenth Circuit held,\\nhowever, when rejecting this same argument in A.F. ex rel. Christine B. v. Española\\nPublic Schools, 801 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2015), “the terms of the statute are clear and\\nunambiguous.” Id. at 1249 (quoting United States v. Sprenger, 625 F.3d 1305, 1307\\n(10th Cir. 2010)). Moreover, “there is nothing remotely implausible about the\\n‘policy’ result the plain language dictates.” Id. at 1250 (“[W]e can easily imagine a\\nrational Congress . . . taking one of many possible intermediate positions by requiring\\nthose who wish to forego a mediated IDEA settlement to exhaust (or prove futile) all\\nof the administrative grievance processes available to them before bringing any\\nrelated federal lawsuit.”); see also Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001-02 (“By the time any\\ndispute reaches court, school authorities will have had a complete opportunity to\\nbring their expertise and judgment to bear on areas of disagreement.”).\\n\\n Although we have recognized the futility exception to administrative\\nexhaustion requirements, see J.B. ex rel. Bailey v. Avilla R-XIII Sch. Dist., 721 F.3d\\n588, 594 (8th Cir. 2013), we do not address its application here because Albright did\\nnot attempt to raise the issue before the district court. See Kountze ex rel. Hitchcock\\nFound. v. Gaines, 536 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 2008) (refusing to consider issue raised\\nfor the first time on appeal where the record on the claim was not developed below).\\nBecause we conclude that Albright’s claims are barred for failure to exhaust, we\\nlikewise do not address the District’s argument that those claims were released by the\\nsettlement agreements, nor Albright’s argument that the District breached the\\nsettlement agreements.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\f Finally, Albright appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the\\nDistrict on her claims of retaliation against herself and Child Doe in violation of\\n§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. We review de novo the district court’s grant of\\nsummary judgment. Anderson v. Durham D & M, L.L.C., 606 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir.\\n2010). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under § 504, Albright must show\\nthat she was “engaged in protected activity, the School District took some adverse\\naction, and a causal connection between the activity and the District’s action.”\\nBradley, 443 F.3d at 976.\\n\\n Albright argues that she provided evidence of twelve adverse actions taken\\nagainst her and three taken against Child Doe, in support of which she cites materials\\ncontained in her stricken summary judgment response. Moreover, many of her\\nallegations fall outside the due process period and have not been exhausted. The\\ndistrict court determined that Albright’s complaint raised only six allegations of harm\\nagainst her or Child Doe that were properly exhausted or did not require exhaustion.\\nThose six allegations were:\\n\\n (1) District personnel filed false allegations of child abuse against Ms.\\n Albright; (2) District personnel subjected Child Doe to strip searches for\\n recording devices that Ms. Albright had hidden on her; (3) Ms. Atkinson\\n generally endeavored to discredit Ms. Albright with District personnel\\n and filed false police reports against her; (4) Ms. Belk failed to\\n implement evidence-based practices when designing behavioral\\n interventions and strategies for Child Doe; (5) Child Doe was denied\\n access to remedial instruction on account of her disability; and (6) the\\n District held a meeting on September 5, 2014, at which the [D]istrict\\n attempted to change Child Doe’s IEP without Ms. Albright attending or\\n having been given notice.\\n\\nJuly 5 Order, at 21-22 (citations omitted). Having struck Albright’s summary\\njudgment response, the district court deemed admitted or undisputed all factual\\nassertions made by the District in support of its summary judgment motion.\\n\\n\\n -15-\\n\\f Albright’s first three allegations are refuted by the District’s undisputed factual\\nassertions that no false reports of child abuse were filed against Albright, that Child\\nDoe was never strip-searched, and that no false police reports were filed against\\nAlbright. The latter three allegations are simply restatements of Albright’s IDEA\\nclaims. Because of our decision that the District did not violate the IDEA, “a\\nretaliation suit under § 504 based on IDEA violations is precluded.” Bradley, 443\\nF.3d at 977. The District was thus entitled to summary judgment on Albright’s\\nretaliation claims.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -16-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2667,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4629229,"string":"4,629,229"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Trudale Raymond WILLIAMS, Defendant - Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Demario Jaqun Jefferson, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Trudale Raymond Williams"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1273; 18-1274"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Colloton, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1273\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Trudale Raymond Williams\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1274\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Demario Jaqun Jefferson\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\f Submitted: February 11, 2019\\n Filed: June 13, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Trudale Williams and Demario Jefferson appeal the sentences imposed by the\\ndistrict court1 after they each pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after being\\nconvicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We address Williams’s\\narguments first, then Jefferson’s, and we affirm both sentences.\\n\\n I\\n\\n Section 2K2.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines establishes the base offense\\nlevel for offenses committed under § 922(g)(1). The applicable base offense level is\\n24 “if the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to\\nsustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). At the time of sentencing, Williams had\\ntwo prior felony convictions: a 2009 conviction for simple robbery, in violation of\\nMinn. Stat. § 609.24, and a 2012 conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance\\nof a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In calculating his\\nbase offense level, the district court characterized the robbery conviction as a “crime\\nof violence” and the § 924(c)(1) conviction as a “controlled substance offense.”\\nWilliams objected to both characterizations, but the court overruled his objections\\nand sentenced him to 100 months of imprisonment, the bottom of the Guidelines\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\frange. On appeal, we review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime\\nof violence or controlled substance offense under the Guidelines. United States v.\\nTessmer, 659 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. Robertson,\\n474 F.3d 538, 540 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n A\\n\\n As Williams acknowledges, his argument that Minnesota robbery does not\\nqualify as a crime of violence under the Guidelines is foreclosed by precedent. We\\nhave previously held that Minnesota simple robbery meets the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act’s (ACCA) definition of “violent felony” under the force clause. See\\nUnited States v. Pettis, 888 F.3d 962, 964–66 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.\\n1258 (2019). Because the ACCA’s force clause is nearly identical to the force clause\\ncontained in the Guidelines’ definition of crime of violence, we construe the clauses\\ninterchangeably. United States v. Hall, 877 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2017), cert.\\ndenied, 139 S. Ct. 1254 (2019). Thus, Williams’s 2009 robbery conviction is a crime\\nof violence. See United States v. Robinson, No. 18-1420, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. June\\n10, 2019) (per curiam); United States v. Bjerke, 744 F. App’x 319, 322 (8th Cir.\\n2018) (per curiam), cert. denied, No. 18-6993, 2019 WL 2078123 (U.S. May 13,\\n2019).\\n\\n B\\n\\n The more complex issue is whether Williams’s 2012 conviction under\\n§ 924(c)(1) qualifies as a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines. A\\ncontrolled substance offense is “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by\\nimprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import,\\nexport, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit\\nsubstance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)\\nwith intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” USSG\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f§ 4B1.2(b); see id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1 (incorporating this definition). To determine\\nwhether a prior conviction meets this definition, we apply the “categorical approach,”\\nunder which we look to the elements of the crime of conviction rather than how a\\nparticular defendant might have committed the offense. United States v. Robinson,\\n639 F.3d 489, 495 (8th Cir. 2011). Where a statute is “divisible,” that is, lists\\nmultiple elements in the alternative and “thereby define[s] multiple crimes,” we apply\\nthe “modified categorical approach,” examining a limited class of\\ndocuments—including the indictment, jury instructions, plea agreement, and plea\\ncolloquy—to determine which crime the defendant was convicted of. Mathis v.\\nUnited States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). We can then compare the elements of\\nthat crime to the Guidelines’ definition.\\n\\n To determine whether a statute is divisible, “we ascertain ‘which words or\\nphrases in the statute are elements of the crime,’ as opposed to the means, or specific\\nfacts, of satisfying these elements.” United States v. McMillan, 863 F.3d 1053, 1056\\n(8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Headbird, 832 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir.\\n2016)). “The elements of a crime ‘are what the jury must find beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt to convict the defendant; and at a plea hearing, they are what the defendant\\nnecessarily admits when he pleads guilty.’” Id. (quoting Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248).\\n“When analyzing which words or phrases of a statute form the elements of a crime,\\ncourts may look to the statute of prior conviction, . . . court decisions, and, as a last\\nresort, ‘the record of a prior conviction itself.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Mathis, 136 S.\\nCt. at 2256).\\n\\n Section 924(c)(1) applies to “any person who, during and in relation to any\\ncrime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be\\nprosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in\\nfurtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” Thus, to violate § 924(c)(1), the\\ndefendant must have committed either a “crime of violence” or a “drug trafficking\\ncrime.” We have previously concluded that these terms are alternative elements of\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f§ 924(c)(1), rather than means. United States v. Boman, 873 F.3d 1035, 1041 (8th\\nCir. 2017). In Williams’s case, this means that he “necessarily admitted” that he\\ncommitted a drug trafficking crime when he pleaded guilty to violating § 924(c)(1).\\nId. (quoting Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2255). The term “drug trafficking crime” means\\n“any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.),\\nthe Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter\\n705 of title 46.” § 924(c)(2). This definition is quite broad, and even the government\\nacknowledges that some felonies within it may not meet the Guidelines’ definition\\nof a controlled substance offense. Williams argues that these underlying felonies are\\nmerely alternative means of committing a drug trafficking crime and that he did not\\nadmit to committing any particular underlying felony when he pleaded guilty to\\nviolating § 924(c)(1).\\n\\n We disagree. Our case law indicates that the underlying felony is an element\\nof—not merely a means of committing—the § 924(c)(1) offense. To prove a\\nviolation of § 924(c)(1), “the jury . . . must find that the defendant committed all the\\nacts necessary to be subject to punishment for the underlying offense.” Boman, 873\\nF.3d at 1041 (cleaned up); see Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014)\\n(noting that a § 924(c) conviction requires the prosecutor to “prove the commission\\nof a predicate (violent or drug trafficking) offense”). Even if the underlying felony\\nis not separately charged, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the\\nelements of that offense to sustain the § 924(c)(1) conviction. See Myers v. United\\nStates, 993 F.2d 171, 172 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). This makes the specific\\nunderlying felony an element of the § 924(c)(1) offense. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at\\n2250.2\\n\\n 2\\n The Guidelines Commentary accompanying the definition of controlled\\nsubstance offense is consistent with this approach. It clarifies that a § 924(c) offense\\nqualifies as a controlled substance offense if the underlying felony meets the\\ndefinition of a controlled substance offense. USSG § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. That\\ninstruction necessarily requires a reviewing court to examine the record of conviction\\nto determine the nature of the underlying felony using the modified categorical\\napproach.\\n -5-\\n\\f Williams’s record of conviction confirms that the underlying felony is an\\nelement of the § 924(c)(1) offense. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. Williams’s\\nindictment alleged that he “did knowingly use and carry a firearm during and in\\nrelation to [a] drug trafficking crime . . . namely, conspiracy to distribute controlled\\nsubstances.” Thus, when Williams pleaded guilty, he did not admit to committing\\njust any drug trafficking crime; he conceded guilt as to a particular underlying\\nfelony. This reaffirms our conclusion that the felony is an element of § 924(c)(1).\\nSee Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257. Accordingly, the modified categorical approach\\napplies.\\n\\n Applying the modified categorical approach, we conclude that Williams’s\\nconviction meets the definition of a controlled substance offense. Williams’s\\nunderlying felony was conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, which is a\\ncontrolled substance offense. See United States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691,\\n694 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Because his underlying felony qualifies as a controlled\\nsubstance offense, his conviction under § 924(c)(1) does too. USSG § 4B1.2(b) cmt.\\nn.1. The district court accordingly committed no procedural error in calculating\\nWilliams’s base offense level.\\n\\n II\\n\\n Jefferson did not object to his Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months of\\nimprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release of one to three years, but\\nasked for a downward variance to 60 months. The district court imposed a 70-month\\nsentence and a three-year term of supervised release. He appeals his sentence as\\nsubstantively unreasonable and argues that his period of supervised release is\\nunconstitutional. We review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Clayton, 828\\nF.3d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 2016). “A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it fails to\\nconsider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives\\nsignificant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fappropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”\\nUnited States v. Cook, 698 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.\\nWatson, 480 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 2007)). Because Jefferson’s sentence was\\nwithin the Guidelines range, it is entitled to a “presumption of reasonableness.” Rita\\nv. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).\\n\\n Jefferson argues that the district court failed to properly weigh his mitigating\\npersonal history. At sentencing, the district court acknowledged Jefferson’s\\nmitigating circumstances. The court concluded, however, that these were\\ncounterbalanced by several aggravating factors, including Jefferson’s participation\\nin “a very dangerous, violent gang” and his “pretty lengthy criminal history.” Under\\nthese circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Jefferson to\\na period of incarceration at the bottom of the Guidelines range. And it was neither\\nunconstitutional nor an abuse of discretion to impose a three-year term of supervised\\nrelease.\\n\\n III\\n\\n For the reasons stated above, we affirm both sentences.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406482/\", \"author_raw\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629229/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Trudale Raymond WILLIAMS, Defendant - Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Demario Jaqun Jefferson, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-13\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1273\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Trudale Raymond Williams\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1274\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Demario Jaqun Jefferson\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeals from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\n ____________\n\f Submitted: February 11, 2019\n Filed: June 13, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\n\n Trudale Williams and Demario Jefferson appeal the sentences imposed by the\ndistrict court1 after they each pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after being\nconvicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We address Williams’s\narguments first, then Jefferson’s, and we affirm both sentences.\n\n I\n\n Section 2K2.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines establishes the base offense\nlevel for offenses committed under § 922(g)(1). The applicable base offense level is\n24 “if the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to\nsustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\nsubstance offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). At the time of sentencing, Williams had\ntwo prior felony convictions: a 2009 conviction for simple robbery, in violation of\nMinn. Stat. § 609.24, and a 2012 conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance\nof a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In calculating his\nbase offense level, the district court characterized the robbery conviction as a “crime\nof violence” and the § 924(c)(1) conviction as a “controlled substance offense.”\nWilliams objected to both characterizations, but the court overruled his objections\nand sentenced him to 100 months of imprisonment, the bottom of the Guidelines\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the\nDistrict of Minnesota.\n\n -2-\n\frange. On appeal, we review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime\nof violence or controlled substance offense under the Guidelines. United States v.\nTessmer, 659 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. Robertson,\n474 F.3d 538, 540 (8th Cir. 2007).\n\n A\n\n As Williams acknowledges, his argument that Minnesota robbery does not\nqualify as a crime of violence under the Guidelines is foreclosed by precedent. We\nhave previously held that Minnesota simple robbery meets the Armed Career\nCriminal Act’s (ACCA) definition of “violent felony” under the force clause. See\nUnited States v. Pettis, 888 F.3d 962, 964–66 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.\n1258 (2019). Because the ACCA’s force clause is nearly identical to the force clause\ncontained in the Guidelines’ definition of crime of violence, we construe the clauses\ninterchangeably. United States v. Hall, 877 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2017), cert.\ndenied, 139 S. Ct. 1254 (2019). Thus, Williams’s 2009 robbery conviction is a crime\nof violence. See United States v. Robinson, No. 18-1420, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. June\n10, 2019) (per curiam); United States v. Bjerke, 744 F. App’x 319, 322 (8th Cir.\n2018) (per curiam), cert. denied, No. 18-6993, 2019 WL 2078123 (U.S. May 13,\n2019).\n\n B\n\n The more complex issue is whether Williams’s 2012 conviction under\n§ 924(c)(1) qualifies as a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines. A\ncontrolled substance offense is “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by\nimprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import,\nexport, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit\nsubstance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)\nwith intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” USSG\n\n -3-\n\f§ 4B1.2(b); see id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1 (incorporating this definition). To determine\nwhether a prior conviction meets this definition, we apply the “categorical approach,”\nunder which we look to the elements of the crime of conviction rather than how a\nparticular defendant might have committed the offense. United States v. Robinson,\n639 F.3d 489, 495 (8th Cir. 2011). Where a statute is “divisible,” that is, lists\nmultiple elements in the alternative and “thereby define[s] multiple crimes,” we apply\nthe “modified categorical approach,” examining a limited class of\ndocuments—including the indictment, jury instructions, plea agreement, and plea\ncolloquy—to determine which crime the defendant was convicted of. Mathis v.\nUnited States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). We can then compare the elements of\nthat crime to the Guidelines’ definition.\n\n To determine whether a statute is divisible, “we ascertain ‘which words or\nphrases in the statute are elements of the crime,’ as opposed to the means, or specific\nfacts, of satisfying these elements.” United States v. McMillan, 863 F.3d 1053, 1056\n(8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Headbird, 832 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir.\n2016)). “The elements of a crime ‘are what the jury must find beyond a reasonable\ndoubt to convict the defendant; and at a plea hearing, they are what the defendant\nnecessarily admits when he pleads guilty.’” Id. (quoting Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248).\n“When analyzing which words or phrases of a statute form the elements of a crime,\ncourts may look to the statute of prior conviction, . . . court decisions, and, as a last\nresort, ‘the record of a prior conviction itself.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Mathis, 136 S.\nCt. at 2256).\n\n Section 924(c)(1) applies to “any person who, during and in relation to any\ncrime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be\nprosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in\nfurtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” Thus, to violate § 924(c)(1), the\ndefendant must have committed either a “crime of violence” or a “drug trafficking\ncrime.” We have previously concluded that these terms are alternative elements of\n\n -4-\n\f§ 924(c)(1), rather than means. United States v. Boman, 873 F.3d 1035, 1041 (8th\nCir. 2017). In Williams’s case, this means that he “necessarily admitted” that he\ncommitted a drug trafficking crime when he pleaded guilty to violating § 924(c)(1).\nId. (quoting Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2255). The term “drug trafficking crime” means\n“any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.),\nthe Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter\n705 of title 46.” § 924(c)(2). This definition is quite broad, and even the government\nacknowledges that some felonies within it may not meet the Guidelines’ definition\nof a controlled substance offense. Williams argues that these underlying felonies are\nmerely alternative means of committing a drug trafficking crime and that he did not\nadmit to committing any particular underlying felony when he pleaded guilty to\nviolating § 924(c)(1).\n\n We disagree. Our case law indicates that the underlying felony is an element\nof—not merely a means of committing—the § 924(c)(1) offense. To prove a\nviolation of § 924(c)(1), “the jury . . . must find that the defendant committed all the\nacts necessary to be subject to punishment for the underlying offense.” Boman, 873\nF.3d at 1041 (cleaned up); see Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014)\n(noting that a § 924(c) conviction requires the prosecutor to “prove the commission\nof a predicate (violent or drug trafficking) offense”). Even if the underlying felony\nis not separately charged, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the\nelements of that offense to sustain the § 924(c)(1) conviction. See Myers v. United\nStates, 993 F.2d 171, 172 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). This makes the specific\nunderlying felony an element of the § 924(c)(1) offense. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at\n2250.2\n\n 2\n The Guidelines Commentary accompanying the definition of controlled\nsubstance offense is consistent with this approach. It clarifies that a § 924(c) offense\nqualifies as a controlled substance offense if the underlying felony meets the\ndefinition of a controlled substance offense. USSG § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. That\ninstruction necessarily requires a reviewing court to examine the record of conviction\nto determine the nature of the underlying felony using the modified categorical\napproach.\n -5-\n\f Williams’s record of conviction confirms that the underlying felony is an\nelement of the § 924(c)(1) offense. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. Williams’s\nindictment alleged that he “did knowingly use and carry a firearm during and in\nrelation to [a] drug trafficking crime . . . namely, conspiracy to distribute controlled\nsubstances.” Thus, when Williams pleaded guilty, he did not admit to committing\njust any drug trafficking crime; he conceded guilt as to a particular underlying\nfelony. This reaffirms our conclusion that the felony is an element of § 924(c)(1).\nSee Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257. Accordingly, the modified categorical approach\napplies.\n\n Applying the modified categorical approach, we conclude that Williams’s\nconviction meets the definition of a controlled substance offense. Williams’s\nunderlying felony was conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, which is a\ncontrolled substance offense. See United States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691,\n694 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Because his underlying felony qualifies as a controlled\nsubstance offense, his conviction under § 924(c)(1) does too. USSG § 4B1.2(b) cmt.\nn.1. The district court accordingly committed no procedural error in calculating\nWilliams’s base offense level.\n\n II\n\n Jefferson did not object to his Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months of\nimprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release of one to three years, but\nasked for a downward variance to 60 months. The district court imposed a 70-month\nsentence and a three-year term of supervised release. He appeals his sentence as\nsubstantively unreasonable and argues that his period of supervised release is\nunconstitutional. We review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Clayton, 828\nF.3d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 2016). “A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it fails to\nconsider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives\nsignificant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the\n\n -6-\n\fappropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”\nUnited States v. Cook, 698 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.\nWatson, 480 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 2007)). Because Jefferson’s sentence was\nwithin the Guidelines range, it is entitled to a “presumption of reasonableness.” Rita\nv. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).\n\n Jefferson argues that the district court failed to properly weigh his mitigating\npersonal history. At sentencing, the district court acknowledged Jefferson’s\nmitigating circumstances. The court concluded, however, that these were\ncounterbalanced by several aggravating factors, including Jefferson’s participation\nin “a very dangerous, violent gang” and his “pretty lengthy criminal history.” Under\nthese circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Jefferson to\na period of incarceration at the bottom of the Guidelines range. And it was neither\nunconstitutional nor an abuse of discretion to impose a three-year term of supervised\nrelease.\n\n III\n\n For the reasons stated above, we affirm both sentences.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Trudale Raymond WILLIAMS, Defendant - Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Demario Jaqun Jefferson, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1273\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Trudale Raymond Williams\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1274\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Demario Jaqun Jefferson\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\f Submitted: February 11, 2019\\n Filed: June 13, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Trudale Williams and Demario Jefferson appeal the sentences imposed by the\\ndistrict court1 after they each pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after being\\nconvicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We address Williams’s\\narguments first, then Jefferson’s, and we affirm both sentences.\\n\\n I\\n\\n Section 2K2.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines establishes the base offense\\nlevel for offenses committed under § 922(g)(1). The applicable base offense level is\\n24 “if the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to\\nsustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). At the time of sentencing, Williams had\\ntwo prior felony convictions: a 2009 conviction for simple robbery, in violation of\\nMinn. Stat. § 609.24, and a 2012 conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance\\nof a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In calculating his\\nbase offense level, the district court characterized the robbery conviction as a “crime\\nof violence” and the § 924(c)(1) conviction as a “controlled substance offense.”\\nWilliams objected to both characterizations, but the court overruled his objections\\nand sentenced him to 100 months of imprisonment, the bottom of the Guidelines\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\frange. On appeal, we review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime\\nof violence or controlled substance offense under the Guidelines. United States v.\\nTessmer, 659 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. Robertson,\\n474 F.3d 538, 540 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n A\\n\\n As Williams acknowledges, his argument that Minnesota robbery does not\\nqualify as a crime of violence under the Guidelines is foreclosed by precedent. We\\nhave previously held that Minnesota simple robbery meets the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act’s (ACCA) definition of “violent felony” under the force clause. See\\nUnited States v. Pettis, 888 F.3d 962, 964–66 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.\\n1258 (2019). Because the ACCA’s force clause is nearly identical to the force clause\\ncontained in the Guidelines’ definition of crime of violence, we construe the clauses\\ninterchangeably. United States v. Hall, 877 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2017), cert.\\ndenied, 139 S. Ct. 1254 (2019). Thus, Williams’s 2009 robbery conviction is a crime\\nof violence. See United States v. Robinson, No. 18-1420, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. June\\n10, 2019) (per curiam); United States v. Bjerke, 744 F. App’x 319, 322 (8th Cir.\\n2018) (per curiam), cert. denied, No. 18-6993, 2019 WL 2078123 (U.S. May 13,\\n2019).\\n\\n B\\n\\n The more complex issue is whether Williams’s 2012 conviction under\\n§ 924(c)(1) qualifies as a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines. A\\ncontrolled substance offense is “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by\\nimprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import,\\nexport, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit\\nsubstance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)\\nwith intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” USSG\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f§ 4B1.2(b); see id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1 (incorporating this definition). To determine\\nwhether a prior conviction meets this definition, we apply the “categorical approach,”\\nunder which we look to the elements of the crime of conviction rather than how a\\nparticular defendant might have committed the offense. United States v. Robinson,\\n639 F.3d 489, 495 (8th Cir. 2011). Where a statute is “divisible,” that is, lists\\nmultiple elements in the alternative and “thereby define[s] multiple crimes,” we apply\\nthe “modified categorical approach,” examining a limited class of\\ndocuments—including the indictment, jury instructions, plea agreement, and plea\\ncolloquy—to determine which crime the defendant was convicted of. Mathis v.\\nUnited States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). We can then compare the elements of\\nthat crime to the Guidelines’ definition.\\n\\n To determine whether a statute is divisible, “we ascertain ‘which words or\\nphrases in the statute are elements of the crime,’ as opposed to the means, or specific\\nfacts, of satisfying these elements.” United States v. McMillan, 863 F.3d 1053, 1056\\n(8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Headbird, 832 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir.\\n2016)). “The elements of a crime ‘are what the jury must find beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt to convict the defendant; and at a plea hearing, they are what the defendant\\nnecessarily admits when he pleads guilty.’” Id. (quoting Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248).\\n“When analyzing which words or phrases of a statute form the elements of a crime,\\ncourts may look to the statute of prior conviction, . . . court decisions, and, as a last\\nresort, ‘the record of a prior conviction itself.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Mathis, 136 S.\\nCt. at 2256).\\n\\n Section 924(c)(1) applies to “any person who, during and in relation to any\\ncrime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be\\nprosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in\\nfurtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” Thus, to violate § 924(c)(1), the\\ndefendant must have committed either a “crime of violence” or a “drug trafficking\\ncrime.” We have previously concluded that these terms are alternative elements of\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f§ 924(c)(1), rather than means. United States v. Boman, 873 F.3d 1035, 1041 (8th\\nCir. 2017). In Williams’s case, this means that he “necessarily admitted” that he\\ncommitted a drug trafficking crime when he pleaded guilty to violating § 924(c)(1).\\nId. (quoting Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2255). The term “drug trafficking crime” means\\n“any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.),\\nthe Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter\\n705 of title 46.” § 924(c)(2). This definition is quite broad, and even the government\\nacknowledges that some felonies within it may not meet the Guidelines’ definition\\nof a controlled substance offense. Williams argues that these underlying felonies are\\nmerely alternative means of committing a drug trafficking crime and that he did not\\nadmit to committing any particular underlying felony when he pleaded guilty to\\nviolating § 924(c)(1).\\n\\n We disagree. Our case law indicates that the underlying felony is an element\\nof—not merely a means of committing—the § 924(c)(1) offense. To prove a\\nviolation of § 924(c)(1), “the jury . . . must find that the defendant committed all the\\nacts necessary to be subject to punishment for the underlying offense.” Boman, 873\\nF.3d at 1041 (cleaned up); see Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014)\\n(noting that a § 924(c) conviction requires the prosecutor to “prove the commission\\nof a predicate (violent or drug trafficking) offense”). Even if the underlying felony\\nis not separately charged, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the\\nelements of that offense to sustain the § 924(c)(1) conviction. See Myers v. United\\nStates, 993 F.2d 171, 172 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). This makes the specific\\nunderlying felony an element of the § 924(c)(1) offense. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at\\n2250.2\\n\\n 2\\n The Guidelines Commentary accompanying the definition of controlled\\nsubstance offense is consistent with this approach. It clarifies that a § 924(c) offense\\nqualifies as a controlled substance offense if the underlying felony meets the\\ndefinition of a controlled substance offense. USSG § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. That\\ninstruction necessarily requires a reviewing court to examine the record of conviction\\nto determine the nature of the underlying felony using the modified categorical\\napproach.\\n -5-\\n\\f Williams’s record of conviction confirms that the underlying felony is an\\nelement of the § 924(c)(1) offense. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. Williams’s\\nindictment alleged that he “did knowingly use and carry a firearm during and in\\nrelation to [a] drug trafficking crime . . . namely, conspiracy to distribute controlled\\nsubstances.” Thus, when Williams pleaded guilty, he did not admit to committing\\njust any drug trafficking crime; he conceded guilt as to a particular underlying\\nfelony. This reaffirms our conclusion that the felony is an element of § 924(c)(1).\\nSee Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257. Accordingly, the modified categorical approach\\napplies.\\n\\n Applying the modified categorical approach, we conclude that Williams’s\\nconviction meets the definition of a controlled substance offense. Williams’s\\nunderlying felony was conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, which is a\\ncontrolled substance offense. See United States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691,\\n694 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Because his underlying felony qualifies as a controlled\\nsubstance offense, his conviction under § 924(c)(1) does too. USSG § 4B1.2(b) cmt.\\nn.1. The district court accordingly committed no procedural error in calculating\\nWilliams’s base offense level.\\n\\n II\\n\\n Jefferson did not object to his Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months of\\nimprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release of one to three years, but\\nasked for a downward variance to 60 months. The district court imposed a 70-month\\nsentence and a three-year term of supervised release. He appeals his sentence as\\nsubstantively unreasonable and argues that his period of supervised release is\\nunconstitutional. We review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Clayton, 828\\nF.3d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 2016). “A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it fails to\\nconsider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives\\nsignificant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fappropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”\\nUnited States v. Cook, 698 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.\\nWatson, 480 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 2007)). Because Jefferson’s sentence was\\nwithin the Guidelines range, it is entitled to a “presumption of reasonableness.” Rita\\nv. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).\\n\\n Jefferson argues that the district court failed to properly weigh his mitigating\\npersonal history. At sentencing, the district court acknowledged Jefferson’s\\nmitigating circumstances. The court concluded, however, that these were\\ncounterbalanced by several aggravating factors, including Jefferson’s participation\\nin “a very dangerous, violent gang” and his “pretty lengthy criminal history.” Under\\nthese circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Jefferson to\\na period of incarceration at the bottom of the Guidelines range. And it was neither\\nunconstitutional nor an abuse of discretion to impose a three-year term of supervised\\nrelease.\\n\\n III\\n\\n For the reasons stated above, we affirm both sentences.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2668,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4629233,"string":"4,629,233"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Chase Logan GUZMAN, Defendant-Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Justin Thomas Morales, Also Known as Speedy, Defendant-Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Chase Logan Guzman"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1506; 18-2202"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Colloton, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1506\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Chase Logan Guzman\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2202\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJustin Thomas Morales, also known as Speedy\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\nfor the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls\\n ____________\\n\\f Submitted: February 13, 2019\\n Filed: June 13, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n As part of an investigation of large-scale methamphetamine trafficking, law\\nenforcement officers pulled over Justin Morales and Chase Guzman in a traffic stop\\nand found a pound of marijuana and a firearm on Guzman. Officers obtained a search\\nwarrant and subsequently found more marijuana and two pounds of methampheta-\\nmine inside a home connected to the trafficking. Morales and Guzman were indicted\\non one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, and Guzman was indicted\\non one count of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking\\ncrime. After the district court1 denied their respective motions to suppress evidence,\\nGuzman conditionally pleaded guilty to both counts and Morales proceeded to trial\\nwhere the jury found him guilty. Defendants separately appeal the district court’s\\ndenial of their motions to suppress and raise various sentencing and evidentiary\\nissues. We consolidated the appeals, and for the reasons explained below, we affirm.\\n\\n I\\n\\n At the suppression hearing, various law enforcement officers testified to the\\nfollowing facts. In March 2016, a confidential informant (CI) told agents from the\\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that Morales would be\\ntrafficking firearms and large quantities of methamphetamine from Wichita, Kansas,\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District\\nof South Dakota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and the surrounding area. According to the CI, Morales\\nasked him to help with the transportation and local distribution of the drugs. ATF\\nSpecial Agents Emmet Warkenthien and Brent Fair opened an investigation.\\n\\n Over the next several months, ATF agents amassed evidence of Morales’s\\nmethamphetamine trafficking. The agents recorded more than forty phone calls\\nbetween the CI and Morales discussing methamphetamine “buys.” Some of these\\npurchases came to fruition. In April 2016, for instance, ATF agents arranged for the\\nCI to conduct a controlled buy of approximately four ounces of methamphetamine\\nfrom Morales in exchange for $5,000.\\n\\n In the early morning hours of September 22, 2016, the CI contacted Warkenthi-\\nen with information that would lead to Morales’s and Guzman’s arrests later that day.\\nThe CI told Warkenthien that Morales and Guzman had arrived in Sioux Falls from\\nWitchita to sell methamphetamine and marijuana. The CI relayed that Morales and\\nGuzman were staying at the Days Inn hotel in Sioux Falls and that the CI planned to\\nmeet with Morales that morning to discuss the CI’s involvement in the drug\\ntrafficking. Fair drove to the Days Inn to set up surveillance.\\n\\n As anticipated, the CI spent a large part of the morning meeting with Morales\\nand Guzman at the Days Inn and some area businesses. The CI recorded many of the\\ngroup’s conversations. In one of these conversations, Morales told the CI that he was\\nstoring two pounds of methamphetamine and three pounds of marijuana at the home\\nof Jerri Young Running Crane in Sioux Falls. Morales also told the CI that he had\\na 9mm Glock 19 semiautomatic pistol that Guzman intended to “take with him” for\\n“protection” during drug sales.\\n\\n While stationed at the Days Inn parking lot that morning, Fair observed two\\npeople get out of a Kansas-plated minivan registered to Jacqueline Morales and get\\ninto the CI’s vehicle. Fair personally identified one of the individuals as Justin\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fMorales based on photos that he had seen previously. Other agents also stationed at\\nthe hotel identified the other individual as Guzman and communicated that\\ninformation via radio to the rest of the investigation team. Morales, Guzman, and the\\nCI left the Days Inn parking lot but returned sometime later, still in the CI’s vehicle.\\nAll three individuals exited the CI’s vehicle and accessed a Kansas-plated pickup\\ntruck registered to Guzman. Agents then saw Morales and Guzman get into the\\nminivan and drive off.\\n\\n Guzman and Morales drove to Young Running Crane’s home, where agents\\nhad also set up surveillance. An agent positively identified Morales and Guzman\\ngetting out of the minivan and entering the home. Some time later, Sioux Falls\\nNarcotics Detective Adam Buiter observed Morales and Guzman—both of whom he\\nidentified based on pictures he had previously seen—exit the home and get into the\\nminivan once more. Buiter relayed this information to the rest of the investigation\\nteam.\\n\\n The minivan left Young Running Crane’s home, and several members of the\\nsurveillance team followed in unmarked cars. The minivan’s “circuitous” driving\\naround area businesses made the agents concerned that their surveillance had been,\\nor soon would be, detected. So they decided to enlist the assistance of the South\\nDakota Highway Patrol to conduct a “ruse” stop of the vehicle in a marked patrol car\\nbased on the evidence of drugs and firearms they had already collected that day. The\\nintent of such a stop is to maintain the appearance of an everyday traffic stop so as\\nto not alert subjects of a narcotics investigation that they may soon be arrested, and\\nto minimize dangers that may arise when armed suspects are stopped by unmarked\\nlaw enforcement vehicles.\\n\\n Detective Dan Christiansen, who was part of the surveillance team, contacted\\nState Trooper Andrew Steen to assist with the stop. Christiansen told Steen that the\\nminivan’s occupants possessed drugs and firearms. Steen was instructed that he did\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fnot have wait to develop his own probable cause for a traffic violation before\\nstopping the minivan but that he should make the stop look routine.\\n\\n Steen stopped the minivan, and Sioux Falls Police Officer Jason Christensen\\narrived to provide assistance. Steen approached the driver’s side and Christensen\\napproached the passenger’s side. Steen falsely told Morales, who was driving, that\\nhis brake light was out and asked him to step out of the vehicle. For his part,\\nChristensen asked Guzman, who was sitting in the passenger seat, also to exit. When\\nGuzman obliged, Christensen saw a small plastic bag containing marijuana between\\nthe passenger seat and the doorsill. The officers placed Morales and Guzman in\\nhandcuffs. Steen and Christensen searched the minivan and found a pound of\\nmarijuana, various cell phones, cash, and a small digital scale that tested positive for\\nmethamphetamine. Searches of Guzman’s person revealed a loaded Glock 19,\\napproximately 29 grams of methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia.\\n\\n Based on this evidence, Warkenthien obtained a search warrant for, among\\nother things, Young Running Crane’s home and the Kansas-plated pickup truck\\nregistered to Guzman. A search of the home produced two pounds of marijuana and\\ntwo pounds of methamphetamine. In the pickup truck, law enforcement officers\\nfound ammunition for the Glock 19.\\n\\n A superseding indictment charged Guzman and Morales with one count of\\nconspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. It also charged Guzman with one count of using or\\ncarrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).\\n\\n On appeal, both defendants challenge the district court’s denial of their\\nrespective motions to suppress and raise various sentencing issues. Morales also\\nchallenges one of the district court’s pretrial evidentiary rulings. We address the\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fdistrict court’s denial of the motions to suppress first, followed by Guzman’s\\nsentencing challenge and Morales’s evidentiary and sentencing arguments.\\n\\n II\\n\\n “We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo but the underlying\\nfactual determinations for clear error, giving due weight to inferences drawn by law\\nenforcement officials.” United States v. Walker, 840 F.3d 477, 483 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(quoting United States v. Hurd, 785 F.3d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 2015)). “To conclude\\nthat findings of fact are clearly erroneous, the court’s review of the record should\\nleave a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,” and “the appellate\\ncourt should give particular deference to findings based upon credibility determina-\\ntions.” Prince v. Sargent, 960 F.2d 720, 720–21 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). We\\nwill affirm the denial of a motion to suppress unless the decision “is unsupported by\\nsubstantial evidence, is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or it is clear,\\nbased on the entire record, that a mistake was made.” Walker, 840 F.3d at 483.\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their\\npersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”\\nU.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure and therefore must be\\nsupported at least by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Givens, 763 F.3d 987,\\n989 (8th Cir. 2014). Reasonable suspicion exists “when a law enforcement officer\\nhas ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped\\nof criminal activity.’” Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). In deciding whether there is\\nreasonable suspicion, “an officer may rely on information provided by other officers\\nas well as any information known to the team of officers conducting the investiga-\\ntion.” United States v. Mora-Higuera, 269 F.3d 905, 910 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Thomas, 249 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2001)); see also Navarette, 134\\nS. Ct. at 1688.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f Morales and Guzman argue that Steen’s stop of the minivan violated their\\nFourth Amendment rights and that all evidence obtained as a result of that stop must\\nbe suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. They contend that they were not\\nspecifically identified as the occupants of the van before the stop, depriving Steen of\\nreasonable suspicion to believe the minivan’s occupants were engaged in criminal\\nactivity. The district court found that before agents directed Steen to stop the\\nminivan, they had “positive[ly] identifi[ed] that the occupants of the grey van were\\nin fact [Morales] and [Guzman].” This finding of fact is amply supported by the\\nrecord.\\n\\n Fair’s and Buiter’s testimony at the suppression hearing established that agents\\nidentified Morales and Guzman at various points throughout the day and specifically\\nas the two defendants drove away from Young Running Crane’s home shortly before\\nSteen’s traffic stop. According to Fair, immediately before Morales and Guzman\\ndrove to the home from the Days Inn parking lot, agents identified Morales and\\nGuzman getting into the minivan. When the minivan arrived at the home, another\\nagent identified Morales and Guzman as exiting the minivan and entering the\\nresidence. Finally, Buiter personally saw Morales and Guzman—both of whom he\\npositively identified—exit the home and get into the minivan once more, information\\nhe communicated to the rest of the surveillance team before Steen was directed to\\nmake the stop.\\n\\n In essence, Morales and Guzman ask us on appeal to disbelieve the agents’\\ntestimony, but as we have stated many times, “[a] credibility determination made by\\na district court after a hearing on the merits of a motion to suppress is ‘virtually\\nunassailable on appeal.’” United States v. Frencher, 503 F.3d 701, 701 (8th Cir.\\n2007) (quoting United States v. Guel-Contreras, 468 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2006)).\\nAccordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that law enforcement\\nofficers knew that Morales and Guzman were inside the minivan before it was\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fstopped.2 We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of each defendant’s motion\\nto suppress.\\n\\n III\\n\\n Guzman’s advisory range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was 135 to 168\\nmonths’ imprisonment for the drug offense, subject to a 120-month statutory\\nmandatory minimum. His firearms offense subjected him to an additional mandatory\\nminimum sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively as\\nrequired by statute.3 At sentencing, Guzman urged the district court to apply the\\n“rationale” of Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017), to vary below the\\n120-month mandatory minimum sentence on the drug offense by taking into account\\nthat he must additionally serve the 60-month sentence for the firearms offense. The\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Without much meaningful analysis, Morales and Guzman also contend that\\neven if they were positively identified as occupying the van before the stop, Steen\\nstill lacked reasonable suspicion to stop them. They do not dispute that Steen learned\\nthe details of the investigation from Christiansen, so we construe their argument to\\nbe that the facts Steen knew were legally insufficient to support reasonable suspicion.\\nWe reject that argument. The information provided by the CI (much of which was\\ncorroborated by the investigation team), the controlled buy between Morales and CI,\\nthe recorded conversations between the two, and the investigation team’s own\\nobservations gave Steen reasonable suspicion to believe Morales and Guzman were\\nengaged in drug-related criminal activity. See, e.g., Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687–92\\n(reaffirming the well-established rule that even the statements of an anonymous\\ntipster can provide reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of a car);\\nUnited States v. Caswell, 436 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that an\\nofficer may use a reliable confidential informant’s tip to establish the more\\ndemanding standard of probable cause).\\n 3\\n Under § 924(c), a separate term of imprisonment must be imposed where the\\ndefendant, “during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries\\na firearm.” This separate term is “in addition to the punishment provided for such\\n. . . drug trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); see also id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fdistrict court rejected Guzman’s argument but varied downward to the statutory\\nminimum on the drug offense and imposed a total sentence of 180 months.\\n\\n On appeal, Guzman argues that the district court misinterpreted Dean in\\nconcluding that the court lacked the authority to vary below the statutory minimum\\non the drug offense. The government counters that Guzman’s challenge is barred by\\nthe appeal waiver in his plea agreement. Guzman acknowledges that his plea\\nagreement waived “his right to appeal any non-jurisdictional issues,” except, as\\nrelevant here, a sentencing decision involving an upward departure or upward\\nvariance. But he contends that the government forfeited its right to enforce the appeal\\nwaiver by failing to object at the district court when Guzman “preserve[d]” the Dean\\nissue for appeal.\\n\\n Courts seem to disagree on whether the government forfeits its right to enforce\\nan appeal waiver if it fails to object before the district court to a defendant’s intent to\\nappeal or the district court’s advisement that the defendant retains the right to appeal.\\nCompare United States v. Alford, 147 F. App’x 45, 49 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding\\nthat the government did not forfeit right, as “the district court does not decide the\\neffect of any waiver on appellate rights—[the court of appeals] does”), with United\\nStates v. Mercado, 525 F. App’x 574, 575 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he government\\nforfeited its right to enforce the waiver by failing to object to the district court’s\\nunqualified advisement that [defendant] retained the right to appeal the court’s\\njudgment.”). We decline to weigh in here, because, assuming for the sake of\\nargument that the government forfeited its right to enforce the appeal waiver,\\nGuzman’s sentencing challenge fails on the merits.\\n\\n Contrary to Guzman’s contentions, Dean does not authorize district courts to\\nimpose a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum. Dean merely held that\\ncourts can consider the § 924(c) mandatory consecutive sentence when deciding\\nwhether to vary downward from the Guidelines range applicable to the other counts\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fof conviction. 137 S. Ct. at 1176–77. Therefore, Dean has no application here. We\\naccordingly affirm Guzman’s sentence.\\n\\n IV\\n\\n A\\n\\n Morales first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion under Federal\\nRules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 to exclude at trial evidence of uncharged conduct,\\nspecifically, that he possessed, used, accessed, or sold marijuana and firearms. The\\ndistrict court agreed with the government that evidence referencing Guzman’s Glock\\n19 and a different gun that another co-conspirator allegedly possessed at Young\\nRunning Crane’s home was admissible because it was probative of, and “intertwined”\\nwith, the methamphetamine conspiracy. Specifically, the district court found that\\ntestimony about those two firearms indicated that Morales sought “to keep the drugs\\nsafe” and to ensure that nothing would go “wrong” during the drug deals. The district\\ncourt did, however, preclude all other references to firearms. It also found that\\nevidence of marijuana was similarly “inextricably intertwined” with the methamphet-\\namine conspiracy, in particular because its discovery in the minivan “then led to the\\nsearch warrant of [Young Running Crane’s] residence where [officers] found\\nmethamphetamine and more marijuana.” And the district court found that any danger\\nof unfair prejudice that admission of the evidence could pose to Morales was\\noutweighed by the evidence’s probative value. On appeal, we review a district\\ncourt’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Thomas, 760\\nF.3d 879, 883 (8th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n Rule 404(b) “excludes evidence of specific bad acts used to circumstantially\\nprove a person has a propensity to commit acts of that sort.” United States v.\\nJohnson, 439 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2006). But this rule does not apply to evidence\\n“intrinsic” to the charged offense. Thomas, 760 F.3d at 883–84. “[I]ntrinsic\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fevidence[] is evidence of wrongful conduct other than the conduct at issue offered for\\nthe purpose of providing the context in which the charged crime occurred.” United\\nStates v. Campbell, 764 F.3d 880, 888 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). It “includes both\\nevidence that is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged as well as evidence\\nthat merely ‘completes the story’ or provides context to the charged crime.” United\\nStates v. Young, 753 F.3d 757, 770 (8th Cir. 2014). Intrinsic evidence need not be\\n“necessary to the jury’s understanding of the issues” to be admissible. Id. Of course,\\nwhen admitting intrinsic evidence, “[t]he dictates of [R]ule 403 must still be applied\\nto ensure that the probative value of this evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial\\nvalue.” United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986). District courts\\nhave “broad discretion” in admitting intrinsic evidence and we will reverse “only if\\nsuch evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to prove\\nthe defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” Thomas, 760 F.3d at 883\\n(quoting United States v. Katz, 445 F.3d 1023, 1029 (8th Cir. 2006)).\\n\\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting as intrinsic\\nevidence the references to Morales’s involvement with marijuana and two firearms.\\nThe district court could reasonably conclude that such evidence was “inextricably\\nintertwined” with the methamphetamine conspiracy, or that at the very least it\\ncompleted the story or provided context to that crime. See id. at 884–85 (affirming\\nadmission of evidence of defendant’s distribution of crack cocaine, although he was\\nonly charged with heroin-related offenses). At the Days Inn, Morales told the CI that\\nthere was both marijuana and methamphetamine at Young Running Crane’s home,\\nand that a co-conspirator there “ha[d] a pistol guarding the meth.” That same day,\\nagents heard that Guzman possessed a Glock 19 intended for “protection” during drug\\nsales. This fact motivated the agents, at least in part, to seek assistance in stopping\\nthe minivan with a marked patrol car. Marijuana discovered in the minivan, in turn,\\nled to the search of Young Running Crane’s home, where law enforcement officers\\nultimately found the methamphetamine. Other drug- or weapons-related evidence is\\nnot invariably admissible as intrinsic evidence in a drug trafficking prosecution, but\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fthe district court was within its discretion in admitting the evidence here. And\\n“recogniz[ing] the overall strength of the government’s case and not[ing] that this\\nevidence played only a small part,” we also conclude that the evidence was properly\\nadmitted under Rule 403. United States v. O’Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 2000).\\n\\n B\\n\\n Morales’s advisory range under the Guidelines was life imprisonment. The\\ndistrict court varied downward and imposed a 360-month sentence. On appeal,\\nMorales argues that the district court procedurally erred in calculating his base\\noffense level and in applying four sentencing enhancements. We address each of his\\nchallenges in turn, reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error and\\nits construction and application of the Guidelines de novo, United States v. Sykes,\\n854 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 2017), keeping in mind that “[t]he Government must\\nprove by a preponderance of the evidence each of the facts necessary to establish a\\nsentencing enhancement,” United States v. Razo-Guerra, 534 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir.\\n2008).\\n\\n First, Morales argues that the district court’s finding that he was responsible\\nfor 31,289.36 kilograms of marijuana equivalent, resulting in a base offense level of\\n36 under Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(2), was clearly erroneous. Before sentencing, an\\ninitial presentence investigation report (PSR) recommended a base offense level of\\n34 based on the 19,951.36 kilograms of marijuana equivalent that law enforcement\\nagents actually confiscated throughout the investigation. The government objected,\\narguing that additional quantities beyond “those amounts that ended up in the\\npossession of law enforcement” should be included in the total drug amount.\\nSpecifically, it argued that the 566.9 grams of methamphetamine (11,338 kilograms\\nof marijuana equivalent) that Morales had offered to sell the CI in April 2016 should\\nalso be included. The probation office agreed and amended the PSR, raising the total\\ndrug amount to 31,289.36 kilograms of marijuana equivalent and the base offense\\n\\n -12-\\n\\flevel to 36. Morales objected, arguing that there was “no proof” that he “had access\\nto th[at] quantity” at his April meeting with the CI.\\n\\n At the sentencing hearing, Warkenthien testified about Morales’s insistence\\nthat the CI purchase the 566.9 grams of methamphetamine. Warkenthien testified that\\nMorales pushed for the CI to buy that amount as part of Morales’s plans to sell only\\nlarge quantities of methamphetamine. According to Warkenthien, however, the ATF\\ndid not make that purchase because the Bureau’s internal rules would have required\\nMorales’s immediate arrest, effectively shutting down the investigation before agents\\ndiscovered the identity of Morales’s source. Warkenthien’s testimony was consistent\\nwith the CI’s trial testimony that Morales asked him to purchase that quantity of\\nmethamphetamine for $16,500. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the\\ndistrict court overruled Morales’s objection to the 566.9 grams and adopted the\\namended PSR’s drug quantity calculation.\\n\\n We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in including the 566.9\\ngrams of methamphetamine in the final drug amount. Under the Guidelines, even\\ndrugs that were not confiscated can be attributed to a defendant where the amount\\nseized does not reflect the scale of the offense. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5. In such a case, “the\\ncourt shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance,” id., and may\\nconsider all relevant information so long as it is sufficiently reliable, see United\\nStates v. Sicaros-Quintero, 557 F.3d 579, 582 (8th Cir. 2009). In this case, more than\\nsufficient evidence, including Warkenthien’s testimony at the sentencing hearing,\\nsupports a finding that Morales could have provided the 566.9 grams of methamphet-\\namine to the CI had the ATF agreed to purchase it.\\n\\n Based on a statement the district court made at the sentencing hearing, Morales\\nnevertheless argues that the court clearly erred in including the 566.9 grams. When\\nruling on the final drug amount, the court stated, “I find that all of the quantities set\\nforth in [the amended PSR] . . . are amounts that were actually confiscated.” But the\\n\\n -13-\\n\\fgovernment never argued that the 566.9 grams were seized. To the contrary, it\\nexpressly urged the district court to include that amount despite the fact that it had not\\nbeen confiscated. When the basis of the parties’ point of contention is this clear, we\\nwould be remiss to conclude that the district court ruled on something other than the\\nprecise issue before it. Cf. United States v. Miles, 499 F.3d 906, 909–10 (8th Cir.\\n2007) (in sentencing context, where the record made clear that district court listened\\nto parties’ arguments and considered supporting evidence, court of appeals would not\\nfind that district court failed to consider issue). There was ample evidence to support\\nthe district court’s drug quantity calculation, and its passing erroneous remark that all\\nthe drugs were “confiscated” does not alter the record on this issue. It was undisputed\\nthat the 566.9 grams were not in fact confiscated. Accordingly, we find no clear\\nerror. See United States v. Lewis-Zubkin, 907 F.3d 1103, 1104 & n.2 (8th Cir. 2018)\\n(per curiam) (affirming district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement\\ndespite the district court’s “passing remark” erroneously suggesting that defendant\\nbore the burden of proof as to the enhancement’s application).\\n\\n Next, Morales argues that the district court clearly erred in applying the two-\\nlevel enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a dangerous weapon\\n(including a firearm). For this enhancement to apply, “[t]he firearm must be\\nconnected with the criminal activity.” United States v. Savage, 414 F.3d 964, 966\\n(8th Cir. 2005). “[T]he government must show that ‘(1) the gun was possessed and\\n(2) it was not clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the drug\\noffense.’” United States v. Renteria-Saldana, 755 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 2014)\\n(quoting United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 2010)). The district\\ncourt found that two independent grounds justified the enhancement: (1) trial\\nevidence that Morales “rack[ed] a gun” in the CI’s presence at the Days Inn on\\nSeptember 22 while the two discussed the sale of drugs; and (2) officers’ discovery\\nof the Glock 19 on Guzman’s person the day of Morales’s arrest. Morales does not\\ncontest the second justification, but argues that trial evidence was “inconclusive” as\\nto the first. We need not address his argument, as Guzman’s possession of the gun\\n\\n -14-\\n\\fin the minivan Morales was driving shortly after Morales discussed that very weapon\\nwith the CI is sufficient to justify the enhancement. See United States v. Lopez, 384\\nF.3d 937, 944 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (explaining that the enhancement applies\\nif “the defendant knew or should have known based on specific past experiences with\\nthe co-conspirator that the co-conspirator possessed a gun and used it during drug\\ndeals”); see also United States v. Muniz Ochoa, 643 F.3d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 2011).\\nAccordingly, the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement.\\n\\n Morales next contends that the district court clearly erred in applying a two-\\nlevel enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2). That enhancement applies “[i]f the\\ndefendant used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use\\nof violence.” The district court found that Morales used social media messages to\\nthreaten physical violence against at least three different people; specifically, the\\ncourt found that “there [were] individuals that owed money to the defendant and . . .\\nif they didn’t pay . . . they would suffer physical violence.” Morales argues that the\\nmessages lacked credible threats and cannot be linked to the drug conspiracy. His\\narguments are belied by the record. In the messages, Morales threatened to “smash”\\nthe face of one of the recipients and, in the context of drug-trafficking activity, told\\nanother to “[g]et [his] money rite [sic]” because Morales was “trigger happy.”\\nWarkenthien testified that in at least one of the messages, Morales expressed\\ndispleasure with the recipient’s “method of dealing meth.” Based on this evidence,\\nthe district court did not clearly err in finding that Morales made a credible threat to\\nuse violence in connection with the drug conspiracy. See, e.g., Lewis-Zubkin, 907\\nF.3d at 1104 (explaining that enhancement may be applied even where the threatened\\nviolence is not ultimately carried out).\\n\\n Finally, Morales argues that the district court clearly erred in applying a four-\\nlevel enhancement under § 3B1.1(a), which applies “[i]f the defendant was an\\norganizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or\\nwas otherwise extensive.” To justify the enhancement, the government must prove\\n\\n -15-\\n\\ftwo elements: (1) that “the defendant organized or led at least one other participant\\nin the criminal activity”; and, as relevant here, (2) that “the criminal activity involved\\nat least five participants.” United States v. Musa, 830 F.3d 786, 788 (8th Cir. 2016).\\nThe district court found that Morales was a “leader or organizer” and that there were\\nfive participants involved in the criminal activity: (1) Morales, (2) Guzman, (3) a\\nthird co-defendant, (4) Young Running Crane, and (5) the source of the methamphet-\\namine. Morales challenges only the five-participant determination, arguing that\\nYoung Running Crane and his drug source were improperly classified as participants.\\n\\n The Guidelines define “participant” as “a person who is criminally responsible\\nfor the commission of the offense,” even if he or she was not convicted. § 3B1.1 cmt.\\nn.1. Importantly here, “[t]he term ‘offense’ encompasses not only the elements and\\nacts cited in the count of conviction, but also all relevant conduct constituting the\\n‘contours of the underlying scheme itself.’” United States v. Starks, 815 F.3d 438,\\n441 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Rosnow, 9 F.3d 728, 730 (8th Cir.\\n1993)). And to be “criminally responsible” under the Guidelines, an individual need\\nonly “give ‘knowing aid in some part of the criminal enterprise.’” Id. (quoting United\\nStates v. Hall, 101 F.3d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996)). Contrary to Morales’s\\ncontention, an individual need not be guilty of the precise offense of conviction—or\\neven charged—to be found “criminally responsible” under § 3B1.1. See, e.g., Starks,\\n815 F.3d at 441; United States v. Mendoza, 341 F.3d 687, 693 (8th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n The district court did not clearly err in finding that Young Running Crane and\\nMorales’s source were criminally responsible for relevant conduct. The government\\npresented evidence that Young Running Crane knowingly permitted Morales,\\nGuzman, and the third co-conspirator to store a “brick-size” quantity of marijuana—at\\nleast one pound—at her home shortly before the conspirators’ arrest. The PSR, as\\nadopted by the district court, included that marijuana as relevant conduct, which\\nMorales does not contest on appeal. See United States v. Gordon, 510 F.3d 811, 817\\n(8th Cir. 2007) (“The district court may consider as relevant conduct all drugs that the\\n\\n -16-\\n\\fgovernment shows by a preponderance of the evidence were a part of the same course\\nof conduct or common scheme as the conspiracy . . . .”). Similarly, ample evidence\\nsupports the district court’s conclusion that Morales’s source was a participant. We\\nhave held that an ongoing supplier relationship may establish participant status under\\n§ 3B1.1(a). See Sykes, 854 F.3d at 460. Warkenthien’s testimony supports a finding\\nthat Morales had an ongoing relationship with at least one source who was behind\\nMorales’s plan to sell large quantities of methamphetamine in the Sioux Falls area.\\nFor instance, Warkenthien testified that it angered Morales that the CI would not\\npurchase the 566.9 grams of methamphetamine, as Morales “was trying to show . . .\\nhis source that he could move this kind of quantity . . . in Sioux Falls, and they could\\nget rid of it and bring up large quantities quickly to make more money.” In light of\\nthis evidence, the district court did not clearly err in applying the four-level\\nenhancement under § 3B1.1(a).\\n\\n For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm Morales’s conviction and sentence.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -17-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406486/\", \"author_raw\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629233/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Chase Logan GUZMAN, Defendant-Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Justin Thomas Morales, Also Known as Speedy, Defendant-Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-13\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1506\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Chase Logan Guzman\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2202\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\nJustin Thomas Morales, also known as Speedy\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeals from United States District Court\nfor the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls\n ____________\n\f Submitted: February 13, 2019\n Filed: June 13, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\n\n As part of an investigation of large-scale methamphetamine trafficking, law\nenforcement officers pulled over Justin Morales and Chase Guzman in a traffic stop\nand found a pound of marijuana and a firearm on Guzman. Officers obtained a search\nwarrant and subsequently found more marijuana and two pounds of methampheta-\nmine inside a home connected to the trafficking. Morales and Guzman were indicted\non one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, and Guzman was indicted\non one count of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking\ncrime. After the district court1 denied their respective motions to suppress evidence,\nGuzman conditionally pleaded guilty to both counts and Morales proceeded to trial\nwhere the jury found him guilty. Defendants separately appeal the district court’s\ndenial of their motions to suppress and raise various sentencing and evidentiary\nissues. We consolidated the appeals, and for the reasons explained below, we affirm.\n\n I\n\n At the suppression hearing, various law enforcement officers testified to the\nfollowing facts. In March 2016, a confidential informant (CI) told agents from the\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that Morales would be\ntrafficking firearms and large quantities of methamphetamine from Wichita, Kansas,\n\n 1\n The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District\nof South Dakota.\n\n -2-\n\fto Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and the surrounding area. According to the CI, Morales\nasked him to help with the transportation and local distribution of the drugs. ATF\nSpecial Agents Emmet Warkenthien and Brent Fair opened an investigation.\n\n Over the next several months, ATF agents amassed evidence of Morales’s\nmethamphetamine trafficking. The agents recorded more than forty phone calls\nbetween the CI and Morales discussing methamphetamine “buys.” Some of these\npurchases came to fruition. In April 2016, for instance, ATF agents arranged for the\nCI to conduct a controlled buy of approximately four ounces of methamphetamine\nfrom Morales in exchange for $5,000.\n\n In the early morning hours of September 22, 2016, the CI contacted Warkenthi-\nen with information that would lead to Morales’s and Guzman’s arrests later that day.\nThe CI told Warkenthien that Morales and Guzman had arrived in Sioux Falls from\nWitchita to sell methamphetamine and marijuana. The CI relayed that Morales and\nGuzman were staying at the Days Inn hotel in Sioux Falls and that the CI planned to\nmeet with Morales that morning to discuss the CI’s involvement in the drug\ntrafficking. Fair drove to the Days Inn to set up surveillance.\n\n As anticipated, the CI spent a large part of the morning meeting with Morales\nand Guzman at the Days Inn and some area businesses. The CI recorded many of the\ngroup’s conversations. In one of these conversations, Morales told the CI that he was\nstoring two pounds of methamphetamine and three pounds of marijuana at the home\nof Jerri Young Running Crane in Sioux Falls. Morales also told the CI that he had\na 9mm Glock 19 semiautomatic pistol that Guzman intended to “take with him” for\n“protection” during drug sales.\n\n While stationed at the Days Inn parking lot that morning, Fair observed two\npeople get out of a Kansas-plated minivan registered to Jacqueline Morales and get\ninto the CI’s vehicle. Fair personally identified one of the individuals as Justin\n\n -3-\n\fMorales based on photos that he had seen previously. Other agents also stationed at\nthe hotel identified the other individual as Guzman and communicated that\ninformation via radio to the rest of the investigation team. Morales, Guzman, and the\nCI left the Days Inn parking lot but returned sometime later, still in the CI’s vehicle.\nAll three individuals exited the CI’s vehicle and accessed a Kansas-plated pickup\ntruck registered to Guzman. Agents then saw Morales and Guzman get into the\nminivan and drive off.\n\n Guzman and Morales drove to Young Running Crane’s home, where agents\nhad also set up surveillance. An agent positively identified Morales and Guzman\ngetting out of the minivan and entering the home. Some time later, Sioux Falls\nNarcotics Detective Adam Buiter observed Morales and Guzman—both of whom he\nidentified based on pictures he had previously seen—exit the home and get into the\nminivan once more. Buiter relayed this information to the rest of the investigation\nteam.\n\n The minivan left Young Running Crane’s home, and several members of the\nsurveillance team followed in unmarked cars. The minivan’s “circuitous” driving\naround area businesses made the agents concerned that their surveillance had been,\nor soon would be, detected. So they decided to enlist the assistance of the South\nDakota Highway Patrol to conduct a “ruse” stop of the vehicle in a marked patrol car\nbased on the evidence of drugs and firearms they had already collected that day. The\nintent of such a stop is to maintain the appearance of an everyday traffic stop so as\nto not alert subjects of a narcotics investigation that they may soon be arrested, and\nto minimize dangers that may arise when armed suspects are stopped by unmarked\nlaw enforcement vehicles.\n\n Detective Dan Christiansen, who was part of the surveillance team, contacted\nState Trooper Andrew Steen to assist with the stop. Christiansen told Steen that the\nminivan’s occupants possessed drugs and firearms. Steen was instructed that he did\n\n -4-\n\fnot have wait to develop his own probable cause for a traffic violation before\nstopping the minivan but that he should make the stop look routine.\n\n Steen stopped the minivan, and Sioux Falls Police Officer Jason Christensen\narrived to provide assistance. Steen approached the driver’s side and Christensen\napproached the passenger’s side. Steen falsely told Morales, who was driving, that\nhis brake light was out and asked him to step out of the vehicle. For his part,\nChristensen asked Guzman, who was sitting in the passenger seat, also to exit. When\nGuzman obliged, Christensen saw a small plastic bag containing marijuana between\nthe passenger seat and the doorsill. The officers placed Morales and Guzman in\nhandcuffs. Steen and Christensen searched the minivan and found a pound of\nmarijuana, various cell phones, cash, and a small digital scale that tested positive for\nmethamphetamine. Searches of Guzman’s person revealed a loaded Glock 19,\napproximately 29 grams of methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia.\n\n Based on this evidence, Warkenthien obtained a search warrant for, among\nother things, Young Running Crane’s home and the Kansas-plated pickup truck\nregistered to Guzman. A search of the home produced two pounds of marijuana and\ntwo pounds of methamphetamine. In the pickup truck, law enforcement officers\nfound ammunition for the Glock 19.\n\n A superseding indictment charged Guzman and Morales with one count of\nconspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. It also charged Guzman with one count of using or\ncarrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).\n\n On appeal, both defendants challenge the district court’s denial of their\nrespective motions to suppress and raise various sentencing issues. Morales also\nchallenges one of the district court’s pretrial evidentiary rulings. We address the\n\n -5-\n\fdistrict court’s denial of the motions to suppress first, followed by Guzman’s\nsentencing challenge and Morales’s evidentiary and sentencing arguments.\n\n II\n\n “We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo but the underlying\nfactual determinations for clear error, giving due weight to inferences drawn by law\nenforcement officials.” United States v. Walker, 840 F.3d 477, 483 (8th Cir. 2016)\n(quoting United States v. Hurd, 785 F.3d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 2015)). “To conclude\nthat findings of fact are clearly erroneous, the court’s review of the record should\nleave a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,” and “the appellate\ncourt should give particular deference to findings based upon credibility determina-\ntions.” Prince v. Sargent, 960 F.2d 720, 720–21 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). We\nwill affirm the denial of a motion to suppress unless the decision “is unsupported by\nsubstantial evidence, is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or it is clear,\nbased on the entire record, that a mistake was made.” Walker, 840 F.3d at 483.\n\n The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their\npersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”\nU.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure and therefore must be\nsupported at least by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Givens, 763 F.3d 987,\n989 (8th Cir. 2014). Reasonable suspicion exists “when a law enforcement officer\nhas ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped\nof criminal activity.’” Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (quoting\nUnited States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). In deciding whether there is\nreasonable suspicion, “an officer may rely on information provided by other officers\nas well as any information known to the team of officers conducting the investiga-\ntion.” United States v. Mora-Higuera, 269 F.3d 905, 910 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting\nUnited States v. Thomas, 249 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2001)); see also Navarette, 134\nS. Ct. at 1688.\n\n -6-\n\f Morales and Guzman argue that Steen’s stop of the minivan violated their\nFourth Amendment rights and that all evidence obtained as a result of that stop must\nbe suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. They contend that they were not\nspecifically identified as the occupants of the van before the stop, depriving Steen of\nreasonable suspicion to believe the minivan’s occupants were engaged in criminal\nactivity. The district court found that before agents directed Steen to stop the\nminivan, they had “positive[ly] identifi[ed] that the occupants of the grey van were\nin fact [Morales] and [Guzman].” This finding of fact is amply supported by the\nrecord.\n\n Fair’s and Buiter’s testimony at the suppression hearing established that agents\nidentified Morales and Guzman at various points throughout the day and specifically\nas the two defendants drove away from Young Running Crane’s home shortly before\nSteen’s traffic stop. According to Fair, immediately before Morales and Guzman\ndrove to the home from the Days Inn parking lot, agents identified Morales and\nGuzman getting into the minivan. When the minivan arrived at the home, another\nagent identified Morales and Guzman as exiting the minivan and entering the\nresidence. Finally, Buiter personally saw Morales and Guzman—both of whom he\npositively identified—exit the home and get into the minivan once more, information\nhe communicated to the rest of the surveillance team before Steen was directed to\nmake the stop.\n\n In essence, Morales and Guzman ask us on appeal to disbelieve the agents’\ntestimony, but as we have stated many times, “[a] credibility determination made by\na district court after a hearing on the merits of a motion to suppress is ‘virtually\nunassailable on appeal.’” United States v. Frencher, 503 F.3d 701, 701 (8th Cir.\n2007) (quoting United States v. Guel-Contreras, 468 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2006)).\nAccordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that law enforcement\nofficers knew that Morales and Guzman were inside the minivan before it was\n\n\n\n -7-\n\fstopped.2 We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of each defendant’s motion\nto suppress.\n\n III\n\n Guzman’s advisory range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was 135 to 168\nmonths’ imprisonment for the drug offense, subject to a 120-month statutory\nmandatory minimum. His firearms offense subjected him to an additional mandatory\nminimum sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively as\nrequired by statute.3 At sentencing, Guzman urged the district court to apply the\n“rationale” of Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017), to vary below the\n120-month mandatory minimum sentence on the drug offense by taking into account\nthat he must additionally serve the 60-month sentence for the firearms offense. The\n\n\n 2\n Without much meaningful analysis, Morales and Guzman also contend that\neven if they were positively identified as occupying the van before the stop, Steen\nstill lacked reasonable suspicion to stop them. They do not dispute that Steen learned\nthe details of the investigation from Christiansen, so we construe their argument to\nbe that the facts Steen knew were legally insufficient to support reasonable suspicion.\nWe reject that argument. The information provided by the CI (much of which was\ncorroborated by the investigation team), the controlled buy between Morales and CI,\nthe recorded conversations between the two, and the investigation team’s own\nobservations gave Steen reasonable suspicion to believe Morales and Guzman were\nengaged in drug-related criminal activity. See, e.g., Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687–92\n(reaffirming the well-established rule that even the statements of an anonymous\ntipster can provide reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of a car);\nUnited States v. Caswell, 436 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that an\nofficer may use a reliable confidential informant’s tip to establish the more\ndemanding standard of probable cause).\n 3\n Under § 924(c), a separate term of imprisonment must be imposed where the\ndefendant, “during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries\na firearm.” This separate term is “in addition to the punishment provided for such\n. . . drug trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); see also id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).\n\n -8-\n\fdistrict court rejected Guzman’s argument but varied downward to the statutory\nminimum on the drug offense and imposed a total sentence of 180 months.\n\n On appeal, Guzman argues that the district court misinterpreted Dean in\nconcluding that the court lacked the authority to vary below the statutory minimum\non the drug offense. The government counters that Guzman’s challenge is barred by\nthe appeal waiver in his plea agreement. Guzman acknowledges that his plea\nagreement waived “his right to appeal any non-jurisdictional issues,” except, as\nrelevant here, a sentencing decision involving an upward departure or upward\nvariance. But he contends that the government forfeited its right to enforce the appeal\nwaiver by failing to object at the district court when Guzman “preserve[d]” the Dean\nissue for appeal.\n\n Courts seem to disagree on whether the government forfeits its right to enforce\nan appeal waiver if it fails to object before the district court to a defendant’s intent to\nappeal or the district court’s advisement that the defendant retains the right to appeal.\nCompare United States v. Alford, 147 F. App’x 45, 49 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding\nthat the government did not forfeit right, as “the district court does not decide the\neffect of any waiver on appellate rights—[the court of appeals] does”), with United\nStates v. Mercado, 525 F. App’x 574, 575 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he government\nforfeited its right to enforce the waiver by failing to object to the district court’s\nunqualified advisement that [defendant] retained the right to appeal the court’s\njudgment.”). We decline to weigh in here, because, assuming for the sake of\nargument that the government forfeited its right to enforce the appeal waiver,\nGuzman’s sentencing challenge fails on the merits.\n\n Contrary to Guzman’s contentions, Dean does not authorize district courts to\nimpose a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum. Dean merely held that\ncourts can consider the § 924(c) mandatory consecutive sentence when deciding\nwhether to vary downward from the Guidelines range applicable to the other counts\n\n -9-\n\fof conviction. 137 S. Ct. at 1176–77. Therefore, Dean has no application here. We\naccordingly affirm Guzman’s sentence.\n\n IV\n\n A\n\n Morales first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion under Federal\nRules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 to exclude at trial evidence of uncharged conduct,\nspecifically, that he possessed, used, accessed, or sold marijuana and firearms. The\ndistrict court agreed with the government that evidence referencing Guzman’s Glock\n19 and a different gun that another co-conspirator allegedly possessed at Young\nRunning Crane’s home was admissible because it was probative of, and “intertwined”\nwith, the methamphetamine conspiracy. Specifically, the district court found that\ntestimony about those two firearms indicated that Morales sought “to keep the drugs\nsafe” and to ensure that nothing would go “wrong” during the drug deals. The district\ncourt did, however, preclude all other references to firearms. It also found that\nevidence of marijuana was similarly “inextricably intertwined” with the methamphet-\namine conspiracy, in particular because its discovery in the minivan “then led to the\nsearch warrant of [Young Running Crane’s] residence where [officers] found\nmethamphetamine and more marijuana.” And the district court found that any danger\nof unfair prejudice that admission of the evidence could pose to Morales was\noutweighed by the evidence’s probative value. On appeal, we review a district\ncourt’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Thomas, 760\nF.3d 879, 883 (8th Cir. 2014).\n\n Rule 404(b) “excludes evidence of specific bad acts used to circumstantially\nprove a person has a propensity to commit acts of that sort.” United States v.\nJohnson, 439 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2006). But this rule does not apply to evidence\n“intrinsic” to the charged offense. Thomas, 760 F.3d at 883–84. “[I]ntrinsic\n\n -10-\n\fevidence[] is evidence of wrongful conduct other than the conduct at issue offered for\nthe purpose of providing the context in which the charged crime occurred.” United\nStates v. Campbell, 764 F.3d 880, 888 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). It “includes both\nevidence that is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged as well as evidence\nthat merely ‘completes the story’ or provides context to the charged crime.” United\nStates v. Young, 753 F.3d 757, 770 (8th Cir. 2014). Intrinsic evidence need not be\n“necessary to the jury’s understanding of the issues” to be admissible. Id. Of course,\nwhen admitting intrinsic evidence, “[t]he dictates of [R]ule 403 must still be applied\nto ensure that the probative value of this evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial\nvalue.” United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986). District courts\nhave “broad discretion” in admitting intrinsic evidence and we will reverse “only if\nsuch evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to prove\nthe defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” Thomas, 760 F.3d at 883\n(quoting United States v. Katz, 445 F.3d 1023, 1029 (8th Cir. 2006)).\n\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting as intrinsic\nevidence the references to Morales’s involvement with marijuana and two firearms.\nThe district court could reasonably conclude that such evidence was “inextricably\nintertwined” with the methamphetamine conspiracy, or that at the very least it\ncompleted the story or provided context to that crime. See id. at 884–85 (affirming\nadmission of evidence of defendant’s distribution of crack cocaine, although he was\nonly charged with heroin-related offenses). At the Days Inn, Morales told the CI that\nthere was both marijuana and methamphetamine at Young Running Crane’s home,\nand that a co-conspirator there “ha[d] a pistol guarding the meth.” That same day,\nagents heard that Guzman possessed a Glock 19 intended for “protection” during drug\nsales. This fact motivated the agents, at least in part, to seek assistance in stopping\nthe minivan with a marked patrol car. Marijuana discovered in the minivan, in turn,\nled to the search of Young Running Crane’s home, where law enforcement officers\nultimately found the methamphetamine. Other drug- or weapons-related evidence is\nnot invariably admissible as intrinsic evidence in a drug trafficking prosecution, but\n\n -11-\n\fthe district court was within its discretion in admitting the evidence here. And\n“recogniz[ing] the overall strength of the government’s case and not[ing] that this\nevidence played only a small part,” we also conclude that the evidence was properly\nadmitted under Rule 403. United States v. O’Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 2000).\n\n B\n\n Morales’s advisory range under the Guidelines was life imprisonment. The\ndistrict court varied downward and imposed a 360-month sentence. On appeal,\nMorales argues that the district court procedurally erred in calculating his base\noffense level and in applying four sentencing enhancements. We address each of his\nchallenges in turn, reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error and\nits construction and application of the Guidelines de novo, United States v. Sykes,\n854 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 2017), keeping in mind that “[t]he Government must\nprove by a preponderance of the evidence each of the facts necessary to establish a\nsentencing enhancement,” United States v. Razo-Guerra, 534 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir.\n2008).\n\n First, Morales argues that the district court’s finding that he was responsible\nfor 31,289.36 kilograms of marijuana equivalent, resulting in a base offense level of\n36 under Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(2), was clearly erroneous. Before sentencing, an\ninitial presentence investigation report (PSR) recommended a base offense level of\n34 based on the 19,951.36 kilograms of marijuana equivalent that law enforcement\nagents actually confiscated throughout the investigation. The government objected,\narguing that additional quantities beyond “those amounts that ended up in the\npossession of law enforcement” should be included in the total drug amount.\nSpecifically, it argued that the 566.9 grams of methamphetamine (11,338 kilograms\nof marijuana equivalent) that Morales had offered to sell the CI in April 2016 should\nalso be included. The probation office agreed and amended the PSR, raising the total\ndrug amount to 31,289.36 kilograms of marijuana equivalent and the base offense\n\n -12-\n\flevel to 36. Morales objected, arguing that there was “no proof” that he “had access\nto th[at] quantity” at his April meeting with the CI.\n\n At the sentencing hearing, Warkenthien testified about Morales’s insistence\nthat the CI purchase the 566.9 grams of methamphetamine. Warkenthien testified that\nMorales pushed for the CI to buy that amount as part of Morales’s plans to sell only\nlarge quantities of methamphetamine. According to Warkenthien, however, the ATF\ndid not make that purchase because the Bureau’s internal rules would have required\nMorales’s immediate arrest, effectively shutting down the investigation before agents\ndiscovered the identity of Morales’s source. Warkenthien’s testimony was consistent\nwith the CI’s trial testimony that Morales asked him to purchase that quantity of\nmethamphetamine for $16,500. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the\ndistrict court overruled Morales’s objection to the 566.9 grams and adopted the\namended PSR’s drug quantity calculation.\n\n We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in including the 566.9\ngrams of methamphetamine in the final drug amount. Under the Guidelines, even\ndrugs that were not confiscated can be attributed to a defendant where the amount\nseized does not reflect the scale of the offense. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5. In such a case, “the\ncourt shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance,” id., and may\nconsider all relevant information so long as it is sufficiently reliable, see United\nStates v. Sicaros-Quintero, 557 F.3d 579, 582 (8th Cir. 2009). In this case, more than\nsufficient evidence, including Warkenthien’s testimony at the sentencing hearing,\nsupports a finding that Morales could have provided the 566.9 grams of methamphet-\namine to the CI had the ATF agreed to purchase it.\n\n Based on a statement the district court made at the sentencing hearing, Morales\nnevertheless argues that the court clearly erred in including the 566.9 grams. When\nruling on the final drug amount, the court stated, “I find that all of the quantities set\nforth in [the amended PSR] . . . are amounts that were actually confiscated.” But the\n\n -13-\n\fgovernment never argued that the 566.9 grams were seized. To the contrary, it\nexpressly urged the district court to include that amount despite the fact that it had not\nbeen confiscated. When the basis of the parties’ point of contention is this clear, we\nwould be remiss to conclude that the district court ruled on something other than the\nprecise issue before it. Cf. United States v. Miles, 499 F.3d 906, 909–10 (8th Cir.\n2007) (in sentencing context, where the record made clear that district court listened\nto parties’ arguments and considered supporting evidence, court of appeals would not\nfind that district court failed to consider issue). There was ample evidence to support\nthe district court’s drug quantity calculation, and its passing erroneous remark that all\nthe drugs were “confiscated” does not alter the record on this issue. It was undisputed\nthat the 566.9 grams were not in fact confiscated. Accordingly, we find no clear\nerror. See United States v. Lewis-Zubkin, 907 F.3d 1103, 1104 & n.2 (8th Cir. 2018)\n(per curiam) (affirming district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement\ndespite the district court’s “passing remark” erroneously suggesting that defendant\nbore the burden of proof as to the enhancement’s application).\n\n Next, Morales argues that the district court clearly erred in applying the two-\nlevel enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a dangerous weapon\n(including a firearm). For this enhancement to apply, “[t]he firearm must be\nconnected with the criminal activity.” United States v. Savage, 414 F.3d 964, 966\n(8th Cir. 2005). “[T]he government must show that ‘(1) the gun was possessed and\n(2) it was not clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the drug\noffense.’” United States v. Renteria-Saldana, 755 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 2014)\n(quoting United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 2010)). The district\ncourt found that two independent grounds justified the enhancement: (1) trial\nevidence that Morales “rack[ed] a gun” in the CI’s presence at the Days Inn on\nSeptember 22 while the two discussed the sale of drugs; and (2) officers’ discovery\nof the Glock 19 on Guzman’s person the day of Morales’s arrest. Morales does not\ncontest the second justification, but argues that trial evidence was “inconclusive” as\nto the first. We need not address his argument, as Guzman’s possession of the gun\n\n -14-\n\fin the minivan Morales was driving shortly after Morales discussed that very weapon\nwith the CI is sufficient to justify the enhancement. See United States v. Lopez, 384\nF.3d 937, 944 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (explaining that the enhancement applies\nif “the defendant knew or should have known based on specific past experiences with\nthe co-conspirator that the co-conspirator possessed a gun and used it during drug\ndeals”); see also United States v. Muniz Ochoa, 643 F.3d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 2011).\nAccordingly, the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement.\n\n Morales next contends that the district court clearly erred in applying a two-\nlevel enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2). That enhancement applies “[i]f the\ndefendant used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use\nof violence.” The district court found that Morales used social media messages to\nthreaten physical violence against at least three different people; specifically, the\ncourt found that “there [were] individuals that owed money to the defendant and . . .\nif they didn’t pay . . . they would suffer physical violence.” Morales argues that the\nmessages lacked credible threats and cannot be linked to the drug conspiracy. His\narguments are belied by the record. In the messages, Morales threatened to “smash”\nthe face of one of the recipients and, in the context of drug-trafficking activity, told\nanother to “[g]et [his] money rite [sic]” because Morales was “trigger happy.”\nWarkenthien testified that in at least one of the messages, Morales expressed\ndispleasure with the recipient’s “method of dealing meth.” Based on this evidence,\nthe district court did not clearly err in finding that Morales made a credible threat to\nuse violence in connection with the drug conspiracy. See, e.g., Lewis-Zubkin, 907\nF.3d at 1104 (explaining that enhancement may be applied even where the threatened\nviolence is not ultimately carried out).\n\n Finally, Morales argues that the district court clearly erred in applying a four-\nlevel enhancement under § 3B1.1(a), which applies “[i]f the defendant was an\norganizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or\nwas otherwise extensive.” To justify the enhancement, the government must prove\n\n -15-\n\ftwo elements: (1) that “the defendant organized or led at least one other participant\nin the criminal activity”; and, as relevant here, (2) that “the criminal activity involved\nat least five participants.” United States v. Musa, 830 F.3d 786, 788 (8th Cir. 2016).\nThe district court found that Morales was a “leader or organizer” and that there were\nfive participants involved in the criminal activity: (1) Morales, (2) Guzman, (3) a\nthird co-defendant, (4) Young Running Crane, and (5) the source of the methamphet-\namine. Morales challenges only the five-participant determination, arguing that\nYoung Running Crane and his drug source were improperly classified as participants.\n\n The Guidelines define “participant” as “a person who is criminally responsible\nfor the commission of the offense,” even if he or she was not convicted. § 3B1.1 cmt.\nn.1. Importantly here, “[t]he term ‘offense’ encompasses not only the elements and\nacts cited in the count of conviction, but also all relevant conduct constituting the\n‘contours of the underlying scheme itself.’” United States v. Starks, 815 F.3d 438,\n441 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Rosnow, 9 F.3d 728, 730 (8th Cir.\n1993)). And to be “criminally responsible” under the Guidelines, an individual need\nonly “give ‘knowing aid in some part of the criminal enterprise.’” Id. (quoting United\nStates v. Hall, 101 F.3d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996)). Contrary to Morales’s\ncontention, an individual need not be guilty of the precise offense of conviction—or\neven charged—to be found “criminally responsible” under § 3B1.1. See, e.g., Starks,\n815 F.3d at 441; United States v. Mendoza, 341 F.3d 687, 693 (8th Cir. 2003).\n\n The district court did not clearly err in finding that Young Running Crane and\nMorales’s source were criminally responsible for relevant conduct. The government\npresented evidence that Young Running Crane knowingly permitted Morales,\nGuzman, and the third co-conspirator to store a “brick-size” quantity of marijuana—at\nleast one pound—at her home shortly before the conspirators’ arrest. The PSR, as\nadopted by the district court, included that marijuana as relevant conduct, which\nMorales does not contest on appeal. See United States v. Gordon, 510 F.3d 811, 817\n(8th Cir. 2007) (“The district court may consider as relevant conduct all drugs that the\n\n -16-\n\fgovernment shows by a preponderance of the evidence were a part of the same course\nof conduct or common scheme as the conspiracy . . . .”). Similarly, ample evidence\nsupports the district court’s conclusion that Morales’s source was a participant. We\nhave held that an ongoing supplier relationship may establish participant status under\n§ 3B1.1(a). See Sykes, 854 F.3d at 460. Warkenthien’s testimony supports a finding\nthat Morales had an ongoing relationship with at least one source who was behind\nMorales’s plan to sell large quantities of methamphetamine in the Sioux Falls area.\nFor instance, Warkenthien testified that it angered Morales that the CI would not\npurchase the 566.9 grams of methamphetamine, as Morales “was trying to show . . .\nhis source that he could move this kind of quantity . . . in Sioux Falls, and they could\nget rid of it and bring up large quantities quickly to make more money.” In light of\nthis evidence, the district court did not clearly err in applying the four-level\nenhancement under § 3B1.1(a).\n\n For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm Morales’s conviction and sentence.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -17-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Chase Logan GUZMAN, Defendant-Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Justin Thomas Morales, Also Known as Speedy, Defendant-Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1506\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Chase Logan Guzman\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2202\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJustin Thomas Morales, also known as Speedy\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\nfor the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls\\n ____________\\n\\f Submitted: February 13, 2019\\n Filed: June 13, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n As part of an investigation of large-scale methamphetamine trafficking, law\\nenforcement officers pulled over Justin Morales and Chase Guzman in a traffic stop\\nand found a pound of marijuana and a firearm on Guzman. Officers obtained a search\\nwarrant and subsequently found more marijuana and two pounds of methampheta-\\nmine inside a home connected to the trafficking. Morales and Guzman were indicted\\non one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, and Guzman was indicted\\non one count of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking\\ncrime. After the district court1 denied their respective motions to suppress evidence,\\nGuzman conditionally pleaded guilty to both counts and Morales proceeded to trial\\nwhere the jury found him guilty. Defendants separately appeal the district court’s\\ndenial of their motions to suppress and raise various sentencing and evidentiary\\nissues. We consolidated the appeals, and for the reasons explained below, we affirm.\\n\\n I\\n\\n At the suppression hearing, various law enforcement officers testified to the\\nfollowing facts. In March 2016, a confidential informant (CI) told agents from the\\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that Morales would be\\ntrafficking firearms and large quantities of methamphetamine from Wichita, Kansas,\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District\\nof South Dakota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and the surrounding area. According to the CI, Morales\\nasked him to help with the transportation and local distribution of the drugs. ATF\\nSpecial Agents Emmet Warkenthien and Brent Fair opened an investigation.\\n\\n Over the next several months, ATF agents amassed evidence of Morales’s\\nmethamphetamine trafficking. The agents recorded more than forty phone calls\\nbetween the CI and Morales discussing methamphetamine “buys.” Some of these\\npurchases came to fruition. In April 2016, for instance, ATF agents arranged for the\\nCI to conduct a controlled buy of approximately four ounces of methamphetamine\\nfrom Morales in exchange for $5,000.\\n\\n In the early morning hours of September 22, 2016, the CI contacted Warkenthi-\\nen with information that would lead to Morales’s and Guzman’s arrests later that day.\\nThe CI told Warkenthien that Morales and Guzman had arrived in Sioux Falls from\\nWitchita to sell methamphetamine and marijuana. The CI relayed that Morales and\\nGuzman were staying at the Days Inn hotel in Sioux Falls and that the CI planned to\\nmeet with Morales that morning to discuss the CI’s involvement in the drug\\ntrafficking. Fair drove to the Days Inn to set up surveillance.\\n\\n As anticipated, the CI spent a large part of the morning meeting with Morales\\nand Guzman at the Days Inn and some area businesses. The CI recorded many of the\\ngroup’s conversations. In one of these conversations, Morales told the CI that he was\\nstoring two pounds of methamphetamine and three pounds of marijuana at the home\\nof Jerri Young Running Crane in Sioux Falls. Morales also told the CI that he had\\na 9mm Glock 19 semiautomatic pistol that Guzman intended to “take with him” for\\n“protection” during drug sales.\\n\\n While stationed at the Days Inn parking lot that morning, Fair observed two\\npeople get out of a Kansas-plated minivan registered to Jacqueline Morales and get\\ninto the CI’s vehicle. Fair personally identified one of the individuals as Justin\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fMorales based on photos that he had seen previously. Other agents also stationed at\\nthe hotel identified the other individual as Guzman and communicated that\\ninformation via radio to the rest of the investigation team. Morales, Guzman, and the\\nCI left the Days Inn parking lot but returned sometime later, still in the CI’s vehicle.\\nAll three individuals exited the CI’s vehicle and accessed a Kansas-plated pickup\\ntruck registered to Guzman. Agents then saw Morales and Guzman get into the\\nminivan and drive off.\\n\\n Guzman and Morales drove to Young Running Crane’s home, where agents\\nhad also set up surveillance. An agent positively identified Morales and Guzman\\ngetting out of the minivan and entering the home. Some time later, Sioux Falls\\nNarcotics Detective Adam Buiter observed Morales and Guzman—both of whom he\\nidentified based on pictures he had previously seen—exit the home and get into the\\nminivan once more. Buiter relayed this information to the rest of the investigation\\nteam.\\n\\n The minivan left Young Running Crane’s home, and several members of the\\nsurveillance team followed in unmarked cars. The minivan’s “circuitous” driving\\naround area businesses made the agents concerned that their surveillance had been,\\nor soon would be, detected. So they decided to enlist the assistance of the South\\nDakota Highway Patrol to conduct a “ruse” stop of the vehicle in a marked patrol car\\nbased on the evidence of drugs and firearms they had already collected that day. The\\nintent of such a stop is to maintain the appearance of an everyday traffic stop so as\\nto not alert subjects of a narcotics investigation that they may soon be arrested, and\\nto minimize dangers that may arise when armed suspects are stopped by unmarked\\nlaw enforcement vehicles.\\n\\n Detective Dan Christiansen, who was part of the surveillance team, contacted\\nState Trooper Andrew Steen to assist with the stop. Christiansen told Steen that the\\nminivan’s occupants possessed drugs and firearms. Steen was instructed that he did\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fnot have wait to develop his own probable cause for a traffic violation before\\nstopping the minivan but that he should make the stop look routine.\\n\\n Steen stopped the minivan, and Sioux Falls Police Officer Jason Christensen\\narrived to provide assistance. Steen approached the driver’s side and Christensen\\napproached the passenger’s side. Steen falsely told Morales, who was driving, that\\nhis brake light was out and asked him to step out of the vehicle. For his part,\\nChristensen asked Guzman, who was sitting in the passenger seat, also to exit. When\\nGuzman obliged, Christensen saw a small plastic bag containing marijuana between\\nthe passenger seat and the doorsill. The officers placed Morales and Guzman in\\nhandcuffs. Steen and Christensen searched the minivan and found a pound of\\nmarijuana, various cell phones, cash, and a small digital scale that tested positive for\\nmethamphetamine. Searches of Guzman’s person revealed a loaded Glock 19,\\napproximately 29 grams of methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia.\\n\\n Based on this evidence, Warkenthien obtained a search warrant for, among\\nother things, Young Running Crane’s home and the Kansas-plated pickup truck\\nregistered to Guzman. A search of the home produced two pounds of marijuana and\\ntwo pounds of methamphetamine. In the pickup truck, law enforcement officers\\nfound ammunition for the Glock 19.\\n\\n A superseding indictment charged Guzman and Morales with one count of\\nconspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. It also charged Guzman with one count of using or\\ncarrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).\\n\\n On appeal, both defendants challenge the district court’s denial of their\\nrespective motions to suppress and raise various sentencing issues. Morales also\\nchallenges one of the district court’s pretrial evidentiary rulings. We address the\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fdistrict court’s denial of the motions to suppress first, followed by Guzman’s\\nsentencing challenge and Morales’s evidentiary and sentencing arguments.\\n\\n II\\n\\n “We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo but the underlying\\nfactual determinations for clear error, giving due weight to inferences drawn by law\\nenforcement officials.” United States v. Walker, 840 F.3d 477, 483 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(quoting United States v. Hurd, 785 F.3d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 2015)). “To conclude\\nthat findings of fact are clearly erroneous, the court’s review of the record should\\nleave a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,” and “the appellate\\ncourt should give particular deference to findings based upon credibility determina-\\ntions.” Prince v. Sargent, 960 F.2d 720, 720–21 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). We\\nwill affirm the denial of a motion to suppress unless the decision “is unsupported by\\nsubstantial evidence, is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or it is clear,\\nbased on the entire record, that a mistake was made.” Walker, 840 F.3d at 483.\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their\\npersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”\\nU.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure and therefore must be\\nsupported at least by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Givens, 763 F.3d 987,\\n989 (8th Cir. 2014). Reasonable suspicion exists “when a law enforcement officer\\nhas ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped\\nof criminal activity.’” Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). In deciding whether there is\\nreasonable suspicion, “an officer may rely on information provided by other officers\\nas well as any information known to the team of officers conducting the investiga-\\ntion.” United States v. Mora-Higuera, 269 F.3d 905, 910 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Thomas, 249 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2001)); see also Navarette, 134\\nS. Ct. at 1688.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f Morales and Guzman argue that Steen’s stop of the minivan violated their\\nFourth Amendment rights and that all evidence obtained as a result of that stop must\\nbe suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. They contend that they were not\\nspecifically identified as the occupants of the van before the stop, depriving Steen of\\nreasonable suspicion to believe the minivan’s occupants were engaged in criminal\\nactivity. The district court found that before agents directed Steen to stop the\\nminivan, they had “positive[ly] identifi[ed] that the occupants of the grey van were\\nin fact [Morales] and [Guzman].” This finding of fact is amply supported by the\\nrecord.\\n\\n Fair’s and Buiter’s testimony at the suppression hearing established that agents\\nidentified Morales and Guzman at various points throughout the day and specifically\\nas the two defendants drove away from Young Running Crane’s home shortly before\\nSteen’s traffic stop. According to Fair, immediately before Morales and Guzman\\ndrove to the home from the Days Inn parking lot, agents identified Morales and\\nGuzman getting into the minivan. When the minivan arrived at the home, another\\nagent identified Morales and Guzman as exiting the minivan and entering the\\nresidence. Finally, Buiter personally saw Morales and Guzman—both of whom he\\npositively identified—exit the home and get into the minivan once more, information\\nhe communicated to the rest of the surveillance team before Steen was directed to\\nmake the stop.\\n\\n In essence, Morales and Guzman ask us on appeal to disbelieve the agents’\\ntestimony, but as we have stated many times, “[a] credibility determination made by\\na district court after a hearing on the merits of a motion to suppress is ‘virtually\\nunassailable on appeal.’” United States v. Frencher, 503 F.3d 701, 701 (8th Cir.\\n2007) (quoting United States v. Guel-Contreras, 468 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2006)).\\nAccordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that law enforcement\\nofficers knew that Morales and Guzman were inside the minivan before it was\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fstopped.2 We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of each defendant’s motion\\nto suppress.\\n\\n III\\n\\n Guzman’s advisory range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was 135 to 168\\nmonths’ imprisonment for the drug offense, subject to a 120-month statutory\\nmandatory minimum. His firearms offense subjected him to an additional mandatory\\nminimum sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively as\\nrequired by statute.3 At sentencing, Guzman urged the district court to apply the\\n“rationale” of Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017), to vary below the\\n120-month mandatory minimum sentence on the drug offense by taking into account\\nthat he must additionally serve the 60-month sentence for the firearms offense. The\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Without much meaningful analysis, Morales and Guzman also contend that\\neven if they were positively identified as occupying the van before the stop, Steen\\nstill lacked reasonable suspicion to stop them. They do not dispute that Steen learned\\nthe details of the investigation from Christiansen, so we construe their argument to\\nbe that the facts Steen knew were legally insufficient to support reasonable suspicion.\\nWe reject that argument. The information provided by the CI (much of which was\\ncorroborated by the investigation team), the controlled buy between Morales and CI,\\nthe recorded conversations between the two, and the investigation team’s own\\nobservations gave Steen reasonable suspicion to believe Morales and Guzman were\\nengaged in drug-related criminal activity. See, e.g., Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687–92\\n(reaffirming the well-established rule that even the statements of an anonymous\\ntipster can provide reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of a car);\\nUnited States v. Caswell, 436 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that an\\nofficer may use a reliable confidential informant’s tip to establish the more\\ndemanding standard of probable cause).\\n 3\\n Under § 924(c), a separate term of imprisonment must be imposed where the\\ndefendant, “during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries\\na firearm.” This separate term is “in addition to the punishment provided for such\\n. . . drug trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); see also id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fdistrict court rejected Guzman’s argument but varied downward to the statutory\\nminimum on the drug offense and imposed a total sentence of 180 months.\\n\\n On appeal, Guzman argues that the district court misinterpreted Dean in\\nconcluding that the court lacked the authority to vary below the statutory minimum\\non the drug offense. The government counters that Guzman’s challenge is barred by\\nthe appeal waiver in his plea agreement. Guzman acknowledges that his plea\\nagreement waived “his right to appeal any non-jurisdictional issues,” except, as\\nrelevant here, a sentencing decision involving an upward departure or upward\\nvariance. But he contends that the government forfeited its right to enforce the appeal\\nwaiver by failing to object at the district court when Guzman “preserve[d]” the Dean\\nissue for appeal.\\n\\n Courts seem to disagree on whether the government forfeits its right to enforce\\nan appeal waiver if it fails to object before the district court to a defendant’s intent to\\nappeal or the district court’s advisement that the defendant retains the right to appeal.\\nCompare United States v. Alford, 147 F. App’x 45, 49 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding\\nthat the government did not forfeit right, as “the district court does not decide the\\neffect of any waiver on appellate rights—[the court of appeals] does”), with United\\nStates v. Mercado, 525 F. App’x 574, 575 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he government\\nforfeited its right to enforce the waiver by failing to object to the district court’s\\nunqualified advisement that [defendant] retained the right to appeal the court’s\\njudgment.”). We decline to weigh in here, because, assuming for the sake of\\nargument that the government forfeited its right to enforce the appeal waiver,\\nGuzman’s sentencing challenge fails on the merits.\\n\\n Contrary to Guzman’s contentions, Dean does not authorize district courts to\\nimpose a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum. Dean merely held that\\ncourts can consider the § 924(c) mandatory consecutive sentence when deciding\\nwhether to vary downward from the Guidelines range applicable to the other counts\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fof conviction. 137 S. Ct. at 1176–77. Therefore, Dean has no application here. We\\naccordingly affirm Guzman’s sentence.\\n\\n IV\\n\\n A\\n\\n Morales first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion under Federal\\nRules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 to exclude at trial evidence of uncharged conduct,\\nspecifically, that he possessed, used, accessed, or sold marijuana and firearms. The\\ndistrict court agreed with the government that evidence referencing Guzman’s Glock\\n19 and a different gun that another co-conspirator allegedly possessed at Young\\nRunning Crane’s home was admissible because it was probative of, and “intertwined”\\nwith, the methamphetamine conspiracy. Specifically, the district court found that\\ntestimony about those two firearms indicated that Morales sought “to keep the drugs\\nsafe” and to ensure that nothing would go “wrong” during the drug deals. The district\\ncourt did, however, preclude all other references to firearms. It also found that\\nevidence of marijuana was similarly “inextricably intertwined” with the methamphet-\\namine conspiracy, in particular because its discovery in the minivan “then led to the\\nsearch warrant of [Young Running Crane’s] residence where [officers] found\\nmethamphetamine and more marijuana.” And the district court found that any danger\\nof unfair prejudice that admission of the evidence could pose to Morales was\\noutweighed by the evidence’s probative value. On appeal, we review a district\\ncourt’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Thomas, 760\\nF.3d 879, 883 (8th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n Rule 404(b) “excludes evidence of specific bad acts used to circumstantially\\nprove a person has a propensity to commit acts of that sort.” United States v.\\nJohnson, 439 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2006). But this rule does not apply to evidence\\n“intrinsic” to the charged offense. Thomas, 760 F.3d at 883–84. “[I]ntrinsic\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fevidence[] is evidence of wrongful conduct other than the conduct at issue offered for\\nthe purpose of providing the context in which the charged crime occurred.” United\\nStates v. Campbell, 764 F.3d 880, 888 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). It “includes both\\nevidence that is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged as well as evidence\\nthat merely ‘completes the story’ or provides context to the charged crime.” United\\nStates v. Young, 753 F.3d 757, 770 (8th Cir. 2014). Intrinsic evidence need not be\\n“necessary to the jury’s understanding of the issues” to be admissible. Id. Of course,\\nwhen admitting intrinsic evidence, “[t]he dictates of [R]ule 403 must still be applied\\nto ensure that the probative value of this evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial\\nvalue.” United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986). District courts\\nhave “broad discretion” in admitting intrinsic evidence and we will reverse “only if\\nsuch evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to prove\\nthe defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” Thomas, 760 F.3d at 883\\n(quoting United States v. Katz, 445 F.3d 1023, 1029 (8th Cir. 2006)).\\n\\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting as intrinsic\\nevidence the references to Morales’s involvement with marijuana and two firearms.\\nThe district court could reasonably conclude that such evidence was “inextricably\\nintertwined” with the methamphetamine conspiracy, or that at the very least it\\ncompleted the story or provided context to that crime. See id. at 884–85 (affirming\\nadmission of evidence of defendant’s distribution of crack cocaine, although he was\\nonly charged with heroin-related offenses). At the Days Inn, Morales told the CI that\\nthere was both marijuana and methamphetamine at Young Running Crane’s home,\\nand that a co-conspirator there “ha[d] a pistol guarding the meth.” That same day,\\nagents heard that Guzman possessed a Glock 19 intended for “protection” during drug\\nsales. This fact motivated the agents, at least in part, to seek assistance in stopping\\nthe minivan with a marked patrol car. Marijuana discovered in the minivan, in turn,\\nled to the search of Young Running Crane’s home, where law enforcement officers\\nultimately found the methamphetamine. Other drug- or weapons-related evidence is\\nnot invariably admissible as intrinsic evidence in a drug trafficking prosecution, but\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fthe district court was within its discretion in admitting the evidence here. And\\n“recogniz[ing] the overall strength of the government’s case and not[ing] that this\\nevidence played only a small part,” we also conclude that the evidence was properly\\nadmitted under Rule 403. United States v. O’Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 2000).\\n\\n B\\n\\n Morales’s advisory range under the Guidelines was life imprisonment. The\\ndistrict court varied downward and imposed a 360-month sentence. On appeal,\\nMorales argues that the district court procedurally erred in calculating his base\\noffense level and in applying four sentencing enhancements. We address each of his\\nchallenges in turn, reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error and\\nits construction and application of the Guidelines de novo, United States v. Sykes,\\n854 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 2017), keeping in mind that “[t]he Government must\\nprove by a preponderance of the evidence each of the facts necessary to establish a\\nsentencing enhancement,” United States v. Razo-Guerra, 534 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir.\\n2008).\\n\\n First, Morales argues that the district court’s finding that he was responsible\\nfor 31,289.36 kilograms of marijuana equivalent, resulting in a base offense level of\\n36 under Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(2), was clearly erroneous. Before sentencing, an\\ninitial presentence investigation report (PSR) recommended a base offense level of\\n34 based on the 19,951.36 kilograms of marijuana equivalent that law enforcement\\nagents actually confiscated throughout the investigation. The government objected,\\narguing that additional quantities beyond “those amounts that ended up in the\\npossession of law enforcement” should be included in the total drug amount.\\nSpecifically, it argued that the 566.9 grams of methamphetamine (11,338 kilograms\\nof marijuana equivalent) that Morales had offered to sell the CI in April 2016 should\\nalso be included. The probation office agreed and amended the PSR, raising the total\\ndrug amount to 31,289.36 kilograms of marijuana equivalent and the base offense\\n\\n -12-\\n\\flevel to 36. Morales objected, arguing that there was “no proof” that he “had access\\nto th[at] quantity” at his April meeting with the CI.\\n\\n At the sentencing hearing, Warkenthien testified about Morales’s insistence\\nthat the CI purchase the 566.9 grams of methamphetamine. Warkenthien testified that\\nMorales pushed for the CI to buy that amount as part of Morales’s plans to sell only\\nlarge quantities of methamphetamine. According to Warkenthien, however, the ATF\\ndid not make that purchase because the Bureau’s internal rules would have required\\nMorales’s immediate arrest, effectively shutting down the investigation before agents\\ndiscovered the identity of Morales’s source. Warkenthien’s testimony was consistent\\nwith the CI’s trial testimony that Morales asked him to purchase that quantity of\\nmethamphetamine for $16,500. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the\\ndistrict court overruled Morales’s objection to the 566.9 grams and adopted the\\namended PSR’s drug quantity calculation.\\n\\n We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in including the 566.9\\ngrams of methamphetamine in the final drug amount. Under the Guidelines, even\\ndrugs that were not confiscated can be attributed to a defendant where the amount\\nseized does not reflect the scale of the offense. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5. In such a case, “the\\ncourt shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance,” id., and may\\nconsider all relevant information so long as it is sufficiently reliable, see United\\nStates v. Sicaros-Quintero, 557 F.3d 579, 582 (8th Cir. 2009). In this case, more than\\nsufficient evidence, including Warkenthien’s testimony at the sentencing hearing,\\nsupports a finding that Morales could have provided the 566.9 grams of methamphet-\\namine to the CI had the ATF agreed to purchase it.\\n\\n Based on a statement the district court made at the sentencing hearing, Morales\\nnevertheless argues that the court clearly erred in including the 566.9 grams. When\\nruling on the final drug amount, the court stated, “I find that all of the quantities set\\nforth in [the amended PSR] . . . are amounts that were actually confiscated.” But the\\n\\n -13-\\n\\fgovernment never argued that the 566.9 grams were seized. To the contrary, it\\nexpressly urged the district court to include that amount despite the fact that it had not\\nbeen confiscated. When the basis of the parties’ point of contention is this clear, we\\nwould be remiss to conclude that the district court ruled on something other than the\\nprecise issue before it. Cf. United States v. Miles, 499 F.3d 906, 909–10 (8th Cir.\\n2007) (in sentencing context, where the record made clear that district court listened\\nto parties’ arguments and considered supporting evidence, court of appeals would not\\nfind that district court failed to consider issue). There was ample evidence to support\\nthe district court’s drug quantity calculation, and its passing erroneous remark that all\\nthe drugs were “confiscated” does not alter the record on this issue. It was undisputed\\nthat the 566.9 grams were not in fact confiscated. Accordingly, we find no clear\\nerror. See United States v. Lewis-Zubkin, 907 F.3d 1103, 1104 & n.2 (8th Cir. 2018)\\n(per curiam) (affirming district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement\\ndespite the district court’s “passing remark” erroneously suggesting that defendant\\nbore the burden of proof as to the enhancement’s application).\\n\\n Next, Morales argues that the district court clearly erred in applying the two-\\nlevel enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a dangerous weapon\\n(including a firearm). For this enhancement to apply, “[t]he firearm must be\\nconnected with the criminal activity.” United States v. Savage, 414 F.3d 964, 966\\n(8th Cir. 2005). “[T]he government must show that ‘(1) the gun was possessed and\\n(2) it was not clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the drug\\noffense.’” United States v. Renteria-Saldana, 755 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 2014)\\n(quoting United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 2010)). The district\\ncourt found that two independent grounds justified the enhancement: (1) trial\\nevidence that Morales “rack[ed] a gun” in the CI’s presence at the Days Inn on\\nSeptember 22 while the two discussed the sale of drugs; and (2) officers’ discovery\\nof the Glock 19 on Guzman’s person the day of Morales’s arrest. Morales does not\\ncontest the second justification, but argues that trial evidence was “inconclusive” as\\nto the first. We need not address his argument, as Guzman’s possession of the gun\\n\\n -14-\\n\\fin the minivan Morales was driving shortly after Morales discussed that very weapon\\nwith the CI is sufficient to justify the enhancement. See United States v. Lopez, 384\\nF.3d 937, 944 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (explaining that the enhancement applies\\nif “the defendant knew or should have known based on specific past experiences with\\nthe co-conspirator that the co-conspirator possessed a gun and used it during drug\\ndeals”); see also United States v. Muniz Ochoa, 643 F.3d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 2011).\\nAccordingly, the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement.\\n\\n Morales next contends that the district court clearly erred in applying a two-\\nlevel enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2). That enhancement applies “[i]f the\\ndefendant used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use\\nof violence.” The district court found that Morales used social media messages to\\nthreaten physical violence against at least three different people; specifically, the\\ncourt found that “there [were] individuals that owed money to the defendant and . . .\\nif they didn’t pay . . . they would suffer physical violence.” Morales argues that the\\nmessages lacked credible threats and cannot be linked to the drug conspiracy. His\\narguments are belied by the record. In the messages, Morales threatened to “smash”\\nthe face of one of the recipients and, in the context of drug-trafficking activity, told\\nanother to “[g]et [his] money rite [sic]” because Morales was “trigger happy.”\\nWarkenthien testified that in at least one of the messages, Morales expressed\\ndispleasure with the recipient’s “method of dealing meth.” Based on this evidence,\\nthe district court did not clearly err in finding that Morales made a credible threat to\\nuse violence in connection with the drug conspiracy. See, e.g., Lewis-Zubkin, 907\\nF.3d at 1104 (explaining that enhancement may be applied even where the threatened\\nviolence is not ultimately carried out).\\n\\n Finally, Morales argues that the district court clearly erred in applying a four-\\nlevel enhancement under § 3B1.1(a), which applies “[i]f the defendant was an\\norganizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or\\nwas otherwise extensive.” To justify the enhancement, the government must prove\\n\\n -15-\\n\\ftwo elements: (1) that “the defendant organized or led at least one other participant\\nin the criminal activity”; and, as relevant here, (2) that “the criminal activity involved\\nat least five participants.” United States v. Musa, 830 F.3d 786, 788 (8th Cir. 2016).\\nThe district court found that Morales was a “leader or organizer” and that there were\\nfive participants involved in the criminal activity: (1) Morales, (2) Guzman, (3) a\\nthird co-defendant, (4) Young Running Crane, and (5) the source of the methamphet-\\namine. Morales challenges only the five-participant determination, arguing that\\nYoung Running Crane and his drug source were improperly classified as participants.\\n\\n The Guidelines define “participant” as “a person who is criminally responsible\\nfor the commission of the offense,” even if he or she was not convicted. § 3B1.1 cmt.\\nn.1. Importantly here, “[t]he term ‘offense’ encompasses not only the elements and\\nacts cited in the count of conviction, but also all relevant conduct constituting the\\n‘contours of the underlying scheme itself.’” United States v. Starks, 815 F.3d 438,\\n441 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Rosnow, 9 F.3d 728, 730 (8th Cir.\\n1993)). And to be “criminally responsible” under the Guidelines, an individual need\\nonly “give ‘knowing aid in some part of the criminal enterprise.’” Id. (quoting United\\nStates v. Hall, 101 F.3d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996)). Contrary to Morales’s\\ncontention, an individual need not be guilty of the precise offense of conviction—or\\neven charged—to be found “criminally responsible” under § 3B1.1. See, e.g., Starks,\\n815 F.3d at 441; United States v. Mendoza, 341 F.3d 687, 693 (8th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n The district court did not clearly err in finding that Young Running Crane and\\nMorales’s source were criminally responsible for relevant conduct. The government\\npresented evidence that Young Running Crane knowingly permitted Morales,\\nGuzman, and the third co-conspirator to store a “brick-size” quantity of marijuana—at\\nleast one pound—at her home shortly before the conspirators’ arrest. The PSR, as\\nadopted by the district court, included that marijuana as relevant conduct, which\\nMorales does not contest on appeal. See United States v. Gordon, 510 F.3d 811, 817\\n(8th Cir. 2007) (“The district court may consider as relevant conduct all drugs that the\\n\\n -16-\\n\\fgovernment shows by a preponderance of the evidence were a part of the same course\\nof conduct or common scheme as the conspiracy . . . .”). Similarly, ample evidence\\nsupports the district court’s conclusion that Morales’s source was a participant. We\\nhave held that an ongoing supplier relationship may establish participant status under\\n§ 3B1.1(a). See Sykes, 854 F.3d at 460. Warkenthien’s testimony supports a finding\\nthat Morales had an ongoing relationship with at least one source who was behind\\nMorales’s plan to sell large quantities of methamphetamine in the Sioux Falls area.\\nFor instance, Warkenthien testified that it angered Morales that the CI would not\\npurchase the 566.9 grams of methamphetamine, as Morales “was trying to show . . .\\nhis source that he could move this kind of quantity . . . in Sioux Falls, and they could\\nget rid of it and bring up large quantities quickly to make more money.” In light of\\nthis evidence, the district court did not clearly err in applying the four-level\\nenhancement under § 3B1.1(a).\\n\\n For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm Morales’s conviction and sentence.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -17-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2669,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4629236,"string":"4,629,236"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Gregory CLARK, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Austin CLARK, Deputy, in His Individual Capacity Only, Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Gregory Clark v. Austin Clark"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1324"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Colloton, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888712/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"030concurrence\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888713/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1324\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Gregory Clark\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Austin Clark, Deputy, in his individual capacity only\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: June 13, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n On January 25, 2016, Ste. Genevieve County Deputies Austin Clark (“Deputy\\nClark”) and Matthew Ballew responded to a 9-1-1 report of gunshots from the\\nvicinity of a rest area. When they arrived at the rest stop to investigate, the officers\\nencountered Gregory Clark (“Gregory”) seated at a table adjacent to the building.\\nAfter calling in Gregory’s identification, a brief, somewhat adversarial discussion\\n\\nabout Gregory’s race ensued. Gregory drove away in his vehicle after the officers\\nwent inside the building to continue their investigation. The officers then followed\\nGregory for approximately 19 miles on the highway, at which point Gregory stopped\\nhis vehicle on an exit ramp. After further discussion and investigation, Gregory was\\nallowed to leave. Gregory filed this action against Deputy Clark, alleging\\nconstitutional violations under the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and the\\nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court1 granted\\nsummary judgment in favor of Deputy Clark on all claims on the basis of qualified\\nimmunity. We affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n On the afternoon of January 25, 2016, the principal of Bloomsdale Elementary\\nSchool called 9-1-1 and reported gunshots coming from the direction of the nearby\\nwoods. Approximately 12-15 minutes later, Ste. Genevieve County Deputies Clark\\nand Ballew arrived at a rest area located about 150 yards from the school.\\n\\n Appellant Gregory Clark was the only person at the rest area at the time.\\nGregory was talking on his phone at a table when Deputy Clark and another officer\\napproached him (not in uniform, but with badges and sidearms). Assuming they were\\npolice officers, Gregory voluntarily handed the officers his driver’s license, his retired\\nmilitary identification, and his concealed carry permit. Gregory informed the officers\\nthat he was armed. The officers asked Gregory whether he had heard “anything” or\\nany “gunfire.” Gregory said that he had not. The officers then asked Gregory where\\nhe was going. He responded that he was on his way to Chicago. Deputy Clark ran\\nGregory’s identification, which came back clean. When Gregory inquired as to the\\nreason his information had been run, Deputy Clark replied that his “boss likes to\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nknow who he is talking to.” Gregory followed up by asking if “[Deputy Clark would]\\nhave done that to anyone else.” Gregory admits that his question was directed at\\nwhether he was being subjected to racial profiling. Deputy Clark responded angrily\\nby saying “don’t play the race card with me.” Without any further discussion, Deputy\\nClark handed the three cards back to Gregory and ended the encounter.\\n\\n The police officers searched for a suspect inside the building, but found no one.\\nWhen they came back out of the building, they saw Gregory driving away. The\\nofficers followed him onto the highway heading northbound toward Chicago.\\nGregory noticed the officers following him. He made a U-turn about two miles later,\\ntrying to avoid them because he “didn’t know what could happen” and “was in fear\\nof [his] life.” The officers continued to follow Gregory.\\n\\n As the officers were following Gregory, Deputy Clark observed Gregory\\nmaking “exaggerated movements,” leaning toward the passenger seat and center\\nconsole. Because Gregory’s vehicle had heavily tinted rear windows, it was difficult\\nto see exactly what Gregory was doing inside the car. After driving approximately\\nthree to five more miles, Gregory spotted several more police cars in the area so he\\nturned on his hazard lights and pulled off the highway onto an exit ramp.\\n\\n After stopping his vehicle, Gregory put both hands outside the driver’s side\\nwindow. Deputy Clark and two other officers approached the vehicle with guns\\ndrawn in the “low ready” position. Deputy Clark then raised his gun and ordered\\nGregory out of the vehicle. Gregory complied. Deputy Clark patted Gregory down\\nand another officer moved him away from the vehicle. Deputy Clark began searching\\ninside the vehicle. Gregory told Deputy Clark that the gun he had told them about at\\nthe rest area was in the center console. When Deputy Clark retrieved the gun, he\\nnoticed it was cold and missing two bullets.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n Deputy Clark questioned Gregory about why the gun was missing two bullets.\\nGregory indicated that he had not fired the weapon in years and could not explain the\\ntwo missing rounds. During this conversation, another officer examined the gun and\\nverified that it had not been fired recently. The gun’s serial number was run by\\ndispatch. When it came back as stolen, Gregory was handcuffed. Further inquiry\\nrevealed that Gregory was the person who had mistakenly reported the gun as stolen\\nwhen he had merely misplaced it, at which point the officers remaining at the scene\\nremoved the handcuffs, returned Gregory’s gun and told Gregory he was free to leave.\\n\\n Gregory sued Deputy Clark, alleging: (1) he was unlawfully seized when\\nDeputy Clark detained him at the rest area while running his identification; (2) a\\nsecond unlawful seizure occurred when Deputy Clark detained him on the highway;\\n(3) Deputy Clark used excessive force when he pointed his gun after he voluntarily\\npulled over; (4) the vehicle search was unconstitutional; (5) the theft of two bullets\\nconstituted a substantive due process violation; (6) the entire detention and inquiry\\nat the rest area was based solely on race and violated the equal protection clause; and\\n(7) the entire course of events that took place after inquiring whether he was being\\nsingled out because of his race was in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment\\nrights. Deputy Clark successfully moved for summary judgment on all counts.\\nGregory now appeals the district court’s ruling on claims (1), (2), (3), (6) and (7).\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n We review the grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity\\nde novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\\nPeterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 2014). Qualified immunity protects\\ngovernment officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does\\nnot violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable\\nperson would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting\\nHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n “[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they\\nviolated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their\\nconduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.\\nCt. 577, 589 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “For a constitutional right\\nto be clearly established, its contours ‘must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable\\nofficial would understand that what [the official] is doing violates that right. This is\\nnot to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very\\naction in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light\\nof pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.\\n730, 739 (2002) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.\\n635, 640 (1987)). See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“[Qualified\\nimmunity] provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who\\nknowingly violate the law.”).\\n\\n For Gregory to establish a § 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation, he\\nmust demonstrate a search or seizure occurred, and the search or seizure was\\nunreasonable. McCoy v. City of Monticello, 342 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2003)\\n(citing Hawkins v. City of Farmington, 189 F.3d 695, 702 (8th Cir. 1999)).\\n“Reasonableness of a seizure is determined by the totality of the circumstances and\\nmust be judged from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene, irrespective\\nof the officer’s underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 848 (citations omitted). If an\\nofficer has reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred and a subject has\\ncommitted it, the officer may detain the subject while the officer investigates that\\ncrime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).\\n\\n A. Initial Encounter\\n\\n The initial encounter at the rest stop presents no colorable claim that Gregory’s\\nFourth Amendment rights were violated. “[C]onsensual communications between\\n\\n -5-\\n\\nofficers and citizens[ ] involv[e] no coercion or restraint of liberty.” Warren v. City\\nof Lincoln, Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1438 (8th Cir. 1989). A consensual encounter\\nbetween an officer and a citizen does not trigger the Fourth Amendment. United\\nStates v. Stewart, 631 F.3d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501\\nU.S. 429, 434 (1991)). Here, a consensual encounter began with Gregory handing\\nover his identification cards without being asked to do so. This inferred consent was\\nnever explicitly revoked. Gregory never gave the officers reason to believe that he\\nno longer wished to engage in the contact. Gregory never asked for the return of his\\nidentification cards or whether he could leave. Gregory has not pointed to any\\nphysical restraint, blocking action, or other show of authority that would indicate he\\nwas not free to leave. Instead, Gregory urges us to find he was detained based upon\\nDeputy Clark’s hostility and angry tone in stating “don’t play the race card with me.”\\nThis alleged hostility occurred after Deputy Clark had handed back Gregory’s\\nidentification cards. Given the timing of when the statement was made–it was the\\nofficer’s parting words–it is of little weight when analyzing the totality of the\\ncircumstances surrounding the encounter. Because the entire interaction was\\nconsensual, there was no seizure.\\n\\n Even if we assume arguendo that the encounter was not consensual, the\\nofficers had a sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion that warranted the\\nintrusion. While a person’s mere presence in a suspicious location does not, in and\\nof itself, justify a Terry stop, Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 237 (8th Cir. 2011),\\nthe court is to “determine whether the facts collectively provide a basis for reasonable\\nsuspicion.” Stewart, 631 F.3d at 457. Here, the officers were aware that shots had\\nbeen fired in the vicinity of the rest area. Gregory was the only person visible outside\\nthe rest area. Gregory volunteered that he had a permit to carry a gun and that he\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nactually had one in his possession.2 Taken in aggregate, these facts would give an\\nobjectively reasonable officer articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.\\n\\n B. Second Encounter\\n\\n Although a number of facts surrounding the second highway encounter are\\ndisputed, Gregory acknowledged that a “detention did not occur when [he] first\\npulled over his car because he pulled over voluntarily.” (Appellant’s Br. 34). The\\nparties have debated extensively whether there was anything unusual about the\\nmanner or speed in which Gregory left the rest area, or whether there was excessive\\nmovement inside Gregory’s truck while he was driving, or whether Deputy Clark had\\nthe ability to observe Gregory’s movement inside the truck. Because Deputy Clark\\ndid not conduct a traffic stop of Gregory’s vehicle, these disputed issues are\\ninsignificant to the particular constitutional issue before us, and resolution of all of\\nthem in Gregory’s favor would not establish a constitutional violation. The disputed\\nseizure implicating the Fourth Amendment occurred when officers, with guns drawn,\\nordered Gregory out of his car after he stopped voluntarily on the exit ramp.\\n\\n To justify an investigative seizure under Terry v. Ohio, a “police officer must\\nbe able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational\\ninferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the intrusion. 392 U.S. at 21. When\\nGregory stopped his vehicle, Deputy Clark knew Gregory had a firearm, but was\\nunsure whether it had been fired recently. After searching the building and grounds\\nof the rest area and failing to find anyone else present, Deputy Clark had reason to\\nfollow up with Gregory about inspecting the gun that Gregory told him he had in his\\npossession. Gregory had informed the officers that he was traveling to Chicago, but\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The officers likely could have immediately completed their investigation of\\nGregory if they would have asked to inspect Gregory’s gun at the rest area. The fact\\nthat they did not do so, however, does not affect the reasonable suspicion analysis.\\n -7-\\n\\ninexplicably made a U-turn in the opposite direction while being followed by police.\\nFinally, Gregory pulled over and put his hands outside the driver’s side window.\\nWhile this is entirely consistent with Gregory’s perspective that he was complying\\nfor his own safety, the act is also unusual and may be indicative of guilty conduct.\\nAt the time Gregory stopped his vehicle, police officers had reasonable and\\narticulable suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot.\\n\\n During the investigative seizure, Deputy Clark investigated the gun quickly and\\nefficiently, and the period of detention lasted no longer than necessary to effectuate\\nthe investigation. While Gregory was handcuffed when the officers received\\ninformation that the firearm had been reported stolen, they were removed as soon as\\nthe officers learned that Gregory was the person who had reported the firearm stolen.\\nHandcuffing was a reasonable precaution and did not elevate the Terry stop to an\\narrest. United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006). The seizure of\\nGregory on the highway exit ramp did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment and\\nwas reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.\\n\\n C. Excessive Force\\n\\n “The right to be free from excessive force in the context of an arrest is a clearly\\nestablished right under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable\\nseizures.” Ngo v. Storlie, 495 F.3d 597, 604 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Samuelson v.\\nCity of New Ulm, 455 F.3d 871, 877 (8th Cir. 2006)). “In determining whether a\\nparticular use of force was excessive, we consider whether it was objectively\\nreasonable under the circumstances, ‘rely[ing] on the perspective of a reasonable\\nofficer present at the scene rather than the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Perry v.\\nWoodruff County Sheriff Dept., 858 F.3d 1141, 1145 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted) (quoting Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir.\\n2012)).\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\n We have previously found police officers were entitled to qualified immunity\\nwhen they pointed a gun at a suspect during a pursuit. See Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d\\n155 (8th Cir. 1995). In Edwards, we held that the pointing of a gun did not constitute\\nan assertion of authority for Fourth Amendment purposes where the display did not\\ncause the suspect to submit to the police officer’s authority and, therefore, no seizure\\noccurred. 51 F.3d at 157. Here, like in Edwards, Gregory submitted to Deputy\\nClark’s authority before the gun was drawn.\\n\\n Gregory relies on cases from this circuit and other circuits that have found that\\npointing a gun may constitute an unconstitutional display of force. E.g., Rochell v.\\nCity of Springdale Police Dep’t, No. 17-3608, 2019 WL 1859237 (8th Cir. Apr. 25,\\n2019); Wilson v. Lamp, 901 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2018); Mlodzinski v. Lewis, 648 F.3d\\n24, 38 (1st Cir. 2011); Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1192-\\n93 (10th Cir. 2001). Those cases are not analogous to the circumstances confronting\\nthe officers in this case. They involve incidents where guns were pointed at suspects\\nfor unreasonably long periods of time, well after the police had taken control of the\\nsituation. In this case, Gregory signaled compliance by putting his hands out the\\ndriver’s side window. A reasonable officer was justified in believing the situation\\nwas not fully under control until Gregory had been removed from the vehicle, patted\\ndown, and restrained. When Gregory stopped his vehicle, officers knew Gregory had\\na weapon, were aware that he had been the only identified person present in an area\\nwhere shots had reportedly been fired, and had reason to believe he might be a\\nsuspect attempting to evade capture. Under these circumstances, pointing a firearm\\nat Gregory for a few seconds while removing him from his vehicle did not constitute\\nexcessive force, and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.\\n\\n D. Equal Protection\\n\\n To prove an equal protection claim in the context of a police interaction,\\nGregory must prove that the officer exercised his discretion to enforce a law solely\\n\\n -9-\\n\\non the basis of race. Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2003).\\nThis requires a showing of both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. Id.\\n(citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)). “[E]ncounters with\\nofficers may violate the Equal Protection Clause when initiated solely based on racial\\nconsiderations.” United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing\\nUnited States v. Woods, 213 F.3d 1021, 1022-23 (8th Cir. 2000)). “When the claim\\nis selective enforcement of the traffic laws or a racially-motivated arrest, the plaintiff\\nmust normally prove that similarly situated individuals were not stopped or arrested\\nin order to show the requisite discriminatory effect and purpose.” Johnson, 326 F.3d\\nat 1000 (citing Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 634-48 (7th Cir. 2001);\\nGardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000)).\\n\\n Gregory has not provided sufficient evidence to raise a fact question about\\nwhether he was singled out for investigation because of his race. He has presented\\nno evidence to establish that similarly situated individuals were not stopped or\\ninvestigated. He has not identified any “affirmative evidence from which a jury could\\nfind that [Gregory] has carried his . . . burden of proving the pertinent motive.”\\nCrawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,\\nInc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986)). While the statement “don’t play the race card\\nwith me” may have been hostile and unprofessional, it does not, alone, carry the\\nburden of showing racial discrimination on Deputy Clark’s part–particularly so when\\nthe alleged discriminatory acts are consistent with legitimate police work.\\n\\n E. First Amendment Retaliation\\n\\n To properly state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, Gregory is required\\nto show “a causal connection between a defendant’s retaliatory animus and [his]\\nsubsequent injury.” Osborne v. Grussing, 477 F.3d 1002, 1005 (8th Cir. 2007)\\n(quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006)). As discussed above, the\\ninitial encounter was consensual and Deputy Clark had sufficient reasonable and\\n\\n -10-\\n\\narticulable suspicion to conduct an investigative seizure of Gregory. In light of\\nDeputy Clark’s legitimate motive to investigate, Clark has failed to draw the requisite\\ncausal connection to state a First Amendment retaliation claim.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406489/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge, concurring.\\n\\n I concur in the court’s holding that the district court properly granted summary\\njudgment in favor of Deputy Clark, as he lacked “fair notice” of his conduct’s\\nunlawfulness. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1158 (2018) (per curiam)\\n(explaining that qualified immunity protects officers lacking “fair notice” of their\\nconduct’s unconstitutionality). I write separately to express my disagreement with\\nthe court’s conclusion that Deputy Clark had reasonable suspicion to stop Gregory\\nafter Gregory departed from the rest area. While Deputy Clark may have had\\nreasonable suspicion to stop Gregory at the rest area had Gregory not consented to a\\nsearch, that reasonable suspicion did not extend beyond that interaction.\\n\\n “A seizure may be accomplished either by physical restraint or by sufficient\\nshow of authority. The Terry seizure requirement is fulfilled when it is apparent from\\nthe circumstances that the individual was not free to ignore the officer and proceed\\non his way.” United States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d 1286, 1288–89 (8th Cir. 1979)\\n(cleaned up).\\n\\n [I]n determining whether [a] seizure and search were unreasonable, this\\n court looks at whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,\\n and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances\\n which justified the interference in the first place. The search must be\\n\\n -11-\\n\\n strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its\\n initiation permissible.\\n\\nWilson v. Lamp, 901 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).\\n\\n The court identifies (1) Deputy Clark knowing that Gregory had a gun and his\\ndesire to inspect that gun, (2) Gregory making a U-turn on the highway and, (3)\\nGregory pulling over and putting his hands out his truck’s window as supporting\\nDeputy Clark’s reasonable suspicion.\\n\\n However, Gregory’s U-turn and surrender are particularly unsatisfactory bases\\nfor reasonable suspicion. By leaving Gregory without instructions to remain and\\nmoving to inspect the restrooms, Deputy Clark objectively indicated that the\\nencounter had ended. Gregory left the rest area, reasonably believing his interaction\\nwith Deputy Clark had ended. Likewise, after the encounter had ended, Gregory\\ncould legitimately avoid further interactions with police. See Florida v. Royer, 460\\nU.S. 491, 498 (1983); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 131 (2000)\\n(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that “[f]light to\\nescape police detection . . . may have an entirely innocent motivation”).\\nNevertheless, Deputy Clark followed Gregory for 19 miles—including across an\\noverpass after Gregory made a U-turn. Shortly after making the U-turn, Gregory\\nnoticed “police cars all over the area,” Appellant’s Br. at 12, and observed police cars\\n“positioned” at an exit he was nearing, Mem. & Order at 3, Gregory Clark v. Austin\\nClark, No. 1:16-cv-00094-AGF (E.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2018), ECF No. 62; see also\\nGregory Clark Depo. at 138, Gregory Clark v. Austin Clark, No. 1:16-cv-00094-AGF\\n(E.D. Mo. Oct. 23, 2017), ECF No. 49-5 (testifying that he pulled over after\\nobserving police cars in front of him on the exit overpass while being followed by\\nDeputy Clark). Afraid, and sensing from this “show of authority” that he “was not\\nfree to . . . proceed on his way,” Palmer, 603 F.2d at 1289, Gregory eventually\\nstopped at an exit. Many reasonable people traveling between states would be\\n\\n -12-\\n\\nunnerved by having local police follow and surround them on the highway. See\\nUnited States v. Peters, 10 F.3d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a\\nnervous reaction to being followed and stared at by an officer after having already\\nbeen searched and released was insufficient to support finding reasonable suspicion).\\nThis does not resemble a typical stop by police for a driving violation. Nervousness\\nin this scenario could easily reflect a cautious consciousness of an imminent\\nconfrontation rather than a guilty conscience. Furthermore, “[r]easonable suspicion\\ncannot be manufactured by the police themselves.” United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d\\n820, 829 (8th Cir. 2002).\\n\\n Without Deputy Clark’s interaction with Gregory at the rest area, Gregory\\nwould have been just another traveler. Therefore, for the stop at the exit to have been\\nreasonable, the circumstances at the rest area must have “justified [Deputy Clark’s]\\ninterference” with Clark, because a “search must be strictly tied to and justified by the\\ncircumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” See Wilson, 901 F.3d at 986\\n(internal quotations removed). While I agree that Deputy Clark likely had reasonable\\nsuspicion for a stop at the rest area, the question is close. Gregory was present near\\nthe crime scene, and, being armed, had had the ability to commit the crime. However,\\nas the court notes, Gregory cooperated with police at the rest area, answering officers’\\nquestions and voluntarily providing them with his military identification and\\nconcealed carry permit. Furthermore, the caller from the school had not provided a\\ndescription of the alleged shooter, and Gregory was not engaging in any suspicious\\nactivity when approached by Deputy Clark. C.f. United States v. Quinn, 812 F.3d 694\\n(8th Cir. 2016) (finding reasonable suspicion where suspect was not only one of the\\nonly people in proximity to the crime scene but also matched a description of the\\nperpetrator and acted suspiciously when approached by police). Considering the\\ncloseness of the reasonable suspicion question at the rest stop, Deputy Clark’s\\nargument that Gregory’s behavior on the highway augmented the suspicion he\\ndeveloped at the rest area is weak. Gregory’s behavior on the highway was a natural\\nreaction to being followed and surrounded by police, not behavior likely indicative\\n\\n -13-\\n\\nof a guilty conscience or criminal activity. With no relevant additional information\\nto suggest that Gregory had in fact been the shooter at the rest area, Deputy Clark’s\\ndecision to stop Gregory at the exit after following him for 19 miles was not\\n“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in\\nthe first place,” or “strictly tied” to those circumstances. See Wilson, 901 F.3d at 986\\n(internal quotations omitted).\\n\\n Neither does Deputy Clark’s desire “to follow up with Gregory about\\ninspecting the gun,” justify the stop. See supra Part II.B. The Fourth Amendment’s\\nprotections are not so easily undermined by second thoughts. See United States v.\\nGarcia, 23 F.3d 1331, 1335–36 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding officer lacked reasonable\\nsuspicion for a second stop where officer released suspects after deciding not to hold\\nthem pending the arrival of backup).\\n\\n Considering the totality of the circumstances, I conclude that Deputy Clark\\nlacked reasonable suspicion for the exit stop and therefore violated Gregory’s Fourth\\nAmendment rights.\\n\\n Nevertheless, that right was not established in a “particularized sense,” as of\\nJanuary 2016. See Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1999). For the\\nreasons stated by the court in Part II.B. of this opinion, Deputy Clark could have\\nreasonably believed that he had the authority to conduct the stop at the exit.\\nConsequently, the district court properly granted summary judgment in Deputy\\nClark’s favor.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406489/\", \"author_raw\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629236/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Gregory CLARK, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Austin CLARK, Deputy, in His Individual Capacity Only, Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-13\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1324\n ___________________________\n\n Gregory Clark\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Austin Clark, Deputy, in his individual capacity only\n\n Defendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\n Filed: June 13, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\n\n On January 25, 2016, Ste. Genevieve County Deputies Austin Clark (“Deputy\nClark”) and Matthew Ballew responded to a 9-1-1 report of gunshots from the\nvicinity of a rest area. When they arrived at the rest stop to investigate, the officers\nencountered Gregory Clark (“Gregory”) seated at a table adjacent to the building.\nAfter calling in Gregory’s identification, a brief, somewhat adversarial discussion\n\nabout Gregory’s race ensued. Gregory drove away in his vehicle after the officers\nwent inside the building to continue their investigation. The officers then followed\nGregory for approximately 19 miles on the highway, at which point Gregory stopped\nhis vehicle on an exit ramp. After further discussion and investigation, Gregory was\nallowed to leave. Gregory filed this action against Deputy Clark, alleging\nconstitutional violations under the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and the\nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court1 granted\nsummary judgment in favor of Deputy Clark on all claims on the basis of qualified\nimmunity. We affirm.\n\nI. Background\n\n On the afternoon of January 25, 2016, the principal of Bloomsdale Elementary\nSchool called 9-1-1 and reported gunshots coming from the direction of the nearby\nwoods. Approximately 12-15 minutes later, Ste. Genevieve County Deputies Clark\nand Ballew arrived at a rest area located about 150 yards from the school.\n\n Appellant Gregory Clark was the only person at the rest area at the time.\nGregory was talking on his phone at a table when Deputy Clark and another officer\napproached him (not in uniform, but with badges and sidearms). Assuming they were\npolice officers, Gregory voluntarily handed the officers his driver’s license, his retired\nmilitary identification, and his concealed carry permit. Gregory informed the officers\nthat he was armed. The officers asked Gregory whether he had heard “anything” or\nany “gunfire.” Gregory said that he had not. The officers then asked Gregory where\nhe was going. He responded that he was on his way to Chicago. Deputy Clark ran\nGregory’s identification, which came back clean. When Gregory inquired as to the\nreason his information had been run, Deputy Clark replied that his “boss likes to\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the\nEastern District of Missouri.\n\n -2-\n\nknow who he is talking to.” Gregory followed up by asking if “[Deputy Clark would]\nhave done that to anyone else.” Gregory admits that his question was directed at\nwhether he was being subjected to racial profiling. Deputy Clark responded angrily\nby saying “don’t play the race card with me.” Without any further discussion, Deputy\nClark handed the three cards back to Gregory and ended the encounter.\n\n The police officers searched for a suspect inside the building, but found no one.\nWhen they came back out of the building, they saw Gregory driving away. The\nofficers followed him onto the highway heading northbound toward Chicago.\nGregory noticed the officers following him. He made a U-turn about two miles later,\ntrying to avoid them because he “didn’t know what could happen” and “was in fear\nof [his] life.” The officers continued to follow Gregory.\n\n As the officers were following Gregory, Deputy Clark observed Gregory\nmaking “exaggerated movements,” leaning toward the passenger seat and center\nconsole. Because Gregory’s vehicle had heavily tinted rear windows, it was difficult\nto see exactly what Gregory was doing inside the car. After driving approximately\nthree to five more miles, Gregory spotted several more police cars in the area so he\nturned on his hazard lights and pulled off the highway onto an exit ramp.\n\n After stopping his vehicle, Gregory put both hands outside the driver’s side\nwindow. Deputy Clark and two other officers approached the vehicle with guns\ndrawn in the “low ready” position. Deputy Clark then raised his gun and ordered\nGregory out of the vehicle. Gregory complied. Deputy Clark patted Gregory down\nand another officer moved him away from the vehicle. Deputy Clark began searching\ninside the vehicle. Gregory told Deputy Clark that the gun he had told them about at\nthe rest area was in the center console. When Deputy Clark retrieved the gun, he\nnoticed it was cold and missing two bullets.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\n Deputy Clark questioned Gregory about why the gun was missing two bullets.\nGregory indicated that he had not fired the weapon in years and could not explain the\ntwo missing rounds. During this conversation, another officer examined the gun and\nverified that it had not been fired recently. The gun’s serial number was run by\ndispatch. When it came back as stolen, Gregory was handcuffed. Further inquiry\nrevealed that Gregory was the person who had mistakenly reported the gun as stolen\nwhen he had merely misplaced it, at which point the officers remaining at the scene\nremoved the handcuffs, returned Gregory’s gun and told Gregory he was free to leave.\n\n Gregory sued Deputy Clark, alleging: (1) he was unlawfully seized when\nDeputy Clark detained him at the rest area while running his identification; (2) a\nsecond unlawful seizure occurred when Deputy Clark detained him on the highway;\n(3) Deputy Clark used excessive force when he pointed his gun after he voluntarily\npulled over; (4) the vehicle search was unconstitutional; (5) the theft of two bullets\nconstituted a substantive due process violation; (6) the entire detention and inquiry\nat the rest area was based solely on race and violated the equal protection clause; and\n(7) the entire course of events that took place after inquiring whether he was being\nsingled out because of his race was in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment\nrights. Deputy Clark successfully moved for summary judgment on all counts.\nGregory now appeals the district court’s ruling on claims (1), (2), (3), (6) and (7).\n\nII. Discussion\n\n We review the grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity\nde novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\nPeterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 2014). Qualified immunity protects\ngovernment officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does\nnot violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable\nperson would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting\nHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).\n\n -4-\n\n “[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they\nviolated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their\nconduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.\nCt. 577, 589 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “For a constitutional right\nto be clearly established, its contours ‘must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable\nofficial would understand that what [the official] is doing violates that right. This is\nnot to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very\naction in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light\nof pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.\n730, 739 (2002) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.\n635, 640 (1987)). See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“[Qualified\nimmunity] provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who\nknowingly violate the law.”).\n\n For Gregory to establish a § 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation, he\nmust demonstrate a search or seizure occurred, and the search or seizure was\nunreasonable. McCoy v. City of Monticello, 342 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2003)\n(citing Hawkins v. City of Farmington, 189 F.3d 695, 702 (8th Cir. 1999)).\n“Reasonableness of a seizure is determined by the totality of the circumstances and\nmust be judged from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene, irrespective\nof the officer’s underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 848 (citations omitted). If an\nofficer has reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred and a subject has\ncommitted it, the officer may detain the subject while the officer investigates that\ncrime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).\n\n A. Initial Encounter\n\n The initial encounter at the rest stop presents no colorable claim that Gregory’s\nFourth Amendment rights were violated. “[C]onsensual communications between\n\n -5-\n\nofficers and citizens[ ] involv[e] no coercion or restraint of liberty.” Warren v. City\nof Lincoln, Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1438 (8th Cir. 1989). A consensual encounter\nbetween an officer and a citizen does not trigger the Fourth Amendment. United\nStates v. Stewart, 631 F.3d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501\nU.S. 429, 434 (1991)). Here, a consensual encounter began with Gregory handing\nover his identification cards without being asked to do so. This inferred consent was\nnever explicitly revoked. Gregory never gave the officers reason to believe that he\nno longer wished to engage in the contact. Gregory never asked for the return of his\nidentification cards or whether he could leave. Gregory has not pointed to any\nphysical restraint, blocking action, or other show of authority that would indicate he\nwas not free to leave. Instead, Gregory urges us to find he was detained based upon\nDeputy Clark’s hostility and angry tone in stating “don’t play the race card with me.”\nThis alleged hostility occurred after Deputy Clark had handed back Gregory’s\nidentification cards. Given the timing of when the statement was made–it was the\nofficer’s parting words–it is of little weight when analyzing the totality of the\ncircumstances surrounding the encounter. Because the entire interaction was\nconsensual, there was no seizure.\n\n Even if we assume arguendo that the encounter was not consensual, the\nofficers had a sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion that warranted the\nintrusion. While a person’s mere presence in a suspicious location does not, in and\nof itself, justify a Terry stop, Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 237 (8th Cir. 2011),\nthe court is to “determine whether the facts collectively provide a basis for reasonable\nsuspicion.” Stewart, 631 F.3d at 457. Here, the officers were aware that shots had\nbeen fired in the vicinity of the rest area. Gregory was the only person visible outside\nthe rest area. Gregory volunteered that he had a permit to carry a gun and that he\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\nactually had one in his possession.2 Taken in aggregate, these facts would give an\nobjectively reasonable officer articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.\n\n B. Second Encounter\n\n Although a number of facts surrounding the second highway encounter are\ndisputed, Gregory acknowledged that a “detention did not occur when [he] first\npulled over his car because he pulled over voluntarily.” (Appellant’s Br. 34). The\nparties have debated extensively whether there was anything unusual about the\nmanner or speed in which Gregory left the rest area, or whether there was excessive\nmovement inside Gregory’s truck while he was driving, or whether Deputy Clark had\nthe ability to observe Gregory’s movement inside the truck. Because Deputy Clark\ndid not conduct a traffic stop of Gregory’s vehicle, these disputed issues are\ninsignificant to the particular constitutional issue before us, and resolution of all of\nthem in Gregory’s favor would not establish a constitutional violation. The disputed\nseizure implicating the Fourth Amendment occurred when officers, with guns drawn,\nordered Gregory out of his car after he stopped voluntarily on the exit ramp.\n\n To justify an investigative seizure under Terry v. Ohio, a “police officer must\nbe able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational\ninferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the intrusion. 392 U.S. at 21. When\nGregory stopped his vehicle, Deputy Clark knew Gregory had a firearm, but was\nunsure whether it had been fired recently. After searching the building and grounds\nof the rest area and failing to find anyone else present, Deputy Clark had reason to\nfollow up with Gregory about inspecting the gun that Gregory told him he had in his\npossession. Gregory had informed the officers that he was traveling to Chicago, but\n\n\n 2\n The officers likely could have immediately completed their investigation of\nGregory if they would have asked to inspect Gregory’s gun at the rest area. The fact\nthat they did not do so, however, does not affect the reasonable suspicion analysis.\n -7-\n\ninexplicably made a U-turn in the opposite direction while being followed by police.\nFinally, Gregory pulled over and put his hands outside the driver’s side window.\nWhile this is entirely consistent with Gregory’s perspective that he was complying\nfor his own safety, the act is also unusual and may be indicative of guilty conduct.\nAt the time Gregory stopped his vehicle, police officers had reasonable and\narticulable suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot.\n\n During the investigative seizure, Deputy Clark investigated the gun quickly and\nefficiently, and the period of detention lasted no longer than necessary to effectuate\nthe investigation. While Gregory was handcuffed when the officers received\ninformation that the firearm had been reported stolen, they were removed as soon as\nthe officers learned that Gregory was the person who had reported the firearm stolen.\nHandcuffing was a reasonable precaution and did not elevate the Terry stop to an\narrest. United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006). The seizure of\nGregory on the highway exit ramp did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment and\nwas reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.\n\n C. Excessive Force\n\n “The right to be free from excessive force in the context of an arrest is a clearly\nestablished right under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable\nseizures.” Ngo v. Storlie, 495 F.3d 597, 604 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Samuelson v.\nCity of New Ulm, 455 F.3d 871, 877 (8th Cir. 2006)). “In determining whether a\nparticular use of force was excessive, we consider whether it was objectively\nreasonable under the circumstances, ‘rely[ing] on the perspective of a reasonable\nofficer present at the scene rather than the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Perry v.\nWoodruff County Sheriff Dept., 858 F.3d 1141, 1145 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal\nquotation marks omitted) (quoting Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir.\n2012)).\n\n\n\n -8-\n\n We have previously found police officers were entitled to qualified immunity\nwhen they pointed a gun at a suspect during a pursuit. See Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d\n155 (8th Cir. 1995). In Edwards, we held that the pointing of a gun did not constitute\nan assertion of authority for Fourth Amendment purposes where the display did not\ncause the suspect to submit to the police officer’s authority and, therefore, no seizure\noccurred. 51 F.3d at 157. Here, like in Edwards, Gregory submitted to Deputy\nClark’s authority before the gun was drawn.\n\n Gregory relies on cases from this circuit and other circuits that have found that\npointing a gun may constitute an unconstitutional display of force. E.g., Rochell v.\nCity of Springdale Police Dep’t, No. 17-3608, 2019 WL 1859237 (8th Cir. Apr. 25,\n2019); Wilson v. Lamp, 901 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2018); Mlodzinski v. Lewis, 648 F.3d\n24, 38 (1st Cir. 2011); Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1192-\n93 (10th Cir. 2001). Those cases are not analogous to the circumstances confronting\nthe officers in this case. They involve incidents where guns were pointed at suspects\nfor unreasonably long periods of time, well after the police had taken control of the\nsituation. In this case, Gregory signaled compliance by putting his hands out the\ndriver’s side window. A reasonable officer was justified in believing the situation\nwas not fully under control until Gregory had been removed from the vehicle, patted\ndown, and restrained. When Gregory stopped his vehicle, officers knew Gregory had\na weapon, were aware that he had been the only identified person present in an area\nwhere shots had reportedly been fired, and had reason to believe he might be a\nsuspect attempting to evade capture. Under these circumstances, pointing a firearm\nat Gregory for a few seconds while removing him from his vehicle did not constitute\nexcessive force, and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.\n\n D. Equal Protection\n\n To prove an equal protection claim in the context of a police interaction,\nGregory must prove that the officer exercised his discretion to enforce a law solely\n\n -9-\n\non the basis of race. Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2003).\nThis requires a showing of both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. Id.\n(citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)). “[E]ncounters with\nofficers may violate the Equal Protection Clause when initiated solely based on racial\nconsiderations.” United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing\nUnited States v. Woods, 213 F.3d 1021, 1022-23 (8th Cir. 2000)). “When the claim\nis selective enforcement of the traffic laws or a racially-motivated arrest, the plaintiff\nmust normally prove that similarly situated individuals were not stopped or arrested\nin order to show the requisite discriminatory effect and purpose.” Johnson, 326 F.3d\nat 1000 (citing Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 634-48 (7th Cir. 2001);\nGardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000)).\n\n Gregory has not provided sufficient evidence to raise a fact question about\nwhether he was singled out for investigation because of his race. He has presented\nno evidence to establish that similarly situated individuals were not stopped or\ninvestigated. He has not identified any “affirmative evidence from which a jury could\nfind that [Gregory] has carried his . . . burden of proving the pertinent motive.”\nCrawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,\nInc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986)). While the statement “don’t play the race card\nwith me” may have been hostile and unprofessional, it does not, alone, carry the\nburden of showing racial discrimination on Deputy Clark’s part–particularly so when\nthe alleged discriminatory acts are consistent with legitimate police work.\n\n E. First Amendment Retaliation\n\n To properly state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, Gregory is required\nto show “a causal connection between a defendant’s retaliatory animus and [his]\nsubsequent injury.” Osborne v. Grussing, 477 F.3d 1002, 1005 (8th Cir. 2007)\n(quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006)). As discussed above, the\ninitial encounter was consensual and Deputy Clark had sufficient reasonable and\n\n -10-\n\narticulable suspicion to conduct an investigative seizure of Gregory. In light of\nDeputy Clark’s legitimate motive to investigate, Clark has failed to draw the requisite\ncausal connection to state a First Amendment retaliation claim.\n\nIII. Conclusion\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary\njudgment.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Gregory CLARK, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Austin CLARK, Deputy, in His Individual Capacity Only, Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1324\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Gregory Clark\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Austin Clark, Deputy, in his individual capacity only\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: June 13, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n On January 25, 2016, Ste. Genevieve County Deputies Austin Clark (“Deputy\\nClark”) and Matthew Ballew responded to a 9-1-1 report of gunshots from the\\nvicinity of a rest area. When they arrived at the rest stop to investigate, the officers\\nencountered Gregory Clark (“Gregory”) seated at a table adjacent to the building.\\nAfter calling in Gregory’s identification, a brief, somewhat adversarial discussion\\n\\nabout Gregory’s race ensued. Gregory drove away in his vehicle after the officers\\nwent inside the building to continue their investigation. The officers then followed\\nGregory for approximately 19 miles on the highway, at which point Gregory stopped\\nhis vehicle on an exit ramp. After further discussion and investigation, Gregory was\\nallowed to leave. Gregory filed this action against Deputy Clark, alleging\\nconstitutional violations under the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and the\\nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court1 granted\\nsummary judgment in favor of Deputy Clark on all claims on the basis of qualified\\nimmunity. We affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n On the afternoon of January 25, 2016, the principal of Bloomsdale Elementary\\nSchool called 9-1-1 and reported gunshots coming from the direction of the nearby\\nwoods. Approximately 12-15 minutes later, Ste. Genevieve County Deputies Clark\\nand Ballew arrived at a rest area located about 150 yards from the school.\\n\\n Appellant Gregory Clark was the only person at the rest area at the time.\\nGregory was talking on his phone at a table when Deputy Clark and another officer\\napproached him (not in uniform, but with badges and sidearms). Assuming they were\\npolice officers, Gregory voluntarily handed the officers his driver’s license, his retired\\nmilitary identification, and his concealed carry permit. Gregory informed the officers\\nthat he was armed. The officers asked Gregory whether he had heard “anything” or\\nany “gunfire.” Gregory said that he had not. The officers then asked Gregory where\\nhe was going. He responded that he was on his way to Chicago. Deputy Clark ran\\nGregory’s identification, which came back clean. When Gregory inquired as to the\\nreason his information had been run, Deputy Clark replied that his “boss likes to\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nknow who he is talking to.” Gregory followed up by asking if “[Deputy Clark would]\\nhave done that to anyone else.” Gregory admits that his question was directed at\\nwhether he was being subjected to racial profiling. Deputy Clark responded angrily\\nby saying “don’t play the race card with me.” Without any further discussion, Deputy\\nClark handed the three cards back to Gregory and ended the encounter.\\n\\n The police officers searched for a suspect inside the building, but found no one.\\nWhen they came back out of the building, they saw Gregory driving away. The\\nofficers followed him onto the highway heading northbound toward Chicago.\\nGregory noticed the officers following him. He made a U-turn about two miles later,\\ntrying to avoid them because he “didn’t know what could happen” and “was in fear\\nof [his] life.” The officers continued to follow Gregory.\\n\\n As the officers were following Gregory, Deputy Clark observed Gregory\\nmaking “exaggerated movements,” leaning toward the passenger seat and center\\nconsole. Because Gregory’s vehicle had heavily tinted rear windows, it was difficult\\nto see exactly what Gregory was doing inside the car. After driving approximately\\nthree to five more miles, Gregory spotted several more police cars in the area so he\\nturned on his hazard lights and pulled off the highway onto an exit ramp.\\n\\n After stopping his vehicle, Gregory put both hands outside the driver’s side\\nwindow. Deputy Clark and two other officers approached the vehicle with guns\\ndrawn in the “low ready” position. Deputy Clark then raised his gun and ordered\\nGregory out of the vehicle. Gregory complied. Deputy Clark patted Gregory down\\nand another officer moved him away from the vehicle. Deputy Clark began searching\\ninside the vehicle. Gregory told Deputy Clark that the gun he had told them about at\\nthe rest area was in the center console. When Deputy Clark retrieved the gun, he\\nnoticed it was cold and missing two bullets.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n Deputy Clark questioned Gregory about why the gun was missing two bullets.\\nGregory indicated that he had not fired the weapon in years and could not explain the\\ntwo missing rounds. During this conversation, another officer examined the gun and\\nverified that it had not been fired recently. The gun’s serial number was run by\\ndispatch. When it came back as stolen, Gregory was handcuffed. Further inquiry\\nrevealed that Gregory was the person who had mistakenly reported the gun as stolen\\nwhen he had merely misplaced it, at which point the officers remaining at the scene\\nremoved the handcuffs, returned Gregory’s gun and told Gregory he was free to leave.\\n\\n Gregory sued Deputy Clark, alleging: (1) he was unlawfully seized when\\nDeputy Clark detained him at the rest area while running his identification; (2) a\\nsecond unlawful seizure occurred when Deputy Clark detained him on the highway;\\n(3) Deputy Clark used excessive force when he pointed his gun after he voluntarily\\npulled over; (4) the vehicle search was unconstitutional; (5) the theft of two bullets\\nconstituted a substantive due process violation; (6) the entire detention and inquiry\\nat the rest area was based solely on race and violated the equal protection clause; and\\n(7) the entire course of events that took place after inquiring whether he was being\\nsingled out because of his race was in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment\\nrights. Deputy Clark successfully moved for summary judgment on all counts.\\nGregory now appeals the district court’s ruling on claims (1), (2), (3), (6) and (7).\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n We review the grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity\\nde novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\\nPeterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 2014). Qualified immunity protects\\ngovernment officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does\\nnot violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable\\nperson would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting\\nHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n “[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they\\nviolated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their\\nconduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.\\nCt. 577, 589 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “For a constitutional right\\nto be clearly established, its contours ‘must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable\\nofficial would understand that what [the official] is doing violates that right. This is\\nnot to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very\\naction in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light\\nof pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.\\n730, 739 (2002) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.\\n635, 640 (1987)). See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“[Qualified\\nimmunity] provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who\\nknowingly violate the law.”).\\n\\n For Gregory to establish a § 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation, he\\nmust demonstrate a search or seizure occurred, and the search or seizure was\\nunreasonable. McCoy v. City of Monticello, 342 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2003)\\n(citing Hawkins v. City of Farmington, 189 F.3d 695, 702 (8th Cir. 1999)).\\n“Reasonableness of a seizure is determined by the totality of the circumstances and\\nmust be judged from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene, irrespective\\nof the officer’s underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 848 (citations omitted). If an\\nofficer has reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred and a subject has\\ncommitted it, the officer may detain the subject while the officer investigates that\\ncrime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).\\n\\n A. Initial Encounter\\n\\n The initial encounter at the rest stop presents no colorable claim that Gregory’s\\nFourth Amendment rights were violated. “[C]onsensual communications between\\n\\n -5-\\n\\nofficers and citizens[ ] involv[e] no coercion or restraint of liberty.” Warren v. City\\nof Lincoln, Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1438 (8th Cir. 1989). A consensual encounter\\nbetween an officer and a citizen does not trigger the Fourth Amendment. United\\nStates v. Stewart, 631 F.3d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501\\nU.S. 429, 434 (1991)). Here, a consensual encounter began with Gregory handing\\nover his identification cards without being asked to do so. This inferred consent was\\nnever explicitly revoked. Gregory never gave the officers reason to believe that he\\nno longer wished to engage in the contact. Gregory never asked for the return of his\\nidentification cards or whether he could leave. Gregory has not pointed to any\\nphysical restraint, blocking action, or other show of authority that would indicate he\\nwas not free to leave. Instead, Gregory urges us to find he was detained based upon\\nDeputy Clark’s hostility and angry tone in stating “don’t play the race card with me.”\\nThis alleged hostility occurred after Deputy Clark had handed back Gregory’s\\nidentification cards. Given the timing of when the statement was made–it was the\\nofficer’s parting words–it is of little weight when analyzing the totality of the\\ncircumstances surrounding the encounter. Because the entire interaction was\\nconsensual, there was no seizure.\\n\\n Even if we assume arguendo that the encounter was not consensual, the\\nofficers had a sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion that warranted the\\nintrusion. While a person’s mere presence in a suspicious location does not, in and\\nof itself, justify a Terry stop, Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 237 (8th Cir. 2011),\\nthe court is to “determine whether the facts collectively provide a basis for reasonable\\nsuspicion.” Stewart, 631 F.3d at 457. Here, the officers were aware that shots had\\nbeen fired in the vicinity of the rest area. Gregory was the only person visible outside\\nthe rest area. Gregory volunteered that he had a permit to carry a gun and that he\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nactually had one in his possession.2 Taken in aggregate, these facts would give an\\nobjectively reasonable officer articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.\\n\\n B. Second Encounter\\n\\n Although a number of facts surrounding the second highway encounter are\\ndisputed, Gregory acknowledged that a “detention did not occur when [he] first\\npulled over his car because he pulled over voluntarily.” (Appellant’s Br. 34). The\\nparties have debated extensively whether there was anything unusual about the\\nmanner or speed in which Gregory left the rest area, or whether there was excessive\\nmovement inside Gregory’s truck while he was driving, or whether Deputy Clark had\\nthe ability to observe Gregory’s movement inside the truck. Because Deputy Clark\\ndid not conduct a traffic stop of Gregory’s vehicle, these disputed issues are\\ninsignificant to the particular constitutional issue before us, and resolution of all of\\nthem in Gregory’s favor would not establish a constitutional violation. The disputed\\nseizure implicating the Fourth Amendment occurred when officers, with guns drawn,\\nordered Gregory out of his car after he stopped voluntarily on the exit ramp.\\n\\n To justify an investigative seizure under Terry v. Ohio, a “police officer must\\nbe able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational\\ninferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the intrusion. 392 U.S. at 21. When\\nGregory stopped his vehicle, Deputy Clark knew Gregory had a firearm, but was\\nunsure whether it had been fired recently. After searching the building and grounds\\nof the rest area and failing to find anyone else present, Deputy Clark had reason to\\nfollow up with Gregory about inspecting the gun that Gregory told him he had in his\\npossession. Gregory had informed the officers that he was traveling to Chicago, but\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The officers likely could have immediately completed their investigation of\\nGregory if they would have asked to inspect Gregory’s gun at the rest area. The fact\\nthat they did not do so, however, does not affect the reasonable suspicion analysis.\\n -7-\\n\\ninexplicably made a U-turn in the opposite direction while being followed by police.\\nFinally, Gregory pulled over and put his hands outside the driver’s side window.\\nWhile this is entirely consistent with Gregory’s perspective that he was complying\\nfor his own safety, the act is also unusual and may be indicative of guilty conduct.\\nAt the time Gregory stopped his vehicle, police officers had reasonable and\\narticulable suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot.\\n\\n During the investigative seizure, Deputy Clark investigated the gun quickly and\\nefficiently, and the period of detention lasted no longer than necessary to effectuate\\nthe investigation. While Gregory was handcuffed when the officers received\\ninformation that the firearm had been reported stolen, they were removed as soon as\\nthe officers learned that Gregory was the person who had reported the firearm stolen.\\nHandcuffing was a reasonable precaution and did not elevate the Terry stop to an\\narrest. United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006). The seizure of\\nGregory on the highway exit ramp did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment and\\nwas reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.\\n\\n C. Excessive Force\\n\\n “The right to be free from excessive force in the context of an arrest is a clearly\\nestablished right under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable\\nseizures.” Ngo v. Storlie, 495 F.3d 597, 604 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Samuelson v.\\nCity of New Ulm, 455 F.3d 871, 877 (8th Cir. 2006)). “In determining whether a\\nparticular use of force was excessive, we consider whether it was objectively\\nreasonable under the circumstances, ‘rely[ing] on the perspective of a reasonable\\nofficer present at the scene rather than the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Perry v.\\nWoodruff County Sheriff Dept., 858 F.3d 1141, 1145 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted) (quoting Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir.\\n2012)).\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\n We have previously found police officers were entitled to qualified immunity\\nwhen they pointed a gun at a suspect during a pursuit. See Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d\\n155 (8th Cir. 1995). In Edwards, we held that the pointing of a gun did not constitute\\nan assertion of authority for Fourth Amendment purposes where the display did not\\ncause the suspect to submit to the police officer’s authority and, therefore, no seizure\\noccurred. 51 F.3d at 157. Here, like in Edwards, Gregory submitted to Deputy\\nClark’s authority before the gun was drawn.\\n\\n Gregory relies on cases from this circuit and other circuits that have found that\\npointing a gun may constitute an unconstitutional display of force. E.g., Rochell v.\\nCity of Springdale Police Dep’t, No. 17-3608, 2019 WL 1859237 (8th Cir. Apr. 25,\\n2019); Wilson v. Lamp, 901 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2018); Mlodzinski v. Lewis, 648 F.3d\\n24, 38 (1st Cir. 2011); Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1192-\\n93 (10th Cir. 2001). Those cases are not analogous to the circumstances confronting\\nthe officers in this case. They involve incidents where guns were pointed at suspects\\nfor unreasonably long periods of time, well after the police had taken control of the\\nsituation. In this case, Gregory signaled compliance by putting his hands out the\\ndriver’s side window. A reasonable officer was justified in believing the situation\\nwas not fully under control until Gregory had been removed from the vehicle, patted\\ndown, and restrained. When Gregory stopped his vehicle, officers knew Gregory had\\na weapon, were aware that he had been the only identified person present in an area\\nwhere shots had reportedly been fired, and had reason to believe he might be a\\nsuspect attempting to evade capture. Under these circumstances, pointing a firearm\\nat Gregory for a few seconds while removing him from his vehicle did not constitute\\nexcessive force, and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.\\n\\n D. Equal Protection\\n\\n To prove an equal protection claim in the context of a police interaction,\\nGregory must prove that the officer exercised his discretion to enforce a law solely\\n\\n -9-\\n\\non the basis of race. Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2003).\\nThis requires a showing of both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. Id.\\n(citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)). “[E]ncounters with\\nofficers may violate the Equal Protection Clause when initiated solely based on racial\\nconsiderations.” United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing\\nUnited States v. Woods, 213 F.3d 1021, 1022-23 (8th Cir. 2000)). “When the claim\\nis selective enforcement of the traffic laws or a racially-motivated arrest, the plaintiff\\nmust normally prove that similarly situated individuals were not stopped or arrested\\nin order to show the requisite discriminatory effect and purpose.” Johnson, 326 F.3d\\nat 1000 (citing Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 634-48 (7th Cir. 2001);\\nGardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000)).\\n\\n Gregory has not provided sufficient evidence to raise a fact question about\\nwhether he was singled out for investigation because of his race. He has presented\\nno evidence to establish that similarly situated individuals were not stopped or\\ninvestigated. He has not identified any “affirmative evidence from which a jury could\\nfind that [Gregory] has carried his . . . burden of proving the pertinent motive.”\\nCrawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,\\nInc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986)). While the statement “don’t play the race card\\nwith me” may have been hostile and unprofessional, it does not, alone, carry the\\nburden of showing racial discrimination on Deputy Clark’s part–particularly so when\\nthe alleged discriminatory acts are consistent with legitimate police work.\\n\\n E. First Amendment Retaliation\\n\\n To properly state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, Gregory is required\\nto show “a causal connection between a defendant’s retaliatory animus and [his]\\nsubsequent injury.” Osborne v. Grussing, 477 F.3d 1002, 1005 (8th Cir. 2007)\\n(quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006)). As discussed above, the\\ninitial encounter was consensual and Deputy Clark had sufficient reasonable and\\n\\n -10-\\n\\narticulable suspicion to conduct an investigative seizure of Gregory. In light of\\nDeputy Clark’s legitimate motive to investigate, Clark has failed to draw the requisite\\ncausal connection to state a First Amendment retaliation claim.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2670,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4629237,"string":"4,629,237"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION; State of North Dakota, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. SANFORD HEALTH; Sanford Bismarck; Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., Defendants - Appellants. State of Minnesota; State of Alaska; State of California; State of Delaware; State of Hawaii; State of Idaho; State of Iowa; State of Mississippi; State of Massachusetts; State of Pennsylvania; Puerto Rico; State of Wyoming, Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s)."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Federal Trade Commission v. Sanford Health"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3783"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Shepherd, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3783\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Federal Trade Commission; State of North Dakota,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Sanford Health; Sanford Bismarck; Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C.,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants.\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\nState of Minnesota; State of Alaska; State of California; State of Delaware; State\\n of Hawaii; State of Idaho; State of Iowa; State of Mississippi; State of\\n Massachusetts; State of Pennsylvania; Puerto Rico; State of Wyoming,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellee(s).\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 13, 2018\\n Filed: June 13, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\fCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This is an antitrust case arising under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.\\nThe Federal Trade Commission and the State of North Dakota moved to enjoin\\nSanford Bismarck’s acquisition of Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., alleging that the merger\\nwould violate the Act. The district court1 granted a preliminary injunction after\\ndetermining that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving that the acquisition\\nwould substantially lessen competition in four types of physician services in the\\nBismarck-Mandan area. The companies appeal, and we affirm.\\n\\n Sanford is an integrated healthcare system operating in North Dakota and\\nseveral other States. In the Bismarck-Mandan region, Sanford operates an acute care\\nhospital and multiple clinics. The company employs approximately thirty-seven adult\\nprimary care physicians, five pediatricians, eight OB/GYN physicians, and four\\ngeneral surgeons.\\n\\n Sanford’s two main competitors in the Bismarck-Mandan region are Mid\\nDakota and Catholic Health Initiatives St. Alexius Health. Mid Dakota is a multi-\\nspeciality physician group that includes approximately twenty-three adult primary\\ncare physicians, six pediatricians, eight OB/GYN physicians, and five general\\nsurgeons. Catholic Health employs eighty-eight physicians, the majority of whom are\\nhospitalists; five are adult primary care physicians.\\n\\n In North Dakota, there are three leading commercial insurers: Blue Cross Blue\\nShield North Dakota, Medica, and Sanford Health Plan. Blue Cross is the largest,\\naccounting for 61% of the North Dakota health insurance market in 2016. Blue Cross\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Alice R. Senechal, United States Magistrate Judge for the\\nDistrict of North Dakota, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by\\nconsent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fhas a participation agreement with every general acute care hospital in the State and\\nwith approximately 99% of practicing physicians. Sanford and Medica accounted for\\n31% and 8% of the 2016 market, respectively.\\n\\n In 2015, Mid Dakota offered itself for sale, and both Catholic Health and\\nSanford submitted purchase proposals. Mid Dakota initially executed a letter of\\nintent with Catholic Health, but after Catholic Health terminated the deal, Mid Dakota\\nbegan negotiations with Sanford. The two entities executed a term sheet in August\\n2016 providing that Sanford would acquire the assets of Mid Dakota. Ten months\\nlater, they signed a stock purchase agreement in which Sanford agreed to purchase\\nthe outstanding capital stock of Mid Dakota. If the companies merge, then Sanford\\nwill have the following market shares in the Bismarck-Mandan region: 99.8% of\\ngeneral surgeon services, 98.6% of pediatric services, 85.7% of adult primary care\\nphysician services, and 84.6% of OB/GYN physician services.\\n\\n The Federal Trade Commission and North Dakota Attorney General brought\\nan action seeking to enjoin the merger. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that no\\nperson engaged in commerce and subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC shall acquire\\nthe stock or assets of another person if “the effect of such acquisition may be\\nsubstantially to lessen competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. The FTC alleged that Sanford’s\\nacquisition of Mid Dakota would contravene this proscription and sought an\\ninjunction under 15 U.S.C. §§ 26 and 53(b). The complaint asserted that Sanford’s\\nplan “to purchase [Mid Dakota’s] assets through two separate transactions” would\\n“violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition.” After\\na four-day evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the plaintiffs were likely\\nto succeed on the merits of their claim. The court therefore issued a preliminary\\ninjunction.\\n\\n We review the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of\\ndiscretion. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 503 (8th Cir. 2006). “An abuse of\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fdiscretion occurs where the district court rests its conclusion on clearly erroneous\\nfactual findings or erroneous legal conclusions.” Id. at 503-04. A district court may\\nenjoin a proposed merger if the FTC shows that “weighing the equities and\\nconsidering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be\\nin the public interest.” FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1051 (8th\\nCir. 1999) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)).\\n\\n To evaluate the FTC’s likelihood of success on the merits, the district court\\nemployed a burden-shifting method endorsed by the D.C. Circuit in United States v.\\nBaker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Under this approach, the\\nplaintiffs must first present a prima facie case that the merger will result in an undue\\nmarket concentration for a particular product or service in a particular geographic\\narea. That showing creates a presumption that the merger will substantially lessen\\ncompetition. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to rebut the\\npresumption, and, on a sufficient showing, back to the plaintiffs to present additional\\nevidence of anticompetitive effects. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all\\ntimes with the plaintiffs.\\n\\n The companies argue that the district court improperly shifted the ultimate\\nburden of persuasion to the defendants when it required them to produce rebuttal\\nevidence that “clearly shows” that no anticompetitive effects were likely. The district\\ncourt cited United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), where\\nthe Court said that “a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage\\nshare of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration\\nof firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that\\nit must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not\\nlikely to have such anticompetitive effects.” Id. at 363 (emphasis added). The D.C.\\nCircuit in Baker Hughes reviewed later decisions that used the term “show” instead\\nof “clearly show,” and concluded that the Supreme Court, without overruling\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fPhiladelphia National Bank, “has at the very least lightened the evidentiary burden\\non a section 7 defendant.” 908 F.2d at 990-91.\\n\\n We conclude that there was no legal error by the district court here. The court\\nfollowed the analytical framework of Baker Hughes, and specified that “[t]he FTC\\nhas the burden of persuasion at all times.” While Baker Hughes adverted to the\\nSupreme Court’s shift in terminology since the 1960s, the D.C. Circuit also\\nrecognized that “[t]he more compelling the prima facie case, the more evidence the\\ndefendant must present to rebut it successfully.” Id. at 991. In the context of this\\ncase, where the plaintiffs presented strong evidence of monopolization or near-\\nmonopolization in each service line, it was necessary for the defendants to make a\\nstrong presentation in rebuttal. We are not convinced that the quotation from\\nPhiladelphia National Bank, read in the context of the district court’s order as a\\nwhole, shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendants or required the defendants\\nto do anything more than produce evidence showing that the FTC’s prima facie case\\n“inaccurately predicts the relevant transaction’s probable effect on future\\ncompetition.” Id.\\n\\n Turning to the district court’s findings of fact, we review the court’s\\ndetermination of the relevant market for clear error. FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d\\n1236, 1239 (8th Cir. 2011). The district court first defined the four relevant product\\nmarkets as adult primary care services, pediatric services, OB/GYN physician\\nservices, and general surgeon services, and defined the relevant geographic market\\nas the Bismarck-Mandan area. The district court employed the “hypothetical\\nmonopolist test,” which is commonly used in antitrust actions to define the relevant\\nmarket. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd.,\\n778 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2015). The test asks whether a hypothetical monopolist\\ncould impose a “small but significant nontransitory increase in price” in the proposed\\nmarket. Id. If consumers would defeat the price increase by switching to products\\noutside of the proposed market, then the market definition is too narrow and must be\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fredefined. Here, the court found that “commercial health insurers would accept a\\nhypothetical monopolist’s [small but significant nontransitory increase in price] rather\\nthan market a health insurance plan in the Bismarck-Mandan area that did not include\\nBismarck-Mandan area physicians providing adult PCP services, pediatrician\\nservices, OB/GYN services, and general surgeon services.” The court’s\\ndetermination was supported by empirical analysis of claims data and testimony of\\nrepresentatives from North Dakota’s three largest insurance companies, including\\nSanford Health Plan—the insurance provider within Sanford Health’s integrated care\\nsystem. The representatives each testified that an insurance plan’s network must\\ninclude each of these services to be competitive in the Bismarck-Mandan area.\\n\\n The companies argue that the district court failed to account for Blue Cross’s\\ndominant position in the market: a provider in North Dakota, they argue, would not\\nbe able to impose a price increase on Blue Cross. In determining the relevant market,\\nhowever, the question is not whether a monopolist would increase prices on an\\ninsurer, but whether the insurer “will shift from one product to the other in response\\nto changes in their relative costs.” SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275,\\n1278 (8th Cir. 1981). When applied to a merger between health care providers, the\\nhypothetical monopolist test evaluates whether an insurer could avoid a price increase\\nby contracting with physicians who offer services that are outside of the proposed\\nservice markets or who are located in a region outside of the proposed geographic\\nmarket. See FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 342 (3d Cir. 2016);\\nHorizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.1.3 (“The hypothetical monopolist’s incentive to\\nraise prices depends both on the extent to which customers would likely substitute\\naway from the products in the candidate market in response to such a price increase\\nand on the profit margins earned on those products.”) (emphasis added). Blue Cross’s\\nalleged bargaining power would not impact its ability to find substitute physician\\nservices when facing a price increase; the undisputed testimony was that there are no\\nfunctional substitutes to a plan offering adult primary care services, pediatric services,\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fOB/GYN physician services, general surgeon services in the Bismarck-Mandan area.\\nThe court thus did not clearly err in defining the relevant market.\\n\\n The district court next found that the government made a sufficient prima facie\\nshowing because “[t]he changes in [Herfindahl-Hirschman Index] in each of the four\\nphysician service lines are well above the Merger Guidelines’ threshold for\\npresumption that the proposed transaction is likely to enhance market power.” In\\nrebuttal, the companies raised four principal arguments: (1) market concentration has\\nno relationship to bargaining power in the North Dakota healthcare market, (2)\\nCatholic Health was poised to enter the market to compete with Sanford after the\\nmerger, (3) merger efficiencies offset the potential to harm consumers, and (4) Mid\\nDakota’s weakened condition justified the merger. The district court evaluated the\\nevidence in support of these contentions and found that the FTC’s evidence still\\ncarried the day.\\n\\n The companies first argued that the ordinary presumption that increased market\\nconcentration will lead to increased prices does not apply to the North Dakota\\nhealthcare market, because Blue Cross is a dominant buyer that sets reimbursement\\nrates using a statewide pricing schedule. Even if a provider has a monopoly or near-\\nmonopoly in one region, they argue, the provider would be unable to increase Blue\\nCross’s reimbursement rates, so the merger would not impact prices. The district\\ncourt viewed this contention as a “powerful buyer defense,” and evaluated whether\\n(1) Blue Cross, as a powerful buyer, could use its leverage to sponsor entry to the\\nmarket, or (2) whether Blue Cross would be able to obtain lower prices from\\nalternative suppliers after a merger. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 8. Finding\\nthat neither was likely, the court rejected the proffered defense.\\n\\n On appeal, the companies dispute the district court’s characterization of their\\nargument as a powerful buyer defense, and complain again that the district court\\nshifted the burden of persuasion. Yet however the submission is described, the\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fdistrict court expressly placed the burden of persuasion on the plaintiffs, and found\\nthat despite the market power of Blue Cross, there was a relationship between market\\nconcentration after the merger and bargaining leverage. A Blue Cross representative\\ntestified that Sanford, after the proposed merger, would indeed have the power to\\nforce Blue Cross to choose between raising prices or leaving the Bismarck-Mandan\\nregion. And there was evidence that Blue Cross in the past was forced to modify\\ncontract terms with a near-monopoly provider in another area of the State. The\\ndistrict court did not clearly err in crediting this evidence and finding that it\\noutweighed the testimony of the companies’ expert that the merged company would\\nbe unlikely to extract higher reimbursements from Blue Cross.\\n\\n The companies also argued that Catholic Health, a competitor of Sanford, was\\npoised to enter and compete in the Bismarck-Mandan market. They contend that\\nCatholic Health’s entrance would counteract the anticompetitive effects of the\\nmerger. Entry of competitors into a market can offset anticompetitive effects,\\nhowever, only if the entrance is “timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude,\\ncharacter, and scope to deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern.”\\nHorizontal Merger Guidelines § 9; see also FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.\\n2d 34, 55 (D.D.C. 1998). The court found that Catholic Health would not be able to\\nenter the market quickly after the merger. Catholic Health’s president testified that\\nthe company faced difficulties recruiting physicians in the Bismarck-Mandan area.\\nAlthough the president testified that the company could recruit doctors to enter the\\nmarket in the short term, Appellants’ App. I, at 174, he also explained that it would\\ntake up to twice as long to establish a name and reputation that could compete with\\nSanford. Id. at 156. On appeal, the companies point to testimony that Catholic\\nHealth intended to enter the market and had recruited a top physician in Bismarck.\\nBut the district court did not clearly err in giving more weight to Catholic Health’s\\ntestimony that it could not timely compete with Sanford in the Bismarck-Mandan\\nmarket, and in finding that entry of this competitor would not come soon enough to\\noffset anticompetitive effects of the merger.\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f The companies further assert that the district court erred in evaluating the\\nquality efficiencies that would be generated by the merger. In the district court, the\\ncompanies pointed to five consumer benefits that would be available to more\\nconsumers in the Bismarck-Mandan region after the merger: (1) Imagenetics, a\\nprogram integrating genetic medicine into primary care, (2) behavioral health\\ntherapists embedded into primary care clinics, (3) cancer care trials and cancer care\\noutreach to communities outside the Bismarck-Mandan area, (4) a combined and\\ncustomized electronic medical record system that would better integrate and\\ncoordinate patient care, and (5) recruitment of subspecialists to the area.\\n\\n For these efficiencies to counteract anticompetitive effects, they must be\\nindependently verifiable and derived specifically from the merger: “[T]hey must be\\nefficiencies that cannot be achieved by either company alone.” FTC v. H.J. Heinz\\nCo., 246 F.3d 708, 721-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The district court found, however, that\\nonly the Imagenetics program was merger-specific. This putative benefit was not\\nenough to offset the anticompetitive effects of the merger, the court found, because\\n“[e]fficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.”\\nHorizontal Merger Guidelines § 10; see also Saint Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 790.\\n\\n The companies argue that the other four proposed efficiencies were also\\nmerger-specific, but the district court’s finding was adequately supported by the\\nrecord. The FTC’s expert reported that Mid Dakota could make the other quality\\ngains without the merger: he provided evidence that patient demands—not practice\\nsize—drive physician recruitment, that a combined electronic medical record system\\nwas neither required nor certain to integrate and coordinate patient care, and that Mid\\nDakota and Sanford already provided community outreach services and could expand\\nthose services without the merger. Sanford’s own executive admitted that Mid\\nDakota could employ a behavioral health therapist without the merger. The\\ncompanies argued in the district court that Mid Dakota did not offer these quality\\nimprovements, but the relevant issue was whether Mid Dakota was capable of\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fdeveloping them without the merger. On the record as a whole, the district court’s\\nfinding on merger-specific efficiencies was not clear error.\\n\\n The district court also understood the companies to raise a “weakened\\ncompetitor” defense, asserting that dim long-term prospects of Mid Dakota justified\\nits merger with Sanford. The court rejected this argument based on sufficient\\nevidence that Mid Dakota was financially healthy. Mid Dakota increased revenues\\nin the three years before the lawsuit; physician compensation was 32% above the\\nnational average; and minutes from a Mid Dakota shareholder meeting in 2015 shows\\nthat the motivation to sell was high share value, not concern about long-term\\nviability. The companies argue that they did not raise a freestanding “weakened\\ncompetitor defense,” but merely urged the district court to consider the financial\\nstatus of Mid Dakota in the context of its arguments about efficiencies and potential\\nentry to the market by Catholic Health. Assuming that is true, the district court’s\\nfindings on those asserted efficiencies were not clearly erroneous.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406490/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629237/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION; State of North Dakota, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. SANFORD HEALTH; Sanford Bismarck; Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., Defendants - Appellants. State of Minnesota; State of Alaska; State of California; State of Delaware; State of Hawaii; State of Idaho; State of Iowa; State of Mississippi; State of Massachusetts; State of Pennsylvania; Puerto Rico; State of Wyoming, Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s).\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-13\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3783\n ___________________________\n\n Federal Trade Commission; State of North Dakota,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees,\n\n v.\n\n Sanford Health; Sanford Bismarck; Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C.,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants.\n\n ------------------------------\n\nState of Minnesota; State of Alaska; State of California; State of Delaware; State\n of Hawaii; State of Idaho; State of Iowa; State of Mississippi; State of\n Massachusetts; State of Pennsylvania; Puerto Rico; State of Wyoming,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellee(s).\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 13, 2018\n Filed: June 13, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\fCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n This is an antitrust case arising under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.\nThe Federal Trade Commission and the State of North Dakota moved to enjoin\nSanford Bismarck’s acquisition of Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., alleging that the merger\nwould violate the Act. The district court1 granted a preliminary injunction after\ndetermining that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving that the acquisition\nwould substantially lessen competition in four types of physician services in the\nBismarck-Mandan area. The companies appeal, and we affirm.\n\n Sanford is an integrated healthcare system operating in North Dakota and\nseveral other States. In the Bismarck-Mandan region, Sanford operates an acute care\nhospital and multiple clinics. The company employs approximately thirty-seven adult\nprimary care physicians, five pediatricians, eight OB/GYN physicians, and four\ngeneral surgeons.\n\n Sanford’s two main competitors in the Bismarck-Mandan region are Mid\nDakota and Catholic Health Initiatives St. Alexius Health. Mid Dakota is a multi-\nspeciality physician group that includes approximately twenty-three adult primary\ncare physicians, six pediatricians, eight OB/GYN physicians, and five general\nsurgeons. Catholic Health employs eighty-eight physicians, the majority of whom are\nhospitalists; five are adult primary care physicians.\n\n In North Dakota, there are three leading commercial insurers: Blue Cross Blue\nShield North Dakota, Medica, and Sanford Health Plan. Blue Cross is the largest,\naccounting for 61% of the North Dakota health insurance market in 2016. Blue Cross\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Alice R. Senechal, United States Magistrate Judge for the\nDistrict of North Dakota, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by\nconsent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\n\n -2-\n\fhas a participation agreement with every general acute care hospital in the State and\nwith approximately 99% of practicing physicians. Sanford and Medica accounted for\n31% and 8% of the 2016 market, respectively.\n\n In 2015, Mid Dakota offered itself for sale, and both Catholic Health and\nSanford submitted purchase proposals. Mid Dakota initially executed a letter of\nintent with Catholic Health, but after Catholic Health terminated the deal, Mid Dakota\nbegan negotiations with Sanford. The two entities executed a term sheet in August\n2016 providing that Sanford would acquire the assets of Mid Dakota. Ten months\nlater, they signed a stock purchase agreement in which Sanford agreed to purchase\nthe outstanding capital stock of Mid Dakota. If the companies merge, then Sanford\nwill have the following market shares in the Bismarck-Mandan region: 99.8% of\ngeneral surgeon services, 98.6% of pediatric services, 85.7% of adult primary care\nphysician services, and 84.6% of OB/GYN physician services.\n\n The Federal Trade Commission and North Dakota Attorney General brought\nan action seeking to enjoin the merger. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that no\nperson engaged in commerce and subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC shall acquire\nthe stock or assets of another person if “the effect of such acquisition may be\nsubstantially to lessen competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. The FTC alleged that Sanford’s\nacquisition of Mid Dakota would contravene this proscription and sought an\ninjunction under 15 U.S.C. §§ 26 and 53(b). The complaint asserted that Sanford’s\nplan “to purchase [Mid Dakota’s] assets through two separate transactions” would\n“violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition.” After\na four-day evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the plaintiffs were likely\nto succeed on the merits of their claim. The court therefore issued a preliminary\ninjunction.\n\n We review the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of\ndiscretion. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 503 (8th Cir. 2006). “An abuse of\n\n -3-\n\fdiscretion occurs where the district court rests its conclusion on clearly erroneous\nfactual findings or erroneous legal conclusions.” Id. at 503-04. A district court may\nenjoin a proposed merger if the FTC shows that “weighing the equities and\nconsidering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be\nin the public interest.” FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1051 (8th\nCir. 1999) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)).\n\n To evaluate the FTC’s likelihood of success on the merits, the district court\nemployed a burden-shifting method endorsed by the D.C. Circuit in United States v.\nBaker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Under this approach, the\nplaintiffs must first present a prima facie case that the merger will result in an undue\nmarket concentration for a particular product or service in a particular geographic\narea. That showing creates a presumption that the merger will substantially lessen\ncompetition. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to rebut the\npresumption, and, on a sufficient showing, back to the plaintiffs to present additional\nevidence of anticompetitive effects. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all\ntimes with the plaintiffs.\n\n The companies argue that the district court improperly shifted the ultimate\nburden of persuasion to the defendants when it required them to produce rebuttal\nevidence that “clearly shows” that no anticompetitive effects were likely. The district\ncourt cited United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), where\nthe Court said that “a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage\nshare of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration\nof firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that\nit must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not\nlikely to have such anticompetitive effects.” Id. at 363 (emphasis added). The D.C.\nCircuit in Baker Hughes reviewed later decisions that used the term “show” instead\nof “clearly show,” and concluded that the Supreme Court, without overruling\n\n\n\n -4-\n\fPhiladelphia National Bank, “has at the very least lightened the evidentiary burden\non a section 7 defendant.” 908 F.2d at 990-91.\n\n We conclude that there was no legal error by the district court here. The court\nfollowed the analytical framework of Baker Hughes, and specified that “[t]he FTC\nhas the burden of persuasion at all times.” While Baker Hughes adverted to the\nSupreme Court’s shift in terminology since the 1960s, the D.C. Circuit also\nrecognized that “[t]he more compelling the prima facie case, the more evidence the\ndefendant must present to rebut it successfully.” Id. at 991. In the context of this\ncase, where the plaintiffs presented strong evidence of monopolization or near-\nmonopolization in each service line, it was necessary for the defendants to make a\nstrong presentation in rebuttal. We are not convinced that the quotation from\nPhiladelphia National Bank, read in the context of the district court’s order as a\nwhole, shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendants or required the defendants\nto do anything more than produce evidence showing that the FTC’s prima facie case\n“inaccurately predicts the relevant transaction’s probable effect on future\ncompetition.” Id.\n\n Turning to the district court’s findings of fact, we review the court’s\ndetermination of the relevant market for clear error. FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d\n1236, 1239 (8th Cir. 2011). The district court first defined the four relevant product\nmarkets as adult primary care services, pediatric services, OB/GYN physician\nservices, and general surgeon services, and defined the relevant geographic market\nas the Bismarck-Mandan area. The district court employed the “hypothetical\nmonopolist test,” which is commonly used in antitrust actions to define the relevant\nmarket. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd.,\n778 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2015). The test asks whether a hypothetical monopolist\ncould impose a “small but significant nontransitory increase in price” in the proposed\nmarket. Id. If consumers would defeat the price increase by switching to products\noutside of the proposed market, then the market definition is too narrow and must be\n\n -5-\n\fredefined. Here, the court found that “commercial health insurers would accept a\nhypothetical monopolist’s [small but significant nontransitory increase in price] rather\nthan market a health insurance plan in the Bismarck-Mandan area that did not include\nBismarck-Mandan area physicians providing adult PCP services, pediatrician\nservices, OB/GYN services, and general surgeon services.” The court’s\ndetermination was supported by empirical analysis of claims data and testimony of\nrepresentatives from North Dakota’s three largest insurance companies, including\nSanford Health Plan—the insurance provider within Sanford Health’s integrated care\nsystem. The representatives each testified that an insurance plan’s network must\ninclude each of these services to be competitive in the Bismarck-Mandan area.\n\n The companies argue that the district court failed to account for Blue Cross’s\ndominant position in the market: a provider in North Dakota, they argue, would not\nbe able to impose a price increase on Blue Cross. In determining the relevant market,\nhowever, the question is not whether a monopolist would increase prices on an\ninsurer, but whether the insurer “will shift from one product to the other in response\nto changes in their relative costs.” SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275,\n1278 (8th Cir. 1981). When applied to a merger between health care providers, the\nhypothetical monopolist test evaluates whether an insurer could avoid a price increase\nby contracting with physicians who offer services that are outside of the proposed\nservice markets or who are located in a region outside of the proposed geographic\nmarket. See FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 342 (3d Cir. 2016);\nHorizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.1.3 (“The hypothetical monopolist’s incentive to\nraise prices depends both on the extent to which customers would likely substitute\naway from the products in the candidate market in response to such a price increase\nand on the profit margins earned on those products.”) (emphasis added). Blue Cross’s\nalleged bargaining power would not impact its ability to find substitute physician\nservices when facing a price increase; the undisputed testimony was that there are no\nfunctional substitutes to a plan offering adult primary care services, pediatric services,\n\n\n\n -6-\n\fOB/GYN physician services, general surgeon services in the Bismarck-Mandan area.\nThe court thus did not clearly err in defining the relevant market.\n\n The district court next found that the government made a sufficient prima facie\nshowing because “[t]he changes in [Herfindahl-Hirschman Index] in each of the four\nphysician service lines are well above the Merger Guidelines’ threshold for\npresumption that the proposed transaction is likely to enhance market power.” In\nrebuttal, the companies raised four principal arguments: (1) market concentration has\nno relationship to bargaining power in the North Dakota healthcare market, (2)\nCatholic Health was poised to enter the market to compete with Sanford after the\nmerger, (3) merger efficiencies offset the potential to harm consumers, and (4) Mid\nDakota’s weakened condition justified the merger. The district court evaluated the\nevidence in support of these contentions and found that the FTC’s evidence still\ncarried the day.\n\n The companies first argued that the ordinary presumption that increased market\nconcentration will lead to increased prices does not apply to the North Dakota\nhealthcare market, because Blue Cross is a dominant buyer that sets reimbursement\nrates using a statewide pricing schedule. Even if a provider has a monopoly or near-\nmonopoly in one region, they argue, the provider would be unable to increase Blue\nCross’s reimbursement rates, so the merger would not impact prices. The district\ncourt viewed this contention as a “powerful buyer defense,” and evaluated whether\n(1) Blue Cross, as a powerful buyer, could use its leverage to sponsor entry to the\nmarket, or (2) whether Blue Cross would be able to obtain lower prices from\nalternative suppliers after a merger. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 8. Finding\nthat neither was likely, the court rejected the proffered defense.\n\n On appeal, the companies dispute the district court’s characterization of their\nargument as a powerful buyer defense, and complain again that the district court\nshifted the burden of persuasion. Yet however the submission is described, the\n\n -7-\n\fdistrict court expressly placed the burden of persuasion on the plaintiffs, and found\nthat despite the market power of Blue Cross, there was a relationship between market\nconcentration after the merger and bargaining leverage. A Blue Cross representative\ntestified that Sanford, after the proposed merger, would indeed have the power to\nforce Blue Cross to choose between raising prices or leaving the Bismarck-Mandan\nregion. And there was evidence that Blue Cross in the past was forced to modify\ncontract terms with a near-monopoly provider in another area of the State. The\ndistrict court did not clearly err in crediting this evidence and finding that it\noutweighed the testimony of the companies’ expert that the merged company would\nbe unlikely to extract higher reimbursements from Blue Cross.\n\n The companies also argued that Catholic Health, a competitor of Sanford, was\npoised to enter and compete in the Bismarck-Mandan market. They contend that\nCatholic Health’s entrance would counteract the anticompetitive effects of the\nmerger. Entry of competitors into a market can offset anticompetitive effects,\nhowever, only if the entrance is “timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude,\ncharacter, and scope to deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern.”\nHorizontal Merger Guidelines § 9; see also FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.\n2d 34, 55 (D.D.C. 1998). The court found that Catholic Health would not be able to\nenter the market quickly after the merger. Catholic Health’s president testified that\nthe company faced difficulties recruiting physicians in the Bismarck-Mandan area.\nAlthough the president testified that the company could recruit doctors to enter the\nmarket in the short term, Appellants’ App. I, at 174, he also explained that it would\ntake up to twice as long to establish a name and reputation that could compete with\nSanford. Id. at 156. On appeal, the companies point to testimony that Catholic\nHealth intended to enter the market and had recruited a top physician in Bismarck.\nBut the district court did not clearly err in giving more weight to Catholic Health’s\ntestimony that it could not timely compete with Sanford in the Bismarck-Mandan\nmarket, and in finding that entry of this competitor would not come soon enough to\noffset anticompetitive effects of the merger.\n\n -8-\n\f The companies further assert that the district court erred in evaluating the\nquality efficiencies that would be generated by the merger. In the district court, the\ncompanies pointed to five consumer benefits that would be available to more\nconsumers in the Bismarck-Mandan region after the merger: (1) Imagenetics, a\nprogram integrating genetic medicine into primary care, (2) behavioral health\ntherapists embedded into primary care clinics, (3) cancer care trials and cancer care\noutreach to communities outside the Bismarck-Mandan area, (4) a combined and\ncustomized electronic medical record system that would better integrate and\ncoordinate patient care, and (5) recruitment of subspecialists to the area.\n\n For these efficiencies to counteract anticompetitive effects, they must be\nindependently verifiable and derived specifically from the merger: “[T]hey must be\nefficiencies that cannot be achieved by either company alone.” FTC v. H.J. Heinz\nCo., 246 F.3d 708, 721-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The district court found, however, that\nonly the Imagenetics program was merger-specific. This putative benefit was not\nenough to offset the anticompetitive effects of the merger, the court found, because\n“[e]fficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.”\nHorizontal Merger Guidelines § 10; see also Saint Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 790.\n\n The companies argue that the other four proposed efficiencies were also\nmerger-specific, but the district court’s finding was adequately supported by the\nrecord. The FTC’s expert reported that Mid Dakota could make the other quality\ngains without the merger: he provided evidence that patient demands—not practice\nsize—drive physician recruitment, that a combined electronic medical record system\nwas neither required nor certain to integrate and coordinate patient care, and that Mid\nDakota and Sanford already provided community outreach services and could expand\nthose services without the merger. Sanford’s own executive admitted that Mid\nDakota could employ a behavioral health therapist without the merger. The\ncompanies argued in the district court that Mid Dakota did not offer these quality\nimprovements, but the relevant issue was whether Mid Dakota was capable of\n\n -9-\n\fdeveloping them without the merger. On the record as a whole, the district court’s\nfinding on merger-specific efficiencies was not clear error.\n\n The district court also understood the companies to raise a “weakened\ncompetitor” defense, asserting that dim long-term prospects of Mid Dakota justified\nits merger with Sanford. The court rejected this argument based on sufficient\nevidence that Mid Dakota was financially healthy. Mid Dakota increased revenues\nin the three years before the lawsuit; physician compensation was 32% above the\nnational average; and minutes from a Mid Dakota shareholder meeting in 2015 shows\nthat the motivation to sell was high share value, not concern about long-term\nviability. The companies argue that they did not raise a freestanding “weakened\ncompetitor defense,” but merely urged the district court to consider the financial\nstatus of Mid Dakota in the context of its arguments about efficiencies and potential\nentry to the market by Catholic Health. Assuming that is true, the district court’s\nfindings on those asserted efficiencies were not clearly erroneous.\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -10-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION; State of North Dakota, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. SANFORD HEALTH; Sanford Bismarck; Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., Defendants - Appellants. State of Minnesota; State of Alaska; State of California; State of Delaware; State of Hawaii; State of Idaho; State of Iowa; State of Mississippi; State of Massachusetts; State of Pennsylvania; Puerto Rico; State of Wyoming, Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s).\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3783\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Federal Trade Commission; State of North Dakota,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Sanford Health; Sanford Bismarck; Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C.,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants.\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\nState of Minnesota; State of Alaska; State of California; State of Delaware; State\\n of Hawaii; State of Idaho; State of Iowa; State of Mississippi; State of\\n Massachusetts; State of Pennsylvania; Puerto Rico; State of Wyoming,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellee(s).\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 13, 2018\\n Filed: June 13, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\fCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This is an antitrust case arising under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.\\nThe Federal Trade Commission and the State of North Dakota moved to enjoin\\nSanford Bismarck’s acquisition of Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., alleging that the merger\\nwould violate the Act. The district court1 granted a preliminary injunction after\\ndetermining that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving that the acquisition\\nwould substantially lessen competition in four types of physician services in the\\nBismarck-Mandan area. The companies appeal, and we affirm.\\n\\n Sanford is an integrated healthcare system operating in North Dakota and\\nseveral other States. In the Bismarck-Mandan region, Sanford operates an acute care\\nhospital and multiple clinics. The company employs approximately thirty-seven adult\\nprimary care physicians, five pediatricians, eight OB/GYN physicians, and four\\ngeneral surgeons.\\n\\n Sanford’s two main competitors in the Bismarck-Mandan region are Mid\\nDakota and Catholic Health Initiatives St. Alexius Health. Mid Dakota is a multi-\\nspeciality physician group that includes approximately twenty-three adult primary\\ncare physicians, six pediatricians, eight OB/GYN physicians, and five general\\nsurgeons. Catholic Health employs eighty-eight physicians, the majority of whom are\\nhospitalists; five are adult primary care physicians.\\n\\n In North Dakota, there are three leading commercial insurers: Blue Cross Blue\\nShield North Dakota, Medica, and Sanford Health Plan. Blue Cross is the largest,\\naccounting for 61% of the North Dakota health insurance market in 2016. Blue Cross\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Alice R. Senechal, United States Magistrate Judge for the\\nDistrict of North Dakota, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by\\nconsent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fhas a participation agreement with every general acute care hospital in the State and\\nwith approximately 99% of practicing physicians. Sanford and Medica accounted for\\n31% and 8% of the 2016 market, respectively.\\n\\n In 2015, Mid Dakota offered itself for sale, and both Catholic Health and\\nSanford submitted purchase proposals. Mid Dakota initially executed a letter of\\nintent with Catholic Health, but after Catholic Health terminated the deal, Mid Dakota\\nbegan negotiations with Sanford. The two entities executed a term sheet in August\\n2016 providing that Sanford would acquire the assets of Mid Dakota. Ten months\\nlater, they signed a stock purchase agreement in which Sanford agreed to purchase\\nthe outstanding capital stock of Mid Dakota. If the companies merge, then Sanford\\nwill have the following market shares in the Bismarck-Mandan region: 99.8% of\\ngeneral surgeon services, 98.6% of pediatric services, 85.7% of adult primary care\\nphysician services, and 84.6% of OB/GYN physician services.\\n\\n The Federal Trade Commission and North Dakota Attorney General brought\\nan action seeking to enjoin the merger. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that no\\nperson engaged in commerce and subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC shall acquire\\nthe stock or assets of another person if “the effect of such acquisition may be\\nsubstantially to lessen competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. The FTC alleged that Sanford’s\\nacquisition of Mid Dakota would contravene this proscription and sought an\\ninjunction under 15 U.S.C. §§ 26 and 53(b). The complaint asserted that Sanford’s\\nplan “to purchase [Mid Dakota’s] assets through two separate transactions” would\\n“violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition.” After\\na four-day evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the plaintiffs were likely\\nto succeed on the merits of their claim. The court therefore issued a preliminary\\ninjunction.\\n\\n We review the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of\\ndiscretion. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 503 (8th Cir. 2006). “An abuse of\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fdiscretion occurs where the district court rests its conclusion on clearly erroneous\\nfactual findings or erroneous legal conclusions.” Id. at 503-04. A district court may\\nenjoin a proposed merger if the FTC shows that “weighing the equities and\\nconsidering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be\\nin the public interest.” FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1051 (8th\\nCir. 1999) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)).\\n\\n To evaluate the FTC’s likelihood of success on the merits, the district court\\nemployed a burden-shifting method endorsed by the D.C. Circuit in United States v.\\nBaker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Under this approach, the\\nplaintiffs must first present a prima facie case that the merger will result in an undue\\nmarket concentration for a particular product or service in a particular geographic\\narea. That showing creates a presumption that the merger will substantially lessen\\ncompetition. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to rebut the\\npresumption, and, on a sufficient showing, back to the plaintiffs to present additional\\nevidence of anticompetitive effects. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all\\ntimes with the plaintiffs.\\n\\n The companies argue that the district court improperly shifted the ultimate\\nburden of persuasion to the defendants when it required them to produce rebuttal\\nevidence that “clearly shows” that no anticompetitive effects were likely. The district\\ncourt cited United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), where\\nthe Court said that “a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage\\nshare of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration\\nof firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that\\nit must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not\\nlikely to have such anticompetitive effects.” Id. at 363 (emphasis added). The D.C.\\nCircuit in Baker Hughes reviewed later decisions that used the term “show” instead\\nof “clearly show,” and concluded that the Supreme Court, without overruling\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fPhiladelphia National Bank, “has at the very least lightened the evidentiary burden\\non a section 7 defendant.” 908 F.2d at 990-91.\\n\\n We conclude that there was no legal error by the district court here. The court\\nfollowed the analytical framework of Baker Hughes, and specified that “[t]he FTC\\nhas the burden of persuasion at all times.” While Baker Hughes adverted to the\\nSupreme Court’s shift in terminology since the 1960s, the D.C. Circuit also\\nrecognized that “[t]he more compelling the prima facie case, the more evidence the\\ndefendant must present to rebut it successfully.” Id. at 991. In the context of this\\ncase, where the plaintiffs presented strong evidence of monopolization or near-\\nmonopolization in each service line, it was necessary for the defendants to make a\\nstrong presentation in rebuttal. We are not convinced that the quotation from\\nPhiladelphia National Bank, read in the context of the district court’s order as a\\nwhole, shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendants or required the defendants\\nto do anything more than produce evidence showing that the FTC’s prima facie case\\n“inaccurately predicts the relevant transaction’s probable effect on future\\ncompetition.” Id.\\n\\n Turning to the district court’s findings of fact, we review the court’s\\ndetermination of the relevant market for clear error. FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d\\n1236, 1239 (8th Cir. 2011). The district court first defined the four relevant product\\nmarkets as adult primary care services, pediatric services, OB/GYN physician\\nservices, and general surgeon services, and defined the relevant geographic market\\nas the Bismarck-Mandan area. The district court employed the “hypothetical\\nmonopolist test,” which is commonly used in antitrust actions to define the relevant\\nmarket. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd.,\\n778 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2015). The test asks whether a hypothetical monopolist\\ncould impose a “small but significant nontransitory increase in price” in the proposed\\nmarket. Id. If consumers would defeat the price increase by switching to products\\noutside of the proposed market, then the market definition is too narrow and must be\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fredefined. Here, the court found that “commercial health insurers would accept a\\nhypothetical monopolist’s [small but significant nontransitory increase in price] rather\\nthan market a health insurance plan in the Bismarck-Mandan area that did not include\\nBismarck-Mandan area physicians providing adult PCP services, pediatrician\\nservices, OB/GYN services, and general surgeon services.” The court’s\\ndetermination was supported by empirical analysis of claims data and testimony of\\nrepresentatives from North Dakota’s three largest insurance companies, including\\nSanford Health Plan—the insurance provider within Sanford Health’s integrated care\\nsystem. The representatives each testified that an insurance plan’s network must\\ninclude each of these services to be competitive in the Bismarck-Mandan area.\\n\\n The companies argue that the district court failed to account for Blue Cross’s\\ndominant position in the market: a provider in North Dakota, they argue, would not\\nbe able to impose a price increase on Blue Cross. In determining the relevant market,\\nhowever, the question is not whether a monopolist would increase prices on an\\ninsurer, but whether the insurer “will shift from one product to the other in response\\nto changes in their relative costs.” SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275,\\n1278 (8th Cir. 1981). When applied to a merger between health care providers, the\\nhypothetical monopolist test evaluates whether an insurer could avoid a price increase\\nby contracting with physicians who offer services that are outside of the proposed\\nservice markets or who are located in a region outside of the proposed geographic\\nmarket. See FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 342 (3d Cir. 2016);\\nHorizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.1.3 (“The hypothetical monopolist’s incentive to\\nraise prices depends both on the extent to which customers would likely substitute\\naway from the products in the candidate market in response to such a price increase\\nand on the profit margins earned on those products.”) (emphasis added). Blue Cross’s\\nalleged bargaining power would not impact its ability to find substitute physician\\nservices when facing a price increase; the undisputed testimony was that there are no\\nfunctional substitutes to a plan offering adult primary care services, pediatric services,\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fOB/GYN physician services, general surgeon services in the Bismarck-Mandan area.\\nThe court thus did not clearly err in defining the relevant market.\\n\\n The district court next found that the government made a sufficient prima facie\\nshowing because “[t]he changes in [Herfindahl-Hirschman Index] in each of the four\\nphysician service lines are well above the Merger Guidelines’ threshold for\\npresumption that the proposed transaction is likely to enhance market power.” In\\nrebuttal, the companies raised four principal arguments: (1) market concentration has\\nno relationship to bargaining power in the North Dakota healthcare market, (2)\\nCatholic Health was poised to enter the market to compete with Sanford after the\\nmerger, (3) merger efficiencies offset the potential to harm consumers, and (4) Mid\\nDakota’s weakened condition justified the merger. The district court evaluated the\\nevidence in support of these contentions and found that the FTC’s evidence still\\ncarried the day.\\n\\n The companies first argued that the ordinary presumption that increased market\\nconcentration will lead to increased prices does not apply to the North Dakota\\nhealthcare market, because Blue Cross is a dominant buyer that sets reimbursement\\nrates using a statewide pricing schedule. Even if a provider has a monopoly or near-\\nmonopoly in one region, they argue, the provider would be unable to increase Blue\\nCross’s reimbursement rates, so the merger would not impact prices. The district\\ncourt viewed this contention as a “powerful buyer defense,” and evaluated whether\\n(1) Blue Cross, as a powerful buyer, could use its leverage to sponsor entry to the\\nmarket, or (2) whether Blue Cross would be able to obtain lower prices from\\nalternative suppliers after a merger. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 8. Finding\\nthat neither was likely, the court rejected the proffered defense.\\n\\n On appeal, the companies dispute the district court’s characterization of their\\nargument as a powerful buyer defense, and complain again that the district court\\nshifted the burden of persuasion. Yet however the submission is described, the\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fdistrict court expressly placed the burden of persuasion on the plaintiffs, and found\\nthat despite the market power of Blue Cross, there was a relationship between market\\nconcentration after the merger and bargaining leverage. A Blue Cross representative\\ntestified that Sanford, after the proposed merger, would indeed have the power to\\nforce Blue Cross to choose between raising prices or leaving the Bismarck-Mandan\\nregion. And there was evidence that Blue Cross in the past was forced to modify\\ncontract terms with a near-monopoly provider in another area of the State. The\\ndistrict court did not clearly err in crediting this evidence and finding that it\\noutweighed the testimony of the companies’ expert that the merged company would\\nbe unlikely to extract higher reimbursements from Blue Cross.\\n\\n The companies also argued that Catholic Health, a competitor of Sanford, was\\npoised to enter and compete in the Bismarck-Mandan market. They contend that\\nCatholic Health’s entrance would counteract the anticompetitive effects of the\\nmerger. Entry of competitors into a market can offset anticompetitive effects,\\nhowever, only if the entrance is “timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude,\\ncharacter, and scope to deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern.”\\nHorizontal Merger Guidelines § 9; see also FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.\\n2d 34, 55 (D.D.C. 1998). The court found that Catholic Health would not be able to\\nenter the market quickly after the merger. Catholic Health’s president testified that\\nthe company faced difficulties recruiting physicians in the Bismarck-Mandan area.\\nAlthough the president testified that the company could recruit doctors to enter the\\nmarket in the short term, Appellants’ App. I, at 174, he also explained that it would\\ntake up to twice as long to establish a name and reputation that could compete with\\nSanford. Id. at 156. On appeal, the companies point to testimony that Catholic\\nHealth intended to enter the market and had recruited a top physician in Bismarck.\\nBut the district court did not clearly err in giving more weight to Catholic Health’s\\ntestimony that it could not timely compete with Sanford in the Bismarck-Mandan\\nmarket, and in finding that entry of this competitor would not come soon enough to\\noffset anticompetitive effects of the merger.\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f The companies further assert that the district court erred in evaluating the\\nquality efficiencies that would be generated by the merger. In the district court, the\\ncompanies pointed to five consumer benefits that would be available to more\\nconsumers in the Bismarck-Mandan region after the merger: (1) Imagenetics, a\\nprogram integrating genetic medicine into primary care, (2) behavioral health\\ntherapists embedded into primary care clinics, (3) cancer care trials and cancer care\\noutreach to communities outside the Bismarck-Mandan area, (4) a combined and\\ncustomized electronic medical record system that would better integrate and\\ncoordinate patient care, and (5) recruitment of subspecialists to the area.\\n\\n For these efficiencies to counteract anticompetitive effects, they must be\\nindependently verifiable and derived specifically from the merger: “[T]hey must be\\nefficiencies that cannot be achieved by either company alone.” FTC v. H.J. Heinz\\nCo., 246 F.3d 708, 721-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The district court found, however, that\\nonly the Imagenetics program was merger-specific. This putative benefit was not\\nenough to offset the anticompetitive effects of the merger, the court found, because\\n“[e]fficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.”\\nHorizontal Merger Guidelines § 10; see also Saint Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 790.\\n\\n The companies argue that the other four proposed efficiencies were also\\nmerger-specific, but the district court’s finding was adequately supported by the\\nrecord. The FTC’s expert reported that Mid Dakota could make the other quality\\ngains without the merger: he provided evidence that patient demands—not practice\\nsize—drive physician recruitment, that a combined electronic medical record system\\nwas neither required nor certain to integrate and coordinate patient care, and that Mid\\nDakota and Sanford already provided community outreach services and could expand\\nthose services without the merger. Sanford’s own executive admitted that Mid\\nDakota could employ a behavioral health therapist without the merger. The\\ncompanies argued in the district court that Mid Dakota did not offer these quality\\nimprovements, but the relevant issue was whether Mid Dakota was capable of\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fdeveloping them without the merger. On the record as a whole, the district court’s\\nfinding on merger-specific efficiencies was not clear error.\\n\\n The district court also understood the companies to raise a “weakened\\ncompetitor” defense, asserting that dim long-term prospects of Mid Dakota justified\\nits merger with Sanford. The court rejected this argument based on sufficient\\nevidence that Mid Dakota was financially healthy. Mid Dakota increased revenues\\nin the three years before the lawsuit; physician compensation was 32% above the\\nnational average; and minutes from a Mid Dakota shareholder meeting in 2015 shows\\nthat the motivation to sell was high share value, not concern about long-term\\nviability. The companies argue that they did not raise a freestanding “weakened\\ncompetitor defense,” but merely urged the district court to consider the financial\\nstatus of Mid Dakota in the context of its arguments about efficiencies and potential\\nentry to the market by Catholic Health. Assuming that is true, the district court’s\\nfindings on those asserted efficiencies were not clearly erroneous.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2671,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4629238,"string":"4,629,238"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Dan CHARLESTON, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Bill MCCARTHY, in His Individual and Official Capacity as Polk County Sheriff, Defendant - Appellee Helen Youngs, in Her Individual Capacity; Florence Buhr, in Her Individual Capacity; Bill Hansen, in His Individual Capacity; Victor J. Munoz, in His Individual Capacity, Defendants"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Dan Charleston v. Bill McCarthy"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1965"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gruender, Wollman, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1965\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Dan Charleston\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Bill McCarthy, in his individual and official capacity as Polk County Sheriff\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n\\n Helen Youngs, in her individual capacity; Florence Buhr, in her individual\\n capacity; Bill Hansen, in his individual capacity; Victor J. Munoz, in his\\n individual capacity\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: June 13, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f Following his unsuccessful bid to unseat Polk County, Iowa Sheriff Bill\\nMcCarthy, Dan Charleston sued Sheriff McCarthy and several other county\\nemployees, alleging various claims related to the treatment Charleston asserts he\\nsuffered as a result of his political beliefs and associations. After dismissing the other\\ndefendants and several claims, the district court1 granted summary judgment in\\nMcCarthy’s favor on the remaining First Amendment discrimination and retaliation\\nclaims. Charleston appeals the adverse grant of summary judgment. Having\\njurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Dan Charleston joined the Polk County Sheriff’s Office in 1997 and served as\\na sergeant in that office at all times relevant to this action. In 2008, Bill McCarthy\\nwas elected as Polk County Sheriff. He sought reelection in 2012, again running as\\na Democrat. In 2010, Charleston announced his intentions to challenge McCarthy,\\nrunning as a Republican candidate for sheriff.\\n\\n The campaign between McCarthy and Charleston was contentious, with each\\ncandidate criticizing the other. Several issues regarding Charleston’s performance\\narose. During the campaign, a sheriff’s department employee disclosed to a reporter\\nthat Charleston had been previously terminated from the Pomona, California Police\\nDepartment after the department discovered that Charleston had lied in an official\\npolice report. Additionally, in February 2012 Charleston served a two-day\\nsuspension from the Polk County Sheriff’s Department related to failure to render\\nmedical aid to a person with a medical emergency. This suspension stemmed from\\nan incident where Charleston arrived on the scene of an emergency call before\\nparamedics and observed an unconscious man bleeding from the nose; neither\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the\\nSouthern District of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fCharleston nor another deputy on the scene rendered any aid to the man, who later\\ndied. After a complaint from the Fire Chief and an investigation by the Office of\\nProfessional Standards (OPS), Charleston’s direct supervisor recommended that\\nCharleston be suspended for three days, and the next highest officer recommended\\nthat Charleston be suspended for two days.2 Charleston appealed his suspension to\\nMcCarthy, who imposed the recommended two-day suspension. A medical examiner\\nlater determined that the deceased individual would not have survived even if\\nCharleston and the other deputy rendered aid.\\n\\n During an October 2012 campaign debate, McCarthy spoke about Charleston’s\\ncampaign website referencing a group called the Oath Keepers. McCarthy described\\nthe group’s views as “about as radical as it gets” and “the kind of garbage you’re\\ngoing to get if [Charleston] is elected.” During this same debate, Charleston\\nexpressed his view that he had been intentionally left off of a promotion list and that\\nMcCarthy refused to promote Charleston due to his political beliefs. McCarthy\\nresponded that “sometimes when people don’t get promoted, there’s a reason behind\\nthat too,” but did not mention Charleston’s political beliefs.\\n\\n Sheriff McCarthy was reelected. On December 6, 2012, McCarthy held a\\n“clear the air” meeting with Charleston. Both men discussed issues that had arisen\\nduring the campaign, including Charleston’s suspension and his termination from the\\nPomona Police Department. Prior to the campaign, McCarthy had been unaware of\\nCharleston’s termination and expressed his concerns, including whether he had an\\nobligation to disclose to criminal defendants Charleston’s previous dishonesty.\\nMcCarthy also made several statements about Charleston’s continued role in the Polk\\nCounty Sheriff’s Department:\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The supervisor also recommended that the other deputy involved receive a\\ntwo-day suspension, but the deputy received no discipline because he had retired.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f You’re not going to be a shadow sheriff and be here and survive in this\\n office. You’re not going to be the spokesperson for the rank and file,\\n and you’re not going to talk against policies in this administration and\\n get by with it. I’m going to hold you accountable to the general orders,\\n and you’re going to have some difficult road ahead if you can’t fall in\\n and just act as a sergeant and support the administration.\\n\\n ***\\n\\n You’re going to be talked to by internal affairs shortly about some of the\\n things that you’ve done to undermine here since the election so you need\\n to cooperate with that, and you need to understand you’re going to be\\n held accountable to the standard that’s outlined in the rules and\\n regulations. You’re not the shadow sheriff, and I say that again, and\\n you’re not going to be viewed that way.\\n\\nMcCarthy also expressed his view that Charleston had been “a cancer [in the\\ndepartment] for 18 months.” Charleston challenged McCarthy as to whether\\nMcCarthy’s true intention was to push Charleston out of law enforcement; McCarthy\\nresponded that while he believed Charleston’s dishonesty in a police report should\\npreclude him from serving in law enforcement and that Charleston should resign, he\\nintended to allow Charleston to remain with the department, stating Charleston had\\n“a place here [in the department] if [he would] just accept the position [he had] and\\nmake the best out of that.”\\n\\n In January 2013, the Department OPS began an investigation into whether, in\\nNovember 2012, Charleston had acted improperly by directly contacting three other\\ndepartment employees and discussing union practices and officer transfers. After\\nOPS determined that Charleston’s conduct violated the Iowa Code provision\\ngoverning collective bargaining and the rights of public employees and that\\nCharleston had interfered with employees and had been untruthful during the course\\nof the investigation, three of Charleston’s supervisors recommended to McCarthy\\nappropriate discipline. The discipline ranged from counseling Charleston regarding\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fthe interference to demotion, suspension, or termination for lying and violating the\\nIowa Code. On February 15, 2013, Charleston and McCarthy met again to discuss\\nthe recommended discipline. During this conversation, McCarthy admitted that he\\nhad previously stated that Charleston was “cancerous” and “a liar,” that he did not\\ntrust Charleston, and that he wanted to “decertify,” or force Charleston out of law\\nenforcement, but maintained that these statements did not reflect McCarthy’s true\\nfeelings: “I have said those things [] but I also tell you that I have mixed feelings and\\nI maintain there is a place here for you even with that background that you have that\\nI believe should prohibit you from being in law enforcement, but you’re here.”\\nMcCarthy went on to state,\\n\\n I don’t want to be unfair with you either and I want to give you an\\n opportunity to have this job and flourish, you’ve got the job, it’s your\\n job, it’s not my job, but you’re not going to maintain that job if you can’t\\n act supportive [in] particularly in the role that you’ve got as a\\n supervisor. You’re not going to be the representative of the rank and\\n file, you’re not going to run your own Sheriff’s Department and you’re\\n not going to constantly try to undermine, for whatever purposes that you\\n have in mind or have had in mind, to try to undermine the direction of\\n this administration and be successful.\\n\\n Following this meeting, McCarthy issued a letter of reprimand to Charleston.\\nThe letter of reprimand stated that Charleston violated the Sheriff’s Office General\\nOrders concerning harmony in the office. The reprimand noted that, during the OPS\\ninvestigation, Charleston stated repeatedly that he could not remember or recall key\\ndetails and conversations and claimed to be able to remember only comments or\\nstatements that reflected positively on Charleston. The reprimand stated that\\nCharleston had been less than credible, that his answers were evasive, and that he did\\nnot cooperate with the OPS investigation. The reprimand constituted formal\\ndiscipline and was placed in his personnel file, but did not have any impact on\\nCharleston’s salary.\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f On March 9, 2013, McCarthy transferred Charleston from the Patrol Division\\nto the Transport Division. McCarthy stated that this was, in part, an effort to alleviate\\nhis concerns about Charleston’s credibility in view of his previous termination for\\ndishonesty and his dishonest and uncooperative behavior during the OPS\\ninvestigation. The Transport Division coordinated and handled prisoner transport.\\nCharleston’s position within the Transport Division required him to work regular\\nbusiness hours; he experienced no change in pay from the Patrol Division; he\\nsupervised 4 employees in Transport while he had previously supervised 12 in Patrol;\\nand Charleston no longer had a patrol vehicle.\\n\\n Charleston filed this action in April 2014, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\\nalleging First Amendment, due process, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against\\nMcCarthy and four other county employees, including one sheriff’s department\\nemployee and three Polk County Civil Service Commissioners who were involved in\\npromotions within the sheriff’s department. After the district court dismissed the\\nclaims against the commissioners and the sheriff’s department employee, as well as\\none claim against Sheriff McCarthy, the only remaining claims for disposition were\\nCharleston’s claims against McCarthy for First Amendment political discrimination\\nand retaliation. Charleston alleged that, once he announced his candidacy for sheriff,\\nhe was subjected to harassment and discrimination based on his political views and\\nthat McCarthy retaliated against Charleston for his political associations through a\\nnumber of means, including suspension, reprimand, transfer, and failure to promote.\\nMcCarthy moved for summary judgment on these claims, which the district court\\ngranted. As to Charleston’s discrimination claim, the district court held that\\nCharleston failed to make a prima facie case because he offered no evidence that his\\npurported unfair treatment was in any way related to his political views and affiliation\\nas a Republican. As to the retaliation claim, the district court determined that\\nCharleston failed to make a prima facie case because he could not identify an adverse\\nemployment action and, even if he could demonstrate an adverse employment action,\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fhe could not show the requisite causal connection between the adverse actions and\\nhis participation in protected First Amendment activity. This appeal follows.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Charleston asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment\\nin favor of McCarthy on both Charleston’s First Amendment discrimination and\\nretaliation claims. “We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, considering\\nthe facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Summary judgment is\\nproper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled\\nto judgment as a matter of law.” Meuir v. Greene Cnty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115,\\n1118 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n With respect to his First Amendment discrimination claim, Charleston asserts\\nthat he presented a prima facie case by showing he ran for sheriff as a Republican,\\nthat he suffered adverse employment actions in the form of the reprimand and the\\ntransfer, and that McCarthy made statements providing “direct evidence of political\\ndiscrimination.” As to his First Amendment retaliation claim, Charleston asserts that\\nhe had sufficiently shown that he was reprimanded, suspended, transferred, and left\\noff of a promotion list, all due to his decision to challenge McCarthy as a Republican\\ncandidate for sheriff. McCarthy also asserts that the district court applied the\\nincorrect burden-shifting framework in evaluating his retaliation claim.\\n\\n The First Amendment prohibits government officials from discriminating\\nagainst public employees based on political affiliation, where political affiliation is\\nnot an appropriate job requirement. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62,\\n64, 75 (1990). A nonpolicymaking employee who alleges First Amendment\\ndiscrimination must make a prima facie showing that: (1) he has a specific political\\nor ideological affiliation; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the\\npolitical or ideological affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fadverse employment action. Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 270 (8th Cir. 2011). “A\\nplaintiff alleging First Amendment retaliation must . . . make a prima facie showing\\nthat (1) []he engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment; (2) []he suffered\\nan adverse employment action; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or\\nmotivating factor in the employer’s decision to take the adverse employment action.”\\nId. at 270.\\n\\n Both of Charleston’s claims suffer from the same fatal flaw: the lack of an\\nadverse employment action. “An adverse employment action is a tangible change in\\nworking conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage. This might\\ninclude termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect an employee’s\\nfuture career prospects.” Wagner v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2015)\\n(quoting Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 2007)). But\\n“minor changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits will not\\nconstitute an adverse employment action.” Spears v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr. & Human\\nRes., 210 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000). Further, “[l]esser actions than demotion,\\nsuspension, and termination can be adverse employment actions if their cumulative\\neffect causes an employee to suffer ‘serious employment consequences’ that\\nadversely affect or undermine his position.” Shockency v. Ramsey County, 493 F.3d\\n941, 948 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n Charleston identifies several actions that he asserts are adverse employment\\nactions, either independently or cumulatively: his 2012 suspension and McCarthy’s\\nrefusal to rescind it; his 2013 reprimand; his transfer from the Patrol Division to the\\nTransport Division, and his being left off of the promotion list. Although Charleston\\nis not explicit in which actions he considers independent adverse actions and which\\nhe argues cumulatively constitute an adverse action, none of the complained-of\\nactions, either together or separately, constitute an adverse employment action.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f First, with respect to Charleston’s suspension, we note that Charleston filed this\\naction on April 24, 2014 and the suspension occurred in February 2012. The\\nsuspension thus falls outside the applicable two-year limitations period, as the district\\ncourt explained in a previous ruling on a motion to dismiss. Order 6, Dist. Ct. Dkt.\\n9 (citing White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 2007) for two-year statute of\\nlimitations for § 1983 claim under Iowa law). While a suspension can constitute an\\nadverse employment action, see Shockency, 493 F.3d at 948, an adverse employment\\naction is completed at the time it occurs and cannot be revived by a mere request for\\nreconsideration. See Rogers v. Metro Bi-State Dev., No. 4:08-CV1627 CEJ, 2010\\nWL 1186523, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2010) (citing Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co.,\\n83 F.3d 225, 229 (8th Cir. 1996) and Boersig v. Union Electric Co., 219 F.3d 816,\\n821 (8th Cir. 2000), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Rowe v. Hussman\\nCorp., 381 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2004)). Charleston’s request that McCarthy rescind the\\nsuspension, made months after the suspension and after Charleston learned that the\\ndecedent’s estate was unlikely to sue Charleston or the sheriff’s department, cannot\\nrevive the adverse employment action to bring it within the appropriate limitations\\nperiod.\\n\\n As to Charleston’s 2013 reprimand, a reprimand constitutes an adverse\\nemployment action “only when the employer uses it as a basis for changing the terms\\nor conditions of the employee’s job for the worse.” Campbell, 779 F.3d at 767. The\\nrecord is devoid of any evidence that the 2013 reprimand in any way changed the\\nterms or conditions of Charleston’s employment. It did not involve any reduction in\\npay or otherwise adversely affect his employment; it was merely documented in his\\npersonnel file. This is insufficient to demonstrate that the reprimand was an adverse\\naction. See Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1058 (8th\\nCir. 2007) (“The reprimand did not affect [plaintiff’s] terms and conditions of\\nemployment, so he cannot make out a prima facie case on this claim.”). To the extent\\nthat Charleston argues that the reprimand adversely affected his employment\\nconditions by resulting in the transfer, as we conclude that the transfer did not\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fdetrimentally affect Charleston’s employment conditions, discussed below, we reject\\nthis argument.\\n\\n A transfer may constitute an adverse employment action where it materially\\nalters the terms or conditions of employment, like an employee’s title, pay, or\\nbenefits. Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1997). But a\\ntransfer may impose some changes in employment circumstances without amounting\\nto an adverse employment action; “a purely lateral transfer, that is, a transfer that does\\nnot involve a demotion in form or substance, cannot rise to the level of a materially\\nadverse employment action.” Id. at 1144 (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite\\nCharleston’s assertions, the record does not reflect that his transfer from Patrol to the\\nTransport Division materially altered his employment conditions. The transfer did\\nnot reduce Charleston’s pay; he remained in a supervisory position even though his\\nnumber of direct supervisees decreased; he remained in the position for two-and-a-\\nhalf months before being transferred to another department that gave him more\\nsupervisees; he was still eligible to work overtime and to use a patrol car when\\nneeded; he was routinely transferred between divisions at least eight times during his\\nemployment with the department; and Charleston admitted that the Transport\\nDivision performed essential functions of the sheriff’s department. Based on this\\nrecord, the transfer does not qualify as an adverse employment action because it did\\nnot adversely affect Charleston’s employment conditions.\\n\\n Finally, we see no merit to Charleston’s contention that being left off of the\\npromotion list due to the suspension and reprimand was an adverse employment\\naction. Charleston offers no evidence as to how the promotion list is compiled or the\\nsignificance of the list. The record contains no evidence as to factors that went into\\ninclusion on the list or how the list operated, and there is no evidence that a\\nsuspension or reprimand would bar a sergeant from appearing on the promotion list.\\nCharleston’s theory, as the district court noted, is devoid of evidentiary support.\\nAlthough “failure to promote can constitute an adverse employment action that would\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fsupport a plaintiff’s retaliation claim[,]” AuBuchon v. Geithner, 743 F.3d 638, 643\\n(8th Cir. 2014), Charleston presents no evidence that would allow us to conclude that\\nhe was deprived of a promotion by being left off the list. We thus conclude that\\nCharleston’s omission from the promotion list is not an adverse employment action.\\nSee Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding that plaintiff’s\\nclaim that poor performance review resulted in lack of promotion was unsupported\\nby evidence that she would have received a promotion but for the negative review and\\nthus was not an adverse employment action).\\n\\n None of these complained-of actions constitutes an adverse employment action\\non its own; cumulatively, these actions also did not result in “serious employment\\nconsequences” that adversely affected or undermined Charleston’s position. See\\nShockency, 493 F.3d at 948. Despite Charleston’s complaints, he remained a\\nsheriff’s department employee with the same title, pay, and benefits throughout the\\nrelevant time frame. Although his job duties did change during this time, we find this\\nto be less than noteworthy given that he has transferred no less than 8 times during\\nthe duration of his employment with the sheriff’s department and 6 times prior to the\\n2012 election campaign.\\n\\n Charleston has failed to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment\\naction. We thus conclude that Charleston failed to present a prima facie showing and\\naffirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to McCarthy on both\\nCharleston’s discrimination and retaliation claims.3 See Duffy v. McPhillips, 276\\nF.3d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff failed\\nto show alleged adverse action to sustain retaliation claim); see also Maymí v. P.R.\\nPorts Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment where\\n\\n 3\\n Because we conclude that Charleston fails to make a prima facie showing, we\\nneed not address his argument that the district court also erred by applying the\\nincorrect burden-shifting framework to his retaliation claim; the burden-shifting\\nframework is inapplicable until a plaintiff has successfully shown a prima facie case.\\n -11-\\n\\fplaintiff failed to show alleged adverse employment actions occurred based on her\\npolitical opinions and thus failed to make a prima facie showing of political\\ndiscrimination).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406491/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629238/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Dan CHARLESTON, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Bill MCCARTHY, in His Individual and Official Capacity as Polk County Sheriff, Defendant - Appellee Helen Youngs, in Her Individual Capacity; Florence Buhr, in Her Individual Capacity; Bill Hansen, in His Individual Capacity; Victor J. Munoz, in His Individual Capacity, Defendants\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-13\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1965\n ___________________________\n\n Dan Charleston\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Bill McCarthy, in his individual and official capacity as Polk County Sheriff\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n\n Helen Youngs, in her individual capacity; Florence Buhr, in her individual\n capacity; Bill Hansen, in his individual capacity; Victor J. Munoz, in his\n individual capacity\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\n Filed: June 13, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\f Following his unsuccessful bid to unseat Polk County, Iowa Sheriff Bill\nMcCarthy, Dan Charleston sued Sheriff McCarthy and several other county\nemployees, alleging various claims related to the treatment Charleston asserts he\nsuffered as a result of his political beliefs and associations. After dismissing the other\ndefendants and several claims, the district court1 granted summary judgment in\nMcCarthy’s favor on the remaining First Amendment discrimination and retaliation\nclaims. Charleston appeals the adverse grant of summary judgment. Having\njurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n Dan Charleston joined the Polk County Sheriff’s Office in 1997 and served as\na sergeant in that office at all times relevant to this action. In 2008, Bill McCarthy\nwas elected as Polk County Sheriff. He sought reelection in 2012, again running as\na Democrat. In 2010, Charleston announced his intentions to challenge McCarthy,\nrunning as a Republican candidate for sheriff.\n\n The campaign between McCarthy and Charleston was contentious, with each\ncandidate criticizing the other. Several issues regarding Charleston’s performance\narose. During the campaign, a sheriff’s department employee disclosed to a reporter\nthat Charleston had been previously terminated from the Pomona, California Police\nDepartment after the department discovered that Charleston had lied in an official\npolice report. Additionally, in February 2012 Charleston served a two-day\nsuspension from the Polk County Sheriff’s Department related to failure to render\nmedical aid to a person with a medical emergency. This suspension stemmed from\nan incident where Charleston arrived on the scene of an emergency call before\nparamedics and observed an unconscious man bleeding from the nose; neither\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the\nSouthern District of Iowa.\n\n -2-\n\fCharleston nor another deputy on the scene rendered any aid to the man, who later\ndied. After a complaint from the Fire Chief and an investigation by the Office of\nProfessional Standards (OPS), Charleston’s direct supervisor recommended that\nCharleston be suspended for three days, and the next highest officer recommended\nthat Charleston be suspended for two days.2 Charleston appealed his suspension to\nMcCarthy, who imposed the recommended two-day suspension. A medical examiner\nlater determined that the deceased individual would not have survived even if\nCharleston and the other deputy rendered aid.\n\n During an October 2012 campaign debate, McCarthy spoke about Charleston’s\ncampaign website referencing a group called the Oath Keepers. McCarthy described\nthe group’s views as “about as radical as it gets” and “the kind of garbage you’re\ngoing to get if [Charleston] is elected.” During this same debate, Charleston\nexpressed his view that he had been intentionally left off of a promotion list and that\nMcCarthy refused to promote Charleston due to his political beliefs. McCarthy\nresponded that “sometimes when people don’t get promoted, there’s a reason behind\nthat too,” but did not mention Charleston’s political beliefs.\n\n Sheriff McCarthy was reelected. On December 6, 2012, McCarthy held a\n“clear the air” meeting with Charleston. Both men discussed issues that had arisen\nduring the campaign, including Charleston’s suspension and his termination from the\nPomona Police Department. Prior to the campaign, McCarthy had been unaware of\nCharleston’s termination and expressed his concerns, including whether he had an\nobligation to disclose to criminal defendants Charleston’s previous dishonesty.\nMcCarthy also made several statements about Charleston’s continued role in the Polk\nCounty Sheriff’s Department:\n\n\n\n 2\n The supervisor also recommended that the other deputy involved receive a\ntwo-day suspension, but the deputy received no discipline because he had retired.\n\n -3-\n\f You’re not going to be a shadow sheriff and be here and survive in this\n office. You’re not going to be the spokesperson for the rank and file,\n and you’re not going to talk against policies in this administration and\n get by with it. I’m going to hold you accountable to the general orders,\n and you’re going to have some difficult road ahead if you can’t fall in\n and just act as a sergeant and support the administration.\n\n ***\n\n You’re going to be talked to by internal affairs shortly about some of the\n things that you’ve done to undermine here since the election so you need\n to cooperate with that, and you need to understand you’re going to be\n held accountable to the standard that’s outlined in the rules and\n regulations. You’re not the shadow sheriff, and I say that again, and\n you’re not going to be viewed that way.\n\nMcCarthy also expressed his view that Charleston had been “a cancer [in the\ndepartment] for 18 months.” Charleston challenged McCarthy as to whether\nMcCarthy’s true intention was to push Charleston out of law enforcement; McCarthy\nresponded that while he believed Charleston’s dishonesty in a police report should\npreclude him from serving in law enforcement and that Charleston should resign, he\nintended to allow Charleston to remain with the department, stating Charleston had\n“a place here [in the department] if [he would] just accept the position [he had] and\nmake the best out of that.”\n\n In January 2013, the Department OPS began an investigation into whether, in\nNovember 2012, Charleston had acted improperly by directly contacting three other\ndepartment employees and discussing union practices and officer transfers. After\nOPS determined that Charleston’s conduct violated the Iowa Code provision\ngoverning collective bargaining and the rights of public employees and that\nCharleston had interfered with employees and had been untruthful during the course\nof the investigation, three of Charleston’s supervisors recommended to McCarthy\nappropriate discipline. The discipline ranged from counseling Charleston regarding\n\n -4-\n\fthe interference to demotion, suspension, or termination for lying and violating the\nIowa Code. On February 15, 2013, Charleston and McCarthy met again to discuss\nthe recommended discipline. During this conversation, McCarthy admitted that he\nhad previously stated that Charleston was “cancerous” and “a liar,” that he did not\ntrust Charleston, and that he wanted to “decertify,” or force Charleston out of law\nenforcement, but maintained that these statements did not reflect McCarthy’s true\nfeelings: “I have said those things [] but I also tell you that I have mixed feelings and\nI maintain there is a place here for you even with that background that you have that\nI believe should prohibit you from being in law enforcement, but you’re here.”\nMcCarthy went on to state,\n\n I don’t want to be unfair with you either and I want to give you an\n opportunity to have this job and flourish, you’ve got the job, it’s your\n job, it’s not my job, but you’re not going to maintain that job if you can’t\n act supportive [in] particularly in the role that you’ve got as a\n supervisor. You’re not going to be the representative of the rank and\n file, you’re not going to run your own Sheriff’s Department and you’re\n not going to constantly try to undermine, for whatever purposes that you\n have in mind or have had in mind, to try to undermine the direction of\n this administration and be successful.\n\n Following this meeting, McCarthy issued a letter of reprimand to Charleston.\nThe letter of reprimand stated that Charleston violated the Sheriff’s Office General\nOrders concerning harmony in the office. The reprimand noted that, during the OPS\ninvestigation, Charleston stated repeatedly that he could not remember or recall key\ndetails and conversations and claimed to be able to remember only comments or\nstatements that reflected positively on Charleston. The reprimand stated that\nCharleston had been less than credible, that his answers were evasive, and that he did\nnot cooperate with the OPS investigation. The reprimand constituted formal\ndiscipline and was placed in his personnel file, but did not have any impact on\nCharleston’s salary.\n\n\n -5-\n\f On March 9, 2013, McCarthy transferred Charleston from the Patrol Division\nto the Transport Division. McCarthy stated that this was, in part, an effort to alleviate\nhis concerns about Charleston’s credibility in view of his previous termination for\ndishonesty and his dishonest and uncooperative behavior during the OPS\ninvestigation. The Transport Division coordinated and handled prisoner transport.\nCharleston’s position within the Transport Division required him to work regular\nbusiness hours; he experienced no change in pay from the Patrol Division; he\nsupervised 4 employees in Transport while he had previously supervised 12 in Patrol;\nand Charleston no longer had a patrol vehicle.\n\n Charleston filed this action in April 2014, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\nalleging First Amendment, due process, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against\nMcCarthy and four other county employees, including one sheriff’s department\nemployee and three Polk County Civil Service Commissioners who were involved in\npromotions within the sheriff’s department. After the district court dismissed the\nclaims against the commissioners and the sheriff’s department employee, as well as\none claim against Sheriff McCarthy, the only remaining claims for disposition were\nCharleston’s claims against McCarthy for First Amendment political discrimination\nand retaliation. Charleston alleged that, once he announced his candidacy for sheriff,\nhe was subjected to harassment and discrimination based on his political views and\nthat McCarthy retaliated against Charleston for his political associations through a\nnumber of means, including suspension, reprimand, transfer, and failure to promote.\nMcCarthy moved for summary judgment on these claims, which the district court\ngranted. As to Charleston’s discrimination claim, the district court held that\nCharleston failed to make a prima facie case because he offered no evidence that his\npurported unfair treatment was in any way related to his political views and affiliation\nas a Republican. As to the retaliation claim, the district court determined that\nCharleston failed to make a prima facie case because he could not identify an adverse\nemployment action and, even if he could demonstrate an adverse employment action,\n\n\n\n -6-\n\fhe could not show the requisite causal connection between the adverse actions and\nhis participation in protected First Amendment activity. This appeal follows.\n\n II.\n\n Charleston asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment\nin favor of McCarthy on both Charleston’s First Amendment discrimination and\nretaliation claims. “We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, considering\nthe facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Summary judgment is\nproper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled\nto judgment as a matter of law.” Meuir v. Greene Cnty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115,\n1118 (8th Cir. 2007).\n\n With respect to his First Amendment discrimination claim, Charleston asserts\nthat he presented a prima facie case by showing he ran for sheriff as a Republican,\nthat he suffered adverse employment actions in the form of the reprimand and the\ntransfer, and that McCarthy made statements providing “direct evidence of political\ndiscrimination.” As to his First Amendment retaliation claim, Charleston asserts that\nhe had sufficiently shown that he was reprimanded, suspended, transferred, and left\noff of a promotion list, all due to his decision to challenge McCarthy as a Republican\ncandidate for sheriff. McCarthy also asserts that the district court applied the\nincorrect burden-shifting framework in evaluating his retaliation claim.\n\n The First Amendment prohibits government officials from discriminating\nagainst public employees based on political affiliation, where political affiliation is\nnot an appropriate job requirement. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62,\n64, 75 (1990). A nonpolicymaking employee who alleges First Amendment\ndiscrimination must make a prima facie showing that: (1) he has a specific political\nor ideological affiliation; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the\npolitical or ideological affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the\n\n -7-\n\fadverse employment action. Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 270 (8th Cir. 2011). “A\nplaintiff alleging First Amendment retaliation must . . . make a prima facie showing\nthat (1) []he engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment; (2) []he suffered\nan adverse employment action; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or\nmotivating factor in the employer’s decision to take the adverse employment action.”\nId. at 270.\n\n Both of Charleston’s claims suffer from the same fatal flaw: the lack of an\nadverse employment action. “An adverse employment action is a tangible change in\nworking conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage. This might\ninclude termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect an employee’s\nfuture career prospects.” Wagner v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2015)\n(quoting Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 2007)). But\n“minor changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits will not\nconstitute an adverse employment action.” Spears v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr. & Human\nRes., 210 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000). Further, “[l]esser actions than demotion,\nsuspension, and termination can be adverse employment actions if their cumulative\neffect causes an employee to suffer ‘serious employment consequences’ that\nadversely affect or undermine his position.” Shockency v. Ramsey County, 493 F.3d\n941, 948 (8th Cir. 2007).\n\n Charleston identifies several actions that he asserts are adverse employment\nactions, either independently or cumulatively: his 2012 suspension and McCarthy’s\nrefusal to rescind it; his 2013 reprimand; his transfer from the Patrol Division to the\nTransport Division, and his being left off of the promotion list. Although Charleston\nis not explicit in which actions he considers independent adverse actions and which\nhe argues cumulatively constitute an adverse action, none of the complained-of\nactions, either together or separately, constitute an adverse employment action.\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n\f First, with respect to Charleston’s suspension, we note that Charleston filed this\naction on April 24, 2014 and the suspension occurred in February 2012. The\nsuspension thus falls outside the applicable two-year limitations period, as the district\ncourt explained in a previous ruling on a motion to dismiss. Order 6, Dist. Ct. Dkt.\n9 (citing White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 2007) for two-year statute of\nlimitations for § 1983 claim under Iowa law). While a suspension can constitute an\nadverse employment action, see Shockency, 493 F.3d at 948, an adverse employment\naction is completed at the time it occurs and cannot be revived by a mere request for\nreconsideration. See Rogers v. Metro Bi-State Dev., No. 4:08-CV1627 CEJ, 2010\nWL 1186523, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2010) (citing Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co.,\n83 F.3d 225, 229 (8th Cir. 1996) and Boersig v. Union Electric Co., 219 F.3d 816,\n821 (8th Cir. 2000), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Rowe v. Hussman\nCorp., 381 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2004)). Charleston’s request that McCarthy rescind the\nsuspension, made months after the suspension and after Charleston learned that the\ndecedent’s estate was unlikely to sue Charleston or the sheriff’s department, cannot\nrevive the adverse employment action to bring it within the appropriate limitations\nperiod.\n\n As to Charleston’s 2013 reprimand, a reprimand constitutes an adverse\nemployment action “only when the employer uses it as a basis for changing the terms\nor conditions of the employee’s job for the worse.” Campbell, 779 F.3d at 767. The\nrecord is devoid of any evidence that the 2013 reprimand in any way changed the\nterms or conditions of Charleston’s employment. It did not involve any reduction in\npay or otherwise adversely affect his employment; it was merely documented in his\npersonnel file. This is insufficient to demonstrate that the reprimand was an adverse\naction. See Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1058 (8th\nCir. 2007) (“The reprimand did not affect [plaintiff’s] terms and conditions of\nemployment, so he cannot make out a prima facie case on this claim.”). To the extent\nthat Charleston argues that the reprimand adversely affected his employment\nconditions by resulting in the transfer, as we conclude that the transfer did not\n\n -9-\n\fdetrimentally affect Charleston’s employment conditions, discussed below, we reject\nthis argument.\n\n A transfer may constitute an adverse employment action where it materially\nalters the terms or conditions of employment, like an employee’s title, pay, or\nbenefits. Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1997). But a\ntransfer may impose some changes in employment circumstances without amounting\nto an adverse employment action; “a purely lateral transfer, that is, a transfer that does\nnot involve a demotion in form or substance, cannot rise to the level of a materially\nadverse employment action.” Id. at 1144 (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite\nCharleston’s assertions, the record does not reflect that his transfer from Patrol to the\nTransport Division materially altered his employment conditions. The transfer did\nnot reduce Charleston’s pay; he remained in a supervisory position even though his\nnumber of direct supervisees decreased; he remained in the position for two-and-a-\nhalf months before being transferred to another department that gave him more\nsupervisees; he was still eligible to work overtime and to use a patrol car when\nneeded; he was routinely transferred between divisions at least eight times during his\nemployment with the department; and Charleston admitted that the Transport\nDivision performed essential functions of the sheriff’s department. Based on this\nrecord, the transfer does not qualify as an adverse employment action because it did\nnot adversely affect Charleston’s employment conditions.\n\n Finally, we see no merit to Charleston’s contention that being left off of the\npromotion list due to the suspension and reprimand was an adverse employment\naction. Charleston offers no evidence as to how the promotion list is compiled or the\nsignificance of the list. The record contains no evidence as to factors that went into\ninclusion on the list or how the list operated, and there is no evidence that a\nsuspension or reprimand would bar a sergeant from appearing on the promotion list.\nCharleston’s theory, as the district court noted, is devoid of evidentiary support.\nAlthough “failure to promote can constitute an adverse employment action that would\n\n -10-\n\fsupport a plaintiff’s retaliation claim[,]” AuBuchon v. Geithner, 743 F.3d 638, 643\n(8th Cir. 2014), Charleston presents no evidence that would allow us to conclude that\nhe was deprived of a promotion by being left off the list. We thus conclude that\nCharleston’s omission from the promotion list is not an adverse employment action.\nSee Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding that plaintiff’s\nclaim that poor performance review resulted in lack of promotion was unsupported\nby evidence that she would have received a promotion but for the negative review and\nthus was not an adverse employment action).\n\n None of these complained-of actions constitutes an adverse employment action\non its own; cumulatively, these actions also did not result in “serious employment\nconsequences” that adversely affected or undermined Charleston’s position. See\nShockency, 493 F.3d at 948. Despite Charleston’s complaints, he remained a\nsheriff’s department employee with the same title, pay, and benefits throughout the\nrelevant time frame. Although his job duties did change during this time, we find this\nto be less than noteworthy given that he has transferred no less than 8 times during\nthe duration of his employment with the sheriff’s department and 6 times prior to the\n2012 election campaign.\n\n Charleston has failed to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment\naction. We thus conclude that Charleston failed to present a prima facie showing and\naffirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to McCarthy on both\nCharleston’s discrimination and retaliation claims.3 See Duffy v. McPhillips, 276\nF.3d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff failed\nto show alleged adverse action to sustain retaliation claim); see also Maymí v. P.R.\nPorts Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment where\n\n 3\n Because we conclude that Charleston fails to make a prima facie showing, we\nneed not address his argument that the district court also erred by applying the\nincorrect burden-shifting framework to his retaliation claim; the burden-shifting\nframework is inapplicable until a plaintiff has successfully shown a prima facie case.\n -11-\n\fplaintiff failed to show alleged adverse employment actions occurred based on her\npolitical opinions and thus failed to make a prima facie showing of political\ndiscrimination).\n\n III.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -12-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Dan CHARLESTON, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Bill MCCARTHY, in His Individual and Official Capacity as Polk County Sheriff, Defendant - Appellee Helen Youngs, in Her Individual Capacity; Florence Buhr, in Her Individual Capacity; Bill Hansen, in His Individual Capacity; Victor J. Munoz, in His Individual Capacity, Defendants\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1965\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Dan Charleston\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Bill McCarthy, in his individual and official capacity as Polk County Sheriff\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n\\n Helen Youngs, in her individual capacity; Florence Buhr, in her individual\\n capacity; Bill Hansen, in his individual capacity; Victor J. Munoz, in his\\n individual capacity\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: June 13, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f Following his unsuccessful bid to unseat Polk County, Iowa Sheriff Bill\\nMcCarthy, Dan Charleston sued Sheriff McCarthy and several other county\\nemployees, alleging various claims related to the treatment Charleston asserts he\\nsuffered as a result of his political beliefs and associations. After dismissing the other\\ndefendants and several claims, the district court1 granted summary judgment in\\nMcCarthy’s favor on the remaining First Amendment discrimination and retaliation\\nclaims. Charleston appeals the adverse grant of summary judgment. Having\\njurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Dan Charleston joined the Polk County Sheriff’s Office in 1997 and served as\\na sergeant in that office at all times relevant to this action. In 2008, Bill McCarthy\\nwas elected as Polk County Sheriff. He sought reelection in 2012, again running as\\na Democrat. In 2010, Charleston announced his intentions to challenge McCarthy,\\nrunning as a Republican candidate for sheriff.\\n\\n The campaign between McCarthy and Charleston was contentious, with each\\ncandidate criticizing the other. Several issues regarding Charleston’s performance\\narose. During the campaign, a sheriff’s department employee disclosed to a reporter\\nthat Charleston had been previously terminated from the Pomona, California Police\\nDepartment after the department discovered that Charleston had lied in an official\\npolice report. Additionally, in February 2012 Charleston served a two-day\\nsuspension from the Polk County Sheriff’s Department related to failure to render\\nmedical aid to a person with a medical emergency. This suspension stemmed from\\nan incident where Charleston arrived on the scene of an emergency call before\\nparamedics and observed an unconscious man bleeding from the nose; neither\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the\\nSouthern District of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fCharleston nor another deputy on the scene rendered any aid to the man, who later\\ndied. After a complaint from the Fire Chief and an investigation by the Office of\\nProfessional Standards (OPS), Charleston’s direct supervisor recommended that\\nCharleston be suspended for three days, and the next highest officer recommended\\nthat Charleston be suspended for two days.2 Charleston appealed his suspension to\\nMcCarthy, who imposed the recommended two-day suspension. A medical examiner\\nlater determined that the deceased individual would not have survived even if\\nCharleston and the other deputy rendered aid.\\n\\n During an October 2012 campaign debate, McCarthy spoke about Charleston’s\\ncampaign website referencing a group called the Oath Keepers. McCarthy described\\nthe group’s views as “about as radical as it gets” and “the kind of garbage you’re\\ngoing to get if [Charleston] is elected.” During this same debate, Charleston\\nexpressed his view that he had been intentionally left off of a promotion list and that\\nMcCarthy refused to promote Charleston due to his political beliefs. McCarthy\\nresponded that “sometimes when people don’t get promoted, there’s a reason behind\\nthat too,” but did not mention Charleston’s political beliefs.\\n\\n Sheriff McCarthy was reelected. On December 6, 2012, McCarthy held a\\n“clear the air” meeting with Charleston. Both men discussed issues that had arisen\\nduring the campaign, including Charleston’s suspension and his termination from the\\nPomona Police Department. Prior to the campaign, McCarthy had been unaware of\\nCharleston’s termination and expressed his concerns, including whether he had an\\nobligation to disclose to criminal defendants Charleston’s previous dishonesty.\\nMcCarthy also made several statements about Charleston’s continued role in the Polk\\nCounty Sheriff’s Department:\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The supervisor also recommended that the other deputy involved receive a\\ntwo-day suspension, but the deputy received no discipline because he had retired.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f You’re not going to be a shadow sheriff and be here and survive in this\\n office. You’re not going to be the spokesperson for the rank and file,\\n and you’re not going to talk against policies in this administration and\\n get by with it. I’m going to hold you accountable to the general orders,\\n and you’re going to have some difficult road ahead if you can’t fall in\\n and just act as a sergeant and support the administration.\\n\\n ***\\n\\n You’re going to be talked to by internal affairs shortly about some of the\\n things that you’ve done to undermine here since the election so you need\\n to cooperate with that, and you need to understand you’re going to be\\n held accountable to the standard that’s outlined in the rules and\\n regulations. You’re not the shadow sheriff, and I say that again, and\\n you’re not going to be viewed that way.\\n\\nMcCarthy also expressed his view that Charleston had been “a cancer [in the\\ndepartment] for 18 months.” Charleston challenged McCarthy as to whether\\nMcCarthy’s true intention was to push Charleston out of law enforcement; McCarthy\\nresponded that while he believed Charleston’s dishonesty in a police report should\\npreclude him from serving in law enforcement and that Charleston should resign, he\\nintended to allow Charleston to remain with the department, stating Charleston had\\n“a place here [in the department] if [he would] just accept the position [he had] and\\nmake the best out of that.”\\n\\n In January 2013, the Department OPS began an investigation into whether, in\\nNovember 2012, Charleston had acted improperly by directly contacting three other\\ndepartment employees and discussing union practices and officer transfers. After\\nOPS determined that Charleston’s conduct violated the Iowa Code provision\\ngoverning collective bargaining and the rights of public employees and that\\nCharleston had interfered with employees and had been untruthful during the course\\nof the investigation, three of Charleston’s supervisors recommended to McCarthy\\nappropriate discipline. The discipline ranged from counseling Charleston regarding\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fthe interference to demotion, suspension, or termination for lying and violating the\\nIowa Code. On February 15, 2013, Charleston and McCarthy met again to discuss\\nthe recommended discipline. During this conversation, McCarthy admitted that he\\nhad previously stated that Charleston was “cancerous” and “a liar,” that he did not\\ntrust Charleston, and that he wanted to “decertify,” or force Charleston out of law\\nenforcement, but maintained that these statements did not reflect McCarthy’s true\\nfeelings: “I have said those things [] but I also tell you that I have mixed feelings and\\nI maintain there is a place here for you even with that background that you have that\\nI believe should prohibit you from being in law enforcement, but you’re here.”\\nMcCarthy went on to state,\\n\\n I don’t want to be unfair with you either and I want to give you an\\n opportunity to have this job and flourish, you’ve got the job, it’s your\\n job, it’s not my job, but you’re not going to maintain that job if you can’t\\n act supportive [in] particularly in the role that you’ve got as a\\n supervisor. You’re not going to be the representative of the rank and\\n file, you’re not going to run your own Sheriff’s Department and you’re\\n not going to constantly try to undermine, for whatever purposes that you\\n have in mind or have had in mind, to try to undermine the direction of\\n this administration and be successful.\\n\\n Following this meeting, McCarthy issued a letter of reprimand to Charleston.\\nThe letter of reprimand stated that Charleston violated the Sheriff’s Office General\\nOrders concerning harmony in the office. The reprimand noted that, during the OPS\\ninvestigation, Charleston stated repeatedly that he could not remember or recall key\\ndetails and conversations and claimed to be able to remember only comments or\\nstatements that reflected positively on Charleston. The reprimand stated that\\nCharleston had been less than credible, that his answers were evasive, and that he did\\nnot cooperate with the OPS investigation. The reprimand constituted formal\\ndiscipline and was placed in his personnel file, but did not have any impact on\\nCharleston’s salary.\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f On March 9, 2013, McCarthy transferred Charleston from the Patrol Division\\nto the Transport Division. McCarthy stated that this was, in part, an effort to alleviate\\nhis concerns about Charleston’s credibility in view of his previous termination for\\ndishonesty and his dishonest and uncooperative behavior during the OPS\\ninvestigation. The Transport Division coordinated and handled prisoner transport.\\nCharleston’s position within the Transport Division required him to work regular\\nbusiness hours; he experienced no change in pay from the Patrol Division; he\\nsupervised 4 employees in Transport while he had previously supervised 12 in Patrol;\\nand Charleston no longer had a patrol vehicle.\\n\\n Charleston filed this action in April 2014, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\\nalleging First Amendment, due process, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against\\nMcCarthy and four other county employees, including one sheriff’s department\\nemployee and three Polk County Civil Service Commissioners who were involved in\\npromotions within the sheriff’s department. After the district court dismissed the\\nclaims against the commissioners and the sheriff’s department employee, as well as\\none claim against Sheriff McCarthy, the only remaining claims for disposition were\\nCharleston’s claims against McCarthy for First Amendment political discrimination\\nand retaliation. Charleston alleged that, once he announced his candidacy for sheriff,\\nhe was subjected to harassment and discrimination based on his political views and\\nthat McCarthy retaliated against Charleston for his political associations through a\\nnumber of means, including suspension, reprimand, transfer, and failure to promote.\\nMcCarthy moved for summary judgment on these claims, which the district court\\ngranted. As to Charleston’s discrimination claim, the district court held that\\nCharleston failed to make a prima facie case because he offered no evidence that his\\npurported unfair treatment was in any way related to his political views and affiliation\\nas a Republican. As to the retaliation claim, the district court determined that\\nCharleston failed to make a prima facie case because he could not identify an adverse\\nemployment action and, even if he could demonstrate an adverse employment action,\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fhe could not show the requisite causal connection between the adverse actions and\\nhis participation in protected First Amendment activity. This appeal follows.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Charleston asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment\\nin favor of McCarthy on both Charleston’s First Amendment discrimination and\\nretaliation claims. “We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, considering\\nthe facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Summary judgment is\\nproper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled\\nto judgment as a matter of law.” Meuir v. Greene Cnty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115,\\n1118 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n With respect to his First Amendment discrimination claim, Charleston asserts\\nthat he presented a prima facie case by showing he ran for sheriff as a Republican,\\nthat he suffered adverse employment actions in the form of the reprimand and the\\ntransfer, and that McCarthy made statements providing “direct evidence of political\\ndiscrimination.” As to his First Amendment retaliation claim, Charleston asserts that\\nhe had sufficiently shown that he was reprimanded, suspended, transferred, and left\\noff of a promotion list, all due to his decision to challenge McCarthy as a Republican\\ncandidate for sheriff. McCarthy also asserts that the district court applied the\\nincorrect burden-shifting framework in evaluating his retaliation claim.\\n\\n The First Amendment prohibits government officials from discriminating\\nagainst public employees based on political affiliation, where political affiliation is\\nnot an appropriate job requirement. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62,\\n64, 75 (1990). A nonpolicymaking employee who alleges First Amendment\\ndiscrimination must make a prima facie showing that: (1) he has a specific political\\nor ideological affiliation; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the\\npolitical or ideological affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fadverse employment action. Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 270 (8th Cir. 2011). “A\\nplaintiff alleging First Amendment retaliation must . . . make a prima facie showing\\nthat (1) []he engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment; (2) []he suffered\\nan adverse employment action; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or\\nmotivating factor in the employer’s decision to take the adverse employment action.”\\nId. at 270.\\n\\n Both of Charleston’s claims suffer from the same fatal flaw: the lack of an\\nadverse employment action. “An adverse employment action is a tangible change in\\nworking conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage. This might\\ninclude termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect an employee’s\\nfuture career prospects.” Wagner v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2015)\\n(quoting Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 2007)). But\\n“minor changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits will not\\nconstitute an adverse employment action.” Spears v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr. & Human\\nRes., 210 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000). Further, “[l]esser actions than demotion,\\nsuspension, and termination can be adverse employment actions if their cumulative\\neffect causes an employee to suffer ‘serious employment consequences’ that\\nadversely affect or undermine his position.” Shockency v. Ramsey County, 493 F.3d\\n941, 948 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n Charleston identifies several actions that he asserts are adverse employment\\nactions, either independently or cumulatively: his 2012 suspension and McCarthy’s\\nrefusal to rescind it; his 2013 reprimand; his transfer from the Patrol Division to the\\nTransport Division, and his being left off of the promotion list. Although Charleston\\nis not explicit in which actions he considers independent adverse actions and which\\nhe argues cumulatively constitute an adverse action, none of the complained-of\\nactions, either together or separately, constitute an adverse employment action.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f First, with respect to Charleston’s suspension, we note that Charleston filed this\\naction on April 24, 2014 and the suspension occurred in February 2012. The\\nsuspension thus falls outside the applicable two-year limitations period, as the district\\ncourt explained in a previous ruling on a motion to dismiss. Order 6, Dist. Ct. Dkt.\\n9 (citing White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 2007) for two-year statute of\\nlimitations for § 1983 claim under Iowa law). While a suspension can constitute an\\nadverse employment action, see Shockency, 493 F.3d at 948, an adverse employment\\naction is completed at the time it occurs and cannot be revived by a mere request for\\nreconsideration. See Rogers v. Metro Bi-State Dev., No. 4:08-CV1627 CEJ, 2010\\nWL 1186523, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2010) (citing Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co.,\\n83 F.3d 225, 229 (8th Cir. 1996) and Boersig v. Union Electric Co., 219 F.3d 816,\\n821 (8th Cir. 2000), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Rowe v. Hussman\\nCorp., 381 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2004)). Charleston’s request that McCarthy rescind the\\nsuspension, made months after the suspension and after Charleston learned that the\\ndecedent’s estate was unlikely to sue Charleston or the sheriff’s department, cannot\\nrevive the adverse employment action to bring it within the appropriate limitations\\nperiod.\\n\\n As to Charleston’s 2013 reprimand, a reprimand constitutes an adverse\\nemployment action “only when the employer uses it as a basis for changing the terms\\nor conditions of the employee’s job for the worse.” Campbell, 779 F.3d at 767. The\\nrecord is devoid of any evidence that the 2013 reprimand in any way changed the\\nterms or conditions of Charleston’s employment. It did not involve any reduction in\\npay or otherwise adversely affect his employment; it was merely documented in his\\npersonnel file. This is insufficient to demonstrate that the reprimand was an adverse\\naction. See Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1058 (8th\\nCir. 2007) (“The reprimand did not affect [plaintiff’s] terms and conditions of\\nemployment, so he cannot make out a prima facie case on this claim.”). To the extent\\nthat Charleston argues that the reprimand adversely affected his employment\\nconditions by resulting in the transfer, as we conclude that the transfer did not\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fdetrimentally affect Charleston’s employment conditions, discussed below, we reject\\nthis argument.\\n\\n A transfer may constitute an adverse employment action where it materially\\nalters the terms or conditions of employment, like an employee’s title, pay, or\\nbenefits. Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1997). But a\\ntransfer may impose some changes in employment circumstances without amounting\\nto an adverse employment action; “a purely lateral transfer, that is, a transfer that does\\nnot involve a demotion in form or substance, cannot rise to the level of a materially\\nadverse employment action.” Id. at 1144 (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite\\nCharleston’s assertions, the record does not reflect that his transfer from Patrol to the\\nTransport Division materially altered his employment conditions. The transfer did\\nnot reduce Charleston’s pay; he remained in a supervisory position even though his\\nnumber of direct supervisees decreased; he remained in the position for two-and-a-\\nhalf months before being transferred to another department that gave him more\\nsupervisees; he was still eligible to work overtime and to use a patrol car when\\nneeded; he was routinely transferred between divisions at least eight times during his\\nemployment with the department; and Charleston admitted that the Transport\\nDivision performed essential functions of the sheriff’s department. Based on this\\nrecord, the transfer does not qualify as an adverse employment action because it did\\nnot adversely affect Charleston’s employment conditions.\\n\\n Finally, we see no merit to Charleston’s contention that being left off of the\\npromotion list due to the suspension and reprimand was an adverse employment\\naction. Charleston offers no evidence as to how the promotion list is compiled or the\\nsignificance of the list. The record contains no evidence as to factors that went into\\ninclusion on the list or how the list operated, and there is no evidence that a\\nsuspension or reprimand would bar a sergeant from appearing on the promotion list.\\nCharleston’s theory, as the district court noted, is devoid of evidentiary support.\\nAlthough “failure to promote can constitute an adverse employment action that would\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fsupport a plaintiff’s retaliation claim[,]” AuBuchon v. Geithner, 743 F.3d 638, 643\\n(8th Cir. 2014), Charleston presents no evidence that would allow us to conclude that\\nhe was deprived of a promotion by being left off the list. We thus conclude that\\nCharleston’s omission from the promotion list is not an adverse employment action.\\nSee Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding that plaintiff’s\\nclaim that poor performance review resulted in lack of promotion was unsupported\\nby evidence that she would have received a promotion but for the negative review and\\nthus was not an adverse employment action).\\n\\n None of these complained-of actions constitutes an adverse employment action\\non its own; cumulatively, these actions also did not result in “serious employment\\nconsequences” that adversely affected or undermined Charleston’s position. See\\nShockency, 493 F.3d at 948. Despite Charleston’s complaints, he remained a\\nsheriff’s department employee with the same title, pay, and benefits throughout the\\nrelevant time frame. Although his job duties did change during this time, we find this\\nto be less than noteworthy given that he has transferred no less than 8 times during\\nthe duration of his employment with the sheriff’s department and 6 times prior to the\\n2012 election campaign.\\n\\n Charleston has failed to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment\\naction. We thus conclude that Charleston failed to present a prima facie showing and\\naffirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to McCarthy on both\\nCharleston’s discrimination and retaliation claims.3 See Duffy v. McPhillips, 276\\nF.3d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff failed\\nto show alleged adverse action to sustain retaliation claim); see also Maymí v. P.R.\\nPorts Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment where\\n\\n 3\\n Because we conclude that Charleston fails to make a prima facie showing, we\\nneed not address his argument that the district court also erred by applying the\\nincorrect burden-shifting framework to his retaliation claim; the burden-shifting\\nframework is inapplicable until a plaintiff has successfully shown a prima facie case.\\n -11-\\n\\fplaintiff failed to show alleged adverse employment actions occurred based on her\\npolitical opinions and thus failed to make a prima facie showing of political\\ndiscrimination).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2672,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4629738,"string":"4,629,738"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Stephen GUSTUS, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Stephen Gustus"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-14"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2303"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Melloy, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888731/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"030concurrence\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888732/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"MELLOY, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2303\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Stephen Gustus\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: June 14, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Following a jury trial, Defendant Stephen Gustus appeals his conviction under\\n18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) for assaulting a United States Postal Service employee.1\\nHaving jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and reverse in part.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n The following facts are presented in a light most favorable to the verdict. On\\nDecember 21, 2016, a Postal Service employee named Julio Gonzalez was\\nunexpectedly tackled from behind by a man wearing nothing but a pair of shoes and\\na bed comforter. The man was later identified as Gustus. Gonzalez fell to the\\nground, and Gustus jumped into Gonzalez’s mail truck. Gonzalez got up and\\nphysically engaged Gustus in the truck, punching him three or four times before\\nslipping and falling to the ground again. At some point after this second fall,\\nGonzalez grabbed hold of Gustus’s comforter. Gustus jumped out of the truck and\\nkicked Gonzalez in the arm until he released the comforter. Gustus then fled on foot.\\nGonzalez ran into a nearby field to keep an eye on Gustus and called 911. Gonzalez\\nlost sight of Gustus, but a police officer was able to locate him soon thereafter.\\n\\n When the officer encountered Gustus, Gustus would not respond to the\\nofficer’s commands. Instead, he merely stared up at the sky. After several\\nunsuccessful attempts to get Gustus to sit down with hands behind his back, the\\nofficer threatened to use pepper spray. The officer observed Gustus clench his hands\\ninto fists as if “he was getting ready to fight.” The officer then sprayed a burst of\\n\\n\\n 1\\n We note that Gustus’s criminal judgment indicates he was convicted of\\nviolating 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and 1114. Section 111(a)(1) references § 1114 for\\nthe purpose of defining the victim of the § 111(a)(1) assault. Section 1114 itself is\\na homicide statute that defines the qualifying victim, in relevant part, as “any officer\\nor employee of the United States . . . while such officer or employee is engaged in . . .\\nofficial duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 1114. To be clear, Gustus was convicted of assault, not\\nhomicide, and the references in his case to § 1114 are merely definitional.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\npepper spray, hitting Gustus in the face. Gustus immediately sat down, and the\\nofficer placed him in handcuffs and called for medical personnel to take Gustus to a\\nnearby healthcare facility.\\n\\n Gustus was eventually charged with “voluntarily and intentionally forcibly\\nassault[ing], imped[ing] and interfer[ing] with an employee of the United States while\\nthe employee was engaged in and on account of the performance of official duties,”\\na violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Gustus pled not guilty to the offense and\\nprepared to present a defense that he was voluntarily intoxicated and lacked the\\nspecific intent to assault Gonzalez.2 He proffered a jury instruction on intoxication\\nto that effect. The government responded by filing a motion in limine, arguing that\\nour opinion in United States v. Hanson, 618 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1980), established\\nthat § 111(a)(1) assaults are general-intent crimes for which a voluntary-intoxication\\ndefense is unavailable. The district court granted the government’s motion and\\nprohibited Gustus from presenting a voluntary-intoxication defense.\\n\\n A two-day trial ensued. The government called several witnesses, including:\\nGonzalez; the 911 operator who fielded Gonzalez’s call; the officer who\\napprehended Gustus; a postal inspector; medical personnel who treated Gonzalez; and\\nGonzalez’s supervisor who visited Gonzalez at the site of the incident and took him\\nto receive medical treatment. Gustus did not call any witnesses but moved for a\\njudgment of acquittal. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found\\nGustus guilty of assaulting Gonzalez. The district court sentenced Gustus to time\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n A presentence investigation report (“PSR”) prepared after trial reveals that, at\\nthe time of the offense, Gustus showed multiple signs of being intoxicated, including\\nsmelling of intoxicants, using slurred speech, and having blood-shot eyes and\\nunstable footing. The PSR further reveals that, at the healthcare facility, Gustus\\nadmitted to drinking alcohol and tested positive for amphetamines,\\nmethamphetamines, and marijuana.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\nserved followed by two years of supervised release. As part of the supervised release,\\nthe district court orally imposed the following special condition:\\n\\n He’ll have to participate, of course, in a substance abuse treatment\\n program under the guidance and supervision of the probation office.\\n And that might include drug testing, alcohol testing, outpatient\\n counseling, residential treatment. He can’t use any alcohol during those\\n sessions.\\n\\n ....\\n\\n . . . He can’t use any alcohol during the program of alcohol testing\\n and outpatient counseling. He must pay for the cost [at a rate of $10 per\\n session, with a total cost not to exceed $40 a month based on ability to\\n pay as determined by the probation office. If he can’t afford that, the\\n copayment will be waived].\\n\\n And he’ll be required to disclose his substance abuse history to\\n prescribing physicians and allow the probation office to verify\\n disclosure. . . .\\n\\nThe district court clarified that the alcohol restriction applied while Gustus was\\nreceiving both substance abuse and mental health treatment. The final, written\\nversion of the special condition (“Special Condition 5”) read as follows:\\n\\n You must participate in a substance abuse treatment program under the\\n guidance and supervision of the probation office. The program may\\n include drug and alcohol testing, outpatient counseling, and residential\\n treatment. You must abstain from the use of alcohol during supervision.\\n You must pay for the cost of treatment at the rate of $10 per session,\\n with the total cost not to exceed $40 per month, based on ability to pay\\n as determined by the probation office. If you are financially unable to\\n pay for the cost of treatment, the co-pay requirement will be waived.\\n You must disclose your substance abuse history to prescribing\\n physicians and allow the probation office to verify disclosure.\\n\\nGustus timely filed a notice of appeal.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n Gustus presents three arguments on appeal: (1) the district court erred in\\ndenying him the opportunity to present a voluntary-intoxication defense; (2) there\\nwas insufficient evidence to convict him of assaulting Gonzalez; and (3) Special\\nCondition 5 was broader than the oral version of the condition and should be\\nmodified. We address each argument in turn. Regarding the voluntary-intoxication\\ndefense and sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments, we review the district court’s\\njudgment de novo. See United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735, 744 (8th Cir. 2010)\\n(“[W]hen the refusal of a proffered instruction . . . denies a legal defense, the correct\\nstandard of review is de novo . . . .”); United States v. DeFoggi, 839 F.3d 701, 709\\n(8th Cir. 2016) (“We review the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial de novo, but\\nexamine the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, resolving\\nfactual disputes and accepting all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict.”).\\nWe review the “terms and conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion.”\\nUnited States v. Phillips, 785 F.3d 282, 284 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n The district court did not err in preventing Gustus from presenting a voluntary-\\nintoxication defense. “Such a defense is . . . unavailable” to defendants being charged\\nwith violating 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) because assaulting a federal employee is a\\ngeneral-intent crime. Hanson, 618 F.2d at 1265. Gustus argues that we should\\ndisregard Hanson because later decisions contain language to the effect that\\nassaulting a federal employee is a specific-intent crime. See, e.g., United States v.\\nManelli, 667 F.2d 695, 696 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Specific intent is an essential element\\nof the crime of assaulting a federal officer in the performance of his duties.”). He\\nfurther argues that voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific-intent crimes. See\\nUnited States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054, 1070 (8th Cir. 2007). We are bound to\\nfollow Hanson as it is the earliest of the conflicting opinions and “should have\\ncontrolled the subsequent panels.” Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\nCir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). Consequently, we hold that Gustus was not\\nentitled to present a voluntary-intoxication defense.\\n\\n We also hold that sufficient evidence supports Gustus’s conviction. Section\\n111(a)(1) makes it a crime to “forcibly assault[], resist[], oppose[], impede[],\\nintimidate[], or interfere[] with [a federal employee] while engaged in or on account\\nof the performance of official duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). The parties agree that\\nthe government proved all of the elements of a § 111(a)(1) violation beyond a\\nreasonable doubt except for the mens rea element, which they agree is voluntary and\\nintentional. See United States v. Drapeau, 644 F.3d 646, 652 (8th Cir. 2011). Gustus\\nargues that because he was intoxicated, his actions could not have been voluntary or\\nintentional. We reject this argument as indistinguishable from his argument above\\nthat the district court erred in preventing him from presenting a voluntary-intoxication\\ndefense.\\n\\n Gustus also argues that portions of Gonzalez’s testimony at trial were not\\ncredible, making the evidence as a whole insufficient. Gonzalez, for example, made\\nseemingly inconsistent statements about: (1) whether he was attacked while he was\\ngetting into his mail truck or while he was getting out; and (2) whether he had his\\nkeys in his hands during the attack. The credibility of a witness is “within the\\nprovince of the jury and virtually unreviewable on appeal.” United States v.\\nThompson, 881 F.3d 629, 633 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). We are to “resolve\\nany credibility issues in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Polk, 715 F.3d 238,\\n247 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). We do so here and reject Gustus’s argument.\\nHis conviction was supported by sufficient, credible evidence.\\n\\n Finally, we agree that Special Condition 5 is broader than the condition the\\ndistrict court imposed orally. However, it is not entirely clear from the sentencing\\ntranscript and other portions of the record exactly how long the district court intended\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nthe alcohol-prohibiting condition to apply or whether that issue is moot.3 We\\ntherefore reverse the district court’s judgment as to Special Condition 5 and remand\\nfor the district court to determine if the special condition is moot, and if not, to clarify\\nthe alcohol-prohibiting special condition of supervised release. See United States v.\\nJames, 792 F.3d 962, 973 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n For the reasons stated above, we affirm Gustus’s conviction under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 111(a)(1). We reverse the district court’s judgment as to Special Condition 5 and\\nremand for the district court to determine if the special condition is moot, and if not,\\nto clarify the alcohol-prohibiting special condition of supervised release.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406991/\", \"author_raw\": \"MELLOY, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring.\\n\\n I concur in the court’s decision because our earliest precedent, Hanson, 618\\nF.2d 1261, appears to foreclose Gustus from presenting an intoxication defense to his\\n§ 111(a)(1) charge. I write separately because we have issued conflicting decisions\\non whether assault under § 111(a)(1) requires specific or general intent, and the issue\\nis one that warrants greater attention.\\n\\n As the court notes, a defendant must be charged with a specific-intent crime to\\nmerit an intoxication defense. See Kenyon, 481 F.3d at 1070. Specific intent is\\nusually defined as “the intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later\\ncharged with,” as opposed to general intent, which is “the intent to perform an act\\n\\n 3\\n We note from the district court docket that Gustus’s supervised release has\\nbeen revoked for reasons unrelated to the alcohol condition. He has been sentenced\\nto four months’ imprisonment with no supervision to follow—likely making this issue\\nmoot.\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\neven though the actor does not desire the consequences that result.” United States v.\\nRobertson, 606 F.3d 943, 954 (8th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Specific intent loosely\\nequates to the Model Penal Code’s culpability standard of “purposely.” See United\\nStates v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404–05 (1980). A defendant is said to act purposely\\nwhen it is the defendant’s “conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to\\ncause such a result.” Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a) (Am. Law Inst. 1985); see\\nVoisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2278 (2016).\\n\\n Section 111(a) makes it a felony to assault a federal employee while the\\nemployee is engaged in official duties if the assault involved physical contact with\\nthe victim.4 The statute does not specify what culpability standard applies to its\\nelements. In United States v. Feola, the Supreme Court addressed one element of the\\noffense—the attendant circumstance of the victim’s identity—and concluded that\\nthere is no requirement that the defendant “be aware that his victim is a federal\\nofficer.” 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975). “All the statute requires is an intent to assault,\\nnot an intent to assault a federal officer.” Id.\\n\\n Feola’s use of the phrase “an intent to assault” generated significant confusion.\\nIn short succession, we issued “conflicting . . . decisions as to whether specific intent\\nis an element of a § 111 violation.” United States v. Oakie, 12 F.3d 1436, 1443 (8th\\n\\n\\n 4\\n The offense is a misdemeanor if the assault “constitute[d] only simple assault,”\\nbut it becomes a felony if the assault “involve[d] physical contact with the victim” or\\nif the defendant had “the intent to commit another felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 111(a).\\nGustus’s conviction was treated as a felony, and the jury specifically found that he\\nmade physical contact with Gonzalez. It should be noted, however, that Gustus’s\\nindictment did not include the allegation that he made physical contact with the\\nvictim. The failure to include in the indictment a critical element that transforms an\\noffense from a misdemeanor to a felony is reversible error. See Almendarez-Torres\\nv. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998). Gustus has not raised this argument, so\\nthe issue is not before us on direct appeal.\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\nCir. 1993) (citing Hanson, 618 F.2d at 1265, and Manelli, 667 F.2d at 696). Hanson\\nappears to hold that § 111 only requires a general intent to assault, 618 F.2d at 1265,\\nwhereas Manelli states that “[s]pecific intent is an essential element of the crime,”\\n667 F.2d at 696. This conflict is particularly curious because Hanson and Manelli\\nwere issued only a year apart, both decisions cite to the Supreme Court’s decision in\\nFeola in support of their respective positions, and one of the judges on the Hanson\\npanel authored the later Manelli opinion. Notably, other circuits also appear divided\\non whether § 111 is a specific-intent or general-intent offense.5 Nonetheless, we are\\nbound to follow Hanson, the earlier opinion, which indicates that § 111 is a general-\\nintent offense.6 See Mader, 654 F.3d at 800.\\n There are compelling arguments for treating assault under § 111 as either a\\n\\n 5\\n Five circuits have characterized the offense as one of general intent. United\\nStates v. Brown, 592 F. App’x 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); United States\\nv. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 808 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ricketts, 146 F.3d 492,\\n497 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Kleinbart, 27 F.3d 586, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1994);\\nUnited States v. Jim, 865 F.2d 211, 214–15 (9th Cir. 1989). But see United States v.\\nStaggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1977) (taking opposite approach). Three\\ncircuits have treated § 111 as a specific-intent crime. United States v. Simmonds, 931\\nF.2d 685, 687 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Taylor, 680 F.2d 378, 381 (5th Cir.\\n1982); United States v. Caruana, 652 F.2d 220, 222–23 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam).\\n\\n 6\\n It is debatable whether Hanson fully addressed the question presented here:\\nDoes § 111 require the defendant to commit the assault with specific intent? The\\ndefendants in Hanson conceded that assault is ordinarily a general-intent crime, but\\nattempted to “distinguish the crime of assault from that of assault on a federal officer”\\nby arguing that the latter offense requires specific intent. 618 F.2d at 1265. Citing\\nFeola, we rejected that distinction because § 111 does not require the defendant to\\nknow the victim’s identity. Id. Even if the court in fact adopted the concession that\\nassault is a general-intent crime, that concession was immaterial to the outcome of the\\ndecision; the court noted, “Even were we to agree that assault were a specific intent\\ncrime, it cannot be said that [the assault was] not done purposely and knowingly.”\\nId.\\n\\n -9-\\n\\ngeneral-intent or specific-intent crime.7 On the one hand, we recognized in United\\nStates v. Yates that Congress imported into § 111 the common-law definition of\\nsimple assault. 304 F.3d 818, 821–23 (8th Cir. 2002). Assault at common law\\n“requires the showing of an offer or attempt by force or violence to do a corporal\\ninjury to another.” Id. at 822 (quoting United States v. Bear Ribs, 562 F.2d 563, 564\\n(8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)). Applying this definition, we have previously\\ncharacterized common-law assault as a general-intent crime. See United States v.\\nAshley, 255 F.3d 907, 911–12 (8th Cir. 2001). This would support treating § 111 as\\na general-intent crime, although some of our sister circuits disagree with our reading\\nof the common law. See, e.g., United States v. Lamott, 831 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.\\n2016) (“[C]ommon law assault is a specific intent crime . . . .”).\\n\\n On the other hand, we have also held that an assault under § 111 must be\\n“willfully” committed. United States v. Olunloyo, 10 F.3d 578, 580–81 (8th Cir.\\n1993) (citing Potter v. United States, 691 F.2d 1275, 1280 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also\\nUnited States v. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601, 606–07 (8th Cir. 1977) (discussing,\\nprior to Hanson, jury instructions requiring the defendant to act willfully). When\\nused in a criminal statute, willfully “generally means an act done with a bad purpose.”\\nScrews v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945) (quoting United States v. Murdock,\\n290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933)). We have therefore regularly interpreted the term as\\nrequiring specific intent. See, e.g., United States v. Boone, 828 F.3d 705, 711 (8th\\nCir. 2016); United States v. Bussey, 942 F.2d 1241, 1250 (8th Cir. 1991). It follows\\nfrom these decisions that for an assault under § 111 to be “willfully” committed, the\\ndefendant must have acted with specific intent.\\n Our pattern jury instructions on § 111 offenses are consistent with this latter\\n\\n 7\\n Regardless of whether the assault element of § 111(a) requires proof of\\nspecific intent, some formulations of the offense undoubtedly would. For example,\\ncharging the offense as a felony because the defendant had the “intent to commit\\nanother felony” unquestionably requires specific intent. See, e.g., United States v.\\nIron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 88 (8th Cir. 1980) (explaining that assault with intent to\\ncommit rape requires the specific intent to commit rape).\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\nview.8 The model instructions advise district courts to add the terms “voluntarily and\\nintentionally” to § 111’s elements because “[t]he assault must be intentional, even\\nthough the term ‘willful’ is not used in the statute.” 8th Cir. Model Crim. Jury\\nInstructions § 6.18.111 & n.4 (2017); see also United States v. Wallace, 852 F.3d\\n778, 783 (8th Cir. 2017) (approving similar instruction); United States v. Bettelyoun,\\n16 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1994) (same). To satisfy a requirement that the assault be\\nintentional, it would appear that the government would need to prove that the\\ndefendant committed the assault willfully, that is, with specific intent. See Screws,\\n325 U.S. at 101.\\n\\n Gustus’s case illustrates the tension in our precedents. His indictment and jury\\ninstructions conformed to our model instructions and included the terms “voluntarily\\nand intentionally.” Those terms usually require a showing of specific intent, and we\\nordinarily “hold the government to the elements charged in its indictment.” Wallace,\\n852 F.3d at 783. Yet Gustus was denied the opportunity to present an intoxication\\ndefense based on the conclusion that he was charged with a general-intent crime.\\n\\n Whether § 111 is a specific-intent or general-intent crime is a difficult question\\nto which we have given conflicting answers, but one that only the court sitting en\\nbanc can resolve. I therefore concur fully in the court’s opinion.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n “The model jury instructions are available for use by the district courts, but\\nthey are not binding.” United States v. Sparkman, 500 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n\\n -11-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406991/\", \"author_raw\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629738/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Stephen GUSTUS, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-14\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2303\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Stephen Gustus\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\n Filed: June 14, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\n\n Following a jury trial, Defendant Stephen Gustus appeals his conviction under\n18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) for assaulting a United States Postal Service employee.1\nHaving jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and reverse in part.\n\n I. Background\n\n The following facts are presented in a light most favorable to the verdict. On\nDecember 21, 2016, a Postal Service employee named Julio Gonzalez was\nunexpectedly tackled from behind by a man wearing nothing but a pair of shoes and\na bed comforter. The man was later identified as Gustus. Gonzalez fell to the\nground, and Gustus jumped into Gonzalez’s mail truck. Gonzalez got up and\nphysically engaged Gustus in the truck, punching him three or four times before\nslipping and falling to the ground again. At some point after this second fall,\nGonzalez grabbed hold of Gustus’s comforter. Gustus jumped out of the truck and\nkicked Gonzalez in the arm until he released the comforter. Gustus then fled on foot.\nGonzalez ran into a nearby field to keep an eye on Gustus and called 911. Gonzalez\nlost sight of Gustus, but a police officer was able to locate him soon thereafter.\n\n When the officer encountered Gustus, Gustus would not respond to the\nofficer’s commands. Instead, he merely stared up at the sky. After several\nunsuccessful attempts to get Gustus to sit down with hands behind his back, the\nofficer threatened to use pepper spray. The officer observed Gustus clench his hands\ninto fists as if “he was getting ready to fight.” The officer then sprayed a burst of\n\n\n 1\n We note that Gustus’s criminal judgment indicates he was convicted of\nviolating 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and 1114. Section 111(a)(1) references § 1114 for\nthe purpose of defining the victim of the § 111(a)(1) assault. Section 1114 itself is\na homicide statute that defines the qualifying victim, in relevant part, as “any officer\nor employee of the United States . . . while such officer or employee is engaged in . . .\nofficial duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 1114. To be clear, Gustus was convicted of assault, not\nhomicide, and the references in his case to § 1114 are merely definitional.\n\n -2-\n\npepper spray, hitting Gustus in the face. Gustus immediately sat down, and the\nofficer placed him in handcuffs and called for medical personnel to take Gustus to a\nnearby healthcare facility.\n\n Gustus was eventually charged with “voluntarily and intentionally forcibly\nassault[ing], imped[ing] and interfer[ing] with an employee of the United States while\nthe employee was engaged in and on account of the performance of official duties,”\na violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Gustus pled not guilty to the offense and\nprepared to present a defense that he was voluntarily intoxicated and lacked the\nspecific intent to assault Gonzalez.2 He proffered a jury instruction on intoxication\nto that effect. The government responded by filing a motion in limine, arguing that\nour opinion in United States v. Hanson, 618 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1980), established\nthat § 111(a)(1) assaults are general-intent crimes for which a voluntary-intoxication\ndefense is unavailable. The district court granted the government’s motion and\nprohibited Gustus from presenting a voluntary-intoxication defense.\n\n A two-day trial ensued. The government called several witnesses, including:\nGonzalez; the 911 operator who fielded Gonzalez’s call; the officer who\napprehended Gustus; a postal inspector; medical personnel who treated Gonzalez; and\nGonzalez’s supervisor who visited Gonzalez at the site of the incident and took him\nto receive medical treatment. Gustus did not call any witnesses but moved for a\njudgment of acquittal. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found\nGustus guilty of assaulting Gonzalez. The district court sentenced Gustus to time\n\n\n\n 2\n A presentence investigation report (“PSR”) prepared after trial reveals that, at\nthe time of the offense, Gustus showed multiple signs of being intoxicated, including\nsmelling of intoxicants, using slurred speech, and having blood-shot eyes and\nunstable footing. The PSR further reveals that, at the healthcare facility, Gustus\nadmitted to drinking alcohol and tested positive for amphetamines,\nmethamphetamines, and marijuana.\n\n -3-\n\nserved followed by two years of supervised release. As part of the supervised release,\nthe district court orally imposed the following special condition:\n\n He’ll have to participate, of course, in a substance abuse treatment\n program under the guidance and supervision of the probation office.\n And that might include drug testing, alcohol testing, outpatient\n counseling, residential treatment. He can’t use any alcohol during those\n sessions.\n\n ....\n\n . . . He can’t use any alcohol during the program of alcohol testing\n and outpatient counseling. He must pay for the cost [at a rate of $10 per\n session, with a total cost not to exceed $40 a month based on ability to\n pay as determined by the probation office. If he can’t afford that, the\n copayment will be waived].\n\n And he’ll be required to disclose his substance abuse history to\n prescribing physicians and allow the probation office to verify\n disclosure. . . .\n\nThe district court clarified that the alcohol restriction applied while Gustus was\nreceiving both substance abuse and mental health treatment. The final, written\nversion of the special condition (“Special Condition 5”) read as follows:\n\n You must participate in a substance abuse treatment program under the\n guidance and supervision of the probation office. The program may\n include drug and alcohol testing, outpatient counseling, and residential\n treatment. You must abstain from the use of alcohol during supervision.\n You must pay for the cost of treatment at the rate of $10 per session,\n with the total cost not to exceed $40 per month, based on ability to pay\n as determined by the probation office. If you are financially unable to\n pay for the cost of treatment, the co-pay requirement will be waived.\n You must disclose your substance abuse history to prescribing\n physicians and allow the probation office to verify disclosure.\n\nGustus timely filed a notice of appeal.\n\n -4-\n\n II. Discussion\n\n Gustus presents three arguments on appeal: (1) the district court erred in\ndenying him the opportunity to present a voluntary-intoxication defense; (2) there\nwas insufficient evidence to convict him of assaulting Gonzalez; and (3) Special\nCondition 5 was broader than the oral version of the condition and should be\nmodified. We address each argument in turn. Regarding the voluntary-intoxication\ndefense and sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments, we review the district court’s\njudgment de novo. See United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735, 744 (8th Cir. 2010)\n(“[W]hen the refusal of a proffered instruction . . . denies a legal defense, the correct\nstandard of review is de novo . . . .”); United States v. DeFoggi, 839 F.3d 701, 709\n(8th Cir. 2016) (“We review the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial de novo, but\nexamine the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, resolving\nfactual disputes and accepting all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict.”).\nWe review the “terms and conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion.”\nUnited States v. Phillips, 785 F.3d 282, 284 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n The district court did not err in preventing Gustus from presenting a voluntary-\nintoxication defense. “Such a defense is . . . unavailable” to defendants being charged\nwith violating 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) because assaulting a federal employee is a\ngeneral-intent crime. Hanson, 618 F.2d at 1265. Gustus argues that we should\ndisregard Hanson because later decisions contain language to the effect that\nassaulting a federal employee is a specific-intent crime. See, e.g., United States v.\nManelli, 667 F.2d 695, 696 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Specific intent is an essential element\nof the crime of assaulting a federal officer in the performance of his duties.”). He\nfurther argues that voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific-intent crimes. See\nUnited States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054, 1070 (8th Cir. 2007). We are bound to\nfollow Hanson as it is the earliest of the conflicting opinions and “should have\ncontrolled the subsequent panels.” Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th\n\n\n\n -5-\n\nCir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). Consequently, we hold that Gustus was not\nentitled to present a voluntary-intoxication defense.\n\n We also hold that sufficient evidence supports Gustus’s conviction. Section\n111(a)(1) makes it a crime to “forcibly assault[], resist[], oppose[], impede[],\nintimidate[], or interfere[] with [a federal employee] while engaged in or on account\nof the performance of official duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). The parties agree that\nthe government proved all of the elements of a § 111(a)(1) violation beyond a\nreasonable doubt except for the mens rea element, which they agree is voluntary and\nintentional. See United States v. Drapeau, 644 F.3d 646, 652 (8th Cir. 2011). Gustus\nargues that because he was intoxicated, his actions could not have been voluntary or\nintentional. We reject this argument as indistinguishable from his argument above\nthat the district court erred in preventing him from presenting a voluntary-intoxication\ndefense.\n\n Gustus also argues that portions of Gonzalez’s testimony at trial were not\ncredible, making the evidence as a whole insufficient. Gonzalez, for example, made\nseemingly inconsistent statements about: (1) whether he was attacked while he was\ngetting into his mail truck or while he was getting out; and (2) whether he had his\nkeys in his hands during the attack. The credibility of a witness is “within the\nprovince of the jury and virtually unreviewable on appeal.” United States v.\nThompson, 881 F.3d 629, 633 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). We are to “resolve\nany credibility issues in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Polk, 715 F.3d 238,\n247 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). We do so here and reject Gustus’s argument.\nHis conviction was supported by sufficient, credible evidence.\n\n Finally, we agree that Special Condition 5 is broader than the condition the\ndistrict court imposed orally. However, it is not entirely clear from the sentencing\ntranscript and other portions of the record exactly how long the district court intended\n\n\n\n -6-\n\nthe alcohol-prohibiting condition to apply or whether that issue is moot.3 We\ntherefore reverse the district court’s judgment as to Special Condition 5 and remand\nfor the district court to determine if the special condition is moot, and if not, to clarify\nthe alcohol-prohibiting special condition of supervised release. See United States v.\nJames, 792 F.3d 962, 973 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n For the reasons stated above, we affirm Gustus’s conviction under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 111(a)(1). We reverse the district court’s judgment as to Special Condition 5 and\nremand for the district court to determine if the special condition is moot, and if not,\nto clarify the alcohol-prohibiting special condition of supervised release.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Stephen GUSTUS, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-14\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2303\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Stephen Gustus\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: June 14, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Following a jury trial, Defendant Stephen Gustus appeals his conviction under\\n18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) for assaulting a United States Postal Service employee.1\\nHaving jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and reverse in part.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n The following facts are presented in a light most favorable to the verdict. On\\nDecember 21, 2016, a Postal Service employee named Julio Gonzalez was\\nunexpectedly tackled from behind by a man wearing nothing but a pair of shoes and\\na bed comforter. The man was later identified as Gustus. Gonzalez fell to the\\nground, and Gustus jumped into Gonzalez’s mail truck. Gonzalez got up and\\nphysically engaged Gustus in the truck, punching him three or four times before\\nslipping and falling to the ground again. At some point after this second fall,\\nGonzalez grabbed hold of Gustus’s comforter. Gustus jumped out of the truck and\\nkicked Gonzalez in the arm until he released the comforter. Gustus then fled on foot.\\nGonzalez ran into a nearby field to keep an eye on Gustus and called 911. Gonzalez\\nlost sight of Gustus, but a police officer was able to locate him soon thereafter.\\n\\n When the officer encountered Gustus, Gustus would not respond to the\\nofficer’s commands. Instead, he merely stared up at the sky. After several\\nunsuccessful attempts to get Gustus to sit down with hands behind his back, the\\nofficer threatened to use pepper spray. The officer observed Gustus clench his hands\\ninto fists as if “he was getting ready to fight.” The officer then sprayed a burst of\\n\\n\\n 1\\n We note that Gustus’s criminal judgment indicates he was convicted of\\nviolating 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and 1114. Section 111(a)(1) references § 1114 for\\nthe purpose of defining the victim of the § 111(a)(1) assault. Section 1114 itself is\\na homicide statute that defines the qualifying victim, in relevant part, as “any officer\\nor employee of the United States . . . while such officer or employee is engaged in . . .\\nofficial duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 1114. To be clear, Gustus was convicted of assault, not\\nhomicide, and the references in his case to § 1114 are merely definitional.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\npepper spray, hitting Gustus in the face. Gustus immediately sat down, and the\\nofficer placed him in handcuffs and called for medical personnel to take Gustus to a\\nnearby healthcare facility.\\n\\n Gustus was eventually charged with “voluntarily and intentionally forcibly\\nassault[ing], imped[ing] and interfer[ing] with an employee of the United States while\\nthe employee was engaged in and on account of the performance of official duties,”\\na violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Gustus pled not guilty to the offense and\\nprepared to present a defense that he was voluntarily intoxicated and lacked the\\nspecific intent to assault Gonzalez.2 He proffered a jury instruction on intoxication\\nto that effect. The government responded by filing a motion in limine, arguing that\\nour opinion in United States v. Hanson, 618 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1980), established\\nthat § 111(a)(1) assaults are general-intent crimes for which a voluntary-intoxication\\ndefense is unavailable. The district court granted the government’s motion and\\nprohibited Gustus from presenting a voluntary-intoxication defense.\\n\\n A two-day trial ensued. The government called several witnesses, including:\\nGonzalez; the 911 operator who fielded Gonzalez’s call; the officer who\\napprehended Gustus; a postal inspector; medical personnel who treated Gonzalez; and\\nGonzalez’s supervisor who visited Gonzalez at the site of the incident and took him\\nto receive medical treatment. Gustus did not call any witnesses but moved for a\\njudgment of acquittal. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found\\nGustus guilty of assaulting Gonzalez. The district court sentenced Gustus to time\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n A presentence investigation report (“PSR”) prepared after trial reveals that, at\\nthe time of the offense, Gustus showed multiple signs of being intoxicated, including\\nsmelling of intoxicants, using slurred speech, and having blood-shot eyes and\\nunstable footing. The PSR further reveals that, at the healthcare facility, Gustus\\nadmitted to drinking alcohol and tested positive for amphetamines,\\nmethamphetamines, and marijuana.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\nserved followed by two years of supervised release. As part of the supervised release,\\nthe district court orally imposed the following special condition:\\n\\n He’ll have to participate, of course, in a substance abuse treatment\\n program under the guidance and supervision of the probation office.\\n And that might include drug testing, alcohol testing, outpatient\\n counseling, residential treatment. He can’t use any alcohol during those\\n sessions.\\n\\n ....\\n\\n . . . He can’t use any alcohol during the program of alcohol testing\\n and outpatient counseling. He must pay for the cost [at a rate of $10 per\\n session, with a total cost not to exceed $40 a month based on ability to\\n pay as determined by the probation office. If he can’t afford that, the\\n copayment will be waived].\\n\\n And he’ll be required to disclose his substance abuse history to\\n prescribing physicians and allow the probation office to verify\\n disclosure. . . .\\n\\nThe district court clarified that the alcohol restriction applied while Gustus was\\nreceiving both substance abuse and mental health treatment. The final, written\\nversion of the special condition (“Special Condition 5”) read as follows:\\n\\n You must participate in a substance abuse treatment program under the\\n guidance and supervision of the probation office. The program may\\n include drug and alcohol testing, outpatient counseling, and residential\\n treatment. You must abstain from the use of alcohol during supervision.\\n You must pay for the cost of treatment at the rate of $10 per session,\\n with the total cost not to exceed $40 per month, based on ability to pay\\n as determined by the probation office. If you are financially unable to\\n pay for the cost of treatment, the co-pay requirement will be waived.\\n You must disclose your substance abuse history to prescribing\\n physicians and allow the probation office to verify disclosure.\\n\\nGustus timely filed a notice of appeal.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n Gustus presents three arguments on appeal: (1) the district court erred in\\ndenying him the opportunity to present a voluntary-intoxication defense; (2) there\\nwas insufficient evidence to convict him of assaulting Gonzalez; and (3) Special\\nCondition 5 was broader than the oral version of the condition and should be\\nmodified. We address each argument in turn. Regarding the voluntary-intoxication\\ndefense and sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments, we review the district court’s\\njudgment de novo. See United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735, 744 (8th Cir. 2010)\\n(“[W]hen the refusal of a proffered instruction . . . denies a legal defense, the correct\\nstandard of review is de novo . . . .”); United States v. DeFoggi, 839 F.3d 701, 709\\n(8th Cir. 2016) (“We review the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial de novo, but\\nexamine the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, resolving\\nfactual disputes and accepting all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict.”).\\nWe review the “terms and conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion.”\\nUnited States v. Phillips, 785 F.3d 282, 284 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n The district court did not err in preventing Gustus from presenting a voluntary-\\nintoxication defense. “Such a defense is . . . unavailable” to defendants being charged\\nwith violating 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) because assaulting a federal employee is a\\ngeneral-intent crime. Hanson, 618 F.2d at 1265. Gustus argues that we should\\ndisregard Hanson because later decisions contain language to the effect that\\nassaulting a federal employee is a specific-intent crime. See, e.g., United States v.\\nManelli, 667 F.2d 695, 696 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Specific intent is an essential element\\nof the crime of assaulting a federal officer in the performance of his duties.”). He\\nfurther argues that voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific-intent crimes. See\\nUnited States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054, 1070 (8th Cir. 2007). We are bound to\\nfollow Hanson as it is the earliest of the conflicting opinions and “should have\\ncontrolled the subsequent panels.” Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\nCir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). Consequently, we hold that Gustus was not\\nentitled to present a voluntary-intoxication defense.\\n\\n We also hold that sufficient evidence supports Gustus’s conviction. Section\\n111(a)(1) makes it a crime to “forcibly assault[], resist[], oppose[], impede[],\\nintimidate[], or interfere[] with [a federal employee] while engaged in or on account\\nof the performance of official duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). The parties agree that\\nthe government proved all of the elements of a § 111(a)(1) violation beyond a\\nreasonable doubt except for the mens rea element, which they agree is voluntary and\\nintentional. See United States v. Drapeau, 644 F.3d 646, 652 (8th Cir. 2011). Gustus\\nargues that because he was intoxicated, his actions could not have been voluntary or\\nintentional. We reject this argument as indistinguishable from his argument above\\nthat the district court erred in preventing him from presenting a voluntary-intoxication\\ndefense.\\n\\n Gustus also argues that portions of Gonzalez’s testimony at trial were not\\ncredible, making the evidence as a whole insufficient. Gonzalez, for example, made\\nseemingly inconsistent statements about: (1) whether he was attacked while he was\\ngetting into his mail truck or while he was getting out; and (2) whether he had his\\nkeys in his hands during the attack. The credibility of a witness is “within the\\nprovince of the jury and virtually unreviewable on appeal.” United States v.\\nThompson, 881 F.3d 629, 633 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). We are to “resolve\\nany credibility issues in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Polk, 715 F.3d 238,\\n247 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). We do so here and reject Gustus’s argument.\\nHis conviction was supported by sufficient, credible evidence.\\n\\n Finally, we agree that Special Condition 5 is broader than the condition the\\ndistrict court imposed orally. However, it is not entirely clear from the sentencing\\ntranscript and other portions of the record exactly how long the district court intended\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nthe alcohol-prohibiting condition to apply or whether that issue is moot.3 We\\ntherefore reverse the district court’s judgment as to Special Condition 5 and remand\\nfor the district court to determine if the special condition is moot, and if not, to clarify\\nthe alcohol-prohibiting special condition of supervised release. See United States v.\\nJames, 792 F.3d 962, 973 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n For the reasons stated above, we affirm Gustus’s conviction under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 111(a)(1). We reverse the district court’s judgment as to Special Condition 5 and\\nremand for the district court to determine if the special condition is moot, and if not,\\nto clarify the alcohol-prohibiting special condition of supervised release.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2673,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4629741,"string":"4,629,741"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Sherry DESPAIN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Sherry Despain v. Nancy A. Berryhill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-14"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1927"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Grasz, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1927\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Sherry Despain\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Nancy A. Berryhill,1 Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: June 14, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Nancy A. Berryhill has been appointed to serve as Acting Commissioner of\\nthe Social Security Administration, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal\\nRule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).\\n\\f Sherry Despain appeals the district court’s2 judgment that the Social Security\\nAdministration (“SSA”) Commissioner’s decision to deny her disability benefits was\\nsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n Despain is a 52-year old woman from Harrisburg, Arkansas, who previously\\nworked as a packaging machine operator at Frito-Lay. She suffered from chronic\\npain and obesity. In 2015, some back spasms and other pain conditions kept her away\\nfrom work long enough that she exhausted her permitted absences under the Family\\nand Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654. Because she knew she was no\\nlonger capable of working her old job, she resigned. She did not apply for any new\\njobs.\\n\\n In June 2015, Despain applied for disability benefits, alleging disability\\nbeginning on May 4, 2015. After the SSA denied her claim initially and on\\nreconsideration, she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).\\n\\n The ALJ found Despain had six severe impairments: obesity, osteoarthritis of\\nboth knees, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, pes planus (flat feet),\\nanxiety, and depression. The ALJ also found none of those impairments individually\\nnor the combination of them were severe enough to satisfy the criteria for disability\\nbenefits under SSA regulations.\\n\\n The ALJ then determined Despain had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)\\nto perform light work with some limitations. She would “need to sit or stand at will”\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The Honorable Beth M. Deere, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent\\nof the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fand be limited to work (1) “with no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and no\\nbalancing requirements,” (2) with only “occasional climbing of ramps and stairs,\\nstooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling,” and (3) “where no lower extremity foot\\ncontrol operation is necessary.” She also would be “limited to unskilled, simple,\\nroutine, and repetitive job tasks, where the supervision is simple, direct, and concrete,\\nconsistent with specific vocational preparation (SVP) 1 or 2 jobs that could be learned\\nwithin thirty days.”\\n\\n Although Despain could not perform her past relevant work under this RFC,\\ntestimony from a vocational expert indicated jobs with her RFC are available in the\\nUnited States economy. Based on that testimony, the ALJ found Despain was not\\nunder a disability as defined by the Social Security Act.\\n\\n The Social Security Appeals Council denied Despain’s petition for review,\\nmaking the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final administrative decision.\\nDespain filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas seeking review. The\\ndistrict court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, and Despain timely appealed.\\n\\n II. Standard of Review\\n\\n We review de novo the district court’s decision affirming the denial of social\\nsecurity benefits and will affirm “if the Commissioner’s decision is supported\\nby . . . substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Ash v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 686,\\n689 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir.\\n2010)). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a\\nreasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.”\\nId. (quoting McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)). If the record\\nsupports two inconsistent conclusions, this court must affirm the Commissioner’s\\nchoice among those two conclusions. Id. at 689–90.\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f III. Analysis\\n\\n On appeal, Despain solely challenges the ALJ’s determination of her RFC. As\\nthe claimant, she bears the burden of proof to establish her RFC. See Goff v.\\nBarnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005). She argues the Commissioner gave\\ninadequate deference to her treating physician’s opinion and the RFC is unsupported\\nby the record.\\n\\n “The opinion of a treating physician is accorded special deference under the\\nsocial security regulations” and is “normally entitled to great weight.” Vossen v.\\nAstrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010,\\n1012–13 (8th Cir. 2000)).3 “[A] treating physician’s opinion ‘should be granted\\ncontrolling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and\\nlaboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial\\nevidence in the record.’” Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting\\nCunningham v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 2000)). However, a treating\\nphysician’s opinion as to whether a patient is disabled or unable to work is not\\ndispositive because these are “issues reserved to the Commissioner and are not the\\ntype of opinions which receive controlling weight.” Vossen, 612 F.3d at 1015;\\naccord Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619–20 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Even though the RFC\\nassessment draws from medical sources for support, it is ultimately an administrative\\ndetermination reserved to the Commissioner.”).\\n\\n In May 2016, Despain’s treating physician, Dr. Michael Crawley, completed\\na “Medical Source Statement-Physical” regarding Despain’s ongoing pain in her\\n\\n 3\\n We note the SSA recently issued rules regarding treating physicians. See\\nRevisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844\\n(Jan. 18, 2017); see also 82 Fed. Reg. 15132 (Mar. 27, 2017) (amending and\\ncorrecting the rules). Because the ALJ order in Despain’s case predates the new\\nrules, we do not address them.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fback, hips, and knees. The boxes he checked on the form essentially indicated seven\\nconclusions imposing limitations on Despain. First, she could lift and carry ten\\npounds maximum for 1/3 to 2/3 of an eight-hour day. Second, she could stand for\\nabout three hours per eight-hour day and sit about two hours per eight-hour day.\\nThird, she would need frequent rest periods and longer-than-normal breaks but would\\nnot need the opportunity to shift at will from a sitting or standing position. Fourth,\\nshe would not have the physical stamina to complete a normal work day or week, let\\nalone maintain an ordinary work routine or a full-time work schedule. Fifth, she\\ncould reach in all directions and manipulate objects for 2/3 of an eight-hour work day.\\nSixth, she would suffer a decreased ability to concentrate and persist in a job setting\\ndue to her medications. Seventh, her impairments would cause her to be absent from\\nwork about three days per month. Dr. Crawley left the portion of the form blank that\\nasked for the medical findings supporting the limitations.\\n\\n Because Dr. Crawley’s opinion in this case is conclusory, the ALJ correctly\\nexamined the underlying medical record to determine whether it supported his\\nconclusion. A conclusory report from a treating physician may still be entitled to\\ncontrolling weight if it is accurate when viewed in the context of the medical record.\\nSee Cox v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 2003). An ALJ properly discredits\\nsuch a report, though, if it is unsupported by the medical record. See Stormo v.\\nBarnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 805–06 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n\\n The record indicates significant sources of pain and Dr. Crawley’s familiarity\\nwith the pain because he served as Despain’s primary care physician since February\\n2014 and had treated her on more than a dozen occasions. As the ALJ noted, medical\\nrecords from before her alleged onset of disability show complaints of back, foot, and\\nknee pain over time; obesity; and diagnoses of lumbar strain, osteoarthritis of the\\nknees, and pes planus. After her alleged onset of disability, medical records from Dr.\\nCrawley and other treating physicians showed continuing back, foot, and knee pain,\\nand one abnormal reflex, but they also showed no resulting limit to her range of\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fmotion. A lumbar spine MRI indicated mild degenerative changes, mild disc bulging,\\nneuroforaminal narrowing (reduced opening of the spinal canal), and a small\\nherniation. The record is mixed on whether her doctors recommended surgery for any\\nof these spinal issues. Despain’s physical therapy records also indicate she was able\\nto tolerate therapy without increased pain, even if the record is mixed about the\\nsuccess of physical therapy.\\n\\n Like the ALJ, we do not believe these records adequately support the\\nlimitations Dr. Crawley stated in 2016. The records of continued pain do not support\\nlimitations beyond those the ALJ applied or otherwise render Despain completely\\nunable to perform light work. Thus, because the ALJ discredited the conclusory\\nreport to the extent it went beyond the submitted records, the ALJ’s consideration of\\nthe treating physician’s opinion was appropriate.\\n\\n Beyond the issue of the ALJ’s deference to Dr. Crawley, Despain argues the\\nevidence does not support a conclusion that she “can meet the demands of light work\\nby sitting, standing, or walking for a full eight-hour day, five days a week.” In\\nassessing Despain’s RFC, the ALJ considered Dr. Crawley’s treatment notes, other\\nphysicians’ notes, Despain’s treatment, her daily activities, and the opinions of the\\nstate agency medical consultants who found Despain had the RFC to perform light\\nwork with postural limits. Then, the ALJ placed several restrictions on light work\\nthat accounted for her proven limitations. While Despain correctly notes the record\\nis mixed on whether she declined back surgery rather than being advised it was not\\nneeded, even presuming that fact in her favor does not alter the ALJ’s main\\nconclusion about Despain’s pain continuing at a level that could be accommodated\\nwith work restrictions. Nothing in the record proves her pain exceeded the amount\\nacknowledged in the RFC limitations. Accordingly, the ALJ’s conclusion Despain\\ndid not meet her burden to prove a more restricted RFC is supported by substantial\\nevidence.\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f IV. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court that the Commissioner’s decision\\nto deny disability benefits was supported by substantial evidence.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406994/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629741/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Sherry DESPAIN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-14\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1927\n ___________________________\n\n Sherry Despain\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Nancy A. Berryhill,1 Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\n Filed: June 14, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n Nancy A. Berryhill has been appointed to serve as Acting Commissioner of\nthe Social Security Administration, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal\nRule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).\n\f Sherry Despain appeals the district court’s2 judgment that the Social Security\nAdministration (“SSA”) Commissioner’s decision to deny her disability benefits was\nsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm.\n\n I. Background\n\n Despain is a 52-year old woman from Harrisburg, Arkansas, who previously\nworked as a packaging machine operator at Frito-Lay. She suffered from chronic\npain and obesity. In 2015, some back spasms and other pain conditions kept her away\nfrom work long enough that she exhausted her permitted absences under the Family\nand Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654. Because she knew she was no\nlonger capable of working her old job, she resigned. She did not apply for any new\njobs.\n\n In June 2015, Despain applied for disability benefits, alleging disability\nbeginning on May 4, 2015. After the SSA denied her claim initially and on\nreconsideration, she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).\n\n The ALJ found Despain had six severe impairments: obesity, osteoarthritis of\nboth knees, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, pes planus (flat feet),\nanxiety, and depression. The ALJ also found none of those impairments individually\nnor the combination of them were severe enough to satisfy the criteria for disability\nbenefits under SSA regulations.\n\n The ALJ then determined Despain had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)\nto perform light work with some limitations. She would “need to sit or stand at will”\n\n\n 2\n The Honorable Beth M. Deere, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent\nof the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\n\n -2-\n\fand be limited to work (1) “with no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and no\nbalancing requirements,” (2) with only “occasional climbing of ramps and stairs,\nstooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling,” and (3) “where no lower extremity foot\ncontrol operation is necessary.” She also would be “limited to unskilled, simple,\nroutine, and repetitive job tasks, where the supervision is simple, direct, and concrete,\nconsistent with specific vocational preparation (SVP) 1 or 2 jobs that could be learned\nwithin thirty days.”\n\n Although Despain could not perform her past relevant work under this RFC,\ntestimony from a vocational expert indicated jobs with her RFC are available in the\nUnited States economy. Based on that testimony, the ALJ found Despain was not\nunder a disability as defined by the Social Security Act.\n\n The Social Security Appeals Council denied Despain’s petition for review,\nmaking the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final administrative decision.\nDespain filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas seeking review. The\ndistrict court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, and Despain timely appealed.\n\n II. Standard of Review\n\n We review de novo the district court’s decision affirming the denial of social\nsecurity benefits and will affirm “if the Commissioner’s decision is supported\nby . . . substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Ash v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 686,\n689 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir.\n2010)). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a\nreasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.”\nId. (quoting McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)). If the record\nsupports two inconsistent conclusions, this court must affirm the Commissioner’s\nchoice among those two conclusions. Id. at 689–90.\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f III. Analysis\n\n On appeal, Despain solely challenges the ALJ’s determination of her RFC. As\nthe claimant, she bears the burden of proof to establish her RFC. See Goff v.\nBarnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005). She argues the Commissioner gave\ninadequate deference to her treating physician’s opinion and the RFC is unsupported\nby the record.\n\n “The opinion of a treating physician is accorded special deference under the\nsocial security regulations” and is “normally entitled to great weight.” Vossen v.\nAstrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010,\n1012–13 (8th Cir. 2000)).3 “[A] treating physician’s opinion ‘should be granted\ncontrolling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and\nlaboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial\nevidence in the record.’” Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting\nCunningham v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 2000)). However, a treating\nphysician’s opinion as to whether a patient is disabled or unable to work is not\ndispositive because these are “issues reserved to the Commissioner and are not the\ntype of opinions which receive controlling weight.” Vossen, 612 F.3d at 1015;\naccord Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619–20 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Even though the RFC\nassessment draws from medical sources for support, it is ultimately an administrative\ndetermination reserved to the Commissioner.”).\n\n In May 2016, Despain’s treating physician, Dr. Michael Crawley, completed\na “Medical Source Statement-Physical” regarding Despain’s ongoing pain in her\n\n 3\n We note the SSA recently issued rules regarding treating physicians. See\nRevisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844\n(Jan. 18, 2017); see also 82 Fed. Reg. 15132 (Mar. 27, 2017) (amending and\ncorrecting the rules). Because the ALJ order in Despain’s case predates the new\nrules, we do not address them.\n\n -4-\n\fback, hips, and knees. The boxes he checked on the form essentially indicated seven\nconclusions imposing limitations on Despain. First, she could lift and carry ten\npounds maximum for 1/3 to 2/3 of an eight-hour day. Second, she could stand for\nabout three hours per eight-hour day and sit about two hours per eight-hour day.\nThird, she would need frequent rest periods and longer-than-normal breaks but would\nnot need the opportunity to shift at will from a sitting or standing position. Fourth,\nshe would not have the physical stamina to complete a normal work day or week, let\nalone maintain an ordinary work routine or a full-time work schedule. Fifth, she\ncould reach in all directions and manipulate objects for 2/3 of an eight-hour work day.\nSixth, she would suffer a decreased ability to concentrate and persist in a job setting\ndue to her medications. Seventh, her impairments would cause her to be absent from\nwork about three days per month. Dr. Crawley left the portion of the form blank that\nasked for the medical findings supporting the limitations.\n\n Because Dr. Crawley’s opinion in this case is conclusory, the ALJ correctly\nexamined the underlying medical record to determine whether it supported his\nconclusion. A conclusory report from a treating physician may still be entitled to\ncontrolling weight if it is accurate when viewed in the context of the medical record.\nSee Cox v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 2003). An ALJ properly discredits\nsuch a report, though, if it is unsupported by the medical record. See Stormo v.\nBarnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 805–06 (8th Cir. 2004).\n\n The record indicates significant sources of pain and Dr. Crawley’s familiarity\nwith the pain because he served as Despain’s primary care physician since February\n2014 and had treated her on more than a dozen occasions. As the ALJ noted, medical\nrecords from before her alleged onset of disability show complaints of back, foot, and\nknee pain over time; obesity; and diagnoses of lumbar strain, osteoarthritis of the\nknees, and pes planus. After her alleged onset of disability, medical records from Dr.\nCrawley and other treating physicians showed continuing back, foot, and knee pain,\nand one abnormal reflex, but they also showed no resulting limit to her range of\n\n -5-\n\fmotion. A lumbar spine MRI indicated mild degenerative changes, mild disc bulging,\nneuroforaminal narrowing (reduced opening of the spinal canal), and a small\nherniation. The record is mixed on whether her doctors recommended surgery for any\nof these spinal issues. Despain’s physical therapy records also indicate she was able\nto tolerate therapy without increased pain, even if the record is mixed about the\nsuccess of physical therapy.\n\n Like the ALJ, we do not believe these records adequately support the\nlimitations Dr. Crawley stated in 2016. The records of continued pain do not support\nlimitations beyond those the ALJ applied or otherwise render Despain completely\nunable to perform light work. Thus, because the ALJ discredited the conclusory\nreport to the extent it went beyond the submitted records, the ALJ’s consideration of\nthe treating physician’s opinion was appropriate.\n\n Beyond the issue of the ALJ’s deference to Dr. Crawley, Despain argues the\nevidence does not support a conclusion that she “can meet the demands of light work\nby sitting, standing, or walking for a full eight-hour day, five days a week.” In\nassessing Despain’s RFC, the ALJ considered Dr. Crawley’s treatment notes, other\nphysicians’ notes, Despain’s treatment, her daily activities, and the opinions of the\nstate agency medical consultants who found Despain had the RFC to perform light\nwork with postural limits. Then, the ALJ placed several restrictions on light work\nthat accounted for her proven limitations. While Despain correctly notes the record\nis mixed on whether she declined back surgery rather than being advised it was not\nneeded, even presuming that fact in her favor does not alter the ALJ’s main\nconclusion about Despain’s pain continuing at a level that could be accommodated\nwith work restrictions. Nothing in the record proves her pain exceeded the amount\nacknowledged in the RFC limitations. Accordingly, the ALJ’s conclusion Despain\ndid not meet her burden to prove a more restricted RFC is supported by substantial\nevidence.\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f IV. Conclusion\n\n We affirm the judgment of the district court that the Commissioner’s decision\nto deny disability benefits was supported by substantial evidence.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Sherry DESPAIN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-14\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1927\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Sherry Despain\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Nancy A. Berryhill,1 Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: June 14, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Nancy A. Berryhill has been appointed to serve as Acting Commissioner of\\nthe Social Security Administration, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal\\nRule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).\\n\\f Sherry Despain appeals the district court’s2 judgment that the Social Security\\nAdministration (“SSA”) Commissioner’s decision to deny her disability benefits was\\nsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n Despain is a 52-year old woman from Harrisburg, Arkansas, who previously\\nworked as a packaging machine operator at Frito-Lay. She suffered from chronic\\npain and obesity. In 2015, some back spasms and other pain conditions kept her away\\nfrom work long enough that she exhausted her permitted absences under the Family\\nand Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654. Because she knew she was no\\nlonger capable of working her old job, she resigned. She did not apply for any new\\njobs.\\n\\n In June 2015, Despain applied for disability benefits, alleging disability\\nbeginning on May 4, 2015. After the SSA denied her claim initially and on\\nreconsideration, she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).\\n\\n The ALJ found Despain had six severe impairments: obesity, osteoarthritis of\\nboth knees, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, pes planus (flat feet),\\nanxiety, and depression. The ALJ also found none of those impairments individually\\nnor the combination of them were severe enough to satisfy the criteria for disability\\nbenefits under SSA regulations.\\n\\n The ALJ then determined Despain had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)\\nto perform light work with some limitations. She would “need to sit or stand at will”\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The Honorable Beth M. Deere, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent\\nof the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fand be limited to work (1) “with no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and no\\nbalancing requirements,” (2) with only “occasional climbing of ramps and stairs,\\nstooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling,” and (3) “where no lower extremity foot\\ncontrol operation is necessary.” She also would be “limited to unskilled, simple,\\nroutine, and repetitive job tasks, where the supervision is simple, direct, and concrete,\\nconsistent with specific vocational preparation (SVP) 1 or 2 jobs that could be learned\\nwithin thirty days.”\\n\\n Although Despain could not perform her past relevant work under this RFC,\\ntestimony from a vocational expert indicated jobs with her RFC are available in the\\nUnited States economy. Based on that testimony, the ALJ found Despain was not\\nunder a disability as defined by the Social Security Act.\\n\\n The Social Security Appeals Council denied Despain’s petition for review,\\nmaking the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final administrative decision.\\nDespain filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas seeking review. The\\ndistrict court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, and Despain timely appealed.\\n\\n II. Standard of Review\\n\\n We review de novo the district court’s decision affirming the denial of social\\nsecurity benefits and will affirm “if the Commissioner’s decision is supported\\nby . . . substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Ash v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 686,\\n689 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir.\\n2010)). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a\\nreasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.”\\nId. (quoting McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)). If the record\\nsupports two inconsistent conclusions, this court must affirm the Commissioner’s\\nchoice among those two conclusions. Id. at 689–90.\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f III. Analysis\\n\\n On appeal, Despain solely challenges the ALJ’s determination of her RFC. As\\nthe claimant, she bears the burden of proof to establish her RFC. See Goff v.\\nBarnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005). She argues the Commissioner gave\\ninadequate deference to her treating physician’s opinion and the RFC is unsupported\\nby the record.\\n\\n “The opinion of a treating physician is accorded special deference under the\\nsocial security regulations” and is “normally entitled to great weight.” Vossen v.\\nAstrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010,\\n1012–13 (8th Cir. 2000)).3 “[A] treating physician’s opinion ‘should be granted\\ncontrolling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and\\nlaboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial\\nevidence in the record.’” Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting\\nCunningham v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 2000)). However, a treating\\nphysician’s opinion as to whether a patient is disabled or unable to work is not\\ndispositive because these are “issues reserved to the Commissioner and are not the\\ntype of opinions which receive controlling weight.” Vossen, 612 F.3d at 1015;\\naccord Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619–20 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Even though the RFC\\nassessment draws from medical sources for support, it is ultimately an administrative\\ndetermination reserved to the Commissioner.”).\\n\\n In May 2016, Despain’s treating physician, Dr. Michael Crawley, completed\\na “Medical Source Statement-Physical” regarding Despain’s ongoing pain in her\\n\\n 3\\n We note the SSA recently issued rules regarding treating physicians. See\\nRevisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844\\n(Jan. 18, 2017); see also 82 Fed. Reg. 15132 (Mar. 27, 2017) (amending and\\ncorrecting the rules). Because the ALJ order in Despain’s case predates the new\\nrules, we do not address them.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fback, hips, and knees. The boxes he checked on the form essentially indicated seven\\nconclusions imposing limitations on Despain. First, she could lift and carry ten\\npounds maximum for 1/3 to 2/3 of an eight-hour day. Second, she could stand for\\nabout three hours per eight-hour day and sit about two hours per eight-hour day.\\nThird, she would need frequent rest periods and longer-than-normal breaks but would\\nnot need the opportunity to shift at will from a sitting or standing position. Fourth,\\nshe would not have the physical stamina to complete a normal work day or week, let\\nalone maintain an ordinary work routine or a full-time work schedule. Fifth, she\\ncould reach in all directions and manipulate objects for 2/3 of an eight-hour work day.\\nSixth, she would suffer a decreased ability to concentrate and persist in a job setting\\ndue to her medications. Seventh, her impairments would cause her to be absent from\\nwork about three days per month. Dr. Crawley left the portion of the form blank that\\nasked for the medical findings supporting the limitations.\\n\\n Because Dr. Crawley’s opinion in this case is conclusory, the ALJ correctly\\nexamined the underlying medical record to determine whether it supported his\\nconclusion. A conclusory report from a treating physician may still be entitled to\\ncontrolling weight if it is accurate when viewed in the context of the medical record.\\nSee Cox v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 2003). An ALJ properly discredits\\nsuch a report, though, if it is unsupported by the medical record. See Stormo v.\\nBarnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 805–06 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n\\n The record indicates significant sources of pain and Dr. Crawley’s familiarity\\nwith the pain because he served as Despain’s primary care physician since February\\n2014 and had treated her on more than a dozen occasions. As the ALJ noted, medical\\nrecords from before her alleged onset of disability show complaints of back, foot, and\\nknee pain over time; obesity; and diagnoses of lumbar strain, osteoarthritis of the\\nknees, and pes planus. After her alleged onset of disability, medical records from Dr.\\nCrawley and other treating physicians showed continuing back, foot, and knee pain,\\nand one abnormal reflex, but they also showed no resulting limit to her range of\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fmotion. A lumbar spine MRI indicated mild degenerative changes, mild disc bulging,\\nneuroforaminal narrowing (reduced opening of the spinal canal), and a small\\nherniation. The record is mixed on whether her doctors recommended surgery for any\\nof these spinal issues. Despain’s physical therapy records also indicate she was able\\nto tolerate therapy without increased pain, even if the record is mixed about the\\nsuccess of physical therapy.\\n\\n Like the ALJ, we do not believe these records adequately support the\\nlimitations Dr. Crawley stated in 2016. The records of continued pain do not support\\nlimitations beyond those the ALJ applied or otherwise render Despain completely\\nunable to perform light work. Thus, because the ALJ discredited the conclusory\\nreport to the extent it went beyond the submitted records, the ALJ’s consideration of\\nthe treating physician’s opinion was appropriate.\\n\\n Beyond the issue of the ALJ’s deference to Dr. Crawley, Despain argues the\\nevidence does not support a conclusion that she “can meet the demands of light work\\nby sitting, standing, or walking for a full eight-hour day, five days a week.” In\\nassessing Despain’s RFC, the ALJ considered Dr. Crawley’s treatment notes, other\\nphysicians’ notes, Despain’s treatment, her daily activities, and the opinions of the\\nstate agency medical consultants who found Despain had the RFC to perform light\\nwork with postural limits. Then, the ALJ placed several restrictions on light work\\nthat accounted for her proven limitations. While Despain correctly notes the record\\nis mixed on whether she declined back surgery rather than being advised it was not\\nneeded, even presuming that fact in her favor does not alter the ALJ’s main\\nconclusion about Despain’s pain continuing at a level that could be accommodated\\nwith work restrictions. Nothing in the record proves her pain exceeded the amount\\nacknowledged in the RFC limitations. Accordingly, the ALJ’s conclusion Despain\\ndid not meet her burden to prove a more restricted RFC is supported by substantial\\nevidence.\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f IV. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court that the Commissioner’s decision\\nto deny disability benefits was supported by substantial evidence.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2674,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4629742,"string":"4,629,742"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"National Union Fire Insurance v. Federal Insurance Company"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-14"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1063"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1063\\n ___________________________\\n\\n National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA; American Home\\n Assurance Company\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Donaldson Company, Inc.\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Federal Insurance Company\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 13, 2019\\n Filed: June 14, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This case involves an insurance coverage dispute over the allocation of a $6\\nmillion settlement in an underlying product liability lawsuit. Defendant-Appellee\\nDonaldson Company, Inc. (“Donaldson”), a designer and manufacturer of defective\\nair ducts, was insured under consecutive commercial general liability (“CGL”)\\npolicies from two subsidiaries of AIG Property Casualty U.S., Inc., specifically\\nPlaintiffs-Appellees National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA and\\nAmerican Home Assurance Company (individually “National Union” and “American\\nHome,” and collectively “AIG”). Donaldson was also insured under consecutive\\numbrella policies issued by Defendant-Appellant Federal Insurance Company\\n(“Federal”).\\n\\n In a series of orders, the district court1 construed the terms of the insurance\\npolicies; determined the parties’ obligations under the policies; and ruled that AIG\\nbe paid $500,000 by Donaldson and be reimbursed over $2.76 million by Federal.\\nFederal appeals, asserting the district court erred in its interpretation of the Batch\\nClause Endorsement and its construction of the term “lot.” We affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n A. Underlying Product Liability Suit\\n\\n During the 1990s, Donaldson designed and manufactured two types of plastic\\nducts exclusively for the air-intake system of trucks manufactured by Western Star\\nTrucks (“Western Star”): a “crossover” duct (product number 317) and an “elbow”\\nduct (product number 319). These trucks were used in the logging and construction\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe District of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nindustries. When functioning properly, the air-intake system delivered clean air into\\nthe internal parts of Western Star diesel truck engines.\\n\\n In January 2000, a Western Star representative informed Donaldson that three\\ntrucks had experienced engine dusting because of a defect in both types of ducts. In\\n2001, purchasers of Western Star trucks began filing lawsuits alleging a design\\ndefect. More specifically, the claims alleged the ducts’ walls were too thin, which\\ncaused the ducts to soften and melt and eventually cause engine dusting and engine\\nfailure. In a lawsuit filed in Mississippi state court, Arender v. Burroughs Diesel,\\nInc., fifteen purchasers of Western Star trucks sued Donaldson, Western Star, and a\\ncommercial dealer of the trucks, Burroughs Diesel, Inc. (“Burroughs”), alleging the\\nWestern Star trucks they purchased were inoperable due to the air-intake system.\\nBurroughs filed a cross-claim against Donaldson. In 2010, the Burroughs cross-claim\\nsettled for $6 million (the “Burroughs settlement”), in which AIG contributed\\n$3,548,387.10 and Federal contributed $2,451,612.90. Both insurers reserved their\\nrights to challenge the apportionment of the settlement.\\n\\n Donaldson notified AIG—or at least American Home—of the complaints\\nregarding the air-intake ducts shortly after they were filed. On March 11, 2002, a\\nclaims management analyst for AIG Vendor Services sent a letter to Donaldson’s\\nthird-party claims administrator, stating:\\n\\n . . . We recently learned that the insured carried a Batch Clause\\n Endorsement on their policy, therefore, all claims related to alleged\\n faulty air intake systems on Western Star trucks would fall under one\\n occurrence. All of the claims are subject to one deductible, and the\\n limits of insurance for this occurrence are $1,000,000.\\n\\n We have reopened our file. Per the Batch Clause Endorsement,\\n we have created a date of loss of November 14, 2001, the date on the\\n first summons received by the insured. We have also combined the\\n Arender and Bonner lawsuits under one claim number, []. We suggest\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n that you take similar steps regarding the date of loss and combination of\\n all claims into one.\\n ***\\n This matter has the potential to exceed the policy limit of\\n $1,000,000, therefore, the umbrella and excess carriers have been placed\\n on notice.\\n\\n In May 2002, the claims management analyst for AIG Vendor Services, on\\nbehalf of American Home, informed Donaldson that it had analyzed the 2001-2002\\npolicy and it would defend Donaldson “subject to a full reservation of all of its rights\\nunder the policy, and to decline coverage to [Donaldson] should there be a future\\ndetermination that there is no potential for coverage.” American Home also noted\\nthat providing a defense “shall not act as an estoppel or waiver of any of the rights\\narising out of the policy or law.” Finally, American Home informed Donaldson that\\nit should submit claims for coverage under different policies separately.\\n\\n In June 2003, National Union’s claims administrator sent Donaldson a letter\\nreserving its rights to deny coverage for the damages alleged in the Arender\\nComplaint (the Burroughs action) and Bonner Complaint on the ground that the\\ndamages manifested prior to the inception of the umbrella liability policy insuring\\nDonaldson.\\n\\n B. Insurance Policies\\n\\n 1. AIG Commercial General Liability Policies\\n\\n Donaldson was insured under AIG policies for six consecutive policy periods.\\nNational Union issued four CGL policies to Donaldson effective for the consecutive\\nannual policy periods from July 31, 1996, to July 31, 2000. American Home issued\\ntwo consecutive CGL policies to Donaldson for the annual policy periods from July\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n31, 2000, to July 31, 2002. The relevant terms at issue in each CGL policy are\\nidentical.\\n\\n Each policy contains a $1 million per-occurrence limit and a $500,000 per-\\noccurrence deductible for “property damage.” The policies require AIG to pay for\\n“property damage” under the following terms:\\n\\n 1. Insuring Agreement\\n\\n a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally\\n obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or\\n “property damage” to which this insurance applies. . . .\\n\\n b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and “property\\n damage” only if:\\n\\n (1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused\\n by an “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage\\n territory”; and\\n\\n (2) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” occurs\\n during the policy period.\\n\\n“Property damage” is covered under the policies if caused by an “occurrence.”\\n“Occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure\\nto substantially the same general harmful conditions.” “Property damage” is\\nseparated into two distinct categories:\\n\\n a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of\\n use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to\\n occur at the time of the physical injury that caused it; or\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All\\n such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the\\n “occurrence” that caused it.\\n\\n At the heart of the dispute is a Batch Clause Endorsement, which provides:\\n\\n Section V. - Definitions, 13. - Occurrence, is amended to add new\\n paragraph:\\n\\n As respects “Products Completed Operations Hazard”, all “bodily\\n injury” or “property damage” arising out of and attributable directly or\\n indirectly to the continuous, repeated or related exposure to substantially\\n the same general conditions affecting one lot of goods or products\\n manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by you or others trading\\n under your name, shall be deemed to result from a single “occurrence.”\\n Such “occurrence” will be deemed to occur with the first injury notified\\n to you during the policy period.\\n\\nWith exceptions not relevant in this case, the policies define “products-completed\\noperations hazard” to include “all ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ occurring\\naway from premises you own or rent and arising out of ‘your product’ or ‘your\\nwork.’”2\\n\\n 2. Federal Umbrella Policies\\n\\n Donaldson was insured under five Federal umbrella policies, effective for the\\nconsecutive annual policy periods from July 31, 1996, to July 31, 2001. The Federal\\npolicies provide $40 million of excess coverage under the following conditions:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n It is undisputed that this case involves damage falling under the “products-\\ncompleted operations hazard.”\\n\\n -6-\\n\\n Under Coverage A, we will pay on behalf of the insured, that part of\\n loss covered by this insurance in excess of the total applicable limits of\\n underlying insurance, provided the injury or offense takes place during\\n the Policy Period of this policy. The terms and conditions of\\n underlying insurance are with respect to Coverage A made a part of\\n this policy, except with respect to:\\n\\n A. any contrary provision contained in this policy; or\\n\\n B. any provision in this policy for which a similar provision is not\\n contained in underlying insurance.\\n\\n With respect to the exceptions stated above, the provisions of this policy\\n will apply.\\n\\nThe Federal policies are silent about the underlying AIG policies’ Batch Clause\\nEndorsement.\\n\\n C. District Court Proceedings\\n\\n In 2010, AIG brought this action against Donaldson and Federal seeking to\\nrecover amounts AIG contributed to the Burroughs settlement. Federal filed a\\ncounterclaim against AIG and a cross-claim against Donaldson, and Donaldson\\ncounterclaimed against both insurance companies. Over the course of several years,\\nthe district court issued a series of five orders deciding various motions. Only three\\nof these decisions are relevant to this appeal: the first two summary judgment orders\\n(referred to as Donaldson Order I and Donaldson Order II) and the order granting\\nentry of judgment (referred to as Donaldson Order V).\\n\\n In Donaldson Order I, the district court interpreted the Batch Clause\\nEndorsement and found the clause “unambiguously combines property damage,\\nincluding damage that may take place across multiple policy periods, into one\\n‘occurrence’ that takes place when Donaldson is notified of that damage.” Nat’l\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nUnion Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Donaldson Co., Inc. (“Donaldson Order I”),\\nNo. 10-4948 (JRT/AJB), 2012 WL 1072329, at *12 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2012). The\\ncourt reasoned, in part, that the Batch Clause Endorsement “artificially bundles\\nproperty damage into one ‘occurrence’ that ‘occurs’” when Donaldson is notified of\\nan injury to the property because “an ‘occurrence’ that causes an injury cannot, in\\nreality, ‘occur’ after the injury already exists and is known to Donaldson.” Id. at *12\\nn.20. The court, in construing the plain language of the Batch Clause Endorsement,\\nfound that coverage existed under a policy period if the required notice was received\\nduring that policy period. Id. at *12. Whether or not actual injury occurred during\\nthe policy period was immaterial in the court’s view. Id. The court determined that\\nthe number of policy years and deductibles implicated would depend on the number\\nof product “lots” involved. Id. at *12 n.21. In making these findings, the court\\nrejected the argument that the Batch Clause Endorsement only combines injuries that\\ntake place during an individual policy year into a single “occurrence.” Id. at *12.\\n\\n The district court’s order also addressed the definition of the term “lot” as\\ncontained in the Batch Clause Endorsement. Id. at *14. Looking to dictionary\\ndefinitions, the court found that “‘lot’ likely applies to each type of unique product\\nas a distinct group, kind, or sort.” Id. The court noted that the “ducts at issue may\\nhave included products with different specifications, product numbers, and base\\nmaterials” and that “[w]hile the term ‘lot’ potentially applies to each type of unique\\nproduct designed and manufactured by Donaldson, the term would not apply to\\nproducts with distinctive qualities that cannot reasonably constitute a group, kind, or\\nsort.” Id.\\n\\n In Donaldson Order II, the court decided cross-motions for summary judgment\\nregarding how many “lots” were involved in the Burroughs settlement. Nat’l Union\\nFire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Donaldson Co., Inc. (“Donaldson Order II”), No.\\n10-4948 (JRT/TNL), 2015 WL 1292561, at *9. (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 2015). Donaldson\\nasserted that one or, at most, two lots were at issue and, under the Batch Clause\\n\\n -8-\\n\\nEndorsement, each lot corresponded to one “occurrence” that involved only the\\n1999-2000 policy period. Id. Federal contended there were “no fewer than 22\\naggregated-by-lot occurrences” based on notice to Donaldson on seven occasions\\nduring the 1999-2000 policy period, ten occasions during the 2001-2002 policy\\nperiod, and five occasions during the 2009-2010 policy period. Id. at *10.\\n\\n Rejecting a technical definition of “lot” proposed by Federal and applying the\\ndefinition from Donaldson Order I, the court found there were two “lots” of ducts\\nresponsible for the damage in Burroughs. Id. at *10–12. The court reasoned that the\\nducts with product numbers 317 and 319 were similar but “differences in their\\nproduct numbers, specifications, and base materials are significant enough to treat\\neach as a distinct group, kind, or sort, and, therefore, a separate lot.” Id. at *10.\\n“Within each product’s manufacturing history, however, the numbers, specifications,\\nand base materials have remained the same.” Id. at *11. The court noted that\\nalthough the ducts’ chemical composition had always remained identical, in 1999 the\\nfactory producing the ducts altered the particle size of the powder form that went into\\nthe product mold and this was a change in base material. Id. The court found that\\nthis change in particle size was irrelevant to the “lot” determination. Id. at *11 n.11.\\n\\n Having determined two “lots” were involved in the Burroughs settlement, the\\ncourt addressed the related issue of when Donaldson received notice of the “property\\ndamage.” Id. at *12. It was undisputed that Donaldson was first notified of damage\\nrelated to both “lots” in January 2000 when the Western Star representative contacted\\nDonaldson. Id. Accordingly, all “property damage” related to each of the two “lots”\\nconstituted an “occurrence” within the 1999-2000 policy period, for a total of two\\n“occurrences.” Id.\\n\\n In Donaldson Order V, the court granted AIG’s motion for entry of judgment\\nagainst Federal and Donaldson. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v.\\nDonaldson Co., Inc. (“Donaldson Order V”), No. 10-4948 (JRT/TNL), 2017 WL\\n\\n -9-\\n\\n6210915, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2017). The court found that, because there were\\ntwo “occurrences,” two $500,000 per-occurrence deductibles applied to the\\nBurroughs settlement, which was allocable to the 1999-2000 AIG Policy. Id. Of the\\n$6 million settlement, the court allocated $785,591.44 to the 1999-2000 AIG policy\\nand $5,214,408.56 to the 1999-2000 Federal Excess Policy. Id. Because Donaldson\\npreviously paid one $500,000 deductible, the court ordered Donaldson to pay AIG\\nan additional $500,000 to satisfy its obligations. Id. Because Federal previously paid\\nonly $2,451,612.90 toward the settlement, Federal was ordered to reimburse AIG\\n$2,762,795.66. Id. The court entered judgment accordingly. Federal timely\\nappealed.\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n A. Standard of Review\\n\\n We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its\\ninterpretation of Minnesota insurance law. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v.\\nSchwieger, 685 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pioneer Indus. v. Hartford Fire\\nIns. Co., 639 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2011)). Summary judgment is proper where “the\\nmovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant\\nis entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).\\n\\n “Under Minnesota law, interpretation of an insurance policy . . . is a question\\nof law to be decided by the court.” Id. at 701. Policy interpretation follows “general\\nprinciples of contract construction, giving effect to the intent of the parties.” Volk\\nv. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Thommes v.\\nMilwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002)). We give unambiguous\\nterms their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. (citing Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880).\\nAmbiguous policy language is to be resolved in the insured’s favor. SECURA\\nSupreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing\\n\\n -10-\\n\\nMarchio v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 747 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008)).\\n“This is done by interpreting the ambiguity in accordance with the reasonable\\nexpectations of the insured.” Id. (citing Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41,\\n47–48 (Minn. 2008)). Ambiguity exists when policy language is “reasonably subject\\nto more than one interpretation.” Volk, 748 F.3d at 828 (quoting Columbia Heights\\nMotors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. 1979)).\\n\\n Insurance policies “must be read as a whole,” and “[p]rovisions in a policy\\nmust be read in context with all other relevant provisions.” Commerce Bank v. W.\\nBend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015) (citations omitted).\\n“[E]ndorsements . . . attached to an insurance contract are part of the contract, and the\\nendorsements and the policy must be construed together.” Employers Mut. Co. v.\\nOppidan, 518 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 1994) (quoting Bobich v. Oja, 104 N.W.2d 19,\\n24 (Minn. 1960)). Provisions limiting liability are construed against the insurer.\\nThommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880 (citations omitted).\\n\\n B. Number of Policy Periods Triggered\\n\\n Federal challenges the district court’s interpretation of the Batch Clause\\nEndorsement and corresponding finding that only the 1999-2000 policy period was\\ntriggered. Federal argues the court ignored the plain language of the insuring\\nagreements in the CGL and umbrella policies, which provide that “property damage”\\nor “injury” is covered only if it occurs or takes place during the policy period. We\\nfind Federal’s arguments unpersuasive.\\n\\n The Batch Clause Endorsement amends “occurrence” as follows: (1) all\\n“property damage” that “aris[es] out of and [is] attributable directly or indirectly to\\nthe continuous, repeated or related exposure to substantially the same general\\nconditions affecting one lot of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or\\ndistributed by” the insured is “deemed to result from a single ‘occurrence.’” The\\n\\n -11-\\n\\nsecond part of the paragraph provides that the “occurrence” is “deemed to occur with\\nthe first injury notified to [the insured] during the policy period.” Federal argues that\\nthis endorsement has no effect on the timing requirement set forth in the CGL\\npolicies’ coverage sections as to when the policies cover “property damage.” In other\\nwords, Federal contends that the “property damage” must occur during the policy\\nperiod regardless of the language in the endorsement.\\n\\n There are several problems with Federal’s interpretation. First, it fails to give\\nmeaning to the plain language of the endorsement as a whole. Combining each\\nprovision in the endorsement leads to a single unambiguous interpretation: All\\n“property damage” affecting a defective “lot of goods or products” is consolidated\\ninto a single “occurrence” deemed to occur when the insured is first notified during\\nthe policy period. Federal’s interpretation renders meaningless the endorsement by\\nplacing a claim in one policy period while assigning the “property damage” to\\nanother.\\n\\n Second, it conflicts with the main purpose of batch clauses, which is “to reduce\\nthe number of occurrences whenever the same product causes multiple bodily injuries\\nor property damage.” Michael Murray, Note, The Law of Describing Accidents: A\\nNew Proposal for Determining the Number of Occurrences in Insurance, 118 Yale\\nL.J. 1484, 1539 (2009) (cleaned up); see also Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v.\\nAetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (“The\\nintent of the parties in adding the batch clause to the policies was to minimize the\\nnumber of occurrences in order to maximize coverage.”). Under Federal’s approach,\\nan insurer would be permitted to break the single “occurrence” created by the\\nendorsement into multiple “occurrences” (i.e., one “occurrence” in each policy period\\nin which a truck is damaged by a duct from the same “lot”). This result not only runs\\ncontrary to the purpose of batch clauses, but also would open the door to expensive\\ncoverage disputes when a defective product is at issue and multiple insurers are\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\ninvolved. It also poses a risk that gaps in coverage will exist if, for example, there\\nis a policy period where the insured received no notification of damage.\\n\\n Finally, Federal’s interpretation violates a cardinal insurance policy\\ninterpretation rule—limitations of liability are to be construed against the insurer.\\nThe “property damage” provision in the coverage section limits liability. The court\\nconstrues limitations against the insurer. To the extent the endorsement creates a\\nconflict with the body of the policy, the endorsement provisions must govern.\\nGrinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 685 F.3d at 701 (citing Bobich, 104 N.W.2d at 24).\\n\\n Upon applying Minnesota’s rules for interpreting insurance policies and\\nconsidering the policies’ unambiguous terms, we find that when a defective “lot” of\\ngoods or products is involved, the claims are consolidated into a single “occurrence”\\ndeemed to occur on the date the insured first received notice of the injury during the\\npolicy period. Damage that takes place across multiple policy periods is to be\\ncombined into a single “occurrence” so long as it “aris[es] out of and [is] attributable\\ndirectly or indirectly to the continuous, repeated or related exposure to substantially\\nthe same general conditions affecting one lot of goods or products manufactured,\\nsold, handled or distributed by [the insured] or others trading under [the insured’s]\\nname.”\\n\\n Federal further argues the district court erred in entering judgment against it\\nbecause the underlying injuries in the Burroughs settlement did not all factually occur\\nduring the policy period of its 1999-2000 umbrella policy. As Federal points out, its\\npolicy includes the phrase “provided the injury or offense takes place during the\\nPolicy Period of this policy”—which mirrors the AIG policy’s timing clause. The\\nFederal umbrella policy, however, is a follow form policy that incorporates the terms\\nand conditions of the underlying AIG policy, including its endorsements, with two\\nlimited exceptions: (1) “any contrary provision contained in [the Federal] policy” or\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n\\n(2) “any provision in [the Federal] policy for which a similar provision is not\\ncontained in [the AIG policy].”\\n\\n Because the Federal umbrella policy is not inconsistent with the AIG policy,\\nwe will not read an implied invalidation of the Batch Clause Endorsement into the\\numbrella policy. A decision that requires actual injury to occur during the policy\\nperiod would contradict the plain language of the Batch Clause Endorsement.\\n\\n C. Definition of “Lot”\\n\\n Federal contends the district court improperly inserted a subjective element into\\nthe definition of “lot” via Donaldson Order II’s footnote 11—that a change to a\\nproduct distinguishes a new “lot” only if the change is “relevant to [the] litigation”\\nat hand. Federal does not challenge the definition of “lot” set forth in Donaldson\\nOrder I. Instead, Federal argues that, had the district court applied the original\\nobjective definition, a finding of a minimum of four “lots” would have been\\nnecessary.\\n\\n Federal has not established the district court erred when making the “lot”\\ndetermination. Donaldson makes unique products tailored to individual companies\\nlike Western Star. A “lot” applies to each type of unique product designed and\\nmanufactured by Donaldson. The minor change in particle size had no bearing on\\nwhether a new type of unique product was formed. There were two different types\\nof ducts uniquely designed for Western Star trucks. These two types of ducts were\\ngiven the same product numbers before and after the particle size change. The molds\\nused to manufacture the ducts did not change, nor did the ducts’ conformity with\\ndesign drawings and manufacturing specifications. The ducts remained “chemically\\nidentical” with the same type of plastic still in use after the change in particle size.\\nThe change itself had nothing to do with Donaldson. Donaldson’s contract\\nmanufacturer made the change universally after identifying fill problems that only\\n\\n -14-\\n\\nexisted with certain non-Donaldson parts. This minimal change with no effect on the\\nfunctioning, specifications, product numbers, appearance, or quality of the two types\\nof uniquely tailored ducts did not produce a new product with distinctive qualities.\\nAccordingly, two “lots” were implicated.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406995/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.\\n\\n I concur in the part of the court's opinion disposing of Federal's argument\\nregarding the number of \\\"lots\\\" at issue in this case. But I respectfully disagree that the\\nbatch clause endorsement aggregates occurrences across different policy periods, and,\\nfor that reason, I would reverse the district court's judgment and remand for further\\nproceedings.\\n\\n The court gives three reasons for its interpretation of the batch clause\\nendorsement, but none of them is ultimately persuasive. The court says that Federal's\\nargument—that the batch clause endorsement does not combine occurrences across\\npolicy periods—doesn't square with the plain language of the endorsement, but it\\nnever explains how that is so; it merely concludes that \\\"a single unambiguous\\ninterpretation\\\" exists. The court appears to support that conclusion by stating that\\n\\\"Federal's interpretation renders meaningless the endorsement by placing a claim in\\none policy period while assigning the 'property damage' to another.\\\" But that\\ninterpretation hardly makes the batch clause endorsement meaningless—the batch\\nclause endorsement still aggregates claims within a single policy period, so it\\ncontinues to have work to do. And there is nothing inherently illogical about an\\noccurrence occurring at a time different from when property damage occurs. In fact,\\nwe have recognized that an occurrence and its resulting injury \\\"need not have any\\n\\n -15-\\n\\nrelationship to each other in time or place.\\\" See Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire\\n& Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1390 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Singsaas v. Diederich,\\n238 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn. 1976).\\n\\n Similarly, the court asserts that Federal's interpretation of the batch clause\\nendorsement conflicts with the purpose of a batch clause, which, the court rightly\\nsays, is \\\"to reduce the number of occurrences whenever the same product causes\\nmultiple bodily injuries or property damage.\\\" But the batch clause endorsement\\nfulfills that function under Federal's interpretation too. For example, the court points\\nout that Donaldson received notice of property damage on seven occasions during the\\n1999–2000 policy period. Assuming each of those notices pertained to the same lot\\nof goods, the batch clause endorsement would reduce those seven occurrences to one.\\nIt simply wouldn't reduce to a single occurrence all of the property damage relating\\nto that lot of goods across different policy periods. In other words, just because, under\\nFederal's interpretation, the batch clause endorsement doesn't reduce every claim\\nregarding a lot to a single occurrence doesn't mean that the batch clause endorsement\\nisn't fulfilling its purpose. As one court explained, \\\"While it is indisputable that the\\nparties intended by the 'one lot' clause to aggregate claims in some fashion, it does not\\nfollow that the parties intended that claims would be aggregated to most effectively\\nlimit the insurer's liability. Rather, the clause's language suggests that the parties\\nintended to aggregate only some claims.\\\" London Mkt. Insurers v. Superior Court,\\n53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 154, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).\\n\\n Finally, the court adverts to the principle that, when interpreting an insurance\\npolicy, we should construe limitations on the insurer's liability in the insured's favor.\\nBut that principle does not come into play where the policy is clear and unambiguous;\\ninstead we must give clear and unambiguous language its ordinary meaning. See\\nWestfield Ins. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., 700 F.3d 1172, 1175 (8th Cir. 2012).\\nThe policy here says quite plainly that the policy applies to property damage only if\\nthe property damage \\\"occurs during the policy period.\\\" The umbrella policy likewise\\n\\n -16-\\n\\napplies \\\"provided the injury or offense takes place during the Policy Period.\\\" Nothing\\nin the batch clause endorsement undercuts these statements. Had the parties intended\\nfor that endorsement to do so, all they had to say in that endorsement was that\\n\\\"'property damage' will be deemed to occur with the first injury notified to you during\\nthe policy period,\\\" but it instead says that an \\\"'occurrence' will be deemed to occur\\\"\\nat that time. The parties knew perfectly well how to draft the clauses so property\\ndamage could be deemed to have occurred at the same time as an occurrence: In\\ndefining the loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured, the policy\\nspecifically provided that such loss \\\"shall be deemed to occur at the time of the\\n'occurrence' that caused it.\\\" The drafters could have sounded a similar note in the\\nbatch clause endorsement had they intended property damage and occurrence to be\\nsynonymous. They did not.\\n\\n Based on my reading of the policy as a whole, I would hold that the batch\\nclause endorsement aggregates claims only within a policy period and not across\\npolicy periods. I would therefore remand the case for the district court to determine\\nhow many policy periods are implicated with this understanding of the batch clause\\nendorsement in mind, and to recalculate the award accordingly.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -17-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406995/\", \"author_raw\": \"ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SHEPHERD\": \", Circuit\", \"ARNOLD\": \", Circuit\", \"ERICKSON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629742/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: National Union Fire Insurance v. Federal Insurance Company\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-14\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1063\n ___________________________\n\n National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA; American Home\n Assurance Company\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\n\n v.\n\n Donaldson Company, Inc.\n\n Defendant - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Federal Insurance Company\n\n Defendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: March 13, 2019\n Filed: June 14, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\n\n This case involves an insurance coverage dispute over the allocation of a $6\nmillion settlement in an underlying product liability lawsuit. Defendant-Appellee\nDonaldson Company, Inc. (“Donaldson”), a designer and manufacturer of defective\nair ducts, was insured under consecutive commercial general liability (“CGL”)\npolicies from two subsidiaries of AIG Property Casualty U.S., Inc., specifically\nPlaintiffs-Appellees National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA and\nAmerican Home Assurance Company (individually “National Union” and “American\nHome,” and collectively “AIG”). Donaldson was also insured under consecutive\numbrella policies issued by Defendant-Appellant Federal Insurance Company\n(“Federal”).\n\n In a series of orders, the district court1 construed the terms of the insurance\npolicies; determined the parties’ obligations under the policies; and ruled that AIG\nbe paid $500,000 by Donaldson and be reimbursed over $2.76 million by Federal.\nFederal appeals, asserting the district court erred in its interpretation of the Batch\nClause Endorsement and its construction of the term “lot.” We affirm.\n\nI. Background\n\n A. Underlying Product Liability Suit\n\n During the 1990s, Donaldson designed and manufactured two types of plastic\nducts exclusively for the air-intake system of trucks manufactured by Western Star\nTrucks (“Western Star”): a “crossover” duct (product number 317) and an “elbow”\nduct (product number 319). These trucks were used in the logging and construction\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\nthe District of Minnesota.\n\n -2-\n\nindustries. When functioning properly, the air-intake system delivered clean air into\nthe internal parts of Western Star diesel truck engines.\n\n In January 2000, a Western Star representative informed Donaldson that three\ntrucks had experienced engine dusting because of a defect in both types of ducts. In\n2001, purchasers of Western Star trucks began filing lawsuits alleging a design\ndefect. More specifically, the claims alleged the ducts’ walls were too thin, which\ncaused the ducts to soften and melt and eventually cause engine dusting and engine\nfailure. In a lawsuit filed in Mississippi state court, Arender v. Burroughs Diesel,\nInc., fifteen purchasers of Western Star trucks sued Donaldson, Western Star, and a\ncommercial dealer of the trucks, Burroughs Diesel, Inc. (“Burroughs”), alleging the\nWestern Star trucks they purchased were inoperable due to the air-intake system.\nBurroughs filed a cross-claim against Donaldson. In 2010, the Burroughs cross-claim\nsettled for $6 million (the “Burroughs settlement”), in which AIG contributed\n$3,548,387.10 and Federal contributed $2,451,612.90. Both insurers reserved their\nrights to challenge the apportionment of the settlement.\n\n Donaldson notified AIG—or at least American Home—of the complaints\nregarding the air-intake ducts shortly after they were filed. On March 11, 2002, a\nclaims management analyst for AIG Vendor Services sent a letter to Donaldson’s\nthird-party claims administrator, stating:\n\n . . . We recently learned that the insured carried a Batch Clause\n Endorsement on their policy, therefore, all claims related to alleged\n faulty air intake systems on Western Star trucks would fall under one\n occurrence. All of the claims are subject to one deductible, and the\n limits of insurance for this occurrence are $1,000,000.\n\n We have reopened our file. Per the Batch Clause Endorsement,\n we have created a date of loss of November 14, 2001, the date on the\n first summons received by the insured. We have also combined the\n Arender and Bonner lawsuits under one claim number, []. We suggest\n\n -3-\n\n that you take similar steps regarding the date of loss and combination of\n all claims into one.\n ***\n This matter has the potential to exceed the policy limit of\n $1,000,000, therefore, the umbrella and excess carriers have been placed\n on notice.\n\n In May 2002, the claims management analyst for AIG Vendor Services, on\nbehalf of American Home, informed Donaldson that it had analyzed the 2001-2002\npolicy and it would defend Donaldson “subject to a full reservation of all of its rights\nunder the policy, and to decline coverage to [Donaldson] should there be a future\ndetermination that there is no potential for coverage.” American Home also noted\nthat providing a defense “shall not act as an estoppel or waiver of any of the rights\narising out of the policy or law.” Finally, American Home informed Donaldson that\nit should submit claims for coverage under different policies separately.\n\n In June 2003, National Union’s claims administrator sent Donaldson a letter\nreserving its rights to deny coverage for the damages alleged in the Arender\nComplaint (the Burroughs action) and Bonner Complaint on the ground that the\ndamages manifested prior to the inception of the umbrella liability policy insuring\nDonaldson.\n\n B. Insurance Policies\n\n 1. AIG Commercial General Liability Policies\n\n Donaldson was insured under AIG policies for six consecutive policy periods.\nNational Union issued four CGL policies to Donaldson effective for the consecutive\nannual policy periods from July 31, 1996, to July 31, 2000. American Home issued\ntwo consecutive CGL policies to Donaldson for the annual policy periods from July\n\n\n\n -4-\n\n31, 2000, to July 31, 2002. The relevant terms at issue in each CGL policy are\nidentical.\n\n Each policy contains a $1 million per-occurrence limit and a $500,000 per-\noccurrence deductible for “property damage.” The policies require AIG to pay for\n“property damage” under the following terms:\n\n 1. Insuring Agreement\n\n a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally\n obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or\n “property damage” to which this insurance applies. . . .\n\n b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and “property\n damage” only if:\n\n (1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused\n by an “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage\n territory”; and\n\n (2) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” occurs\n during the policy period.\n\n“Property damage” is covered under the policies if caused by an “occurrence.”\n“Occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure\nto substantially the same general harmful conditions.” “Property damage” is\nseparated into two distinct categories:\n\n a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of\n use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to\n occur at the time of the physical injury that caused it; or\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\n b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All\n such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the\n “occurrence” that caused it.\n\n At the heart of the dispute is a Batch Clause Endorsement, which provides:\n\n Section V. - Definitions, 13. - Occurrence, is amended to add new\n paragraph:\n\n As respects “Products Completed Operations Hazard”, all “bodily\n injury” or “property damage” arising out of and attributable directly or\n indirectly to the continuous, repeated or related exposure to substantially\n the same general conditions affecting one lot of goods or products\n manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by you or others trading\n under your name, shall be deemed to result from a single “occurrence.”\n Such “occurrence” will be deemed to occur with the first injury notified\n to you during the policy period.\n\nWith exceptions not relevant in this case, the policies define “products-completed\noperations hazard” to include “all ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ occurring\naway from premises you own or rent and arising out of ‘your product’ or ‘your\nwork.’”2\n\n 2. Federal Umbrella Policies\n\n Donaldson was insured under five Federal umbrella policies, effective for the\nconsecutive annual policy periods from July 31, 1996, to July 31, 2001. The Federal\npolicies provide $40 million of excess coverage under the following conditions:\n\n\n\n\n 2\n It is undisputed that this case involves damage falling under the “products-\ncompleted operations hazard.”\n\n -6-\n\n Under Coverage A, we will pay on behalf of the insured, that part of\n loss covered by this insurance in excess of the total applicable limits of\n underlying insurance, provided the injury or offense takes place during\n the Policy Period of this policy. The terms and conditions of\n underlying insurance are with respect to Coverage A made a part of\n this policy, except with respect to:\n\n A. any contrary provision contained in this policy; or\n\n B. any provision in this policy for which a similar provision is not\n contained in underlying insurance.\n\n With respect to the exceptions stated above, the provisions of this policy\n will apply.\n\nThe Federal policies are silent about the underlying AIG policies’ Batch Clause\nEndorsement.\n\n C. District Court Proceedings\n\n In 2010, AIG brought this action against Donaldson and Federal seeking to\nrecover amounts AIG contributed to the Burroughs settlement. Federal filed a\ncounterclaim against AIG and a cross-claim against Donaldson, and Donaldson\ncounterclaimed against both insurance companies. Over the course of several years,\nthe district court issued a series of five orders deciding various motions. Only three\nof these decisions are relevant to this appeal: the first two summary judgment orders\n(referred to as Donaldson Order I and Donaldson Order II) and the order granting\nentry of judgment (referred to as Donaldson Order V).\n\n In Donaldson Order I, the district court interpreted the Batch Clause\nEndorsement and found the clause “unambiguously combines property damage,\nincluding damage that may take place across multiple policy periods, into one\n‘occurrence’ that takes place when Donaldson is notified of that damage.” Nat’l\n\n -7-\n\nUnion Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Donaldson Co., Inc. (“Donaldson Order I”),\nNo. 10-4948 (JRT/AJB), 2012 WL 1072329, at *12 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2012). The\ncourt reasoned, in part, that the Batch Clause Endorsement “artificially bundles\nproperty damage into one ‘occurrence’ that ‘occurs’” when Donaldson is notified of\nan injury to the property because “an ‘occurrence’ that causes an injury cannot, in\nreality, ‘occur’ after the injury already exists and is known to Donaldson.” Id. at *12\nn.20. The court, in construing the plain language of the Batch Clause Endorsement,\nfound that coverage existed under a policy period if the required notice was received\nduring that policy period. Id. at *12. Whether or not actual injury occurred during\nthe policy period was immaterial in the court’s view. Id. The court determined that\nthe number of policy years and deductibles implicated would depend on the number\nof product “lots” involved. Id. at *12 n.21. In making these findings, the court\nrejected the argument that the Batch Clause Endorsement only combines injuries that\ntake place during an individual policy year into a single “occurrence.” Id. at *12.\n\n The district court’s order also addressed the definition of the term “lot” as\ncontained in the Batch Clause Endorsement. Id. at *14. Looking to dictionary\ndefinitions, the court found that “‘lot’ likely applies to each type of unique product\nas a distinct group, kind, or sort.” Id. The court noted that the “ducts at issue may\nhave included products with different specifications, product numbers, and base\nmaterials” and that “[w]hile the term ‘lot’ potentially applies to each type of unique\nproduct designed and manufactured by Donaldson, the term would not apply to\nproducts with distinctive qualities that cannot reasonably constitute a group, kind, or\nsort.” Id.\n\n In Donaldson Order II, the court decided cross-motions for summary judgment\nregarding how many “lots” were involved in the Burroughs settlement. Nat’l Union\nFire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Donaldson Co., Inc. (“Donaldson Order II”), No.\n10-4948 (JRT/TNL), 2015 WL 1292561, at *9. (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 2015). Donaldson\nasserted that one or, at most, two lots were at issue and, under the Batch Clause\n\n -8-\n\nEndorsement, each lot corresponded to one “occurrence” that involved only the\n1999-2000 policy period. Id. Federal contended there were “no fewer than 22\naggregated-by-lot occurrences” based on notice to Donaldson on seven occasions\nduring the 1999-2000 policy period, ten occasions during the 2001-2002 policy\nperiod, and five occasions during the 2009-2010 policy period. Id. at *10.\n\n Rejecting a technical definition of “lot” proposed by Federal and applying the\ndefinition from Donaldson Order I, the court found there were two “lots” of ducts\nresponsible for the damage in Burroughs. Id. at *10–12. The court reasoned that the\nducts with product numbers 317 and 319 were similar but “differences in their\nproduct numbers, specifications, and base materials are significant enough to treat\neach as a distinct group, kind, or sort, and, therefore, a separate lot.” Id. at *10.\n“Within each product’s manufacturing history, however, the numbers, specifications,\nand base materials have remained the same.” Id. at *11. The court noted that\nalthough the ducts’ chemical composition had always remained identical, in 1999 the\nfactory producing the ducts altered the particle size of the powder form that went into\nthe product mold and this was a change in base material. Id. The court found that\nthis change in particle size was irrelevant to the “lot” determination. Id. at *11 n.11.\n\n Having determined two “lots” were involved in the Burroughs settlement, the\ncourt addressed the related issue of when Donaldson received notice of the “property\ndamage.” Id. at *12. It was undisputed that Donaldson was first notified of damage\nrelated to both “lots” in January 2000 when the Western Star representative contacted\nDonaldson. Id. Accordingly, all “property damage” related to each of the two “lots”\nconstituted an “occurrence” within the 1999-2000 policy period, for a total of two\n“occurrences.” Id.\n\n In Donaldson Order V, the court granted AIG’s motion for entry of judgment\nagainst Federal and Donaldson. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v.\nDonaldson Co., Inc. (“Donaldson Order V”), No. 10-4948 (JRT/TNL), 2017 WL\n\n -9-\n\n6210915, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2017). The court found that, because there were\ntwo “occurrences,” two $500,000 per-occurrence deductibles applied to the\nBurroughs settlement, which was allocable to the 1999-2000 AIG Policy. Id. Of the\n$6 million settlement, the court allocated $785,591.44 to the 1999-2000 AIG policy\nand $5,214,408.56 to the 1999-2000 Federal Excess Policy. Id. Because Donaldson\npreviously paid one $500,000 deductible, the court ordered Donaldson to pay AIG\nan additional $500,000 to satisfy its obligations. Id. Because Federal previously paid\nonly $2,451,612.90 toward the settlement, Federal was ordered to reimburse AIG\n$2,762,795.66. Id. The court entered judgment accordingly. Federal timely\nappealed.\n\nII. Discussion\n\n A. Standard of Review\n\n We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its\ninterpretation of Minnesota insurance law. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v.\nSchwieger, 685 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pioneer Indus. v. Hartford Fire\nIns. Co., 639 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2011)). Summary judgment is proper where “the\nmovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant\nis entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).\n\n “Under Minnesota law, interpretation of an insurance policy . . . is a question\nof law to be decided by the court.” Id. at 701. Policy interpretation follows “general\nprinciples of contract construction, giving effect to the intent of the parties.” Volk\nv. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Thommes v.\nMilwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002)). We give unambiguous\nterms their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. (citing Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880).\nAmbiguous policy language is to be resolved in the insured’s favor. SECURA\nSupreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing\n\n -10-\n\nMarchio v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 747 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008)).\n“This is done by interpreting the ambiguity in accordance with the reasonable\nexpectations of the insured.” Id. (citing Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41,\n47–48 (Minn. 2008)). Ambiguity exists when policy language is “reasonably subject\nto more than one interpretation.” Volk, 748 F.3d at 828 (quoting Columbia Heights\nMotors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. 1979)).\n\n Insurance policies “must be read as a whole,” and “[p]rovisions in a policy\nmust be read in context with all other relevant provisions.” Commerce Bank v. W.\nBend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015) (citations omitted).\n“[E]ndorsements . . . attached to an insurance contract are part of the contract, and the\nendorsements and the policy must be construed together.” Employers Mut. Co. v.\nOppidan, 518 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 1994) (quoting Bobich v. Oja, 104 N.W.2d 19,\n24 (Minn. 1960)). Provisions limiting liability are construed against the insurer.\nThommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880 (citations omitted).\n\n B. Number of Policy Periods Triggered\n\n Federal challenges the district court’s interpretation of the Batch Clause\nEndorsement and corresponding finding that only the 1999-2000 policy period was\ntriggered. Federal argues the court ignored the plain language of the insuring\nagreements in the CGL and umbrella policies, which provide that “property damage”\nor “injury” is covered only if it occurs or takes place during the policy period. We\nfind Federal’s arguments unpersuasive.\n\n The Batch Clause Endorsement amends “occurrence” as follows: (1) all\n“property damage” that “aris[es] out of and [is] attributable directly or indirectly to\nthe continuous, repeated or related exposure to substantially the same general\nconditions affecting one lot of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or\ndistributed by” the insured is “deemed to result from a single ‘occurrence.’” The\n\n -11-\n\nsecond part of the paragraph provides that the “occurrence” is “deemed to occur with\nthe first injury notified to [the insured] during the policy period.” Federal argues that\nthis endorsement has no effect on the timing requirement set forth in the CGL\npolicies’ coverage sections as to when the policies cover “property damage.” In other\nwords, Federal contends that the “property damage” must occur during the policy\nperiod regardless of the language in the endorsement.\n\n There are several problems with Federal’s interpretation. First, it fails to give\nmeaning to the plain language of the endorsement as a whole. Combining each\nprovision in the endorsement leads to a single unambiguous interpretation: All\n“property damage” affecting a defective “lot of goods or products” is consolidated\ninto a single “occurrence” deemed to occur when the insured is first notified during\nthe policy period. Federal’s interpretation renders meaningless the endorsement by\nplacing a claim in one policy period while assigning the “property damage” to\nanother.\n\n Second, it conflicts with the main purpose of batch clauses, which is “to reduce\nthe number of occurrences whenever the same product causes multiple bodily injuries\nor property damage.” Michael Murray, Note, The Law of Describing Accidents: A\nNew Proposal for Determining the Number of Occurrences in Insurance, 118 Yale\nL.J. 1484, 1539 (2009) (cleaned up); see also Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v.\nAetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (“The\nintent of the parties in adding the batch clause to the policies was to minimize the\nnumber of occurrences in order to maximize coverage.”). Under Federal’s approach,\nan insurer would be permitted to break the single “occurrence” created by the\nendorsement into multiple “occurrences” (i.e., one “occurrence” in each policy period\nin which a truck is damaged by a duct from the same “lot”). This result not only runs\ncontrary to the purpose of batch clauses, but also would open the door to expensive\ncoverage disputes when a defective product is at issue and multiple insurers are\n\n\n\n -12-\n\ninvolved. It also poses a risk that gaps in coverage will exist if, for example, there\nis a policy period where the insured received no notification of damage.\n\n Finally, Federal’s interpretation violates a cardinal insurance policy\ninterpretation rule—limitations of liability are to be construed against the insurer.\nThe “property damage” provision in the coverage section limits liability. The court\nconstrues limitations against the insurer. To the extent the endorsement creates a\nconflict with the body of the policy, the endorsement provisions must govern.\nGrinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 685 F.3d at 701 (citing Bobich, 104 N.W.2d at 24).\n\n Upon applying Minnesota’s rules for interpreting insurance policies and\nconsidering the policies’ unambiguous terms, we find that when a defective “lot” of\ngoods or products is involved, the claims are consolidated into a single “occurrence”\ndeemed to occur on the date the insured first received notice of the injury during the\npolicy period. Damage that takes place across multiple policy periods is to be\ncombined into a single “occurrence” so long as it “aris[es] out of and [is] attributable\ndirectly or indirectly to the continuous, repeated or related exposure to substantially\nthe same general conditions affecting one lot of goods or products manufactured,\nsold, handled or distributed by [the insured] or others trading under [the insured’s]\nname.”\n\n Federal further argues the district court erred in entering judgment against it\nbecause the underlying injuries in the Burroughs settlement did not all factually occur\nduring the policy period of its 1999-2000 umbrella policy. As Federal points out, its\npolicy includes the phrase “provided the injury or offense takes place during the\nPolicy Period of this policy”—which mirrors the AIG policy’s timing clause. The\nFederal umbrella policy, however, is a follow form policy that incorporates the terms\nand conditions of the underlying AIG policy, including its endorsements, with two\nlimited exceptions: (1) “any contrary provision contained in [the Federal] policy” or\n\n\n\n -13-\n\n(2) “any provision in [the Federal] policy for which a similar provision is not\ncontained in [the AIG policy].”\n\n Because the Federal umbrella policy is not inconsistent with the AIG policy,\nwe will not read an implied invalidation of the Batch Clause Endorsement into the\numbrella policy. A decision that requires actual injury to occur during the policy\nperiod would contradict the plain language of the Batch Clause Endorsement.\n\n C. Definition of “Lot”\n\n Federal contends the district court improperly inserted a subjective element into\nthe definition of “lot” via Donaldson Order II’s footnote 11—that a change to a\nproduct distinguishes a new “lot” only if the change is “relevant to [the] litigation”\nat hand. Federal does not challenge the definition of “lot” set forth in Donaldson\nOrder I. Instead, Federal argues that, had the district court applied the original\nobjective definition, a finding of a minimum of four “lots” would have been\nnecessary.\n\n Federal has not established the district court erred when making the “lot”\ndetermination. Donaldson makes unique products tailored to individual companies\nlike Western Star. A “lot” applies to each type of unique product designed and\nmanufactured by Donaldson. The minor change in particle size had no bearing on\nwhether a new type of unique product was formed. There were two different types\nof ducts uniquely designed for Western Star trucks. These two types of ducts were\ngiven the same product numbers before and after the particle size change. The molds\nused to manufacture the ducts did not change, nor did the ducts’ conformity with\ndesign drawings and manufacturing specifications. The ducts remained “chemically\nidentical” with the same type of plastic still in use after the change in particle size.\nThe change itself had nothing to do with Donaldson. Donaldson’s contract\nmanufacturer made the change universally after identifying fill problems that only\n\n -14-\n\nexisted with certain non-Donaldson parts. This minimal change with no effect on the\nfunctioning, specifications, product numbers, appearance, or quality of the two types\nof uniquely tailored ducts did not produce a new product with distinctive qualities.\nAccordingly, two “lots” were implicated.\n\nIII. Conclusion\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: National Union Fire Insurance v. Federal Insurance Company\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-14\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1063\\n ___________________________\\n\\n National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA; American Home\\n Assurance Company\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Donaldson Company, Inc.\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Federal Insurance Company\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 13, 2019\\n Filed: June 14, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This case involves an insurance coverage dispute over the allocation of a $6\\nmillion settlement in an underlying product liability lawsuit. Defendant-Appellee\\nDonaldson Company, Inc. (“Donaldson”), a designer and manufacturer of defective\\nair ducts, was insured under consecutive commercial general liability (“CGL”)\\npolicies from two subsidiaries of AIG Property Casualty U.S., Inc., specifically\\nPlaintiffs-Appellees National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA and\\nAmerican Home Assurance Company (individually “National Union” and “American\\nHome,” and collectively “AIG”). Donaldson was also insured under consecutive\\numbrella policies issued by Defendant-Appellant Federal Insurance Company\\n(“Federal”).\\n\\n In a series of orders, the district court1 construed the terms of the insurance\\npolicies; determined the parties’ obligations under the policies; and ruled that AIG\\nbe paid $500,000 by Donaldson and be reimbursed over $2.76 million by Federal.\\nFederal appeals, asserting the district court erred in its interpretation of the Batch\\nClause Endorsement and its construction of the term “lot.” We affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n A. Underlying Product Liability Suit\\n\\n During the 1990s, Donaldson designed and manufactured two types of plastic\\nducts exclusively for the air-intake system of trucks manufactured by Western Star\\nTrucks (“Western Star”): a “crossover” duct (product number 317) and an “elbow”\\nduct (product number 319). These trucks were used in the logging and construction\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe District of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nindustries. When functioning properly, the air-intake system delivered clean air into\\nthe internal parts of Western Star diesel truck engines.\\n\\n In January 2000, a Western Star representative informed Donaldson that three\\ntrucks had experienced engine dusting because of a defect in both types of ducts. In\\n2001, purchasers of Western Star trucks began filing lawsuits alleging a design\\ndefect. More specifically, the claims alleged the ducts’ walls were too thin, which\\ncaused the ducts to soften and melt and eventually cause engine dusting and engine\\nfailure. In a lawsuit filed in Mississippi state court, Arender v. Burroughs Diesel,\\nInc., fifteen purchasers of Western Star trucks sued Donaldson, Western Star, and a\\ncommercial dealer of the trucks, Burroughs Diesel, Inc. (“Burroughs”), alleging the\\nWestern Star trucks they purchased were inoperable due to the air-intake system.\\nBurroughs filed a cross-claim against Donaldson. In 2010, the Burroughs cross-claim\\nsettled for $6 million (the “Burroughs settlement”), in which AIG contributed\\n$3,548,387.10 and Federal contributed $2,451,612.90. Both insurers reserved their\\nrights to challenge the apportionment of the settlement.\\n\\n Donaldson notified AIG—or at least American Home—of the complaints\\nregarding the air-intake ducts shortly after they were filed. On March 11, 2002, a\\nclaims management analyst for AIG Vendor Services sent a letter to Donaldson’s\\nthird-party claims administrator, stating:\\n\\n . . . We recently learned that the insured carried a Batch Clause\\n Endorsement on their policy, therefore, all claims related to alleged\\n faulty air intake systems on Western Star trucks would fall under one\\n occurrence. All of the claims are subject to one deductible, and the\\n limits of insurance for this occurrence are $1,000,000.\\n\\n We have reopened our file. Per the Batch Clause Endorsement,\\n we have created a date of loss of November 14, 2001, the date on the\\n first summons received by the insured. We have also combined the\\n Arender and Bonner lawsuits under one claim number, []. We suggest\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n that you take similar steps regarding the date of loss and combination of\\n all claims into one.\\n ***\\n This matter has the potential to exceed the policy limit of\\n $1,000,000, therefore, the umbrella and excess carriers have been placed\\n on notice.\\n\\n In May 2002, the claims management analyst for AIG Vendor Services, on\\nbehalf of American Home, informed Donaldson that it had analyzed the 2001-2002\\npolicy and it would defend Donaldson “subject to a full reservation of all of its rights\\nunder the policy, and to decline coverage to [Donaldson] should there be a future\\ndetermination that there is no potential for coverage.” American Home also noted\\nthat providing a defense “shall not act as an estoppel or waiver of any of the rights\\narising out of the policy or law.” Finally, American Home informed Donaldson that\\nit should submit claims for coverage under different policies separately.\\n\\n In June 2003, National Union’s claims administrator sent Donaldson a letter\\nreserving its rights to deny coverage for the damages alleged in the Arender\\nComplaint (the Burroughs action) and Bonner Complaint on the ground that the\\ndamages manifested prior to the inception of the umbrella liability policy insuring\\nDonaldson.\\n\\n B. Insurance Policies\\n\\n 1. AIG Commercial General Liability Policies\\n\\n Donaldson was insured under AIG policies for six consecutive policy periods.\\nNational Union issued four CGL policies to Donaldson effective for the consecutive\\nannual policy periods from July 31, 1996, to July 31, 2000. American Home issued\\ntwo consecutive CGL policies to Donaldson for the annual policy periods from July\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n31, 2000, to July 31, 2002. The relevant terms at issue in each CGL policy are\\nidentical.\\n\\n Each policy contains a $1 million per-occurrence limit and a $500,000 per-\\noccurrence deductible for “property damage.” The policies require AIG to pay for\\n“property damage” under the following terms:\\n\\n 1. Insuring Agreement\\n\\n a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally\\n obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or\\n “property damage” to which this insurance applies. . . .\\n\\n b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and “property\\n damage” only if:\\n\\n (1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused\\n by an “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage\\n territory”; and\\n\\n (2) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” occurs\\n during the policy period.\\n\\n“Property damage” is covered under the policies if caused by an “occurrence.”\\n“Occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure\\nto substantially the same general harmful conditions.” “Property damage” is\\nseparated into two distinct categories:\\n\\n a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of\\n use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to\\n occur at the time of the physical injury that caused it; or\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All\\n such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the\\n “occurrence” that caused it.\\n\\n At the heart of the dispute is a Batch Clause Endorsement, which provides:\\n\\n Section V. - Definitions, 13. - Occurrence, is amended to add new\\n paragraph:\\n\\n As respects “Products Completed Operations Hazard”, all “bodily\\n injury” or “property damage” arising out of and attributable directly or\\n indirectly to the continuous, repeated or related exposure to substantially\\n the same general conditions affecting one lot of goods or products\\n manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by you or others trading\\n under your name, shall be deemed to result from a single “occurrence.”\\n Such “occurrence” will be deemed to occur with the first injury notified\\n to you during the policy period.\\n\\nWith exceptions not relevant in this case, the policies define “products-completed\\noperations hazard” to include “all ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ occurring\\naway from premises you own or rent and arising out of ‘your product’ or ‘your\\nwork.’”2\\n\\n 2. Federal Umbrella Policies\\n\\n Donaldson was insured under five Federal umbrella policies, effective for the\\nconsecutive annual policy periods from July 31, 1996, to July 31, 2001. The Federal\\npolicies provide $40 million of excess coverage under the following conditions:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n It is undisputed that this case involves damage falling under the “products-\\ncompleted operations hazard.”\\n\\n -6-\\n\\n Under Coverage A, we will pay on behalf of the insured, that part of\\n loss covered by this insurance in excess of the total applicable limits of\\n underlying insurance, provided the injury or offense takes place during\\n the Policy Period of this policy. The terms and conditions of\\n underlying insurance are with respect to Coverage A made a part of\\n this policy, except with respect to:\\n\\n A. any contrary provision contained in this policy; or\\n\\n B. any provision in this policy for which a similar provision is not\\n contained in underlying insurance.\\n\\n With respect to the exceptions stated above, the provisions of this policy\\n will apply.\\n\\nThe Federal policies are silent about the underlying AIG policies’ Batch Clause\\nEndorsement.\\n\\n C. District Court Proceedings\\n\\n In 2010, AIG brought this action against Donaldson and Federal seeking to\\nrecover amounts AIG contributed to the Burroughs settlement. Federal filed a\\ncounterclaim against AIG and a cross-claim against Donaldson, and Donaldson\\ncounterclaimed against both insurance companies. Over the course of several years,\\nthe district court issued a series of five orders deciding various motions. Only three\\nof these decisions are relevant to this appeal: the first two summary judgment orders\\n(referred to as Donaldson Order I and Donaldson Order II) and the order granting\\nentry of judgment (referred to as Donaldson Order V).\\n\\n In Donaldson Order I, the district court interpreted the Batch Clause\\nEndorsement and found the clause “unambiguously combines property damage,\\nincluding damage that may take place across multiple policy periods, into one\\n‘occurrence’ that takes place when Donaldson is notified of that damage.” Nat’l\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nUnion Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Donaldson Co., Inc. (“Donaldson Order I”),\\nNo. 10-4948 (JRT/AJB), 2012 WL 1072329, at *12 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2012). The\\ncourt reasoned, in part, that the Batch Clause Endorsement “artificially bundles\\nproperty damage into one ‘occurrence’ that ‘occurs’” when Donaldson is notified of\\nan injury to the property because “an ‘occurrence’ that causes an injury cannot, in\\nreality, ‘occur’ after the injury already exists and is known to Donaldson.” Id. at *12\\nn.20. The court, in construing the plain language of the Batch Clause Endorsement,\\nfound that coverage existed under a policy period if the required notice was received\\nduring that policy period. Id. at *12. Whether or not actual injury occurred during\\nthe policy period was immaterial in the court’s view. Id. The court determined that\\nthe number of policy years and deductibles implicated would depend on the number\\nof product “lots” involved. Id. at *12 n.21. In making these findings, the court\\nrejected the argument that the Batch Clause Endorsement only combines injuries that\\ntake place during an individual policy year into a single “occurrence.” Id. at *12.\\n\\n The district court’s order also addressed the definition of the term “lot” as\\ncontained in the Batch Clause Endorsement. Id. at *14. Looking to dictionary\\ndefinitions, the court found that “‘lot’ likely applies to each type of unique product\\nas a distinct group, kind, or sort.” Id. The court noted that the “ducts at issue may\\nhave included products with different specifications, product numbers, and base\\nmaterials” and that “[w]hile the term ‘lot’ potentially applies to each type of unique\\nproduct designed and manufactured by Donaldson, the term would not apply to\\nproducts with distinctive qualities that cannot reasonably constitute a group, kind, or\\nsort.” Id.\\n\\n In Donaldson Order II, the court decided cross-motions for summary judgment\\nregarding how many “lots” were involved in the Burroughs settlement. Nat’l Union\\nFire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Donaldson Co., Inc. (“Donaldson Order II”), No.\\n10-4948 (JRT/TNL), 2015 WL 1292561, at *9. (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 2015). Donaldson\\nasserted that one or, at most, two lots were at issue and, under the Batch Clause\\n\\n -8-\\n\\nEndorsement, each lot corresponded to one “occurrence” that involved only the\\n1999-2000 policy period. Id. Federal contended there were “no fewer than 22\\naggregated-by-lot occurrences” based on notice to Donaldson on seven occasions\\nduring the 1999-2000 policy period, ten occasions during the 2001-2002 policy\\nperiod, and five occasions during the 2009-2010 policy period. Id. at *10.\\n\\n Rejecting a technical definition of “lot” proposed by Federal and applying the\\ndefinition from Donaldson Order I, the court found there were two “lots” of ducts\\nresponsible for the damage in Burroughs. Id. at *10–12. The court reasoned that the\\nducts with product numbers 317 and 319 were similar but “differences in their\\nproduct numbers, specifications, and base materials are significant enough to treat\\neach as a distinct group, kind, or sort, and, therefore, a separate lot.” Id. at *10.\\n“Within each product’s manufacturing history, however, the numbers, specifications,\\nand base materials have remained the same.” Id. at *11. The court noted that\\nalthough the ducts’ chemical composition had always remained identical, in 1999 the\\nfactory producing the ducts altered the particle size of the powder form that went into\\nthe product mold and this was a change in base material. Id. The court found that\\nthis change in particle size was irrelevant to the “lot” determination. Id. at *11 n.11.\\n\\n Having determined two “lots” were involved in the Burroughs settlement, the\\ncourt addressed the related issue of when Donaldson received notice of the “property\\ndamage.” Id. at *12. It was undisputed that Donaldson was first notified of damage\\nrelated to both “lots” in January 2000 when the Western Star representative contacted\\nDonaldson. Id. Accordingly, all “property damage” related to each of the two “lots”\\nconstituted an “occurrence” within the 1999-2000 policy period, for a total of two\\n“occurrences.” Id.\\n\\n In Donaldson Order V, the court granted AIG’s motion for entry of judgment\\nagainst Federal and Donaldson. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v.\\nDonaldson Co., Inc. (“Donaldson Order V”), No. 10-4948 (JRT/TNL), 2017 WL\\n\\n -9-\\n\\n6210915, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2017). The court found that, because there were\\ntwo “occurrences,” two $500,000 per-occurrence deductibles applied to the\\nBurroughs settlement, which was allocable to the 1999-2000 AIG Policy. Id. Of the\\n$6 million settlement, the court allocated $785,591.44 to the 1999-2000 AIG policy\\nand $5,214,408.56 to the 1999-2000 Federal Excess Policy. Id. Because Donaldson\\npreviously paid one $500,000 deductible, the court ordered Donaldson to pay AIG\\nan additional $500,000 to satisfy its obligations. Id. Because Federal previously paid\\nonly $2,451,612.90 toward the settlement, Federal was ordered to reimburse AIG\\n$2,762,795.66. Id. The court entered judgment accordingly. Federal timely\\nappealed.\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n A. Standard of Review\\n\\n We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its\\ninterpretation of Minnesota insurance law. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v.\\nSchwieger, 685 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pioneer Indus. v. Hartford Fire\\nIns. Co., 639 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2011)). Summary judgment is proper where “the\\nmovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant\\nis entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).\\n\\n “Under Minnesota law, interpretation of an insurance policy . . . is a question\\nof law to be decided by the court.” Id. at 701. Policy interpretation follows “general\\nprinciples of contract construction, giving effect to the intent of the parties.” Volk\\nv. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Thommes v.\\nMilwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002)). We give unambiguous\\nterms their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. (citing Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880).\\nAmbiguous policy language is to be resolved in the insured’s favor. SECURA\\nSupreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing\\n\\n -10-\\n\\nMarchio v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 747 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008)).\\n“This is done by interpreting the ambiguity in accordance with the reasonable\\nexpectations of the insured.” Id. (citing Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41,\\n47–48 (Minn. 2008)). Ambiguity exists when policy language is “reasonably subject\\nto more than one interpretation.” Volk, 748 F.3d at 828 (quoting Columbia Heights\\nMotors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. 1979)).\\n\\n Insurance policies “must be read as a whole,” and “[p]rovisions in a policy\\nmust be read in context with all other relevant provisions.” Commerce Bank v. W.\\nBend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015) (citations omitted).\\n“[E]ndorsements . . . attached to an insurance contract are part of the contract, and the\\nendorsements and the policy must be construed together.” Employers Mut. Co. v.\\nOppidan, 518 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 1994) (quoting Bobich v. Oja, 104 N.W.2d 19,\\n24 (Minn. 1960)). Provisions limiting liability are construed against the insurer.\\nThommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880 (citations omitted).\\n\\n B. Number of Policy Periods Triggered\\n\\n Federal challenges the district court’s interpretation of the Batch Clause\\nEndorsement and corresponding finding that only the 1999-2000 policy period was\\ntriggered. Federal argues the court ignored the plain language of the insuring\\nagreements in the CGL and umbrella policies, which provide that “property damage”\\nor “injury” is covered only if it occurs or takes place during the policy period. We\\nfind Federal’s arguments unpersuasive.\\n\\n The Batch Clause Endorsement amends “occurrence” as follows: (1) all\\n“property damage” that “aris[es] out of and [is] attributable directly or indirectly to\\nthe continuous, repeated or related exposure to substantially the same general\\nconditions affecting one lot of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or\\ndistributed by” the insured is “deemed to result from a single ‘occurrence.’” The\\n\\n -11-\\n\\nsecond part of the paragraph provides that the “occurrence” is “deemed to occur with\\nthe first injury notified to [the insured] during the policy period.” Federal argues that\\nthis endorsement has no effect on the timing requirement set forth in the CGL\\npolicies’ coverage sections as to when the policies cover “property damage.” In other\\nwords, Federal contends that the “property damage” must occur during the policy\\nperiod regardless of the language in the endorsement.\\n\\n There are several problems with Federal’s interpretation. First, it fails to give\\nmeaning to the plain language of the endorsement as a whole. Combining each\\nprovision in the endorsement leads to a single unambiguous interpretation: All\\n“property damage” affecting a defective “lot of goods or products” is consolidated\\ninto a single “occurrence” deemed to occur when the insured is first notified during\\nthe policy period. Federal’s interpretation renders meaningless the endorsement by\\nplacing a claim in one policy period while assigning the “property damage” to\\nanother.\\n\\n Second, it conflicts with the main purpose of batch clauses, which is “to reduce\\nthe number of occurrences whenever the same product causes multiple bodily injuries\\nor property damage.” Michael Murray, Note, The Law of Describing Accidents: A\\nNew Proposal for Determining the Number of Occurrences in Insurance, 118 Yale\\nL.J. 1484, 1539 (2009) (cleaned up); see also Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v.\\nAetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (“The\\nintent of the parties in adding the batch clause to the policies was to minimize the\\nnumber of occurrences in order to maximize coverage.”). Under Federal’s approach,\\nan insurer would be permitted to break the single “occurrence” created by the\\nendorsement into multiple “occurrences” (i.e., one “occurrence” in each policy period\\nin which a truck is damaged by a duct from the same “lot”). This result not only runs\\ncontrary to the purpose of batch clauses, but also would open the door to expensive\\ncoverage disputes when a defective product is at issue and multiple insurers are\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\ninvolved. It also poses a risk that gaps in coverage will exist if, for example, there\\nis a policy period where the insured received no notification of damage.\\n\\n Finally, Federal’s interpretation violates a cardinal insurance policy\\ninterpretation rule—limitations of liability are to be construed against the insurer.\\nThe “property damage” provision in the coverage section limits liability. The court\\nconstrues limitations against the insurer. To the extent the endorsement creates a\\nconflict with the body of the policy, the endorsement provisions must govern.\\nGrinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 685 F.3d at 701 (citing Bobich, 104 N.W.2d at 24).\\n\\n Upon applying Minnesota’s rules for interpreting insurance policies and\\nconsidering the policies’ unambiguous terms, we find that when a defective “lot” of\\ngoods or products is involved, the claims are consolidated into a single “occurrence”\\ndeemed to occur on the date the insured first received notice of the injury during the\\npolicy period. Damage that takes place across multiple policy periods is to be\\ncombined into a single “occurrence” so long as it “aris[es] out of and [is] attributable\\ndirectly or indirectly to the continuous, repeated or related exposure to substantially\\nthe same general conditions affecting one lot of goods or products manufactured,\\nsold, handled or distributed by [the insured] or others trading under [the insured’s]\\nname.”\\n\\n Federal further argues the district court erred in entering judgment against it\\nbecause the underlying injuries in the Burroughs settlement did not all factually occur\\nduring the policy period of its 1999-2000 umbrella policy. As Federal points out, its\\npolicy includes the phrase “provided the injury or offense takes place during the\\nPolicy Period of this policy”—which mirrors the AIG policy’s timing clause. The\\nFederal umbrella policy, however, is a follow form policy that incorporates the terms\\nand conditions of the underlying AIG policy, including its endorsements, with two\\nlimited exceptions: (1) “any contrary provision contained in [the Federal] policy” or\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n\\n(2) “any provision in [the Federal] policy for which a similar provision is not\\ncontained in [the AIG policy].”\\n\\n Because the Federal umbrella policy is not inconsistent with the AIG policy,\\nwe will not read an implied invalidation of the Batch Clause Endorsement into the\\numbrella policy. A decision that requires actual injury to occur during the policy\\nperiod would contradict the plain language of the Batch Clause Endorsement.\\n\\n C. Definition of “Lot”\\n\\n Federal contends the district court improperly inserted a subjective element into\\nthe definition of “lot” via Donaldson Order II’s footnote 11—that a change to a\\nproduct distinguishes a new “lot” only if the change is “relevant to [the] litigation”\\nat hand. Federal does not challenge the definition of “lot” set forth in Donaldson\\nOrder I. Instead, Federal argues that, had the district court applied the original\\nobjective definition, a finding of a minimum of four “lots” would have been\\nnecessary.\\n\\n Federal has not established the district court erred when making the “lot”\\ndetermination. Donaldson makes unique products tailored to individual companies\\nlike Western Star. A “lot” applies to each type of unique product designed and\\nmanufactured by Donaldson. The minor change in particle size had no bearing on\\nwhether a new type of unique product was formed. There were two different types\\nof ducts uniquely designed for Western Star trucks. These two types of ducts were\\ngiven the same product numbers before and after the particle size change. The molds\\nused to manufacture the ducts did not change, nor did the ducts’ conformity with\\ndesign drawings and manufacturing specifications. The ducts remained “chemically\\nidentical” with the same type of plastic still in use after the change in particle size.\\nThe change itself had nothing to do with Donaldson. Donaldson’s contract\\nmanufacturer made the change universally after identifying fill problems that only\\n\\n -14-\\n\\nexisted with certain non-Donaldson parts. This minimal change with no effect on the\\nfunctioning, specifications, product numbers, appearance, or quality of the two types\\nof uniquely tailored ducts did not produce a new product with distinctive qualities.\\nAccordingly, two “lots” were implicated.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2675,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4629743,"string":"4,629,743"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Cheryl J. Schwandt v. Nancy A. Berryhill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-14"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3406"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3406\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Cheryl J. Schwandt,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\\n Filed: June 14, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Cheryl Schwandt appeals a judgment of the district court1 upholding the denial\\nof her application for disability insurance benefits. We affirm.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable\\nHildy Bowbeer, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.\\n\\f I.\\n\\n In February 2012, Cheryl Schwandt applied for disability insurance benefits\\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 423, claiming a disability onset date of January 1, 2012. Schwandt\\nalleged that avascular necrosis of the knees, a full knee replacement, and chronic pain\\nsyndrome limited her ability to work as a dental hygienist. The Social Security\\nAdministration granted Schwandt’s application in July 2012.\\n\\n As it happened, however, the Administration mistakenly recorded an onset date\\nof January 1, 2001. Under the correct onset date of January 1, 2012, benefit payments\\nshould have started in June 2012, because a claimant generally must be disabled for\\na full five months before benefits can be paid. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1), (c)(2). The\\nerroneous onset date resulted in benefit payments dating back to February 2011,\\ntwelve months before the application date. See id. § 423(b). The agency’s error thus\\nresulted in Schwandt receiving undeserved payments for the months from February\\n2011 to May 2012. When the agency discovered the mistake, it sought to recover the\\noverpayments, and declined to grant Schwandt a waiver that would allow her to keep\\nthe money.\\n\\n Around this time, an agency employee learned that Schwandt’s earnings had\\nbeen “subsidized” since 2010, meaning that Schwandt was paid more than the\\nreasonable value of the actual services she performed. See 20 C.F.R.\\n§ 404.1574(a)(2). As a result, the employee thought that Schwandt had not engaged\\nin substantial gainful activity after 2009, and recommended using an amended\\ndisability onset date of December 31, 2009, to calculate Schwandt’s benefits. The\\nearlier onset date would have allowed Schwandt to keep the overpayments that she\\nreceived from the government. Acting on this recommendation, an agency disability\\nexaminer reopened Schwandt’s claim in September 2013 to investigate the matter.\\nAfter conducting a full review, however, the agency concluded that Schwandt’s\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fimpairments had not been disabling before 2012, and that the correct onset date was\\nstill January 1, 2012.\\n\\n In an effort to establish an earlier onset date of December 31, 2009, Schwandt\\nrequested a hearing before an administrative law judge. The ALJ informed Schwandt\\nbefore the hearing that she would evaluate Schwandt’s disability status from\\n“December 31, 2009 through the present.” Schwandt responded with a letter\\nobjecting to any reconsideration of her disability status from 2012 onward, but she\\ndid not attempt to withdraw her request for a hearing.\\n\\n The ALJ began the hearing by overruling Schwandt’s objection to the scope\\nof the hearing. Applying the familiar sequential process, the ALJ then concluded that\\nSchwandt had not been disabled since December 31, 2009. See Bowen v. Yuckert,\\n482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ determined at step\\none that Schwandt had been engaged in substantial gainful activity from December\\n31, 2009, to December 31, 2011, so she was not disabled during that period.\\nSchwandt had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2012,\\nbut the ALJ concluded that Schwandt could perform past relevant work and therefore\\nwas not disabled from 2012 onward. As a result, Schwandt was not entitled to any\\ndisability insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E), (d).\\n\\n After the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, Schwandt\\nsought review in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court affirmed\\nthe Commissioner’s disability determination, but remanded to the Administration for\\nfurther consideration of the overpayment waiver issue. Schwandt appeals the portion\\nof the district court’s order affirming the disability determination, and we have\\njurisdiction despite the pendency of the waiver issue before the agency. See Forney\\nv. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 269, 271-72 (1998).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f We review the district court’s judgment de novo and will affirm if substantial\\nevidence supports the Commissioner’s decision. Vance v. Berryhill, 860 F.3d 1114,\\n1117 (8th Cir. 2017). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough\\nthat a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s\\ndecision. Id. “We consider evidence that supports the Commissioner’s conclusion,\\nas well as evidence that detracts from it, and we review any legal conclusions de\\nnovo.” Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Schwandt first asserts that there were defects in the process that culminated in\\nthe ALJ’s decision that Schwandt was not disabled. Schwandt argues that the\\nCommissioner improperly reopened the favorable July 2012 determination at two\\nseparate times: first, when a disability examiner reopened to decide whether the onset\\ndate should be December 31, 2009, instead of January 1, 2012, and second, when the\\nALJ chose to reconsider the 2012 onset date. Schwandt faults both the disability\\nexaminer and the ALJ for failing to articulate that they were reopening based on\\n“good cause” and for making no findings to support a “good cause” determination.\\nSee 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-.989.\\n\\n The disability examiner’s decision to reopen was governed by regulations that\\nsay the agency has authority to reopen determinations on its “own initiative,” id.\\n§ 404.987(b), for “good cause.” See id. §§ 404.905, .987, .988(b). The agency has\\n“good cause” where “[n]ew and material evidence is furnished,” “[a] clerical error in\\nthe computation or recomputation of benefits was made,” or “[t]he evidence that was\\nconsidered in making the determination or decision clearly shows on its face that an\\nerror was made.” Id. § 404.989(a)(1)-(3).\\n\\n The examiner reopened the benefits determination after an agency employee\\nrecommended changing the disability onset date in Schwandt’s favor, to December\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f31, 2009, based on “new and material information regarding [Schwandt’s] income.”\\nSpecifically, based on information received from Schwandt’s employer, the agency\\nemployee thought that Schwandt’s pay since 2010 amounted to a “60% subsidy,”\\nmeaning that the reasonable value of the work that she performed amounted to only\\n40% of her income. See id. § 404.1574(a)(2). If Schwandt had been earning only\\n40% of her income since 2010, then the last time that Schwandt performed substantial\\ngainful activity would have been December 2009. Although the examiner did not use\\nthe words “good cause” in explaining the reopening, she cited “new and material\\ninformation” regarding the 60% pay subsidy, and that was in substance a\\ndetermination of good cause. See id. § 404.989(a)(1).\\n\\n Although an earlier onset date would only have helped Schwandt to receive\\nmore benefits, she now contends that the examiner was not justified in citing “new\\nand material information.” Whether a determination of “new and material evidence”\\nis considered a finding of fact that is reviewed for substantial evidence, see 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 405(g); Higginbotham v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 408, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1985), or a legal\\nquestion reviewed de novo, see Cole ex rel. Cole v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 149, 152 (5th\\nCir. 2002), we conclude that the agency was justified in reopening.\\n\\n The information from Schwandt’s employer was “new,” because the agency\\nfirst received it in July 2013, well after it had made the July 2012 determination. See\\nMarshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996). The information was also\\n“material,” because there was a reasonable probability that it would have changed the\\noutcome if the agency had considered it initially. See Cieutat v. Bowen, 824 F.2d\\n348, 358 (5th Cir. 1987). Schwandt’s employer provided information about her pay\\nand work duties that suggested a 60% subsidy had been in place since 2010. If a\\ncomplete review had verified that degree of subsidy, then Schwandt would not have\\nengaged in substantial gainful activity during 2010 and 2011, and her onset date\\ncould have changed to December 31, 2009. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v).\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fThis earlier onset date would have allowed Schwandt to retain all benefits previously\\npaid by the agency.\\n\\n Further investigation was required, and an agency examiner eventually\\ndetermined in light of a more complete record that Schwandt was not disabled before\\n2012. But the information available to the agency at the time of reopening was\\nsufficient to justify that action. And the reopening, originally undertaken because it\\ncould have increased Schwandt’s benefits, ultimately did not change the status quo.\\nWe therefore reject Schwandt’s claim that she is entitled to relief based on an\\nimproper reopening by the agency examiner.\\n\\n Schwandt herself then requested a hearing before an ALJ, and she now\\ncomplains that the ALJ improperly “reopened” the agency’s July 2012 benefits\\ndetermination. The ALJ’s action in this case, however, was not governed by the same\\nregulation on reopening that applied to the agency examiner. See Highfill v. Bowen,\\n832 F.2d 112, 113-15 (8th Cir. 1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.921(a), .946(a). Schwandt\\nrequested review of the “reconsideration” determination that the agency issued in the\\nwake of the examiner’s reopening. This determination included a finding that\\nSchwandt was disabled as of January 1, 2012.\\n\\n When a claimant seeks review before an ALJ, the issues before the ALJ\\n“include all the issues brought out in the initial, reconsidered or revised determination\\nthat were not decided entirely in [the claimant’s] favor.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.946(a). But\\nthe regulations further provide that “if evidence presented before or during the\\nhearing causes the administrative law judge to question a fully favorable\\ndetermination, he or she will notify you and will consider it an issue at the hearing.”\\nId. (emphasis added). Where, as here, the ALJ ends up questioning and reversing a\\nfavorable determination under § 404.946(a), we review that final decision under the\\nsubstantial evidence standard, as discussed in Part III below. See Highfill, 832 F.2d\\nat 115.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f The ALJ did not give her reasons for reconsidering the favorable determination\\nuntil she issued her written decision. Schwandt claims that the ALJ’s failure to give\\nthese reasons before the hearing was a violation of due process. Due process requires\\nthat notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise\\ninterested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to\\npresent their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,\\n314 (1950). After Schwandt submitted a brief focusing on the overpayment issue, the\\nALJ notified Schwandt that the only issue at the hearing would be Schwandt’s\\ndisability status from “December 31, 2009 through the present.” The ALJ even\\npostponed the hearing to give Schwandt adequate time to prepare on the disability\\nissue. The ALJ’s notice prompted Schwandt to send a letter objecting to the hearing’s\\nscope. At the beginning of the hearing, the ALJ twice stated that she was overruling\\nSchwandt’s objection, and Schwandt confirmed that she understood the proceedings\\ncould result in a determination that she was not disabled at all, even since January 1,\\n2012. Under these circumstances, there was adequate notice to Schwandt and no due\\nprocess violation.\\n\\n Schwandt argues that res judicata barred the Commissioner from reversing the\\nfavorable determination finding her disabled. But res judicata does not bar the\\nCommissioner from revising a determination when the agency properly reconsiders\\nthat determination under 20 C.F.R. § 404.946(a) or 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-.989. See\\nHighfill, 832 F.2d at 115; Dugan v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 1384, 1387-89 (7th Cir. 1992);\\nDraper v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). The ALJ\\nproperly reconsidered the favorable determination under § 404.946(a), so res judicata\\ndid not bar the ALJ’s reversal of that determination. Schwandt’s heavy reliance on\\nDugan is unavailing, because the Seventh Circuit there concluded that the agency’s\\nattempted reopening did not comport with the applicable regulations. See 957 F.2d\\nat 1388-91.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f Schwandt also contends that the “clean hands” doctrine warrants judgment in\\nher favor because the Commissioner acted in bad faith. See Precision Instrument\\nMfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945). Schwandt argues\\nthat the Commissioner used the erroneous onset date as a pretext to terminate her\\nbenefits retroactively. Assuming without deciding that the “clean hands” doctrine is\\napplicable in this context, Schwandt’s claims of bad faith have no support in the\\nrecord. The Commissioner acknowledged that the agency’s use of an erroneous onset\\ndate was not Schwandt’s fault and advised Schwandt of her rights with respect to the\\noverpayment. After the agency reconsidered whether Schwandt was entitled to an\\nearlier onset date that would have allowed her to keep the overpayments, it was\\nSchwandt who decided to seek a hearing before the ALJ rather than settle for the\\nstatus quo with an onset date of January 1, 2012. Once Schwandt requested the\\nhearing, the ALJ properly considered both the potential onset date in 2009 and\\nSchwandt’s status from 2012 onward. There was no bad faith by the agency.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Schwandt raises several arguments challenging the ALJ’s conclusion that she\\nwas not disabled from 2012 onward. Schwandt first complains that the ALJ did not\\ngive enough weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Berglund. “A\\ntreating physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight when it is supported by\\nmedically acceptable techniques and is not inconsistent with substantial evidence in\\nthe record.” Julin, 826 F.3d at 1088; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Even if not\\nentitled to controlling weight, such opinions “typically are entitled to at least\\nsubstantial weight, but may be given limited weight if they are conclusory or\\ninconsistent with the record.” Julin, 826 F.3d at 1088.\\n\\n Dr. Berglund provided three opinions at issue here: (1) that Schwandt could\\nnot be on her feet for six hours in an eight-hour workday; (2) that Schwandt could lift\\nonly five to ten pounds; and (3) that Schwandt could perform only sedentary work.\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fThe ALJ incorporated the first opinion into Schwandt’s residual functional capacity.\\nDr. Berglund’s third opinion was an ultimate determination reserved to the\\nCommissioner, so the ALJ properly declined to weigh it. See House v. Astrue, 500\\nF.3d 741, 744-45 (8th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).\\n\\n The ALJ partially rejected Dr. Berglund’s second opinion, concluding that\\nSchwandt could lift up to ten pounds frequently and up to twenty pounds\\noccasionally. The results of a claimant’s medical examinations and the claimant’s\\nreported daily activities can undermine a treating physician’s opinion. See Fentress\\nv. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2017). While Dr. Berglund and other\\ntreating physicians consistently documented Schwandt’s chronic pain between 2009\\nand 2014, several examinations from that period found that Schwandt had normal\\nmotor strength in the upper and lower extremities. Schwandt’s reported daily\\nactivities as of February 2012 and July 2013 included cleaning her home, doing\\nlaundry, preparing meals, ironing, sweeping, and buying groceries. Schwandt\\nreported in 2012 that she exercised by walking or lifting weights twelve times per\\nmonth, and that she went to the gym regularly to keep up her muscle strength.\\nSubstantial evidence thus supports the ALJ’s decision not to assign controlling\\nweight to Dr. Berglund’s recommended lifting restriction.\\n\\n Schwandt next contends that the ALJ improperly discounted her credibility.\\nWhen evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must consider\\nobjective medical evidence, the claimant’s work history, and other evidence relating\\nto (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the\\npain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side\\neffects of medication; and (5) the claimant’s functional restrictions. See Polaski v.\\nHeckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).\\nSchwandt complains that the ALJ did not adequately consider the Polaski factors.\\nBut an ALJ need not explicitly discuss each factor, Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549,\\n558 (8th Cir. 2011), and we will defer to credibility determinations that are supported\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fby good reasons and substantial evidence. Julin, 826 F.3d at 1086. “An ALJ may\\ndecline to credit a claimant’s subjective complaints ‘if the evidence as a whole is\\ninconsistent with the claimant’s testimony.’” Id. (quoting Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d\\n902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006)).\\n\\n As the ALJ recounted, Schwandt testified that she experiences severe, disabling\\npain in her thighs and feet and that her pain averages a ‘7’ on a scale between ‘1’ and\\n‘10,’ even with pain medication. She described this pain as causing low energy and\\nas severely limiting her ability to stand, walk, and lift objects. The ALJ found\\nSchwandt’s testimony “not entirely credible.”\\n\\n The objective medical evidence undermines Schwandt’s testimony. As noted,\\nmultiple physical examinations found Schwandt to have normal motor strength in her\\nupper and lower extremities. Examinations also consistently found that Schwandt\\nhad full extension, a normal range of motion, and good stability in her knees.\\nBetween 2011 and 2012, Schwandt generally reported her pain to be either ‘3’ or ‘4’\\non a scale between ‘0’ and ‘10.’ Schwandt did consistently complain of pain over the\\ncourse of multiple visits with physicians between 2009 and 2014, but the ALJ was\\nentitled to consider the full scope of the medical evidence.\\n\\n Schwandt contends that the ALJ failed to account for her medications and their\\nside effects. Schwandt and her physicians reported several times that medications\\nwere helping to relieve her symptoms, and the ALJ pointed to evidence undermining\\nSchwandt’s reports of significant cognitive side effects. Schwandt testified that her\\nmedications also have debilitating physical side effects, but Schwandt’s medical\\nrecords and reported daily activities cast doubt on this claim. Viewing the record as\\na whole, good reasons and substantial evidence support the ALJ’s decision to\\ndiscount Schwandt’s credibility.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f Schwandt also complains that the ALJ gave only “some weight” to twelve lay\\nwitnesses who submitted written statements on her behalf. But an ALJ properly may\\ngive less than controlling weight to lay-witness statements that are inconsistent with\\nthe record. Schwandt points to statements from witnesses who explained that she\\ndoes not get out of bed until mid-afternoon on days she does not work, that she has\\ntrouble concentrating during conversations, and that she takes naps every few hours.\\nThese statements, however, are inconsistent with Schwandt’s reported daily activities\\nand psychologists’ observations that Schwandt was capable of normal, organized\\nthought processes.\\n\\n Schwandt next presents several objections to the ALJ’s step-four determination\\nthat she could perform her past relevant work as a dental hygienist. She first\\ncomplains that while the ALJ found at step one that Schwandt needed to work many\\nmore hours to reach substantial gainful activity levels from 2012 onward, her physical\\nlimitations made it impossible for her to work the additional hours. The step-four\\ninquiry, however, was simply whether Schwandt could still perform her past relevant\\nwork as a dental hygienist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Her “past relevant\\nwork” was her pre-2012 work as a dental hygienist, because Schwandt had performed\\nthat work at substantial gainful activity levels. See id. § 404.1560(b)(1). The step-\\nfour inquiry thus did not require the ALJ to assess Schwandt’s ability to work\\nadditional hours to reach substantial gainful activity levels from 2012 onward.\\n\\n Citing Carter v. Sullivan, 909 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam),\\nSchwandt next argues that her two-hour standing restriction precluded a finding that\\nshe could perform her past “light work” as a dental hygienist. In Carter, we held that\\nthe claimant’s inability to walk or stand off and on for six hours in an eight-hour\\nworkday precluded a finding that the claimant could perform his past “light” job as\\ngenerally performed in the national economy. See id. at 1202. The standing\\nrestriction was dispositive because the job at issue required “a good deal of walking\\nor standing.” See id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)).\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f Here, a vocational expert testified that the work of a dental hygienist is “light”\\nbecause it requires constant use of hands and arms. This testimony was consistent\\nwith Schwandt’s own report that her job mainly involved handling small objects and\\nrequired walking for no more than two hours in an eight-hour workday. A two-hour\\nstanding restriction is not an absolute bar to performing “light work.” See Fenton v.\\nApfel, 149 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1998). The vocational expert answered\\naffirmatively when the ALJ asked him whether someone with Schwandt’s\\nlimitations—including the two-hour standing restriction—could perform Schwandt’s\\npast work as she actually performed it and as generally performed. The expert’s\\nanswer supplied substantial evidence to support a determination that Schwandt could\\nperform her past relevant work. See Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 568 (8th Cir.\\n2003).\\n\\n Schwandt urges that the ALJ’s statement of her residual functional capacity to\\nthe vocational expert was incomplete. She suggests that the ALJ should have\\nincorporated her claimed need for a recovery day after each work shift and the special\\nwork accommodations that she received starting in 2012. Schwandt’s work\\naccommodations included help from other employees in preparing her room and\\nreviewing charts, assignments to “regular” patients, and reduced hours. The alleged\\nneed for a recovery day after each shift was based on Schwandt’s testimony and a\\nwritten statement from her husband. But Schwandt’s medical records, her reported\\ndaily activities, her overall employment history, and the apparent effectiveness of her\\nmedications undermine the need for such accommodations. Substantial evidence\\nsupports the omission of these limitations from Schwandt’s residual functional\\ncapacity.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -12-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406996/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"COLLOTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SHEPHERD\": \", Circuit\", \"STRAS\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629743/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Cheryl J. Schwandt v. Nancy A. Berryhill\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-14\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3406\n ___________________________\n\n Cheryl J. Schwandt,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\n Filed: June 14, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Cheryl Schwandt appeals a judgment of the district court1 upholding the denial\nof her application for disability insurance benefits. We affirm.\n\n 1\n The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the\nDistrict of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable\nHildy Bowbeer, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.\n\f I.\n\n In February 2012, Cheryl Schwandt applied for disability insurance benefits\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 423, claiming a disability onset date of January 1, 2012. Schwandt\nalleged that avascular necrosis of the knees, a full knee replacement, and chronic pain\nsyndrome limited her ability to work as a dental hygienist. The Social Security\nAdministration granted Schwandt’s application in July 2012.\n\n As it happened, however, the Administration mistakenly recorded an onset date\nof January 1, 2001. Under the correct onset date of January 1, 2012, benefit payments\nshould have started in June 2012, because a claimant generally must be disabled for\na full five months before benefits can be paid. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1), (c)(2). The\nerroneous onset date resulted in benefit payments dating back to February 2011,\ntwelve months before the application date. See id. § 423(b). The agency’s error thus\nresulted in Schwandt receiving undeserved payments for the months from February\n2011 to May 2012. When the agency discovered the mistake, it sought to recover the\noverpayments, and declined to grant Schwandt a waiver that would allow her to keep\nthe money.\n\n Around this time, an agency employee learned that Schwandt’s earnings had\nbeen “subsidized” since 2010, meaning that Schwandt was paid more than the\nreasonable value of the actual services she performed. See 20 C.F.R.\n§ 404.1574(a)(2). As a result, the employee thought that Schwandt had not engaged\nin substantial gainful activity after 2009, and recommended using an amended\ndisability onset date of December 31, 2009, to calculate Schwandt’s benefits. The\nearlier onset date would have allowed Schwandt to keep the overpayments that she\nreceived from the government. Acting on this recommendation, an agency disability\nexaminer reopened Schwandt’s claim in September 2013 to investigate the matter.\nAfter conducting a full review, however, the agency concluded that Schwandt’s\n\n\n\n -2-\n\fimpairments had not been disabling before 2012, and that the correct onset date was\nstill January 1, 2012.\n\n In an effort to establish an earlier onset date of December 31, 2009, Schwandt\nrequested a hearing before an administrative law judge. The ALJ informed Schwandt\nbefore the hearing that she would evaluate Schwandt’s disability status from\n“December 31, 2009 through the present.” Schwandt responded with a letter\nobjecting to any reconsideration of her disability status from 2012 onward, but she\ndid not attempt to withdraw her request for a hearing.\n\n The ALJ began the hearing by overruling Schwandt’s objection to the scope\nof the hearing. Applying the familiar sequential process, the ALJ then concluded that\nSchwandt had not been disabled since December 31, 2009. See Bowen v. Yuckert,\n482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ determined at step\none that Schwandt had been engaged in substantial gainful activity from December\n31, 2009, to December 31, 2011, so she was not disabled during that period.\nSchwandt had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2012,\nbut the ALJ concluded that Schwandt could perform past relevant work and therefore\nwas not disabled from 2012 onward. As a result, Schwandt was not entitled to any\ndisability insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E), (d).\n\n After the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, Schwandt\nsought review in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court affirmed\nthe Commissioner’s disability determination, but remanded to the Administration for\nfurther consideration of the overpayment waiver issue. Schwandt appeals the portion\nof the district court’s order affirming the disability determination, and we have\njurisdiction despite the pendency of the waiver issue before the agency. See Forney\nv. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 269, 271-72 (1998).\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f We review the district court’s judgment de novo and will affirm if substantial\nevidence supports the Commissioner’s decision. Vance v. Berryhill, 860 F.3d 1114,\n1117 (8th Cir. 2017). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough\nthat a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s\ndecision. Id. “We consider evidence that supports the Commissioner’s conclusion,\nas well as evidence that detracts from it, and we review any legal conclusions de\nnovo.” Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2016).\n\n II.\n\n Schwandt first asserts that there were defects in the process that culminated in\nthe ALJ’s decision that Schwandt was not disabled. Schwandt argues that the\nCommissioner improperly reopened the favorable July 2012 determination at two\nseparate times: first, when a disability examiner reopened to decide whether the onset\ndate should be December 31, 2009, instead of January 1, 2012, and second, when the\nALJ chose to reconsider the 2012 onset date. Schwandt faults both the disability\nexaminer and the ALJ for failing to articulate that they were reopening based on\n“good cause” and for making no findings to support a “good cause” determination.\nSee 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-.989.\n\n The disability examiner’s decision to reopen was governed by regulations that\nsay the agency has authority to reopen determinations on its “own initiative,” id.\n§ 404.987(b), for “good cause.” See id. §§ 404.905, .987, .988(b). The agency has\n“good cause” where “[n]ew and material evidence is furnished,” “[a] clerical error in\nthe computation or recomputation of benefits was made,” or “[t]he evidence that was\nconsidered in making the determination or decision clearly shows on its face that an\nerror was made.” Id. § 404.989(a)(1)-(3).\n\n The examiner reopened the benefits determination after an agency employee\nrecommended changing the disability onset date in Schwandt’s favor, to December\n\n -4-\n\f31, 2009, based on “new and material information regarding [Schwandt’s] income.”\nSpecifically, based on information received from Schwandt’s employer, the agency\nemployee thought that Schwandt’s pay since 2010 amounted to a “60% subsidy,”\nmeaning that the reasonable value of the work that she performed amounted to only\n40% of her income. See id. § 404.1574(a)(2). If Schwandt had been earning only\n40% of her income since 2010, then the last time that Schwandt performed substantial\ngainful activity would have been December 2009. Although the examiner did not use\nthe words “good cause” in explaining the reopening, she cited “new and material\ninformation” regarding the 60% pay subsidy, and that was in substance a\ndetermination of good cause. See id. § 404.989(a)(1).\n\n Although an earlier onset date would only have helped Schwandt to receive\nmore benefits, she now contends that the examiner was not justified in citing “new\nand material information.” Whether a determination of “new and material evidence”\nis considered a finding of fact that is reviewed for substantial evidence, see 42 U.S.C.\n§ 405(g); Higginbotham v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 408, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1985), or a legal\nquestion reviewed de novo, see Cole ex rel. Cole v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 149, 152 (5th\nCir. 2002), we conclude that the agency was justified in reopening.\n\n The information from Schwandt’s employer was “new,” because the agency\nfirst received it in July 2013, well after it had made the July 2012 determination. See\nMarshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996). The information was also\n“material,” because there was a reasonable probability that it would have changed the\noutcome if the agency had considered it initially. See Cieutat v. Bowen, 824 F.2d\n348, 358 (5th Cir. 1987). Schwandt’s employer provided information about her pay\nand work duties that suggested a 60% subsidy had been in place since 2010. If a\ncomplete review had verified that degree of subsidy, then Schwandt would not have\nengaged in substantial gainful activity during 2010 and 2011, and her onset date\ncould have changed to December 31, 2009. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v).\n\n\n\n -5-\n\fThis earlier onset date would have allowed Schwandt to retain all benefits previously\npaid by the agency.\n\n Further investigation was required, and an agency examiner eventually\ndetermined in light of a more complete record that Schwandt was not disabled before\n2012. But the information available to the agency at the time of reopening was\nsufficient to justify that action. And the reopening, originally undertaken because it\ncould have increased Schwandt’s benefits, ultimately did not change the status quo.\nWe therefore reject Schwandt’s claim that she is entitled to relief based on an\nimproper reopening by the agency examiner.\n\n Schwandt herself then requested a hearing before an ALJ, and she now\ncomplains that the ALJ improperly “reopened” the agency’s July 2012 benefits\ndetermination. The ALJ’s action in this case, however, was not governed by the same\nregulation on reopening that applied to the agency examiner. See Highfill v. Bowen,\n832 F.2d 112, 113-15 (8th Cir. 1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.921(a), .946(a). Schwandt\nrequested review of the “reconsideration” determination that the agency issued in the\nwake of the examiner’s reopening. This determination included a finding that\nSchwandt was disabled as of January 1, 2012.\n\n When a claimant seeks review before an ALJ, the issues before the ALJ\n“include all the issues brought out in the initial, reconsidered or revised determination\nthat were not decided entirely in [the claimant’s] favor.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.946(a). But\nthe regulations further provide that “if evidence presented before or during the\nhearing causes the administrative law judge to question a fully favorable\ndetermination, he or she will notify you and will consider it an issue at the hearing.”\nId. (emphasis added). Where, as here, the ALJ ends up questioning and reversing a\nfavorable determination under § 404.946(a), we review that final decision under the\nsubstantial evidence standard, as discussed in Part III below. See Highfill, 832 F.2d\nat 115.\n\n -6-\n\f The ALJ did not give her reasons for reconsidering the favorable determination\nuntil she issued her written decision. Schwandt claims that the ALJ’s failure to give\nthese reasons before the hearing was a violation of due process. Due process requires\nthat notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise\ninterested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to\npresent their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,\n314 (1950). After Schwandt submitted a brief focusing on the overpayment issue, the\nALJ notified Schwandt that the only issue at the hearing would be Schwandt’s\ndisability status from “December 31, 2009 through the present.” The ALJ even\npostponed the hearing to give Schwandt adequate time to prepare on the disability\nissue. The ALJ’s notice prompted Schwandt to send a letter objecting to the hearing’s\nscope. At the beginning of the hearing, the ALJ twice stated that she was overruling\nSchwandt’s objection, and Schwandt confirmed that she understood the proceedings\ncould result in a determination that she was not disabled at all, even since January 1,\n2012. Under these circumstances, there was adequate notice to Schwandt and no due\nprocess violation.\n\n Schwandt argues that res judicata barred the Commissioner from reversing the\nfavorable determination finding her disabled. But res judicata does not bar the\nCommissioner from revising a determination when the agency properly reconsiders\nthat determination under 20 C.F.R. § 404.946(a) or 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-.989. See\nHighfill, 832 F.2d at 115; Dugan v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 1384, 1387-89 (7th Cir. 1992);\nDraper v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). The ALJ\nproperly reconsidered the favorable determination under § 404.946(a), so res judicata\ndid not bar the ALJ’s reversal of that determination. Schwandt’s heavy reliance on\nDugan is unavailing, because the Seventh Circuit there concluded that the agency’s\nattempted reopening did not comport with the applicable regulations. See 957 F.2d\nat 1388-91.\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f Schwandt also contends that the “clean hands” doctrine warrants judgment in\nher favor because the Commissioner acted in bad faith. See Precision Instrument\nMfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945). Schwandt argues\nthat the Commissioner used the erroneous onset date as a pretext to terminate her\nbenefits retroactively. Assuming without deciding that the “clean hands” doctrine is\napplicable in this context, Schwandt’s claims of bad faith have no support in the\nrecord. The Commissioner acknowledged that the agency’s use of an erroneous onset\ndate was not Schwandt’s fault and advised Schwandt of her rights with respect to the\noverpayment. After the agency reconsidered whether Schwandt was entitled to an\nearlier onset date that would have allowed her to keep the overpayments, it was\nSchwandt who decided to seek a hearing before the ALJ rather than settle for the\nstatus quo with an onset date of January 1, 2012. Once Schwandt requested the\nhearing, the ALJ properly considered both the potential onset date in 2009 and\nSchwandt’s status from 2012 onward. There was no bad faith by the agency.\n\n III.\n\n Schwandt raises several arguments challenging the ALJ’s conclusion that she\nwas not disabled from 2012 onward. Schwandt first complains that the ALJ did not\ngive enough weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Berglund. “A\ntreating physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight when it is supported by\nmedically acceptable techniques and is not inconsistent with substantial evidence in\nthe record.” Julin, 826 F.3d at 1088; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Even if not\nentitled to controlling weight, such opinions “typically are entitled to at least\nsubstantial weight, but may be given limited weight if they are conclusory or\ninconsistent with the record.” Julin, 826 F.3d at 1088.\n\n Dr. Berglund provided three opinions at issue here: (1) that Schwandt could\nnot be on her feet for six hours in an eight-hour workday; (2) that Schwandt could lift\nonly five to ten pounds; and (3) that Schwandt could perform only sedentary work.\n\n -8-\n\fThe ALJ incorporated the first opinion into Schwandt’s residual functional capacity.\nDr. Berglund’s third opinion was an ultimate determination reserved to the\nCommissioner, so the ALJ properly declined to weigh it. See House v. Astrue, 500\nF.3d 741, 744-45 (8th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).\n\n The ALJ partially rejected Dr. Berglund’s second opinion, concluding that\nSchwandt could lift up to ten pounds frequently and up to twenty pounds\noccasionally. The results of a claimant’s medical examinations and the claimant’s\nreported daily activities can undermine a treating physician’s opinion. See Fentress\nv. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2017). While Dr. Berglund and other\ntreating physicians consistently documented Schwandt’s chronic pain between 2009\nand 2014, several examinations from that period found that Schwandt had normal\nmotor strength in the upper and lower extremities. Schwandt’s reported daily\nactivities as of February 2012 and July 2013 included cleaning her home, doing\nlaundry, preparing meals, ironing, sweeping, and buying groceries. Schwandt\nreported in 2012 that she exercised by walking or lifting weights twelve times per\nmonth, and that she went to the gym regularly to keep up her muscle strength.\nSubstantial evidence thus supports the ALJ’s decision not to assign controlling\nweight to Dr. Berglund’s recommended lifting restriction.\n\n Schwandt next contends that the ALJ improperly discounted her credibility.\nWhen evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must consider\nobjective medical evidence, the claimant’s work history, and other evidence relating\nto (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the\npain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side\neffects of medication; and (5) the claimant’s functional restrictions. See Polaski v.\nHeckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).\nSchwandt complains that the ALJ did not adequately consider the Polaski factors.\nBut an ALJ need not explicitly discuss each factor, Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549,\n558 (8th Cir. 2011), and we will defer to credibility determinations that are supported\n\n -9-\n\fby good reasons and substantial evidence. Julin, 826 F.3d at 1086. “An ALJ may\ndecline to credit a claimant’s subjective complaints ‘if the evidence as a whole is\ninconsistent with the claimant’s testimony.’” Id. (quoting Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d\n902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006)).\n\n As the ALJ recounted, Schwandt testified that she experiences severe, disabling\npain in her thighs and feet and that her pain averages a ‘7’ on a scale between ‘1’ and\n‘10,’ even with pain medication. She described this pain as causing low energy and\nas severely limiting her ability to stand, walk, and lift objects. The ALJ found\nSchwandt’s testimony “not entirely credible.”\n\n The objective medical evidence undermines Schwandt’s testimony. As noted,\nmultiple physical examinations found Schwandt to have normal motor strength in her\nupper and lower extremities. Examinations also consistently found that Schwandt\nhad full extension, a normal range of motion, and good stability in her knees.\nBetween 2011 and 2012, Schwandt generally reported her pain to be either ‘3’ or ‘4’\non a scale between ‘0’ and ‘10.’ Schwandt did consistently complain of pain over the\ncourse of multiple visits with physicians between 2009 and 2014, but the ALJ was\nentitled to consider the full scope of the medical evidence.\n\n Schwandt contends that the ALJ failed to account for her medications and their\nside effects. Schwandt and her physicians reported several times that medications\nwere helping to relieve her symptoms, and the ALJ pointed to evidence undermining\nSchwandt’s reports of significant cognitive side effects. Schwandt testified that her\nmedications also have debilitating physical side effects, but Schwandt’s medical\nrecords and reported daily activities cast doubt on this claim. Viewing the record as\na whole, good reasons and substantial evidence support the ALJ’s decision to\ndiscount Schwandt’s credibility.\n\n\n\n\n -10-\n\f Schwandt also complains that the ALJ gave only “some weight” to twelve lay\nwitnesses who submitted written statements on her behalf. But an ALJ properly may\ngive less than controlling weight to lay-witness statements that are inconsistent with\nthe record. Schwandt points to statements from witnesses who explained that she\ndoes not get out of bed until mid-afternoon on days she does not work, that she has\ntrouble concentrating during conversations, and that she takes naps every few hours.\nThese statements, however, are inconsistent with Schwandt’s reported daily activities\nand psychologists’ observations that Schwandt was capable of normal, organized\nthought processes.\n\n Schwandt next presents several objections to the ALJ’s step-four determination\nthat she could perform her past relevant work as a dental hygienist. She first\ncomplains that while the ALJ found at step one that Schwandt needed to work many\nmore hours to reach substantial gainful activity levels from 2012 onward, her physical\nlimitations made it impossible for her to work the additional hours. The step-four\ninquiry, however, was simply whether Schwandt could still perform her past relevant\nwork as a dental hygienist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Her “past relevant\nwork” was her pre-2012 work as a dental hygienist, because Schwandt had performed\nthat work at substantial gainful activity levels. See id. § 404.1560(b)(1). The step-\nfour inquiry thus did not require the ALJ to assess Schwandt’s ability to work\nadditional hours to reach substantial gainful activity levels from 2012 onward.\n\n Citing Carter v. Sullivan, 909 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam),\nSchwandt next argues that her two-hour standing restriction precluded a finding that\nshe could perform her past “light work” as a dental hygienist. In Carter, we held that\nthe claimant’s inability to walk or stand off and on for six hours in an eight-hour\nworkday precluded a finding that the claimant could perform his past “light” job as\ngenerally performed in the national economy. See id. at 1202. The standing\nrestriction was dispositive because the job at issue required “a good deal of walking\nor standing.” See id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)).\n\n -11-\n\f Here, a vocational expert testified that the work of a dental hygienist is “light”\nbecause it requires constant use of hands and arms. This testimony was consistent\nwith Schwandt’s own report that her job mainly involved handling small objects and\nrequired walking for no more than two hours in an eight-hour workday. A two-hour\nstanding restriction is not an absolute bar to performing “light work.” See Fenton v.\nApfel, 149 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1998). The vocational expert answered\naffirmatively when the ALJ asked him whether someone with Schwandt’s\nlimitations—including the two-hour standing restriction—could perform Schwandt’s\npast work as she actually performed it and as generally performed. The expert’s\nanswer supplied substantial evidence to support a determination that Schwandt could\nperform her past relevant work. See Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 568 (8th Cir.\n2003).\n\n Schwandt urges that the ALJ’s statement of her residual functional capacity to\nthe vocational expert was incomplete. She suggests that the ALJ should have\nincorporated her claimed need for a recovery day after each work shift and the special\nwork accommodations that she received starting in 2012. Schwandt’s work\naccommodations included help from other employees in preparing her room and\nreviewing charts, assignments to “regular” patients, and reduced hours. The alleged\nneed for a recovery day after each shift was based on Schwandt’s testimony and a\nwritten statement from her husband. But Schwandt’s medical records, her reported\ndaily activities, her overall employment history, and the apparent effectiveness of her\nmedications undermine the need for such accommodations. Substantial evidence\nsupports the omission of these limitations from Schwandt’s residual functional\ncapacity.\n\n * * *\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n -12-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Cheryl J. Schwandt v. Nancy A. Berryhill\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-14\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3406\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Cheryl J. Schwandt,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 15, 2018\\n Filed: June 14, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Cheryl Schwandt appeals a judgment of the district court1 upholding the denial\\nof her application for disability insurance benefits. We affirm.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable\\nHildy Bowbeer, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.\\n\\f I.\\n\\n In February 2012, Cheryl Schwandt applied for disability insurance benefits\\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 423, claiming a disability onset date of January 1, 2012. Schwandt\\nalleged that avascular necrosis of the knees, a full knee replacement, and chronic pain\\nsyndrome limited her ability to work as a dental hygienist. The Social Security\\nAdministration granted Schwandt’s application in July 2012.\\n\\n As it happened, however, the Administration mistakenly recorded an onset date\\nof January 1, 2001. Under the correct onset date of January 1, 2012, benefit payments\\nshould have started in June 2012, because a claimant generally must be disabled for\\na full five months before benefits can be paid. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1), (c)(2). The\\nerroneous onset date resulted in benefit payments dating back to February 2011,\\ntwelve months before the application date. See id. § 423(b). The agency’s error thus\\nresulted in Schwandt receiving undeserved payments for the months from February\\n2011 to May 2012. When the agency discovered the mistake, it sought to recover the\\noverpayments, and declined to grant Schwandt a waiver that would allow her to keep\\nthe money.\\n\\n Around this time, an agency employee learned that Schwandt’s earnings had\\nbeen “subsidized” since 2010, meaning that Schwandt was paid more than the\\nreasonable value of the actual services she performed. See 20 C.F.R.\\n§ 404.1574(a)(2). As a result, the employee thought that Schwandt had not engaged\\nin substantial gainful activity after 2009, and recommended using an amended\\ndisability onset date of December 31, 2009, to calculate Schwandt’s benefits. The\\nearlier onset date would have allowed Schwandt to keep the overpayments that she\\nreceived from the government. Acting on this recommendation, an agency disability\\nexaminer reopened Schwandt’s claim in September 2013 to investigate the matter.\\nAfter conducting a full review, however, the agency concluded that Schwandt’s\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fimpairments had not been disabling before 2012, and that the correct onset date was\\nstill January 1, 2012.\\n\\n In an effort to establish an earlier onset date of December 31, 2009, Schwandt\\nrequested a hearing before an administrative law judge. The ALJ informed Schwandt\\nbefore the hearing that she would evaluate Schwandt’s disability status from\\n“December 31, 2009 through the present.” Schwandt responded with a letter\\nobjecting to any reconsideration of her disability status from 2012 onward, but she\\ndid not attempt to withdraw her request for a hearing.\\n\\n The ALJ began the hearing by overruling Schwandt’s objection to the scope\\nof the hearing. Applying the familiar sequential process, the ALJ then concluded that\\nSchwandt had not been disabled since December 31, 2009. See Bowen v. Yuckert,\\n482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ determined at step\\none that Schwandt had been engaged in substantial gainful activity from December\\n31, 2009, to December 31, 2011, so she was not disabled during that period.\\nSchwandt had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2012,\\nbut the ALJ concluded that Schwandt could perform past relevant work and therefore\\nwas not disabled from 2012 onward. As a result, Schwandt was not entitled to any\\ndisability insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E), (d).\\n\\n After the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, Schwandt\\nsought review in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court affirmed\\nthe Commissioner’s disability determination, but remanded to the Administration for\\nfurther consideration of the overpayment waiver issue. Schwandt appeals the portion\\nof the district court’s order affirming the disability determination, and we have\\njurisdiction despite the pendency of the waiver issue before the agency. See Forney\\nv. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 269, 271-72 (1998).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f We review the district court’s judgment de novo and will affirm if substantial\\nevidence supports the Commissioner’s decision. Vance v. Berryhill, 860 F.3d 1114,\\n1117 (8th Cir. 2017). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough\\nthat a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s\\ndecision. Id. “We consider evidence that supports the Commissioner’s conclusion,\\nas well as evidence that detracts from it, and we review any legal conclusions de\\nnovo.” Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Schwandt first asserts that there were defects in the process that culminated in\\nthe ALJ’s decision that Schwandt was not disabled. Schwandt argues that the\\nCommissioner improperly reopened the favorable July 2012 determination at two\\nseparate times: first, when a disability examiner reopened to decide whether the onset\\ndate should be December 31, 2009, instead of January 1, 2012, and second, when the\\nALJ chose to reconsider the 2012 onset date. Schwandt faults both the disability\\nexaminer and the ALJ for failing to articulate that they were reopening based on\\n“good cause” and for making no findings to support a “good cause” determination.\\nSee 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-.989.\\n\\n The disability examiner’s decision to reopen was governed by regulations that\\nsay the agency has authority to reopen determinations on its “own initiative,” id.\\n§ 404.987(b), for “good cause.” See id. §§ 404.905, .987, .988(b). The agency has\\n“good cause” where “[n]ew and material evidence is furnished,” “[a] clerical error in\\nthe computation or recomputation of benefits was made,” or “[t]he evidence that was\\nconsidered in making the determination or decision clearly shows on its face that an\\nerror was made.” Id. § 404.989(a)(1)-(3).\\n\\n The examiner reopened the benefits determination after an agency employee\\nrecommended changing the disability onset date in Schwandt’s favor, to December\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f31, 2009, based on “new and material information regarding [Schwandt’s] income.”\\nSpecifically, based on information received from Schwandt’s employer, the agency\\nemployee thought that Schwandt’s pay since 2010 amounted to a “60% subsidy,”\\nmeaning that the reasonable value of the work that she performed amounted to only\\n40% of her income. See id. § 404.1574(a)(2). If Schwandt had been earning only\\n40% of her income since 2010, then the last time that Schwandt performed substantial\\ngainful activity would have been December 2009. Although the examiner did not use\\nthe words “good cause” in explaining the reopening, she cited “new and material\\ninformation” regarding the 60% pay subsidy, and that was in substance a\\ndetermination of good cause. See id. § 404.989(a)(1).\\n\\n Although an earlier onset date would only have helped Schwandt to receive\\nmore benefits, she now contends that the examiner was not justified in citing “new\\nand material information.” Whether a determination of “new and material evidence”\\nis considered a finding of fact that is reviewed for substantial evidence, see 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 405(g); Higginbotham v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 408, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1985), or a legal\\nquestion reviewed de novo, see Cole ex rel. Cole v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 149, 152 (5th\\nCir. 2002), we conclude that the agency was justified in reopening.\\n\\n The information from Schwandt’s employer was “new,” because the agency\\nfirst received it in July 2013, well after it had made the July 2012 determination. See\\nMarshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996). The information was also\\n“material,” because there was a reasonable probability that it would have changed the\\noutcome if the agency had considered it initially. See Cieutat v. Bowen, 824 F.2d\\n348, 358 (5th Cir. 1987). Schwandt’s employer provided information about her pay\\nand work duties that suggested a 60% subsidy had been in place since 2010. If a\\ncomplete review had verified that degree of subsidy, then Schwandt would not have\\nengaged in substantial gainful activity during 2010 and 2011, and her onset date\\ncould have changed to December 31, 2009. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v).\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fThis earlier onset date would have allowed Schwandt to retain all benefits previously\\npaid by the agency.\\n\\n Further investigation was required, and an agency examiner eventually\\ndetermined in light of a more complete record that Schwandt was not disabled before\\n2012. But the information available to the agency at the time of reopening was\\nsufficient to justify that action. And the reopening, originally undertaken because it\\ncould have increased Schwandt’s benefits, ultimately did not change the status quo.\\nWe therefore reject Schwandt’s claim that she is entitled to relief based on an\\nimproper reopening by the agency examiner.\\n\\n Schwandt herself then requested a hearing before an ALJ, and she now\\ncomplains that the ALJ improperly “reopened” the agency’s July 2012 benefits\\ndetermination. The ALJ’s action in this case, however, was not governed by the same\\nregulation on reopening that applied to the agency examiner. See Highfill v. Bowen,\\n832 F.2d 112, 113-15 (8th Cir. 1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.921(a), .946(a). Schwandt\\nrequested review of the “reconsideration” determination that the agency issued in the\\nwake of the examiner’s reopening. This determination included a finding that\\nSchwandt was disabled as of January 1, 2012.\\n\\n When a claimant seeks review before an ALJ, the issues before the ALJ\\n“include all the issues brought out in the initial, reconsidered or revised determination\\nthat were not decided entirely in [the claimant’s] favor.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.946(a). But\\nthe regulations further provide that “if evidence presented before or during the\\nhearing causes the administrative law judge to question a fully favorable\\ndetermination, he or she will notify you and will consider it an issue at the hearing.”\\nId. (emphasis added). Where, as here, the ALJ ends up questioning and reversing a\\nfavorable determination under § 404.946(a), we review that final decision under the\\nsubstantial evidence standard, as discussed in Part III below. See Highfill, 832 F.2d\\nat 115.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f The ALJ did not give her reasons for reconsidering the favorable determination\\nuntil she issued her written decision. Schwandt claims that the ALJ’s failure to give\\nthese reasons before the hearing was a violation of due process. Due process requires\\nthat notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise\\ninterested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to\\npresent their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,\\n314 (1950). After Schwandt submitted a brief focusing on the overpayment issue, the\\nALJ notified Schwandt that the only issue at the hearing would be Schwandt’s\\ndisability status from “December 31, 2009 through the present.” The ALJ even\\npostponed the hearing to give Schwandt adequate time to prepare on the disability\\nissue. The ALJ’s notice prompted Schwandt to send a letter objecting to the hearing’s\\nscope. At the beginning of the hearing, the ALJ twice stated that she was overruling\\nSchwandt’s objection, and Schwandt confirmed that she understood the proceedings\\ncould result in a determination that she was not disabled at all, even since January 1,\\n2012. Under these circumstances, there was adequate notice to Schwandt and no due\\nprocess violation.\\n\\n Schwandt argues that res judicata barred the Commissioner from reversing the\\nfavorable determination finding her disabled. But res judicata does not bar the\\nCommissioner from revising a determination when the agency properly reconsiders\\nthat determination under 20 C.F.R. § 404.946(a) or 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-.989. See\\nHighfill, 832 F.2d at 115; Dugan v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 1384, 1387-89 (7th Cir. 1992);\\nDraper v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). The ALJ\\nproperly reconsidered the favorable determination under § 404.946(a), so res judicata\\ndid not bar the ALJ’s reversal of that determination. Schwandt’s heavy reliance on\\nDugan is unavailing, because the Seventh Circuit there concluded that the agency’s\\nattempted reopening did not comport with the applicable regulations. See 957 F.2d\\nat 1388-91.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f Schwandt also contends that the “clean hands” doctrine warrants judgment in\\nher favor because the Commissioner acted in bad faith. See Precision Instrument\\nMfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945). Schwandt argues\\nthat the Commissioner used the erroneous onset date as a pretext to terminate her\\nbenefits retroactively. Assuming without deciding that the “clean hands” doctrine is\\napplicable in this context, Schwandt’s claims of bad faith have no support in the\\nrecord. The Commissioner acknowledged that the agency’s use of an erroneous onset\\ndate was not Schwandt’s fault and advised Schwandt of her rights with respect to the\\noverpayment. After the agency reconsidered whether Schwandt was entitled to an\\nearlier onset date that would have allowed her to keep the overpayments, it was\\nSchwandt who decided to seek a hearing before the ALJ rather than settle for the\\nstatus quo with an onset date of January 1, 2012. Once Schwandt requested the\\nhearing, the ALJ properly considered both the potential onset date in 2009 and\\nSchwandt’s status from 2012 onward. There was no bad faith by the agency.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Schwandt raises several arguments challenging the ALJ’s conclusion that she\\nwas not disabled from 2012 onward. Schwandt first complains that the ALJ did not\\ngive enough weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Berglund. “A\\ntreating physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight when it is supported by\\nmedically acceptable techniques and is not inconsistent with substantial evidence in\\nthe record.” Julin, 826 F.3d at 1088; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Even if not\\nentitled to controlling weight, such opinions “typically are entitled to at least\\nsubstantial weight, but may be given limited weight if they are conclusory or\\ninconsistent with the record.” Julin, 826 F.3d at 1088.\\n\\n Dr. Berglund provided three opinions at issue here: (1) that Schwandt could\\nnot be on her feet for six hours in an eight-hour workday; (2) that Schwandt could lift\\nonly five to ten pounds; and (3) that Schwandt could perform only sedentary work.\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fThe ALJ incorporated the first opinion into Schwandt’s residual functional capacity.\\nDr. Berglund’s third opinion was an ultimate determination reserved to the\\nCommissioner, so the ALJ properly declined to weigh it. See House v. Astrue, 500\\nF.3d 741, 744-45 (8th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).\\n\\n The ALJ partially rejected Dr. Berglund’s second opinion, concluding that\\nSchwandt could lift up to ten pounds frequently and up to twenty pounds\\noccasionally. The results of a claimant’s medical examinations and the claimant’s\\nreported daily activities can undermine a treating physician’s opinion. See Fentress\\nv. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2017). While Dr. Berglund and other\\ntreating physicians consistently documented Schwandt’s chronic pain between 2009\\nand 2014, several examinations from that period found that Schwandt had normal\\nmotor strength in the upper and lower extremities. Schwandt’s reported daily\\nactivities as of February 2012 and July 2013 included cleaning her home, doing\\nlaundry, preparing meals, ironing, sweeping, and buying groceries. Schwandt\\nreported in 2012 that she exercised by walking or lifting weights twelve times per\\nmonth, and that she went to the gym regularly to keep up her muscle strength.\\nSubstantial evidence thus supports the ALJ’s decision not to assign controlling\\nweight to Dr. Berglund’s recommended lifting restriction.\\n\\n Schwandt next contends that the ALJ improperly discounted her credibility.\\nWhen evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must consider\\nobjective medical evidence, the claimant’s work history, and other evidence relating\\nto (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the\\npain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side\\neffects of medication; and (5) the claimant’s functional restrictions. See Polaski v.\\nHeckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).\\nSchwandt complains that the ALJ did not adequately consider the Polaski factors.\\nBut an ALJ need not explicitly discuss each factor, Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549,\\n558 (8th Cir. 2011), and we will defer to credibility determinations that are supported\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fby good reasons and substantial evidence. Julin, 826 F.3d at 1086. “An ALJ may\\ndecline to credit a claimant’s subjective complaints ‘if the evidence as a whole is\\ninconsistent with the claimant’s testimony.’” Id. (quoting Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d\\n902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006)).\\n\\n As the ALJ recounted, Schwandt testified that she experiences severe, disabling\\npain in her thighs and feet and that her pain averages a ‘7’ on a scale between ‘1’ and\\n‘10,’ even with pain medication. She described this pain as causing low energy and\\nas severely limiting her ability to stand, walk, and lift objects. The ALJ found\\nSchwandt’s testimony “not entirely credible.”\\n\\n The objective medical evidence undermines Schwandt’s testimony. As noted,\\nmultiple physical examinations found Schwandt to have normal motor strength in her\\nupper and lower extremities. Examinations also consistently found that Schwandt\\nhad full extension, a normal range of motion, and good stability in her knees.\\nBetween 2011 and 2012, Schwandt generally reported her pain to be either ‘3’ or ‘4’\\non a scale between ‘0’ and ‘10.’ Schwandt did consistently complain of pain over the\\ncourse of multiple visits with physicians between 2009 and 2014, but the ALJ was\\nentitled to consider the full scope of the medical evidence.\\n\\n Schwandt contends that the ALJ failed to account for her medications and their\\nside effects. Schwandt and her physicians reported several times that medications\\nwere helping to relieve her symptoms, and the ALJ pointed to evidence undermining\\nSchwandt’s reports of significant cognitive side effects. Schwandt testified that her\\nmedications also have debilitating physical side effects, but Schwandt’s medical\\nrecords and reported daily activities cast doubt on this claim. Viewing the record as\\na whole, good reasons and substantial evidence support the ALJ’s decision to\\ndiscount Schwandt’s credibility.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f Schwandt also complains that the ALJ gave only “some weight” to twelve lay\\nwitnesses who submitted written statements on her behalf. But an ALJ properly may\\ngive less than controlling weight to lay-witness statements that are inconsistent with\\nthe record. Schwandt points to statements from witnesses who explained that she\\ndoes not get out of bed until mid-afternoon on days she does not work, that she has\\ntrouble concentrating during conversations, and that she takes naps every few hours.\\nThese statements, however, are inconsistent with Schwandt’s reported daily activities\\nand psychologists’ observations that Schwandt was capable of normal, organized\\nthought processes.\\n\\n Schwandt next presents several objections to the ALJ’s step-four determination\\nthat she could perform her past relevant work as a dental hygienist. She first\\ncomplains that while the ALJ found at step one that Schwandt needed to work many\\nmore hours to reach substantial gainful activity levels from 2012 onward, her physical\\nlimitations made it impossible for her to work the additional hours. The step-four\\ninquiry, however, was simply whether Schwandt could still perform her past relevant\\nwork as a dental hygienist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Her “past relevant\\nwork” was her pre-2012 work as a dental hygienist, because Schwandt had performed\\nthat work at substantial gainful activity levels. See id. § 404.1560(b)(1). The step-\\nfour inquiry thus did not require the ALJ to assess Schwandt’s ability to work\\nadditional hours to reach substantial gainful activity levels from 2012 onward.\\n\\n Citing Carter v. Sullivan, 909 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam),\\nSchwandt next argues that her two-hour standing restriction precluded a finding that\\nshe could perform her past “light work” as a dental hygienist. In Carter, we held that\\nthe claimant’s inability to walk or stand off and on for six hours in an eight-hour\\nworkday precluded a finding that the claimant could perform his past “light” job as\\ngenerally performed in the national economy. See id. at 1202. The standing\\nrestriction was dispositive because the job at issue required “a good deal of walking\\nor standing.” See id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)).\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f Here, a vocational expert testified that the work of a dental hygienist is “light”\\nbecause it requires constant use of hands and arms. This testimony was consistent\\nwith Schwandt’s own report that her job mainly involved handling small objects and\\nrequired walking for no more than two hours in an eight-hour workday. A two-hour\\nstanding restriction is not an absolute bar to performing “light work.” See Fenton v.\\nApfel, 149 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1998). The vocational expert answered\\naffirmatively when the ALJ asked him whether someone with Schwandt’s\\nlimitations—including the two-hour standing restriction—could perform Schwandt’s\\npast work as she actually performed it and as generally performed. The expert’s\\nanswer supplied substantial evidence to support a determination that Schwandt could\\nperform her past relevant work. See Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 568 (8th Cir.\\n2003).\\n\\n Schwandt urges that the ALJ’s statement of her residual functional capacity to\\nthe vocational expert was incomplete. She suggests that the ALJ should have\\nincorporated her claimed need for a recovery day after each work shift and the special\\nwork accommodations that she received starting in 2012. Schwandt’s work\\naccommodations included help from other employees in preparing her room and\\nreviewing charts, assignments to “regular” patients, and reduced hours. The alleged\\nneed for a recovery day after each shift was based on Schwandt’s testimony and a\\nwritten statement from her husband. But Schwandt’s medical records, her reported\\ndaily activities, her overall employment history, and the apparent effectiveness of her\\nmedications undermine the need for such accommodations. Substantial evidence\\nsupports the omission of these limitations from Schwandt’s residual functional\\ncapacity.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -12-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2676,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4629744,"string":"4,629,744"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Ahmed SOUEIDAN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY, Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ahmed Soueidan v. St. Louis University"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-14"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2124"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Colloton, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2124\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Ahmed Soueidan\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n St. Louis University\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: June 14, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n Ahmed Soueidan appeals from the district court’s1 order dismissing his\\nMissouri state-law claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of\\ngood faith and fair dealing, and fraudulent misrepresentation against St. Louis\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Ronnie L. White, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\fUniversity (SLU). Soueidan argues that the district court erroneously dismissed the\\nclaims under the educational malpractice doctrine and for failure to prove the required\\nelements. He further asserts that the district court erred in denying his request for\\nleave to amend his complaint. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background2\\n Soueidan enrolled as a doctoral student at SLU in the Parks College of\\nEngineering, Aviation and Technology in 2012. SLU represented to Soueidan that he\\nwould obtain his Ph.D. in mechanical and aerospace engineering in four years. In\\nAugust 2012, Soueidan met with the department chair to discuss a plan of study. The\\ndepartment chair drafted a plan for Soueidan to graduate with his doctoral degree in\\nfour years. Soueidan began following the plan and enrolled in coursework.\\n\\n Soueidan attempted to find a Ph.D. advisor to supervise his graduate studies,\\nbut he was unable to find anyone willing and able to accept new graduate students.\\nOne professor even told Soueidan that he “should not be in this program.” Compl. at\\n2, ¶ 10, Soueidan v. St. Louis Univ., No. 4:17-cv-02777 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 27, 2017),\\nECF No. 1. As a result, Soueidan completed his first three semesters without an\\nadvisor.\\n\\n In December 2013, Professor Raymond Lebeau agreed to serve as Soueidan’s\\nadvisor. Lebeau indicated that he could get Soueidan through the program in two\\nmore years, even though Lebeau had no research or funding for Soueidan. Lebeau\\nwas uncertain about the requisite qualifying examination for Soueidan. As a result,\\nSoueidan referred to the SLU Graduate Student Handbook (“Handbook”) for\\n\\n 2\\n In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we recite the facts as alleged in\\nSoueidan’s complaint and assume them to be true. See Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d\\n1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (“We assume all facts in the\\ncomplaint to be true, and [we] draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-\\nmoving party.”).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fguidance. But Lebeau advised Soueidan to disregard the Handbook’s guidelines.\\nLebeau told Soueidan that they would “do it our way” and that Soueidan was “a\\nguinea pig for this program.” Compl. at 3, ¶ 13.\\n\\n In August 2014, the graduate coordinator, graduate programs assistant,\\ndepartment chair, and several professors in the department simultaneously left SLU.\\nBy August 2015, the graduate programs assistant3 and the Dean of the College of\\nEngineering left their positions. By that time, Soueidan had completed ten graduate-\\nlevel courses toward satisfying the course credits requirement for his Ph.D. in\\naccordance with the Handbook.\\n\\n In June 2015, Lebeau advised Soueidan that he needed to attend a conference\\nto prepare for the qualifying examination. In January 2016, they attended the AIAA\\nSciTech 2016 conference in San Diego, California. At that conference, Soueidan\\npresented his thesis work. Soueidan paid for all of his conference expenses.\\n\\n In May 2016, Soueidan met with Lebeau and the graduate coordinator to\\ndiscuss the timing of Soueidan’s qualifying examination. Thereafter, Lebeau\\nrecommended that Soueidan do a practice exam in preparation for the actual exam.\\nFollowing Soueidan’s practice examination, Lebeau told Soueidan that two of the\\ncommittee members said Soueidan would not pass his examination. But, Lebeau\\nnoted, a third committee member said he would have passed Soueidan. Lebeau\\nrelayed this information to Soueidan before the actual exam so “bullets wouldn’t go\\nflying.” Id. at 4, ¶ 16.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Soueidan averred that the “graduate programs assistant” left SLU “[i]n August\\n2014,” but he also averred that the “graduate programs assistant” left “[o]ne year\\nlater, in 2015.” Id. at 3, ¶ 14. The complaint does not explain if a new graduate\\nassistant was hired after August 2014 and departed by August 2015.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f In August 2016, at the start of his fifth year at SLU, Soueidan took the\\nqualifying examination. One committee member informed Soueidan prior to the\\nexamination that Soueidan did not follow the guidelines for writing his paper and\\nquestioned his preparedness for the examination. After the examination, Lebeau told\\nSoueidan that he “should not have been let in here” because Lebeau was “not\\ninterested in new ideas” and was “afraid of putting Mr. Soueidan out there because\\nMr. Leabeau didn’t know what Mr. Lebeau was doing and didn’t want to bear that\\nresponsibility.” Id. at 4, ¶ 17 (brackets omitted).\\n\\n After not passing the qualifying examination, Soueidan was instructed to take\\nanother written examination and perform additional course work. Notably, Soueidan\\nhad suggested to Lebeau years prior that he take this same written exam. The exam\\nis normally taken within the first year of Ph.D. studies. Soueidan did enroll in the\\nrecommended additional course. He also met an additional time with the graduate\\ncoordinator and Lebeau to discuss his progress.\\n\\n In the fall of 2016, after over four years, Soueidan left the Ph.D. program and\\ndowngraded to a Master’s degree. But, in a final attempt to obtain his Ph.D., Soueidan\\nspoke with the SLU Provost of Academic Affairs about his situation. The Provost\\ninitially advised Soueidan to leave SLU to join a new program and that the Provost\\nwould help him get his dissertation credits refunded. Later, after speaking with the\\nDean of the College of Engineering, the Provost advised Soueidan to find an\\nestablished research project. Soueidan was unable to find one.\\n\\n In February 2017, at the Provost’s behest, Soueidan renewed his relationship\\nwith Lebeau. Lebeau, however, still showed uncertainty advising Soueidan going\\nforward. Lebeau directed Soueidan to the Handbook’s guidelines. Lebeau told\\nSoueidan, “We do it the way SLU does it.” Id. at 5, ¶ 25. Nevertheless, Lebeau\\nremained unfamiliar with the exam format and procedures. At this point, Soueidan\\ndecided to earn his Ph.D. by beginning anew at a different university.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Soueidan filed suit against SLU, alleging Missouri state-law claims for breach\\nof contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and\\nfraudulent misrepresentation. In support of his claims, Soueidan referred to several\\nsections of the Handbook that he claimed SLU failed to follow during his time in the\\nPh.D. program. According to Soueidan, SLU’s failure to “meet their obligation[s]”\\nset forth in the Handbook “made it very unlikely from the beginning that [he] would\\nbe able to achieve his Ph.D. degree at SLU.” Id. at 6, ¶ 30. First, the Handbook\\nprovided that “[y]ou should have an advisor assigned within the first few weeks of\\nclasses starting.” Id. at 6, ¶ 27 (quoting Handbook at 9). Soueidan alleged that “SLU\\ndid not assign an advisor to [him]” within the first few weeks of the program. Id.\\nInstead, Soueidan was without an advisor until December 2013, “a year and a half\\nafter [he] began the Ph.D. program.” Id. at 6, ¶ 28.\\n\\n Second, the Handbook “indicate[d] that students are to meet with their advisor\\nin January to complete their Annual Student Review.” Id. at 6, ¶ 29 (citing Handbook\\nat 9). Soueidan alleged that he was deprived of this review, which “would have been\\nan opportunity for Mr. Soueidan to ‘have a review of [his] work completed, create\\ngoals for the next year of studies and research, and ensure [he was] staying on track\\nfor graduation.’” Id. (bold omitted) (first alteration in original).\\n\\n Third, the Handbook stated that “‘[f]or Engineering students, the Qualifying\\nExam is scheduled after 2 semesters,’ and that ‘[t]he Qualifying Exam is designed to\\ndetermine if the student is prepared to continue Ph.D. studies and carry on with\\nresearch.’” Id. at 6, ¶ 31 (second alteration in original) (quoting Handbook at 12).\\nSoueidan alleged that because he was without an advisor after two semesters, the\\nQualifying Exam was not scheduled and he “missed out on another opportunity to\\nensure he was on track to obtain a Ph.D.” Id. at 7, ¶ 31. He noted that he did not take\\nthe Qualifying Exam “until August 2016, at the start of his fifth year at SLU.” Id. at\\n7, ¶ 32 (bold omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f In support of his claims, Soueidan additionally cited the 2015–2016 SLU\\nGraduate Education Catalog (“Catalog”). The Catalog “indicate[d] that the Parks\\nCollege of Engineering does in fact have a Ph.D. program.” Id. at 7, ¶ 33 (citing\\nCatalog at 111). Soueidan alleged that “in practice, students who register for the SLU\\nCollege of Engineering Ph.D. program are faced with” an insufficient number of\\n“professors with funding or research to serve as advisors to these Ph.D. Students.” Id.\\nat 7, ¶ 34. Soueidan alleged that “[a]s a prospective student, [he] had a right to rely\\nupon the Catalog and that is what he did when enrolling in the Ph.D. program at\\nSLU.” Id. at 7, ¶ 35.\\n\\n Soueidan alleged that SLU’s fraudulent conduct “cost [him] nearly\\n$200,000.00 in tuition payments.” Id. at 7, ¶ 36.\\n\\n SLU moved to dismiss Soueidan’s complaint, and the district court granted the\\nmotion. First, the court determined that Missouri’s educational malpractice doctrine\\napplied to all of Soueidan’s claims and required dismissal. According to the court,\\nSoueidan’s claims would impermissibly require it “to determine whether SLU timely\\nassigned a Ph.D. advisor, conducted a student review, and scheduled the qualifying\\nexamination and how those decisions affected Soueidan’s matriculation.” Soueidan\\nv. Saint Louis Univ., No. 4:17-cv-02777, 2018 WL 1997287, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 27,\\n2018). His claims would also require the court “to analyze whether SLU breached its\\ncontract by ‘failing to award . . . Soueidan the Ph.D. degree he was promised after\\ncompleting all directives and 5 years of requisite coursework’” and “to address not\\nonly the quality of the Ph.D. program but also whether Soueidan comprehensively\\nand adequately completed all of his coursework.” Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting\\nCompl. at 8, ¶ 39). The court held that making such determinations would require the\\ncourt to examine SLU’s educational process. Thus, the educational malpractice\\ndoctrine barred Soueidan’s claims.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f Second, the district court alternatively held that Soueidan’s claims of breach\\nof contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing required\\ndismissal “based upon the timing of this action and of the alleged discrete, contractual\\npromises relied upon by Soueidan.” Id. at *4. According to the court, “Soueidan was\\nadmitted and accepted into the Ph.D. program in 2012, which is when the alleged\\ncontract would have been formed.” Id. But Soueidan did not receive the alleged\\npromises until “after his 2012 contract with SLU was formed.” Id. The court noted\\nthat Soueidan “first reviewed the Handbook in December 2013.” Id. Furthermore,\\nSoueidan’s claims were also premised on “promises contained in the 2015–2016\\nCatalog[ ].” Id. “Thus,” the court concluded, “Soueidan could not have relied upon\\nthese promises in the Handbook and Catalog when he e[nr]olled in the Ph.D. program\\nin 2012.” Id. The court held that Soueidan’s breach claims failed because Soueidan\\nfailed “to identify any promises that he relied upon when he e[nr]olled in 2012.” Id.\\n\\n Third, the court held that Soueidan’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim\\nrequired dismissal because “Soueidan . . . failed to allege a fraud that is independent\\nof his contract action. Rather, his fraud claim is based upon the same promises and\\nactions that he alleged to support his breach of contract claim.” Id.\\n\\n Finally, the district court “denie[d] Soueidan’s request to file an amended\\ncomplaint because he . . . failed to provide a proposed amendment along with his\\nrequest.” Id. at *5.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n On appeal, Soueidan argues that the district court erroneously dismissed his\\nMissouri state-law claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith\\nand fair dealing, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Specifically, Soueidan contends\\nhe provided sufficient evidence of all the required elements in each cause of action\\nand that the court should not have applied Missouri’s educational malpractice\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fdoctrine. He further asserts that the district court erred in denying his request for\\nleave to amend his complaint.\\n\\n A. Educational Malpractice Doctrine\\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. BNSF Ry.\\nCo. v. Seats, Inc., 900 F.3d 545, 546 (8th Cir. 2018). To survive a motion to dismiss,\\nthe plaintiff must show that he “is entitled to relief, by alleging sufficient factual\\nmatter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.\\n(quoting In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th\\nCir. 2017) (en banc)).\\n\\n The district court determined that the educational malpractice doctrine bars all\\nof Soueidan’s claims. We agree.\\n\\n In educational malpractice cases, a plaintiff sues his or her academic\\n institution for tortiously failing to provide adequate educational\\n services. If a negligence claim raises questions concerning the\\n reasonableness of the educator’s conduct in providing educational\\n services, then the claim is one of educational malpractice. Similarly, if\\n the claim requires an analysis of the quality of education received and\\n in making that analysis the fact-finder must consider principles of duty,\\n standards of care, and the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct,\\n then the claim is one of educational malpractice. If the duty alleged to\\n have been breached is the duty to educate effectively, the claim is one\\n of educational malpractice. A claim that educational services provided\\n were inadequate, substandard, or ineffective constitutes a claim of\\n educational malpractice. Where the court is asked to evaluate the course\\n of instruction or the soundness of the method of teaching that has been\\n adopted by an educational institution, the claim is one of educational\\n malpractice.\\n\\nDallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Mo. Ct. App.\\n2008) (cleaned up).\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f “Generally, courts have refrained from recognizing educational malpractice\\nclaims, either in tort or contract, on the premise that ‘[u]niversities must be allowed\\nthe flexibility to manage themselves and correct their own mistakes.’” Lucero v.\\nCurators of Univ. of Mo., 400 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (alteration in original)\\n(quoting Miller v. Loyola Univ. of New Orleans, 829 So.2d 1057, 1061 (La. Ct. App.\\n2002)). Missouri courts have “refuse[d] to recognize a claim for educational\\nmalpractice” because it is not the role of courts “to micromanage a university’s daily\\noperations.” Id. (citing Dallas Airmotive, Inc., 277 S.W.3d at 700 (“[C]ourts have\\nrefused to become the overseers of both the day-to-day operation of [the] educational\\nprocess as well as the formulation of its governing policies” (second alteration in\\noriginal) (internal quotations omitted))).\\n\\n In the present case, Soueidan relies on the Catalog and Handbook in support\\nof his contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. But all of the statements\\nprovided in these sources are “aspirational in nature.” Id. at 6. First, the Handbook’s\\nstatement that “[y]ou should have an advisor assigned within the first few weeks of\\nclasses starting,” Compl. at 6, ¶ 27 (quoting Handbook at 9) (emphasis added), does\\nnot create an obligation on the part of SLU to assign Soueidan an advisor. Not only\\ndoes the Handbook fail to specify who assigns the advisor, but it also uses the term\\n“should,” not “must” or “shall.” Cf. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,\\n599 (1999) (“The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, a\\n1975 measure, stated in aspirational terms that ‘[t]he treatment, services, and\\nhabilitation for a person with developmental disabilities . . . should be provided in the\\nsetting that is least restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.’” (first emphasis\\nadded) (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,\\n515 U.S. 417, 432 n.9 (1995) (“Though ‘shall’ generally means ‘must,’ legal writers\\nsometimes use, or misuse, ‘shall’ to mean ‘should,’ ‘will,’ or even ‘may.’”); Union\\nElec. Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 188 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The parties\\ncould easily have made the GIC obligatory by using mandatory language, such as\\n‘must and shall’ rather than ‘may and should.’”).\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Second, Soueidan’s allegation that the Handbook provided that “students are\\nto meet with their advisor in January to complete their Annual Student Review,”\\nCompl. at 6, ¶ 29 (citing Handbook at 9), creates no obligation on SLU’s behalf. This\\nalleged promise is dependent on the Handbook’s prior statement that the student\\n“should have an advisor assigned.” Id. at 6, ¶ 27 (quoting Handbook at 9).\\nFurthermore, Soueidan has not alleged that the Handbook says that the advisors\\n“must” or “shall” meet with the students; instead, he alleges that the Handbook places\\nthe onus on the students to meet with their advisor.4 Therefore, the Handbook\\nlanguage, as Soueidan alleges that it reads, indicates more of a recommendation or\\ngoal and is “aspirational in nature.” See Lucero, 400 S.W.3d at 6.\\n\\n Third, the Handbook’s statement that “‘[f]or Engineering students, the\\nQualifying Exam is scheduled after 2 semesters,’” Compl. at 6, ¶ 31 (quoting\\nHandbook at 12), does not constitute an obligation that SLU owed to Soueidan. As\\nwith the two prior provisions, the cited language contains no mandatory language that\\nthe Qualifying Exam “must” or “shall” be scheduled within two semesters. And, the\\nprovision does not say who schedules the Qualifying Exam.\\n\\n In addition to the Handbook, Soueidan’s complaint alleges that the Catalog\\n“indicates that the Parks College of Engineering does in fact have a Ph.D. program.”\\nId. at 7, ¶ 33 (citing Catalog at 111). Like the Handbook, the Catalog does not\\naffirmatively set forth any obligation on behalf of SLU. Soueidan has cited no\\nmandatory language from the Catalog guaranteeing that Soueidan will earn his Ph.D.\\ndegree in a certain number of years or earn the degree at all.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Soueidan’s complaint did not directly quote the actual language from the\\nHandbook; however, nowhere does he indicate that the Handbook uses mandatory\\nlanguage.\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f If we “wade[d] into the issue of how closely [SLU] operated within the\\nconstructs of the . . . aspirational [Handbook and Catalog] provisions cited by\\n[Soueidan], [we] would be forced to engage—with complete disregard for Missouri\\nlaw—in an educational malpractice analysis rife with . . . practical and policy\\nconcerns.” Gillis v. Principia Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 978, 985 (E.D. Mo. 2015), aff’d,\\n832 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2016). As the district court aptly explained, Soueidan’s claims\\nwould impermissibly require it “to determine whether SLU timely assigned a Ph.D.\\nadvisor, conducted a student review, and scheduled the qualifying examination and\\nhow those decisions affected Soueidan’s matriculation”; “to analyze whether SLU\\nbreached its contract by ‘failing to award . . . Soueidan the Ph.D. degree he was\\npromised after completing all directives and 5 years of requisite coursework’”; and\\n“to address not only the quality of the Ph.D. program but also whether Soueidan\\ncomprehensively and adequately completed all of his coursework.” Soueidan, 2018\\nWL 1997287, at *3 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Compl. at 8, ¶ 39). Such\\n“intervention by the court would amount to judicial supervision of [SLU’s] internal\\nprocedures for monitoring” the progress of its doctoral students.” Lucero, 400 S.W.3d\\nat 8 (“With this purpose in mind, any intervention by the court would amount to\\njudicial supervision of a university’s internal procedures for monitoring its faculty.”).\\n\\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Soueidan’s claims\\nbased on the educational malpractice doctrine.\\n\\n B. Request for Leave to Amend Complaint\\n Soueidan also challenges the district court’s denial of his request for leave to\\namend his complaint. Soueidan conditionally requested leave to amend his complaint\\nin his response to SLU’s motion to dismiss. Soueidan did not disclose what he would\\nchange in the complaint, nor did he attach a proposed amended pleading or file a\\nseparate motion for leave to amend. The district court denied Soueidan’s request to\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\ffile an amended complaint “because he . . . failed to provide a proposed amendment\\nalong with his request.” Soueidan, 2018 WL 1997287, at *5.\\n\\n Soueidan argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his\\nrequest for leave to amend his complaint. See Wolgin v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389, 394\\n(8th Cir. 1983) (standard of review). We addressed a substantially similar situation\\nin Wolgin. In that case, the appellant, “[i]n his brief in opposition to the appellees’\\nmotion to dismiss, . . . concluded his argument by requesting leave to amend the\\ncomplaint if the court granted the appellees’ motion.” Id. (emphases added). The\\nappellant contended that the district court construe the request “as a motion for leave\\nto amend.” Id. We rejected the appellant’s argument based on his failure to preserve\\nthe right to amend by submitting a proposed amendment with a motion. Id. at 394–95.\\n\\n Soueidan attempts to distinguish Wolgin by arguing that the appellant in that\\ncase filed a motion for leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\\n15(a), while Soueidan did not file a Rule 15(a) motion but rather only sought\\npermission to file a Rule 15 motion. Contrary to Soueidan’s argument, the appellant\\nin Wolgin did precisely what Soueidan did here—“concluded his argument [in his\\nbrief in opposition] by requesting leave to amend the complaint if the court granted\\nthe appellees’ motion.” Id. at 394. As a result, Wolgin is controlling. We, therefore,\\nhold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Soueidan leave to\\namend when Soueidan “did not submit a proposed amendment to the trial court, nor\\n[include] anything in [his] brief to indicate what an amended complaint would have\\ncontained.” Id.5\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Even if Soueidan were allowed to amend his complaint, such amendment\\nwould be futile. Plymouth Cty., Iowa v. Merscorp, Inc., 774 F.3d 1155, 1160 (8th Cir.\\n2014) (“[A] party is not entitled to amend a complaint without making a showing that\\nsuch an amendment would be able to save an otherwise meritless claim.”). Soueidan\\nargues his amended complaint would “add an allegation that he looked at the\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f III. Conclusion\\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nHandbook at the time he enrolled or that the Handbook terms were in existence at that\\ntime” to remedy the district court’s conclusion that Soueidan’s contract claims failed\\nbecause Soueidan could not have relied upon alleged promises set forth in the\\nHandbook and Catalog that he received after he formed his alleged 2012 contract\\nwith SLU. Appellant’s Br. at 31. Additionally, he asserts he would “clarify that the\\nrepresentation that there is a Ph.D. program at all, through which any student can\\nobtain a Ph.D., is distinct from a promise to provide a Ph.D. within a certain\\ntimeframe so long as he followed certain steps, and was a representation made at the\\ntime he applied for the program.” Id. But these amendments would not remedy the\\nfact that the educational malpractice doctrine bars Soueidan’s claims.\\n\\n\\n -13-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4406997/\", \"author_raw\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629744/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ahmed SOUEIDAN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY, Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-14\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2124\n ___________________________\n\n Ahmed Soueidan\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n St. Louis University\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\n Filed: June 14, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\n\n Ahmed Soueidan appeals from the district court’s1 order dismissing his\nMissouri state-law claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of\ngood faith and fair dealing, and fraudulent misrepresentation against St. Louis\n\n 1\n The Honorable Ronnie L. White, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Missouri.\n\fUniversity (SLU). Soueidan argues that the district court erroneously dismissed the\nclaims under the educational malpractice doctrine and for failure to prove the required\nelements. He further asserts that the district court erred in denying his request for\nleave to amend his complaint. We affirm.\n\n I. Background2\n Soueidan enrolled as a doctoral student at SLU in the Parks College of\nEngineering, Aviation and Technology in 2012. SLU represented to Soueidan that he\nwould obtain his Ph.D. in mechanical and aerospace engineering in four years. In\nAugust 2012, Soueidan met with the department chair to discuss a plan of study. The\ndepartment chair drafted a plan for Soueidan to graduate with his doctoral degree in\nfour years. Soueidan began following the plan and enrolled in coursework.\n\n Soueidan attempted to find a Ph.D. advisor to supervise his graduate studies,\nbut he was unable to find anyone willing and able to accept new graduate students.\nOne professor even told Soueidan that he “should not be in this program.” Compl. at\n2, ¶ 10, Soueidan v. St. Louis Univ., No. 4:17-cv-02777 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 27, 2017),\nECF No. 1. As a result, Soueidan completed his first three semesters without an\nadvisor.\n\n In December 2013, Professor Raymond Lebeau agreed to serve as Soueidan’s\nadvisor. Lebeau indicated that he could get Soueidan through the program in two\nmore years, even though Lebeau had no research or funding for Soueidan. Lebeau\nwas uncertain about the requisite qualifying examination for Soueidan. As a result,\nSoueidan referred to the SLU Graduate Student Handbook (“Handbook”) for\n\n 2\n In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we recite the facts as alleged in\nSoueidan’s complaint and assume them to be true. See Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d\n1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (“We assume all facts in the\ncomplaint to be true, and [we] draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-\nmoving party.”).\n\n -2-\n\fguidance. But Lebeau advised Soueidan to disregard the Handbook’s guidelines.\nLebeau told Soueidan that they would “do it our way” and that Soueidan was “a\nguinea pig for this program.” Compl. at 3, ¶ 13.\n\n In August 2014, the graduate coordinator, graduate programs assistant,\ndepartment chair, and several professors in the department simultaneously left SLU.\nBy August 2015, the graduate programs assistant3 and the Dean of the College of\nEngineering left their positions. By that time, Soueidan had completed ten graduate-\nlevel courses toward satisfying the course credits requirement for his Ph.D. in\naccordance with the Handbook.\n\n In June 2015, Lebeau advised Soueidan that he needed to attend a conference\nto prepare for the qualifying examination. In January 2016, they attended the AIAA\nSciTech 2016 conference in San Diego, California. At that conference, Soueidan\npresented his thesis work. Soueidan paid for all of his conference expenses.\n\n In May 2016, Soueidan met with Lebeau and the graduate coordinator to\ndiscuss the timing of Soueidan’s qualifying examination. Thereafter, Lebeau\nrecommended that Soueidan do a practice exam in preparation for the actual exam.\nFollowing Soueidan’s practice examination, Lebeau told Soueidan that two of the\ncommittee members said Soueidan would not pass his examination. But, Lebeau\nnoted, a third committee member said he would have passed Soueidan. Lebeau\nrelayed this information to Soueidan before the actual exam so “bullets wouldn’t go\nflying.” Id. at 4, ¶ 16.\n\n\n\n\n 3\n Soueidan averred that the “graduate programs assistant” left SLU “[i]n August\n2014,” but he also averred that the “graduate programs assistant” left “[o]ne year\nlater, in 2015.” Id. at 3, ¶ 14. The complaint does not explain if a new graduate\nassistant was hired after August 2014 and departed by August 2015.\n\n -3-\n\f In August 2016, at the start of his fifth year at SLU, Soueidan took the\nqualifying examination. One committee member informed Soueidan prior to the\nexamination that Soueidan did not follow the guidelines for writing his paper and\nquestioned his preparedness for the examination. After the examination, Lebeau told\nSoueidan that he “should not have been let in here” because Lebeau was “not\ninterested in new ideas” and was “afraid of putting Mr. Soueidan out there because\nMr. Leabeau didn’t know what Mr. Lebeau was doing and didn’t want to bear that\nresponsibility.” Id. at 4, ¶ 17 (brackets omitted).\n\n After not passing the qualifying examination, Soueidan was instructed to take\nanother written examination and perform additional course work. Notably, Soueidan\nhad suggested to Lebeau years prior that he take this same written exam. The exam\nis normally taken within the first year of Ph.D. studies. Soueidan did enroll in the\nrecommended additional course. He also met an additional time with the graduate\ncoordinator and Lebeau to discuss his progress.\n\n In the fall of 2016, after over four years, Soueidan left the Ph.D. program and\ndowngraded to a Master’s degree. But, in a final attempt to obtain his Ph.D., Soueidan\nspoke with the SLU Provost of Academic Affairs about his situation. The Provost\ninitially advised Soueidan to leave SLU to join a new program and that the Provost\nwould help him get his dissertation credits refunded. Later, after speaking with the\nDean of the College of Engineering, the Provost advised Soueidan to find an\nestablished research project. Soueidan was unable to find one.\n\n In February 2017, at the Provost’s behest, Soueidan renewed his relationship\nwith Lebeau. Lebeau, however, still showed uncertainty advising Soueidan going\nforward. Lebeau directed Soueidan to the Handbook’s guidelines. Lebeau told\nSoueidan, “We do it the way SLU does it.” Id. at 5, ¶ 25. Nevertheless, Lebeau\nremained unfamiliar with the exam format and procedures. At this point, Soueidan\ndecided to earn his Ph.D. by beginning anew at a different university.\n\n -4-\n\f Soueidan filed suit against SLU, alleging Missouri state-law claims for breach\nof contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and\nfraudulent misrepresentation. In support of his claims, Soueidan referred to several\nsections of the Handbook that he claimed SLU failed to follow during his time in the\nPh.D. program. According to Soueidan, SLU’s failure to “meet their obligation[s]”\nset forth in the Handbook “made it very unlikely from the beginning that [he] would\nbe able to achieve his Ph.D. degree at SLU.” Id. at 6, ¶ 30. First, the Handbook\nprovided that “[y]ou should have an advisor assigned within the first few weeks of\nclasses starting.” Id. at 6, ¶ 27 (quoting Handbook at 9). Soueidan alleged that “SLU\ndid not assign an advisor to [him]” within the first few weeks of the program. Id.\nInstead, Soueidan was without an advisor until December 2013, “a year and a half\nafter [he] began the Ph.D. program.” Id. at 6, ¶ 28.\n\n Second, the Handbook “indicate[d] that students are to meet with their advisor\nin January to complete their Annual Student Review.” Id. at 6, ¶ 29 (citing Handbook\nat 9). Soueidan alleged that he was deprived of this review, which “would have been\nan opportunity for Mr. Soueidan to ‘have a review of [his] work completed, create\ngoals for the next year of studies and research, and ensure [he was] staying on track\nfor graduation.’” Id. (bold omitted) (first alteration in original).\n\n Third, the Handbook stated that “‘[f]or Engineering students, the Qualifying\nExam is scheduled after 2 semesters,’ and that ‘[t]he Qualifying Exam is designed to\ndetermine if the student is prepared to continue Ph.D. studies and carry on with\nresearch.’” Id. at 6, ¶ 31 (second alteration in original) (quoting Handbook at 12).\nSoueidan alleged that because he was without an advisor after two semesters, the\nQualifying Exam was not scheduled and he “missed out on another opportunity to\nensure he was on track to obtain a Ph.D.” Id. at 7, ¶ 31. He noted that he did not take\nthe Qualifying Exam “until August 2016, at the start of his fifth year at SLU.” Id. at\n7, ¶ 32 (bold omitted).\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f In support of his claims, Soueidan additionally cited the 2015–2016 SLU\nGraduate Education Catalog (“Catalog”). The Catalog “indicate[d] that the Parks\nCollege of Engineering does in fact have a Ph.D. program.” Id. at 7, ¶ 33 (citing\nCatalog at 111). Soueidan alleged that “in practice, students who register for the SLU\nCollege of Engineering Ph.D. program are faced with” an insufficient number of\n“professors with funding or research to serve as advisors to these Ph.D. Students.” Id.\nat 7, ¶ 34. Soueidan alleged that “[a]s a prospective student, [he] had a right to rely\nupon the Catalog and that is what he did when enrolling in the Ph.D. program at\nSLU.” Id. at 7, ¶ 35.\n\n Soueidan alleged that SLU’s fraudulent conduct “cost [him] nearly\n$200,000.00 in tuition payments.” Id. at 7, ¶ 36.\n\n SLU moved to dismiss Soueidan’s complaint, and the district court granted the\nmotion. First, the court determined that Missouri’s educational malpractice doctrine\napplied to all of Soueidan’s claims and required dismissal. According to the court,\nSoueidan’s claims would impermissibly require it “to determine whether SLU timely\nassigned a Ph.D. advisor, conducted a student review, and scheduled the qualifying\nexamination and how those decisions affected Soueidan’s matriculation.” Soueidan\nv. Saint Louis Univ., No. 4:17-cv-02777, 2018 WL 1997287, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 27,\n2018). His claims would also require the court “to analyze whether SLU breached its\ncontract by ‘failing to award . . . Soueidan the Ph.D. degree he was promised after\ncompleting all directives and 5 years of requisite coursework’” and “to address not\nonly the quality of the Ph.D. program but also whether Soueidan comprehensively\nand adequately completed all of his coursework.” Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting\nCompl. at 8, ¶ 39). The court held that making such determinations would require the\ncourt to examine SLU’s educational process. Thus, the educational malpractice\ndoctrine barred Soueidan’s claims.\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f Second, the district court alternatively held that Soueidan’s claims of breach\nof contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing required\ndismissal “based upon the timing of this action and of the alleged discrete, contractual\npromises relied upon by Soueidan.” Id. at *4. According to the court, “Soueidan was\nadmitted and accepted into the Ph.D. program in 2012, which is when the alleged\ncontract would have been formed.” Id. But Soueidan did not receive the alleged\npromises until “after his 2012 contract with SLU was formed.” Id. The court noted\nthat Soueidan “first reviewed the Handbook in December 2013.” Id. Furthermore,\nSoueidan’s claims were also premised on “promises contained in the 2015–2016\nCatalog[ ].” Id. “Thus,” the court concluded, “Soueidan could not have relied upon\nthese promises in the Handbook and Catalog when he e[nr]olled in the Ph.D. program\nin 2012.” Id. The court held that Soueidan’s breach claims failed because Soueidan\nfailed “to identify any promises that he relied upon when he e[nr]olled in 2012.” Id.\n\n Third, the court held that Soueidan’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim\nrequired dismissal because “Soueidan . . . failed to allege a fraud that is independent\nof his contract action. Rather, his fraud claim is based upon the same promises and\nactions that he alleged to support his breach of contract claim.” Id.\n\n Finally, the district court “denie[d] Soueidan’s request to file an amended\ncomplaint because he . . . failed to provide a proposed amendment along with his\nrequest.” Id. at *5.\n\n II. Discussion\n On appeal, Soueidan argues that the district court erroneously dismissed his\nMissouri state-law claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith\nand fair dealing, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Specifically, Soueidan contends\nhe provided sufficient evidence of all the required elements in each cause of action\nand that the court should not have applied Missouri’s educational malpractice\n\n\n\n -7-\n\fdoctrine. He further asserts that the district court erred in denying his request for\nleave to amend his complaint.\n\n A. Educational Malpractice Doctrine\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. BNSF Ry.\nCo. v. Seats, Inc., 900 F.3d 545, 546 (8th Cir. 2018). To survive a motion to dismiss,\nthe plaintiff must show that he “is entitled to relief, by alleging sufficient factual\nmatter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.\n(quoting In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th\nCir. 2017) (en banc)).\n\n The district court determined that the educational malpractice doctrine bars all\nof Soueidan’s claims. We agree.\n\n In educational malpractice cases, a plaintiff sues his or her academic\n institution for tortiously failing to provide adequate educational\n services. If a negligence claim raises questions concerning the\n reasonableness of the educator’s conduct in providing educational\n services, then the claim is one of educational malpractice. Similarly, if\n the claim requires an analysis of the quality of education received and\n in making that analysis the fact-finder must consider principles of duty,\n standards of care, and the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct,\n then the claim is one of educational malpractice. If the duty alleged to\n have been breached is the duty to educate effectively, the claim is one\n of educational malpractice. A claim that educational services provided\n were inadequate, substandard, or ineffective constitutes a claim of\n educational malpractice. Where the court is asked to evaluate the course\n of instruction or the soundness of the method of teaching that has been\n adopted by an educational institution, the claim is one of educational\n malpractice.\n\nDallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Mo. Ct. App.\n2008) (cleaned up).\n\n -8-\n\f “Generally, courts have refrained from recognizing educational malpractice\nclaims, either in tort or contract, on the premise that ‘[u]niversities must be allowed\nthe flexibility to manage themselves and correct their own mistakes.’” Lucero v.\nCurators of Univ. of Mo., 400 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (alteration in original)\n(quoting Miller v. Loyola Univ. of New Orleans, 829 So.2d 1057, 1061 (La. Ct. App.\n2002)). Missouri courts have “refuse[d] to recognize a claim for educational\nmalpractice” because it is not the role of courts “to micromanage a university’s daily\noperations.” Id. (citing Dallas Airmotive, Inc., 277 S.W.3d at 700 (“[C]ourts have\nrefused to become the overseers of both the day-to-day operation of [the] educational\nprocess as well as the formulation of its governing policies” (second alteration in\noriginal) (internal quotations omitted))).\n\n In the present case, Soueidan relies on the Catalog and Handbook in support\nof his contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. But all of the statements\nprovided in these sources are “aspirational in nature.” Id. at 6. First, the Handbook’s\nstatement that “[y]ou should have an advisor assigned within the first few weeks of\nclasses starting,” Compl. at 6, ¶ 27 (quoting Handbook at 9) (emphasis added), does\nnot create an obligation on the part of SLU to assign Soueidan an advisor. Not only\ndoes the Handbook fail to specify who assigns the advisor, but it also uses the term\n“should,” not “must” or “shall.” Cf. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,\n599 (1999) (“The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, a\n1975 measure, stated in aspirational terms that ‘[t]he treatment, services, and\nhabilitation for a person with developmental disabilities . . . should be provided in the\nsetting that is least restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.’” (first emphasis\nadded) (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,\n515 U.S. 417, 432 n.9 (1995) (“Though ‘shall’ generally means ‘must,’ legal writers\nsometimes use, or misuse, ‘shall’ to mean ‘should,’ ‘will,’ or even ‘may.’”); Union\nElec. Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 188 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The parties\ncould easily have made the GIC obligatory by using mandatory language, such as\n‘must and shall’ rather than ‘may and should.’”).\n\n -9-\n\f Second, Soueidan’s allegation that the Handbook provided that “students are\nto meet with their advisor in January to complete their Annual Student Review,”\nCompl. at 6, ¶ 29 (citing Handbook at 9), creates no obligation on SLU’s behalf. This\nalleged promise is dependent on the Handbook’s prior statement that the student\n“should have an advisor assigned.” Id. at 6, ¶ 27 (quoting Handbook at 9).\nFurthermore, Soueidan has not alleged that the Handbook says that the advisors\n“must” or “shall” meet with the students; instead, he alleges that the Handbook places\nthe onus on the students to meet with their advisor.4 Therefore, the Handbook\nlanguage, as Soueidan alleges that it reads, indicates more of a recommendation or\ngoal and is “aspirational in nature.” See Lucero, 400 S.W.3d at 6.\n\n Third, the Handbook’s statement that “‘[f]or Engineering students, the\nQualifying Exam is scheduled after 2 semesters,’” Compl. at 6, ¶ 31 (quoting\nHandbook at 12), does not constitute an obligation that SLU owed to Soueidan. As\nwith the two prior provisions, the cited language contains no mandatory language that\nthe Qualifying Exam “must” or “shall” be scheduled within two semesters. And, the\nprovision does not say who schedules the Qualifying Exam.\n\n In addition to the Handbook, Soueidan’s complaint alleges that the Catalog\n“indicates that the Parks College of Engineering does in fact have a Ph.D. program.”\nId. at 7, ¶ 33 (citing Catalog at 111). Like the Handbook, the Catalog does not\naffirmatively set forth any obligation on behalf of SLU. Soueidan has cited no\nmandatory language from the Catalog guaranteeing that Soueidan will earn his Ph.D.\ndegree in a certain number of years or earn the degree at all.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n Soueidan’s complaint did not directly quote the actual language from the\nHandbook; however, nowhere does he indicate that the Handbook uses mandatory\nlanguage.\n\n\n -10-\n\f If we “wade[d] into the issue of how closely [SLU] operated within the\nconstructs of the . . . aspirational [Handbook and Catalog] provisions cited by\n[Soueidan], [we] would be forced to engage—with complete disregard for Missouri\nlaw—in an educational malpractice analysis rife with . . . practical and policy\nconcerns.” Gillis v. Principia Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 978, 985 (E.D. Mo. 2015), aff’d,\n832 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2016). As the district court aptly explained, Soueidan’s claims\nwould impermissibly require it “to determine whether SLU timely assigned a Ph.D.\nadvisor, conducted a student review, and scheduled the qualifying examination and\nhow those decisions affected Soueidan’s matriculation”; “to analyze whether SLU\nbreached its contract by ‘failing to award . . . Soueidan the Ph.D. degree he was\npromised after completing all directives and 5 years of requisite coursework’”; and\n“to address not only the quality of the Ph.D. program but also whether Soueidan\ncomprehensively and adequately completed all of his coursework.” Soueidan, 2018\nWL 1997287, at *3 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Compl. at 8, ¶ 39). Such\n“intervention by the court would amount to judicial supervision of [SLU’s] internal\nprocedures for monitoring” the progress of its doctoral students.” Lucero, 400 S.W.3d\nat 8 (“With this purpose in mind, any intervention by the court would amount to\njudicial supervision of a university’s internal procedures for monitoring its faculty.”).\n\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Soueidan’s claims\nbased on the educational malpractice doctrine.\n\n B. Request for Leave to Amend Complaint\n Soueidan also challenges the district court’s denial of his request for leave to\namend his complaint. Soueidan conditionally requested leave to amend his complaint\nin his response to SLU’s motion to dismiss. Soueidan did not disclose what he would\nchange in the complaint, nor did he attach a proposed amended pleading or file a\nseparate motion for leave to amend. The district court denied Soueidan’s request to\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n\ffile an amended complaint “because he . . . failed to provide a proposed amendment\nalong with his request.” Soueidan, 2018 WL 1997287, at *5.\n\n Soueidan argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his\nrequest for leave to amend his complaint. See Wolgin v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389, 394\n(8th Cir. 1983) (standard of review). We addressed a substantially similar situation\nin Wolgin. In that case, the appellant, “[i]n his brief in opposition to the appellees’\nmotion to dismiss, . . . concluded his argument by requesting leave to amend the\ncomplaint if the court granted the appellees’ motion.” Id. (emphases added). The\nappellant contended that the district court construe the request “as a motion for leave\nto amend.” Id. We rejected the appellant’s argument based on his failure to preserve\nthe right to amend by submitting a proposed amendment with a motion. Id. at 394–95.\n\n Soueidan attempts to distinguish Wolgin by arguing that the appellant in that\ncase filed a motion for leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\n15(a), while Soueidan did not file a Rule 15(a) motion but rather only sought\npermission to file a Rule 15 motion. Contrary to Soueidan’s argument, the appellant\nin Wolgin did precisely what Soueidan did here—“concluded his argument [in his\nbrief in opposition] by requesting leave to amend the complaint if the court granted\nthe appellees’ motion.” Id. at 394. As a result, Wolgin is controlling. We, therefore,\nhold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Soueidan leave to\namend when Soueidan “did not submit a proposed amendment to the trial court, nor\n[include] anything in [his] brief to indicate what an amended complaint would have\ncontained.” Id.5\n\n\n 5\n Even if Soueidan were allowed to amend his complaint, such amendment\nwould be futile. Plymouth Cty., Iowa v. Merscorp, Inc., 774 F.3d 1155, 1160 (8th Cir.\n2014) (“[A] party is not entitled to amend a complaint without making a showing that\nsuch an amendment would be able to save an otherwise meritless claim.”). Soueidan\nargues his amended complaint would “add an allegation that he looked at the\n\n\n -12-\n\f III. Conclusion\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\nHandbook at the time he enrolled or that the Handbook terms were in existence at that\ntime” to remedy the district court’s conclusion that Soueidan’s contract claims failed\nbecause Soueidan could not have relied upon alleged promises set forth in the\nHandbook and Catalog that he received after he formed his alleged 2012 contract\nwith SLU. Appellant’s Br. at 31. Additionally, he asserts he would “clarify that the\nrepresentation that there is a Ph.D. program at all, through which any student can\nobtain a Ph.D., is distinct from a promise to provide a Ph.D. within a certain\ntimeframe so long as he followed certain steps, and was a representation made at the\ntime he applied for the program.” Id. But these amendments would not remedy the\nfact that the educational malpractice doctrine bars Soueidan’s claims.\n\n\n -13-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ahmed SOUEIDAN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY, Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-14\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2124\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Ahmed Soueidan\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n St. Louis University\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: June 14, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n Ahmed Soueidan appeals from the district court’s1 order dismissing his\\nMissouri state-law claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of\\ngood faith and fair dealing, and fraudulent misrepresentation against St. Louis\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Ronnie L. White, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\fUniversity (SLU). Soueidan argues that the district court erroneously dismissed the\\nclaims under the educational malpractice doctrine and for failure to prove the required\\nelements. He further asserts that the district court erred in denying his request for\\nleave to amend his complaint. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background2\\n Soueidan enrolled as a doctoral student at SLU in the Parks College of\\nEngineering, Aviation and Technology in 2012. SLU represented to Soueidan that he\\nwould obtain his Ph.D. in mechanical and aerospace engineering in four years. In\\nAugust 2012, Soueidan met with the department chair to discuss a plan of study. The\\ndepartment chair drafted a plan for Soueidan to graduate with his doctoral degree in\\nfour years. Soueidan began following the plan and enrolled in coursework.\\n\\n Soueidan attempted to find a Ph.D. advisor to supervise his graduate studies,\\nbut he was unable to find anyone willing and able to accept new graduate students.\\nOne professor even told Soueidan that he “should not be in this program.” Compl. at\\n2, ¶ 10, Soueidan v. St. Louis Univ., No. 4:17-cv-02777 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 27, 2017),\\nECF No. 1. As a result, Soueidan completed his first three semesters without an\\nadvisor.\\n\\n In December 2013, Professor Raymond Lebeau agreed to serve as Soueidan’s\\nadvisor. Lebeau indicated that he could get Soueidan through the program in two\\nmore years, even though Lebeau had no research or funding for Soueidan. Lebeau\\nwas uncertain about the requisite qualifying examination for Soueidan. As a result,\\nSoueidan referred to the SLU Graduate Student Handbook (“Handbook”) for\\n\\n 2\\n In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we recite the facts as alleged in\\nSoueidan’s complaint and assume them to be true. See Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d\\n1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (“We assume all facts in the\\ncomplaint to be true, and [we] draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-\\nmoving party.”).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fguidance. But Lebeau advised Soueidan to disregard the Handbook’s guidelines.\\nLebeau told Soueidan that they would “do it our way” and that Soueidan was “a\\nguinea pig for this program.” Compl. at 3, ¶ 13.\\n\\n In August 2014, the graduate coordinator, graduate programs assistant,\\ndepartment chair, and several professors in the department simultaneously left SLU.\\nBy August 2015, the graduate programs assistant3 and the Dean of the College of\\nEngineering left their positions. By that time, Soueidan had completed ten graduate-\\nlevel courses toward satisfying the course credits requirement for his Ph.D. in\\naccordance with the Handbook.\\n\\n In June 2015, Lebeau advised Soueidan that he needed to attend a conference\\nto prepare for the qualifying examination. In January 2016, they attended the AIAA\\nSciTech 2016 conference in San Diego, California. At that conference, Soueidan\\npresented his thesis work. Soueidan paid for all of his conference expenses.\\n\\n In May 2016, Soueidan met with Lebeau and the graduate coordinator to\\ndiscuss the timing of Soueidan’s qualifying examination. Thereafter, Lebeau\\nrecommended that Soueidan do a practice exam in preparation for the actual exam.\\nFollowing Soueidan’s practice examination, Lebeau told Soueidan that two of the\\ncommittee members said Soueidan would not pass his examination. But, Lebeau\\nnoted, a third committee member said he would have passed Soueidan. Lebeau\\nrelayed this information to Soueidan before the actual exam so “bullets wouldn’t go\\nflying.” Id. at 4, ¶ 16.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Soueidan averred that the “graduate programs assistant” left SLU “[i]n August\\n2014,” but he also averred that the “graduate programs assistant” left “[o]ne year\\nlater, in 2015.” Id. at 3, ¶ 14. The complaint does not explain if a new graduate\\nassistant was hired after August 2014 and departed by August 2015.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f In August 2016, at the start of his fifth year at SLU, Soueidan took the\\nqualifying examination. One committee member informed Soueidan prior to the\\nexamination that Soueidan did not follow the guidelines for writing his paper and\\nquestioned his preparedness for the examination. After the examination, Lebeau told\\nSoueidan that he “should not have been let in here” because Lebeau was “not\\ninterested in new ideas” and was “afraid of putting Mr. Soueidan out there because\\nMr. Leabeau didn’t know what Mr. Lebeau was doing and didn’t want to bear that\\nresponsibility.” Id. at 4, ¶ 17 (brackets omitted).\\n\\n After not passing the qualifying examination, Soueidan was instructed to take\\nanother written examination and perform additional course work. Notably, Soueidan\\nhad suggested to Lebeau years prior that he take this same written exam. The exam\\nis normally taken within the first year of Ph.D. studies. Soueidan did enroll in the\\nrecommended additional course. He also met an additional time with the graduate\\ncoordinator and Lebeau to discuss his progress.\\n\\n In the fall of 2016, after over four years, Soueidan left the Ph.D. program and\\ndowngraded to a Master’s degree. But, in a final attempt to obtain his Ph.D., Soueidan\\nspoke with the SLU Provost of Academic Affairs about his situation. The Provost\\ninitially advised Soueidan to leave SLU to join a new program and that the Provost\\nwould help him get his dissertation credits refunded. Later, after speaking with the\\nDean of the College of Engineering, the Provost advised Soueidan to find an\\nestablished research project. Soueidan was unable to find one.\\n\\n In February 2017, at the Provost’s behest, Soueidan renewed his relationship\\nwith Lebeau. Lebeau, however, still showed uncertainty advising Soueidan going\\nforward. Lebeau directed Soueidan to the Handbook’s guidelines. Lebeau told\\nSoueidan, “We do it the way SLU does it.” Id. at 5, ¶ 25. Nevertheless, Lebeau\\nremained unfamiliar with the exam format and procedures. At this point, Soueidan\\ndecided to earn his Ph.D. by beginning anew at a different university.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Soueidan filed suit against SLU, alleging Missouri state-law claims for breach\\nof contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and\\nfraudulent misrepresentation. In support of his claims, Soueidan referred to several\\nsections of the Handbook that he claimed SLU failed to follow during his time in the\\nPh.D. program. According to Soueidan, SLU’s failure to “meet their obligation[s]”\\nset forth in the Handbook “made it very unlikely from the beginning that [he] would\\nbe able to achieve his Ph.D. degree at SLU.” Id. at 6, ¶ 30. First, the Handbook\\nprovided that “[y]ou should have an advisor assigned within the first few weeks of\\nclasses starting.” Id. at 6, ¶ 27 (quoting Handbook at 9). Soueidan alleged that “SLU\\ndid not assign an advisor to [him]” within the first few weeks of the program. Id.\\nInstead, Soueidan was without an advisor until December 2013, “a year and a half\\nafter [he] began the Ph.D. program.” Id. at 6, ¶ 28.\\n\\n Second, the Handbook “indicate[d] that students are to meet with their advisor\\nin January to complete their Annual Student Review.” Id. at 6, ¶ 29 (citing Handbook\\nat 9). Soueidan alleged that he was deprived of this review, which “would have been\\nan opportunity for Mr. Soueidan to ‘have a review of [his] work completed, create\\ngoals for the next year of studies and research, and ensure [he was] staying on track\\nfor graduation.’” Id. (bold omitted) (first alteration in original).\\n\\n Third, the Handbook stated that “‘[f]or Engineering students, the Qualifying\\nExam is scheduled after 2 semesters,’ and that ‘[t]he Qualifying Exam is designed to\\ndetermine if the student is prepared to continue Ph.D. studies and carry on with\\nresearch.’” Id. at 6, ¶ 31 (second alteration in original) (quoting Handbook at 12).\\nSoueidan alleged that because he was without an advisor after two semesters, the\\nQualifying Exam was not scheduled and he “missed out on another opportunity to\\nensure he was on track to obtain a Ph.D.” Id. at 7, ¶ 31. He noted that he did not take\\nthe Qualifying Exam “until August 2016, at the start of his fifth year at SLU.” Id. at\\n7, ¶ 32 (bold omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f In support of his claims, Soueidan additionally cited the 2015–2016 SLU\\nGraduate Education Catalog (“Catalog”). The Catalog “indicate[d] that the Parks\\nCollege of Engineering does in fact have a Ph.D. program.” Id. at 7, ¶ 33 (citing\\nCatalog at 111). Soueidan alleged that “in practice, students who register for the SLU\\nCollege of Engineering Ph.D. program are faced with” an insufficient number of\\n“professors with funding or research to serve as advisors to these Ph.D. Students.” Id.\\nat 7, ¶ 34. Soueidan alleged that “[a]s a prospective student, [he] had a right to rely\\nupon the Catalog and that is what he did when enrolling in the Ph.D. program at\\nSLU.” Id. at 7, ¶ 35.\\n\\n Soueidan alleged that SLU’s fraudulent conduct “cost [him] nearly\\n$200,000.00 in tuition payments.” Id. at 7, ¶ 36.\\n\\n SLU moved to dismiss Soueidan’s complaint, and the district court granted the\\nmotion. First, the court determined that Missouri’s educational malpractice doctrine\\napplied to all of Soueidan’s claims and required dismissal. According to the court,\\nSoueidan’s claims would impermissibly require it “to determine whether SLU timely\\nassigned a Ph.D. advisor, conducted a student review, and scheduled the qualifying\\nexamination and how those decisions affected Soueidan’s matriculation.” Soueidan\\nv. Saint Louis Univ., No. 4:17-cv-02777, 2018 WL 1997287, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 27,\\n2018). His claims would also require the court “to analyze whether SLU breached its\\ncontract by ‘failing to award . . . Soueidan the Ph.D. degree he was promised after\\ncompleting all directives and 5 years of requisite coursework’” and “to address not\\nonly the quality of the Ph.D. program but also whether Soueidan comprehensively\\nand adequately completed all of his coursework.” Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting\\nCompl. at 8, ¶ 39). The court held that making such determinations would require the\\ncourt to examine SLU’s educational process. Thus, the educational malpractice\\ndoctrine barred Soueidan’s claims.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f Second, the district court alternatively held that Soueidan’s claims of breach\\nof contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing required\\ndismissal “based upon the timing of this action and of the alleged discrete, contractual\\npromises relied upon by Soueidan.” Id. at *4. According to the court, “Soueidan was\\nadmitted and accepted into the Ph.D. program in 2012, which is when the alleged\\ncontract would have been formed.” Id. But Soueidan did not receive the alleged\\npromises until “after his 2012 contract with SLU was formed.” Id. The court noted\\nthat Soueidan “first reviewed the Handbook in December 2013.” Id. Furthermore,\\nSoueidan’s claims were also premised on “promises contained in the 2015–2016\\nCatalog[ ].” Id. “Thus,” the court concluded, “Soueidan could not have relied upon\\nthese promises in the Handbook and Catalog when he e[nr]olled in the Ph.D. program\\nin 2012.” Id. The court held that Soueidan’s breach claims failed because Soueidan\\nfailed “to identify any promises that he relied upon when he e[nr]olled in 2012.” Id.\\n\\n Third, the court held that Soueidan’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim\\nrequired dismissal because “Soueidan . . . failed to allege a fraud that is independent\\nof his contract action. Rather, his fraud claim is based upon the same promises and\\nactions that he alleged to support his breach of contract claim.” Id.\\n\\n Finally, the district court “denie[d] Soueidan’s request to file an amended\\ncomplaint because he . . . failed to provide a proposed amendment along with his\\nrequest.” Id. at *5.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n On appeal, Soueidan argues that the district court erroneously dismissed his\\nMissouri state-law claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith\\nand fair dealing, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Specifically, Soueidan contends\\nhe provided sufficient evidence of all the required elements in each cause of action\\nand that the court should not have applied Missouri’s educational malpractice\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fdoctrine. He further asserts that the district court erred in denying his request for\\nleave to amend his complaint.\\n\\n A. Educational Malpractice Doctrine\\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. BNSF Ry.\\nCo. v. Seats, Inc., 900 F.3d 545, 546 (8th Cir. 2018). To survive a motion to dismiss,\\nthe plaintiff must show that he “is entitled to relief, by alleging sufficient factual\\nmatter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.\\n(quoting In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th\\nCir. 2017) (en banc)).\\n\\n The district court determined that the educational malpractice doctrine bars all\\nof Soueidan’s claims. We agree.\\n\\n In educational malpractice cases, a plaintiff sues his or her academic\\n institution for tortiously failing to provide adequate educational\\n services. If a negligence claim raises questions concerning the\\n reasonableness of the educator’s conduct in providing educational\\n services, then the claim is one of educational malpractice. Similarly, if\\n the claim requires an analysis of the quality of education received and\\n in making that analysis the fact-finder must consider principles of duty,\\n standards of care, and the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct,\\n then the claim is one of educational malpractice. If the duty alleged to\\n have been breached is the duty to educate effectively, the claim is one\\n of educational malpractice. A claim that educational services provided\\n were inadequate, substandard, or ineffective constitutes a claim of\\n educational malpractice. Where the court is asked to evaluate the course\\n of instruction or the soundness of the method of teaching that has been\\n adopted by an educational institution, the claim is one of educational\\n malpractice.\\n\\nDallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Mo. Ct. App.\\n2008) (cleaned up).\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f “Generally, courts have refrained from recognizing educational malpractice\\nclaims, either in tort or contract, on the premise that ‘[u]niversities must be allowed\\nthe flexibility to manage themselves and correct their own mistakes.’” Lucero v.\\nCurators of Univ. of Mo., 400 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (alteration in original)\\n(quoting Miller v. Loyola Univ. of New Orleans, 829 So.2d 1057, 1061 (La. Ct. App.\\n2002)). Missouri courts have “refuse[d] to recognize a claim for educational\\nmalpractice” because it is not the role of courts “to micromanage a university’s daily\\noperations.” Id. (citing Dallas Airmotive, Inc., 277 S.W.3d at 700 (“[C]ourts have\\nrefused to become the overseers of both the day-to-day operation of [the] educational\\nprocess as well as the formulation of its governing policies” (second alteration in\\noriginal) (internal quotations omitted))).\\n\\n In the present case, Soueidan relies on the Catalog and Handbook in support\\nof his contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. But all of the statements\\nprovided in these sources are “aspirational in nature.” Id. at 6. First, the Handbook’s\\nstatement that “[y]ou should have an advisor assigned within the first few weeks of\\nclasses starting,” Compl. at 6, ¶ 27 (quoting Handbook at 9) (emphasis added), does\\nnot create an obligation on the part of SLU to assign Soueidan an advisor. Not only\\ndoes the Handbook fail to specify who assigns the advisor, but it also uses the term\\n“should,” not “must” or “shall.” Cf. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,\\n599 (1999) (“The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, a\\n1975 measure, stated in aspirational terms that ‘[t]he treatment, services, and\\nhabilitation for a person with developmental disabilities . . . should be provided in the\\nsetting that is least restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.’” (first emphasis\\nadded) (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,\\n515 U.S. 417, 432 n.9 (1995) (“Though ‘shall’ generally means ‘must,’ legal writers\\nsometimes use, or misuse, ‘shall’ to mean ‘should,’ ‘will,’ or even ‘may.’”); Union\\nElec. Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 188 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The parties\\ncould easily have made the GIC obligatory by using mandatory language, such as\\n‘must and shall’ rather than ‘may and should.’”).\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Second, Soueidan’s allegation that the Handbook provided that “students are\\nto meet with their advisor in January to complete their Annual Student Review,”\\nCompl. at 6, ¶ 29 (citing Handbook at 9), creates no obligation on SLU’s behalf. This\\nalleged promise is dependent on the Handbook’s prior statement that the student\\n“should have an advisor assigned.” Id. at 6, ¶ 27 (quoting Handbook at 9).\\nFurthermore, Soueidan has not alleged that the Handbook says that the advisors\\n“must” or “shall” meet with the students; instead, he alleges that the Handbook places\\nthe onus on the students to meet with their advisor.4 Therefore, the Handbook\\nlanguage, as Soueidan alleges that it reads, indicates more of a recommendation or\\ngoal and is “aspirational in nature.” See Lucero, 400 S.W.3d at 6.\\n\\n Third, the Handbook’s statement that “‘[f]or Engineering students, the\\nQualifying Exam is scheduled after 2 semesters,’” Compl. at 6, ¶ 31 (quoting\\nHandbook at 12), does not constitute an obligation that SLU owed to Soueidan. As\\nwith the two prior provisions, the cited language contains no mandatory language that\\nthe Qualifying Exam “must” or “shall” be scheduled within two semesters. And, the\\nprovision does not say who schedules the Qualifying Exam.\\n\\n In addition to the Handbook, Soueidan’s complaint alleges that the Catalog\\n“indicates that the Parks College of Engineering does in fact have a Ph.D. program.”\\nId. at 7, ¶ 33 (citing Catalog at 111). Like the Handbook, the Catalog does not\\naffirmatively set forth any obligation on behalf of SLU. Soueidan has cited no\\nmandatory language from the Catalog guaranteeing that Soueidan will earn his Ph.D.\\ndegree in a certain number of years or earn the degree at all.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Soueidan’s complaint did not directly quote the actual language from the\\nHandbook; however, nowhere does he indicate that the Handbook uses mandatory\\nlanguage.\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f If we “wade[d] into the issue of how closely [SLU] operated within the\\nconstructs of the . . . aspirational [Handbook and Catalog] provisions cited by\\n[Soueidan], [we] would be forced to engage—with complete disregard for Missouri\\nlaw—in an educational malpractice analysis rife with . . . practical and policy\\nconcerns.” Gillis v. Principia Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 978, 985 (E.D. Mo. 2015), aff’d,\\n832 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2016). As the district court aptly explained, Soueidan’s claims\\nwould impermissibly require it “to determine whether SLU timely assigned a Ph.D.\\nadvisor, conducted a student review, and scheduled the qualifying examination and\\nhow those decisions affected Soueidan’s matriculation”; “to analyze whether SLU\\nbreached its contract by ‘failing to award . . . Soueidan the Ph.D. degree he was\\npromised after completing all directives and 5 years of requisite coursework’”; and\\n“to address not only the quality of the Ph.D. program but also whether Soueidan\\ncomprehensively and adequately completed all of his coursework.” Soueidan, 2018\\nWL 1997287, at *3 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Compl. at 8, ¶ 39). Such\\n“intervention by the court would amount to judicial supervision of [SLU’s] internal\\nprocedures for monitoring” the progress of its doctoral students.” Lucero, 400 S.W.3d\\nat 8 (“With this purpose in mind, any intervention by the court would amount to\\njudicial supervision of a university’s internal procedures for monitoring its faculty.”).\\n\\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Soueidan’s claims\\nbased on the educational malpractice doctrine.\\n\\n B. Request for Leave to Amend Complaint\\n Soueidan also challenges the district court’s denial of his request for leave to\\namend his complaint. Soueidan conditionally requested leave to amend his complaint\\nin his response to SLU’s motion to dismiss. Soueidan did not disclose what he would\\nchange in the complaint, nor did he attach a proposed amended pleading or file a\\nseparate motion for leave to amend. The district court denied Soueidan’s request to\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\ffile an amended complaint “because he . . . failed to provide a proposed amendment\\nalong with his request.” Soueidan, 2018 WL 1997287, at *5.\\n\\n Soueidan argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his\\nrequest for leave to amend his complaint. See Wolgin v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389, 394\\n(8th Cir. 1983) (standard of review). We addressed a substantially similar situation\\nin Wolgin. In that case, the appellant, “[i]n his brief in opposition to the appellees’\\nmotion to dismiss, . . . concluded his argument by requesting leave to amend the\\ncomplaint if the court granted the appellees’ motion.” Id. (emphases added). The\\nappellant contended that the district court construe the request “as a motion for leave\\nto amend.” Id. We rejected the appellant’s argument based on his failure to preserve\\nthe right to amend by submitting a proposed amendment with a motion. Id. at 394–95.\\n\\n Soueidan attempts to distinguish Wolgin by arguing that the appellant in that\\ncase filed a motion for leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\\n15(a), while Soueidan did not file a Rule 15(a) motion but rather only sought\\npermission to file a Rule 15 motion. Contrary to Soueidan’s argument, the appellant\\nin Wolgin did precisely what Soueidan did here—“concluded his argument [in his\\nbrief in opposition] by requesting leave to amend the complaint if the court granted\\nthe appellees’ motion.” Id. at 394. As a result, Wolgin is controlling. We, therefore,\\nhold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Soueidan leave to\\namend when Soueidan “did not submit a proposed amendment to the trial court, nor\\n[include] anything in [his] brief to indicate what an amended complaint would have\\ncontained.” Id.5\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Even if Soueidan were allowed to amend his complaint, such amendment\\nwould be futile. Plymouth Cty., Iowa v. Merscorp, Inc., 774 F.3d 1155, 1160 (8th Cir.\\n2014) (“[A] party is not entitled to amend a complaint without making a showing that\\nsuch an amendment would be able to save an otherwise meritless claim.”). Soueidan\\nargues his amended complaint would “add an allegation that he looked at the\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f III. Conclusion\\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nHandbook at the time he enrolled or that the Handbook terms were in existence at that\\ntime” to remedy the district court’s conclusion that Soueidan’s contract claims failed\\nbecause Soueidan could not have relied upon alleged promises set forth in the\\nHandbook and Catalog that he received after he formed his alleged 2012 contract\\nwith SLU. Appellant’s Br. at 31. Additionally, he asserts he would “clarify that the\\nrepresentation that there is a Ph.D. program at all, through which any student can\\nobtain a Ph.D., is distinct from a promise to provide a Ph.D. within a certain\\ntimeframe so long as he followed certain steps, and was a representation made at the\\ntime he applied for the program.” Id. But these amendments would not remedy the\\nfact that the educational malpractice doctrine bars Soueidan’s claims.\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2677,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4630133,"string":"4,630,133"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Brandon Cloud"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-17"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1170"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1170\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Brandon Scott Cloud\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: February 11, 2019\\n Filed: June 17, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Brandon Scott Cloud pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a minor in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 2243(a). At sentencing, the district court1 calculated a\\nUnited States Sentencing Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. The\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota.\\n\\fdistrict court varied upward by 23 months from the top of the Guidelines range and\\nimposed a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment. Cloud appeals his sentence,\\narguing that the district court impermissibly based its upward variance on certain\\ntribal court documents and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.\\n\\n We first consider whether the district court committed procedural error, and\\nthen review for substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Bryant, 913 F.3d\\n783, 786 (8th Cir. 2019). We understand Cloud to argue that the district court\\nprocedurally erred by varying upward from the Guidelines range based on\\ninformation contained in certain tribal court documents without giving him notice and\\nan opportunity to challenge their reliability. See Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.\\n708, 715 (2008) (“Sound practice dictates that judges in all cases should make sure\\nthat the information provided to the parties in advance of the hearing, and in the\\nhearing itself, has given them an adequate opportunity to confront and debate the\\nrelevant issues.”). Cloud’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) reveals a history\\nof various tribal court convictions, including, as relevant here, a sentence of one year\\nfor an indecent liberties charge involving a seven-year-old girl. Cloud objected to the\\nuse of tribal court records for purposes of determining whether an enhancement\\npursuant to USSG § 4B1.5(b) applied, arguing that it is not appropriate to rely on\\ntribal court adjudications for purposes of the enhancement.2 The government also\\nobjected to the enhancement, but on the grounds that the limited records available\\nfrom the tribal court did not provide sufficient factual information to determine\\nwhether Cloud “engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.”\\nUSSG § 4B1.5(b). Notably, Cloud did not object to the fact of the tribal convictions\\nor of any tribal arrests, or to the factual descriptions of the convictions and arrests as\\ncontained in the PSR. Nor did he object to the district court’s use of this information\\nwhen imposing the sentence. Accordingly, we review his claim for plain error. See,\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The tribal court convictions were not included in the calculation of Cloud’s\\ncriminal history score. See USSG § 4A1.2(i).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fe.g., United States v. Coppenger, 775 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying plain\\nerror standard where defendant did not object to district court’s reliance on\\ninformation in undisclosed, inaccessible presentence reports to impose upward\\nvariance).\\n\\n Applying the plain error standard, we will affirm unless Cloud can show (1) an\\nerror; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects his substantial rights; and (4) that seriously\\naffects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United\\nStates v. Boman, 873 F.3d 1035, 1040 (8th Cir. 2017). “To satisfy [the] third\\ncondition, the defendant ordinarily must show a reasonable probability that, but for\\nthe error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Rosales-Mireles\\nv. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904–05 (2018) (cleaned up).\\n\\n It does not appear that the district court relied on any information that was not\\notherwise available to the court or to the parties. A district court is permitted to base\\nits decision to impose an upward variance on the uncontested facts set forth in a\\ndefendant’s PSR. See United States v. Zayas, 758 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2014)\\n(“The district court may rely on factual allegations in a presentence report . . . as long\\nas [the defendant] has not objected to the facts themselves.”). At sentencing, the\\ndistrict court stated that it had received a complaint and a notation on a docket sheet\\nfrom tribal court proceedings showing that Cloud served one year in jail for an\\nindecent liberties charge involving Cloud putting his hands under a seven-year-old’s\\npants and “touching her privates.” In its written Statement of Reasons for imposing\\nCloud’s 60-month sentence, the court referred to this incident as well as other assaults\\nthat Cloud perpetrated against female victims in 2009 and 2010. All of this\\ninformation was available in the unobjected-to account of Cloud’s criminal history\\nset forth in the PSR, and the district court was permitted to rely on it. See, e.g.,\\nUnited States v. Vasquez, 552 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2009). Cloud points to nothing\\nin the record to indicate that the court relied on anything but the information that it\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\frecited to the parties and that was also available in the PSR. Thus, on this record,\\nCloud has failed to show any error that is plain.\\n\\n Cloud also argues that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable\\nsentence. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of\\ndiscretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The factors set out in 18\\nU.S.C. § 3553(a) guide our review. United States v. Meadows, 866 F.3d 913, 920\\n(8th Cir. 2017). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) ‘fails to consider\\na relevant factor that should have received significant weight’; (2) ‘gives significant\\nweight to an improper or irrelevant factor’; or (3) ‘considers only the appropriate\\nfactors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.’” United\\nStates v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United\\nStates v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009)).\\n\\n The district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.\\nBecause Cloud’s sentence is outside of the advisory Guidelines range, we do not\\npresume that it is reasonable, but “may consider the extent of the deviation . . .\\ngiv[ing] due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on\\na whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court\\nconsidered “what occurred on the tragic evening” when the sexual abuse took place\\nand noted that the victim was a thirteen-year-old family member who believed she\\nwas safe with family when Cloud began sexually assaulting her while she was asleep.\\nThe court also expressed concern that Cloud had engaged in similar conduct in the\\npast and determined that a lengthy prison sentence was necessary to protect the\\npublic—children in particular. We are satisfied that the district court did not abuse\\nits discretion in imposing an upward variance of 23 months.\\n\\n We are not persuaded by Cloud’s arguments to the contrary. Cloud contends\\nthat the district court failed to take into consideration certain mitigating factors,\\nincluding his difficult life circumstances. But the district court did not improperly\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fexercise its wide latitude when it afforded greater weight to the aggravating factors\\nin Cloud’s case than the mitigating factors his counsel brought to its attention. See,\\ne.g., United States v. Ballard, 872 F.3d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Cloud\\nalso argues that the district court improperly considered the disparity between his\\nsentence in federal court and what he would have received in state court. In support\\nof his argument, he points to the district court’s statement at sentencing that “if this\\nhad occurred off the reservation in state court, [in] my understanding . . . criminal\\nsexual conduct in the first degree in state court would have called for a sentence of\\n144 months in prison.” A district court may not “consider potential federal/state\\nsentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6).” United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625,\\n635 (8th Cir. 2010). Here, the district court began explaining its sentence by telling\\nCloud that it was concerned that he had “slipped through the cracks of the judicial\\nsystem.” In this context, it is unclear whether the court’s subsequent reference to the\\nsentence that “would have [been] called for” in state court was directed to Cloud’s\\npast tribal court conviction or the instant offense. In any event, our review of the\\nrecord confirms that the district court did not afford any such disparities significant\\nweight. Its main concerns were the seriousness of the instant offense, Cloud’s history\\nand characteristics, and the need to protect the public. Therefore, the district court\\ndid not abuse its discretion by relying significantly on an improper factor. See United\\nStates v. Wrice, 855 F.3d 832, 832–33 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4407386/\", \"author_raw\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"LOKEN\": \", Circuit\", \"COLLOTON\": \", Circuit\", \"KELLY\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4630133/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Brandon Cloud\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-17\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1170\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Brandon Scott Cloud\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\n ____________\n\n Submitted: February 11, 2019\n Filed: June 17, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\n\n Brandon Scott Cloud pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a minor in violation of\n18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 2243(a). At sentencing, the district court1 calculated a\nUnited States Sentencing Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. The\n\n 1\n The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District\nof Minnesota.\n\fdistrict court varied upward by 23 months from the top of the Guidelines range and\nimposed a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment. Cloud appeals his sentence,\narguing that the district court impermissibly based its upward variance on certain\ntribal court documents and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.\n\n We first consider whether the district court committed procedural error, and\nthen review for substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Bryant, 913 F.3d\n783, 786 (8th Cir. 2019). We understand Cloud to argue that the district court\nprocedurally erred by varying upward from the Guidelines range based on\ninformation contained in certain tribal court documents without giving him notice and\nan opportunity to challenge their reliability. See Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.\n708, 715 (2008) (“Sound practice dictates that judges in all cases should make sure\nthat the information provided to the parties in advance of the hearing, and in the\nhearing itself, has given them an adequate opportunity to confront and debate the\nrelevant issues.”). Cloud’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) reveals a history\nof various tribal court convictions, including, as relevant here, a sentence of one year\nfor an indecent liberties charge involving a seven-year-old girl. Cloud objected to the\nuse of tribal court records for purposes of determining whether an enhancement\npursuant to USSG § 4B1.5(b) applied, arguing that it is not appropriate to rely on\ntribal court adjudications for purposes of the enhancement.2 The government also\nobjected to the enhancement, but on the grounds that the limited records available\nfrom the tribal court did not provide sufficient factual information to determine\nwhether Cloud “engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.”\nUSSG § 4B1.5(b). Notably, Cloud did not object to the fact of the tribal convictions\nor of any tribal arrests, or to the factual descriptions of the convictions and arrests as\ncontained in the PSR. Nor did he object to the district court’s use of this information\nwhen imposing the sentence. Accordingly, we review his claim for plain error. See,\n\n\n 2\n The tribal court convictions were not included in the calculation of Cloud’s\ncriminal history score. See USSG § 4A1.2(i).\n\n -2-\n\fe.g., United States v. Coppenger, 775 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying plain\nerror standard where defendant did not object to district court’s reliance on\ninformation in undisclosed, inaccessible presentence reports to impose upward\nvariance).\n\n Applying the plain error standard, we will affirm unless Cloud can show (1) an\nerror; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects his substantial rights; and (4) that seriously\naffects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United\nStates v. Boman, 873 F.3d 1035, 1040 (8th Cir. 2017). “To satisfy [the] third\ncondition, the defendant ordinarily must show a reasonable probability that, but for\nthe error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Rosales-Mireles\nv. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904–05 (2018) (cleaned up).\n\n It does not appear that the district court relied on any information that was not\notherwise available to the court or to the parties. A district court is permitted to base\nits decision to impose an upward variance on the uncontested facts set forth in a\ndefendant’s PSR. See United States v. Zayas, 758 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2014)\n(“The district court may rely on factual allegations in a presentence report . . . as long\nas [the defendant] has not objected to the facts themselves.”). At sentencing, the\ndistrict court stated that it had received a complaint and a notation on a docket sheet\nfrom tribal court proceedings showing that Cloud served one year in jail for an\nindecent liberties charge involving Cloud putting his hands under a seven-year-old’s\npants and “touching her privates.” In its written Statement of Reasons for imposing\nCloud’s 60-month sentence, the court referred to this incident as well as other assaults\nthat Cloud perpetrated against female victims in 2009 and 2010. All of this\ninformation was available in the unobjected-to account of Cloud’s criminal history\nset forth in the PSR, and the district court was permitted to rely on it. See, e.g.,\nUnited States v. Vasquez, 552 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2009). Cloud points to nothing\nin the record to indicate that the court relied on anything but the information that it\n\n\n\n -3-\n\frecited to the parties and that was also available in the PSR. Thus, on this record,\nCloud has failed to show any error that is plain.\n\n Cloud also argues that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable\nsentence. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of\ndiscretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The factors set out in 18\nU.S.C. § 3553(a) guide our review. United States v. Meadows, 866 F.3d 913, 920\n(8th Cir. 2017). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) ‘fails to consider\na relevant factor that should have received significant weight’; (2) ‘gives significant\nweight to an improper or irrelevant factor’; or (3) ‘considers only the appropriate\nfactors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.’” United\nStates v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United\nStates v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009)).\n\n The district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.\nBecause Cloud’s sentence is outside of the advisory Guidelines range, we do not\npresume that it is reasonable, but “may consider the extent of the deviation . . .\ngiv[ing] due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on\na whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court\nconsidered “what occurred on the tragic evening” when the sexual abuse took place\nand noted that the victim was a thirteen-year-old family member who believed she\nwas safe with family when Cloud began sexually assaulting her while she was asleep.\nThe court also expressed concern that Cloud had engaged in similar conduct in the\npast and determined that a lengthy prison sentence was necessary to protect the\npublic—children in particular. We are satisfied that the district court did not abuse\nits discretion in imposing an upward variance of 23 months.\n\n We are not persuaded by Cloud’s arguments to the contrary. Cloud contends\nthat the district court failed to take into consideration certain mitigating factors,\nincluding his difficult life circumstances. But the district court did not improperly\n\n -4-\n\fexercise its wide latitude when it afforded greater weight to the aggravating factors\nin Cloud’s case than the mitigating factors his counsel brought to its attention. See,\ne.g., United States v. Ballard, 872 F.3d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Cloud\nalso argues that the district court improperly considered the disparity between his\nsentence in federal court and what he would have received in state court. In support\nof his argument, he points to the district court’s statement at sentencing that “if this\nhad occurred off the reservation in state court, [in] my understanding . . . criminal\nsexual conduct in the first degree in state court would have called for a sentence of\n144 months in prison.” A district court may not “consider potential federal/state\nsentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6).” United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625,\n635 (8th Cir. 2010). Here, the district court began explaining its sentence by telling\nCloud that it was concerned that he had “slipped through the cracks of the judicial\nsystem.” In this context, it is unclear whether the court’s subsequent reference to the\nsentence that “would have [been] called for” in state court was directed to Cloud’s\npast tribal court conviction or the instant offense. In any event, our review of the\nrecord confirms that the district court did not afford any such disparities significant\nweight. Its main concerns were the seriousness of the instant offense, Cloud’s history\nand characteristics, and the need to protect the public. Therefore, the district court\ndid not abuse its discretion by relying significantly on an improper factor. See United\nStates v. Wrice, 855 F.3d 832, 832–33 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).\n\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Brandon Cloud\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-17\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1170\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Brandon Scott Cloud\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: February 11, 2019\\n Filed: June 17, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Brandon Scott Cloud pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a minor in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 2243(a). At sentencing, the district court1 calculated a\\nUnited States Sentencing Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. The\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota.\\n\\fdistrict court varied upward by 23 months from the top of the Guidelines range and\\nimposed a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment. Cloud appeals his sentence,\\narguing that the district court impermissibly based its upward variance on certain\\ntribal court documents and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.\\n\\n We first consider whether the district court committed procedural error, and\\nthen review for substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Bryant, 913 F.3d\\n783, 786 (8th Cir. 2019). We understand Cloud to argue that the district court\\nprocedurally erred by varying upward from the Guidelines range based on\\ninformation contained in certain tribal court documents without giving him notice and\\nan opportunity to challenge their reliability. See Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.\\n708, 715 (2008) (“Sound practice dictates that judges in all cases should make sure\\nthat the information provided to the parties in advance of the hearing, and in the\\nhearing itself, has given them an adequate opportunity to confront and debate the\\nrelevant issues.”). Cloud’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) reveals a history\\nof various tribal court convictions, including, as relevant here, a sentence of one year\\nfor an indecent liberties charge involving a seven-year-old girl. Cloud objected to the\\nuse of tribal court records for purposes of determining whether an enhancement\\npursuant to USSG § 4B1.5(b) applied, arguing that it is not appropriate to rely on\\ntribal court adjudications for purposes of the enhancement.2 The government also\\nobjected to the enhancement, but on the grounds that the limited records available\\nfrom the tribal court did not provide sufficient factual information to determine\\nwhether Cloud “engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.”\\nUSSG § 4B1.5(b). Notably, Cloud did not object to the fact of the tribal convictions\\nor of any tribal arrests, or to the factual descriptions of the convictions and arrests as\\ncontained in the PSR. Nor did he object to the district court’s use of this information\\nwhen imposing the sentence. Accordingly, we review his claim for plain error. See,\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The tribal court convictions were not included in the calculation of Cloud’s\\ncriminal history score. See USSG § 4A1.2(i).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fe.g., United States v. Coppenger, 775 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying plain\\nerror standard where defendant did not object to district court’s reliance on\\ninformation in undisclosed, inaccessible presentence reports to impose upward\\nvariance).\\n\\n Applying the plain error standard, we will affirm unless Cloud can show (1) an\\nerror; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects his substantial rights; and (4) that seriously\\naffects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United\\nStates v. Boman, 873 F.3d 1035, 1040 (8th Cir. 2017). “To satisfy [the] third\\ncondition, the defendant ordinarily must show a reasonable probability that, but for\\nthe error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Rosales-Mireles\\nv. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904–05 (2018) (cleaned up).\\n\\n It does not appear that the district court relied on any information that was not\\notherwise available to the court or to the parties. A district court is permitted to base\\nits decision to impose an upward variance on the uncontested facts set forth in a\\ndefendant’s PSR. See United States v. Zayas, 758 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2014)\\n(“The district court may rely on factual allegations in a presentence report . . . as long\\nas [the defendant] has not objected to the facts themselves.”). At sentencing, the\\ndistrict court stated that it had received a complaint and a notation on a docket sheet\\nfrom tribal court proceedings showing that Cloud served one year in jail for an\\nindecent liberties charge involving Cloud putting his hands under a seven-year-old’s\\npants and “touching her privates.” In its written Statement of Reasons for imposing\\nCloud’s 60-month sentence, the court referred to this incident as well as other assaults\\nthat Cloud perpetrated against female victims in 2009 and 2010. All of this\\ninformation was available in the unobjected-to account of Cloud’s criminal history\\nset forth in the PSR, and the district court was permitted to rely on it. See, e.g.,\\nUnited States v. Vasquez, 552 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2009). Cloud points to nothing\\nin the record to indicate that the court relied on anything but the information that it\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\frecited to the parties and that was also available in the PSR. Thus, on this record,\\nCloud has failed to show any error that is plain.\\n\\n Cloud also argues that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable\\nsentence. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of\\ndiscretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The factors set out in 18\\nU.S.C. § 3553(a) guide our review. United States v. Meadows, 866 F.3d 913, 920\\n(8th Cir. 2017). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) ‘fails to consider\\na relevant factor that should have received significant weight’; (2) ‘gives significant\\nweight to an improper or irrelevant factor’; or (3) ‘considers only the appropriate\\nfactors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.’” United\\nStates v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United\\nStates v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009)).\\n\\n The district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.\\nBecause Cloud’s sentence is outside of the advisory Guidelines range, we do not\\npresume that it is reasonable, but “may consider the extent of the deviation . . .\\ngiv[ing] due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on\\na whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court\\nconsidered “what occurred on the tragic evening” when the sexual abuse took place\\nand noted that the victim was a thirteen-year-old family member who believed she\\nwas safe with family when Cloud began sexually assaulting her while she was asleep.\\nThe court also expressed concern that Cloud had engaged in similar conduct in the\\npast and determined that a lengthy prison sentence was necessary to protect the\\npublic—children in particular. We are satisfied that the district court did not abuse\\nits discretion in imposing an upward variance of 23 months.\\n\\n We are not persuaded by Cloud’s arguments to the contrary. Cloud contends\\nthat the district court failed to take into consideration certain mitigating factors,\\nincluding his difficult life circumstances. But the district court did not improperly\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fexercise its wide latitude when it afforded greater weight to the aggravating factors\\nin Cloud’s case than the mitigating factors his counsel brought to its attention. See,\\ne.g., United States v. Ballard, 872 F.3d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Cloud\\nalso argues that the district court improperly considered the disparity between his\\nsentence in federal court and what he would have received in state court. In support\\nof his argument, he points to the district court’s statement at sentencing that “if this\\nhad occurred off the reservation in state court, [in] my understanding . . . criminal\\nsexual conduct in the first degree in state court would have called for a sentence of\\n144 months in prison.” A district court may not “consider potential federal/state\\nsentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6).” United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625,\\n635 (8th Cir. 2010). Here, the district court began explaining its sentence by telling\\nCloud that it was concerned that he had “slipped through the cracks of the judicial\\nsystem.” In this context, it is unclear whether the court’s subsequent reference to the\\nsentence that “would have [been] called for” in state court was directed to Cloud’s\\npast tribal court conviction or the instant offense. In any event, our review of the\\nrecord confirms that the district court did not afford any such disparities significant\\nweight. Its main concerns were the seriousness of the instant offense, Cloud’s history\\nand characteristics, and the need to protect the public. Therefore, the district court\\ndid not abuse its discretion by relying significantly on an improper factor. See United\\nStates v. Wrice, 855 F.3d 832, 832–33 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2678,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4630134,"string":"4,630,134"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Dorian JOHNSON Plaintiff - Appellee v. CITY OF FERGUSON, MISSOURI; Thomas Jackson; Darren Wilson Defendants - Appellants National Police Association Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Dorian Johnson v. City of Ferguson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-17"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"16-1697"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Wollman, Loken, Murphy, Melloy, Colloton, Gruender, Benton, Shepherd, Kelly, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 16-1697\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Dorian Johnson\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\nCity of Ferguson, Missouri; Thomas Jackson; Darren Wilson\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n National Police Association\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 10, 2018\\n Filed: June 17, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, LOKEN, MURPHY,1 MELLOY,\\nCOLLOTON, GRUENDER, BENTON, SHEPHERD, KELLY, and ERICKSON,\\nCircuit Judges, En Banc.2\\n ____________\\n\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 864 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2017), a panel of our\\ncourt affirmed the district court’s ruling that Dorian Johnson had alleged sufficient\\nfacts to state 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of unlawful seizure and the use of excessive\\nforce against former Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson, as well as a claim of\\nsupervisory liability against former Ferguson Police Chief Thomas Jackson, and thus\\ndenied the defendants’ motion for dismissal based upon qualified immunity. We\\ngranted their petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the panel’s opinion. We now\\nreverse the district court’s order and remand with directions to dismiss the federal\\nclaims.\\n\\n As alleged in Johnson’s complaint, he and Michael Brown, Jr. were “peacefully\\nand lawfully” walking down Canfield Drive in Ferguson, Missouri, at approximately\\n12:00 p.m. on August 9, 2014, when they were approached by Officer Darren Wilson\\nin his marked police vehicle. As he approached the pair, Wilson slowed his vehicle\\nand ordered them to “Get the f*ck on the sidewalk.” Wilson continued to drive his\\nvehicle several more yards, then abruptly put the vehicle in reverse and parked it at\\nan angle so as to block the pair’s path. After stopping his vehicle just inches from\\nBrown, Wilson forcefully opened his door, striking Brown. Wilson reached through\\nhis window, grabbed Brown, and threatened to shoot his weapon. As Brown\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Diana E. Murphy participated in oral argument, but died on\\nMay 16, 2018.\\n 2\\n Judge Grasz, Judge Stras, and Judge Kobes did not participate in the\\nconsideration or decision of this matter.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nstruggled to break free, Wilson discharged his weapon twice, striking Brown in the\\narm. Both Brown and Johnson ran away from Wilson, who at no time ordered either\\nof them to “stop” or “freeze,” but rather fired his weapon at the two men, with several\\nof the shots striking and killing Brown.\\n\\n We agree with the panel opinion’s identification of the governing issue in this\\ncase: “The crux of the motion to dismiss and this resulting appeal centers on the issue\\nof whether there was a seizure. Johnson concedes that if there was no seizure\\nvirtually all of his claims fall away.” Johnson, 864 F.3d at 872. We disagree with the\\npanel’s ruling that a seizure occurred, and thus we hold that the district court erred\\nin not granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss based upon their claim of qualified\\nimmunity.\\n\\n Whatever one might say about Wilson’s expletive-expressed directive that\\nBrown and Johnson move from the street to the sidewalk, Johnson’s complaint\\nconcedes that neither he nor Brown was ordered to stop and to remain in place.\\nJohnson’s decision to remain by Brown’s side during Brown’s altercation with\\nWilson rather than complying with Wilson’s lawful command to return to the\\nsidewalk was that of his own choosing. That he was able to leave the scene following\\nthe discharge of Wilson’s weapon gives the lie to his argument that the placement of\\nWilson’s vehicle prevented him from doing so. As was the case in United States v.\\nHayden, 759 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2014), Wilson’s police vehicle constituted no\\nbarrier to Johnson’s ability to cross to the sidewalk. Any physical or weapon-related\\ncontact by Wilson was directed towards Brown alone in the first instance. In a word,\\nthen, because Johnson himself was neither physically restrained nor prevented from\\nproceeding to the sidewalk in compliance with Wilson’s directive rather than fleeing\\nas he did, the question before us is alike to that presented in California v. Hodari D.,\\n499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991):\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n The narrow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of\\n authority as with respect to application of physical force, a seizure\\n occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does not.\\n\\nLikewise, what the Court wrote in Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007),\\nis equally applicable in this case: “[T]here is no seizure without actual submission.”\\nBecause there was no verbal or physical impediment to Johnson’s freedom of\\nmovement, there was no submission to authority on his part even in a metaphysical\\nsense of the meaning of that word. Accordingly, in the absence of any intentional\\nacquisition of physical control terminating Johnson’s freedom of movement through\\nmeans intentionally applied, as occurred in both Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S.\\n593, 596-99 (1989), and in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4, 7 (1985), we conclude\\nthat no seizure occurred in this case. See also United States v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991,\\n995 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059, 1065-66 (10th Cir.\\n2010); United States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 144, 145-46 (3rd Cir. 2009); United\\nStates v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 218-19 (2nd Cir. 2007); United States v. Letsinger,\\n93 F.3d 140, 143-45 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1406-\\n07 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir.\\n1994).\\n\\n We turn then to the claim of supervisory liability against Police Chief Jackson.\\nIn addressing this issue, the panel opinion recognized that “Section 1983 liability\\ncannot attach to a supervisor merely because a subordinate violated someone’s\\nconstitutional rights.” Johnson, 864 F.3d at 877 (quoting Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d\\n1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997)). As we held in Moore v. City of Desloge, 647 F.3d 841,\\n849 (8th Cir. 2011), “This circuit has consistently recognized a general rule that, in\\norder for municipal liability to attach, individual liability first must be found on an\\nunderlying substantive claim.” (quoting McCoy v. City of Monticello, 411 F.3d 920,\\n922 (8th Cir. 2005)). Further, “to maintain an action for training or supervisory\\nliability, a plaintiff must show the failure to train or supervise caused the injury.\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\nBecause Moore failed to establish Officer Malady violated Moore’s constitutional\\nrights, Moore cannot maintain this action against either Chief Bullock or the city.”\\nId. (internal citation omitted). In light of our holding that no seizure and thus no\\nconstitutional violation occurred in this case, Johnson’s claim of supervisory liability\\nagainst Chief Jackson necessarily fails, as perforce does any claim of municipal\\nliability against the City of Ferguson. Accord Mahn v. Jefferson Cty., 891 F.3d 1093,\\n1099-1100 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n The district court’s order is reversed and the case is remanded with directions\\nto dismiss the federal claims.\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge, with whom SMITH, Chief Judge, KELLY and\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4407387/\", \"author_raw\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.\\n\\n At this stage of the proceedings the majority has identified a single issue that\\nmust be addressed: Was there a Fourth Amendment seizure? On appeal, Officer\\nWilson argues that, under the Fourth Amendment, his actions neither qualified as a\\nshow of authority to stop nor did Johnson actually stop. The Court today holds that\\nthe facts alleged in Johnson’s complaint—viewed in the light most favorable to\\nJohnson—cannot establish a Fourth Amendment seizure. I respectfully disagree and\\ntherefore dissent.\\n\\nI. Fourth Amendment Violation\\n\\n In his § 1983 claim, Johnson asserts that Officer Wilson violated the Fourth\\nAmendment by unreasonably seizing Johnson. The Fourth Amendment prohibits\\n“unreasonable . . . seizures” of persons. U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the\\npeople to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not\\nbe violated . . . .”); accord California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). Thus,\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\nto show a Fourth Amendment violation, a claimant must show both that he was seized\\nand that the seizure was unreasonable.\\n\\n A. Seizure\\n\\n “A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the\\ngovernment’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘by means of\\nphysical force or show of authority,’ terminates or restrains his freedom of movement\\nthrough means intentionally applied.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254\\n(2007) (citations and emphasis omitted, emphasis added). In claiming a seizure\\nthrough a show of authority (rather than through physical force), the claimant must\\ndemonstrate both (1) a show of authority and (2) actual submission to that show of\\nauthority. Id.\\n\\n 1. Show of Authority\\n\\n To determine whether there was a show of authority, courts apply an objective\\ntest: “not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his\\nmovement, but whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to\\na reasonable person.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628; accord Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.\\n429, 437 (1991) (framing the analysis as whether the officer’s conduct would “have\\ncommunicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police\\npresence and go about his business” (citation omitted)). This analysis is based on\\n“the totality of circumstances surrounding the incident.” United States v. Johnson,\\n326 F.3d 1018, 1021 (8th Cir. 2003). Factors relevant to the analysis include “the\\npresence of several officers, a display of a weapon by an officer, physical touching\\nof the person, or the ‘use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with\\nthe officer’s request might be compelled.’” United States v. Flores–Sandoval, 474\\nF.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Hathcock, 103 F.3d 715,\\n719 (8th Cir. 1997)). Although this is an objective, reasonable-person standard (and\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nalthough Fourth Amendment cases are necessarily fact specific), this Court has\\nfrequently set a high bar for police conduct to qualify as a Fourth Amendment show\\nof authority. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 842 F.3d 597, 601 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(holding that the defendant was not seized when police officers parked their vehicle\\nbehind defendant’s parked car, activated the patrol car’s “wig wag” lights, and\\napproached the defendant’s vehicle); United States v. Hayden, 759 F.3d 842, 846 (8th\\nCir. 2014) (holding that the defendant was not seized when a police officer pulled his\\nvehicle alongside the defendant, shined a flashlight on him, and yelled “Police!”).\\n\\n Here, I believe that Officer Wilson made a show of authority communicating\\nthat Johnson “was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his\\nbusiness.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437. As stated above, the only facts relevant at this\\nprocedural posture are those alleged in the complaint. And the Court must accept\\nthose facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to Johnson. To recap,\\nJohnson’s complaint alleged the following facts relevant to this issue:\\n\\n • As Johnson and Brown walked peacefully and “lawfully” down\\n the road, Officer Wilson, operating a marked police vehicle,\\n approached Johnson and Brown, slowed his vehicle to a stop, and\\n ordered them to “Get the f*ck on the sidewalk.”\\n\\n • Officer Wilson continued to drive his vehicle several yards, then\\n abruptly put his vehicle into reverse and parked his vehicle at an\\n angle so as to block the paths of Johnson and Brown.\\n\\n • Officer Wilson stopped his vehicle just inches from Brown and\\n forcefully opened his door, striking Brown. Officer Wilson then\\n reached through his window and grabbed Brown, who was closer\\n to Officer Wilson than Johnson. Officer Wilson thereafter\\n threatened to shoot his weapon. As Brown struggled to break\\n free, Officer Wilson discharged his weapon twice, striking Brown\\n in the arm. Surprised by Officer Wilson’s use of “excessive”\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\n force and fearing for his life, Plaintiff Johnson ran away from\\n Officer Wilson simultaneously with Brown.\\n\\n By crudely ordering Johnson to move and then abruptly reversing his vehicle\\nand stopping it inches away and directly in Johnson’s path, Officer Wilson\\ncommunicated an intent to use a roadblock to stop Johnson’s movement. Despite\\nDefendants’ (and amicus curiae’s) argument that the roadblock did not foreclose all\\nof Johnson’s avenues of travel, a reasonable person would understand the roadblock’s\\npurpose was to serve as a “physical obstacle” conveying an order to stop—not an\\norder to go around the vehicle and continue on one’s way. Brower v. Cty. of Inyo,\\n489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989) (“We think it enough for a seizure that a person be stopped\\nby the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result.\\nIt was enough here, therefore, that, according to the allegations of the complaint,\\nBrower was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock—and that\\nhe was so stopped.”). Officer Wilson’s actions thus would convey to the “reasonable\\nperson that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his\\nbusiness.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.\\n\\n On this issue, amicus curiae The National Police Association argues that\\nOfficer Wilson’s order was nothing more than an order “simply for two pedestrians\\nto get off the street and use the sidewalk” and that “[h]e did not order anything other\\nthan compliance with the law.” Amicus Br. 8. This type of order is commonly\\nreferred to as a “move on” order and is meant to convey the message that a person is\\nfree to go anywhere else but cannot remain where he is. The parties have not cited,\\nnor am I aware of, any Eighth Circuit precedent addressing whether move-on orders\\nqualify as seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Other circuits have split on the\\nissue, with the analysis frequently (but not always) turning on whether there was\\nphysical contact. See, e.g., Salmon v. Blesser, 802 F.3d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 2015)\\n(holding that the plaintiff, who was physically removed from a courthouse—after an\\nofficer ordered him to leave, grabbed his shirt collar, twisted his arm behind his back,\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\nand shoved him toward the door—pleaded sufficient facts to allege a Fourth\\nAmendment violation); id. at 253 n.4 (stating that “nowhere in [any case] has the\\nSupreme Court suggested that police orders directing persons to move from particular\\npublic areas while leaving them free to go anywhere else they wish effect Fourth\\nAmendment seizures of the persons”); Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810,\\n834 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a “person is seized not only when a reasonable\\nperson would not feel free to leave an encounter with police, but also when a\\nreasonable person would not feel free to remain somewhere, by virtue of some\\nofficial action”); Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that\\na fired law clerk—ordered to leave a courthouse, escorted off the premises, and free\\nto go anywhere else, but who was not physically removed—was not seized for\\npurposes of the Fourth Amendment).\\n\\n The majority essentially agrees with this argument and asserts there was no\\nseizure because Johnson could merely have complied with the police officer’s\\ndirective and moved to the sidewalk. Were the facts as simple as the majority and\\namicus curiae present, then this would be a compelling argument as to why there was\\nno Fourth Amendment seizure. Had Officer Wilson blocked Johnson’s direction of\\ntravel but then permitted him to proceed to the sidewalk and continue on his way, a\\nreasonable person likely would believe he was “at liberty to ignore the police\\npresence and go about his business.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.\\n\\n But the facts are not as simple as amicus curiae contends. Officer Wilson’s\\ninitial command to get on the sidewalk merely began the encounter that then\\ncontinued. As alleged, Officer Wilson next escalated the encounter by abruptly\\nputting his vehicle into reverse and parking his car at an angle blocking Johnson’s\\npath and within inches of Brown and Johnson. Officer Wilson then fought with\\nBrown and threatened to fire his firearm. These events, viewed in a light most\\nfavorable to Johnson, would communicate to the reasonable person that Johnson “was\\nnot at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Bostick, 501\\n\\n -9-\\n\\nU.S. at 437. Officer Wilson’s abrupt stopping of his vehicle inches away from\\nJohnson, thereby creating a roadblock, coupled with the threat of using his service\\nweapon, was a show of force communicating to a reasonable person the necessity to\\nstop and not continue on one’s way. Officer Wilson’s actions were a “show of\\nauthority . . . at least partly directed at [Johnson], and [conveying] that he was thus\\nnot free to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Brendlin, 551 U.S.\\nat 261.\\n\\n 2. Submission\\n\\n Assuming there is a show of authority, Johnson still must demonstrate that he\\nsubmitted to that show of authority. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626. Whereas fleeing\\nor refusing to comply with a show of authority does not qualify as submission to\\nauthority, id., stopping one’s movement often qualifies as submission, see Brendlin,\\n551 U.S. at 255–56 (collecting cases). But temporarily stopping is not always\\nsufficient to constitute a submission to authority. See United States v. Baldwin, 496\\nF.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that, after a police vehicle with activated lights\\nand sirens followed the defendant’s vehicle, the defendant’s “momentary stop did not\\nconstitute submission to police authority”). This analysis also depends, of course, on\\nthe facts of the case.\\n\\n Here, I believe that Johnson submitted to Officer Wilson’s show of authority.\\nJohnson stopped walking when Officer Wilson placed his vehicle directly in\\nJohnson’s path. Based on the alleged facts, Johnson’s stop was not a temporary,\\nreactionary pause caused by the roadblock placed in his path. Johnson did not\\nrecommence walking and go around the vehicle. Instead, Johnson remained\\nthroughout the time that Officer Wilson reached through his window and grabbed\\nBrown, threatened to shoot his weapon, wrestled with Brown who struggled to break\\nfree, and then twice fired his weapon.\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\n The majority seems to imply that Officer Wilson’s use of a weapon was\\ndirected at Brown only and that, while Brown may have been seized, Johnson was\\nnot. I do not believe the complaint can be parsed that finely. Both Brown and\\nJohnson were walking together, Officer Wilson pulled his vehicle in front of both,\\nboth eventually fled, and Officer Wilson fired his weapon in the direction of both,\\nstriking and killing Brown but missing Johnson. In short, I do not believe that from\\nthe perspective of a reasonable person encountering Officer Wilson, it can be\\nreasonably said Officer Wilson intended to seize Brown but not Johnson. If one of\\nthe two were seized, both were seized.\\n\\n One difficulty surrounding this issue is whether Johnson’s “submission to [the]\\nshow of governmental authority takes the form of passive acquiescence” that rises to\\nthe level of a submission to authority. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255. The Supreme Court\\nin Brendlin held that “what may amount to submission depends on what a person was\\ndoing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically\\noverpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to\\nrun away.” Id. at 262. There, the Court considered “whether a traffic stop subjects\\na passenger,” who merely remained in the car throughout the traffic stop, “to Fourth\\nAmendment seizure.” Id. at 254. The Court held that the passenger was seized. Id.\\nat 263. In so holding, the Court adopted a test for determining whether a claimant’s\\npassive acquiescence to a show of authority qualifies as submission to that show of\\nauthority: “We resolve this question by asking whether a reasonable person in [the\\nclaimant’s] position . . . would have believed himself free to ‘terminate the encounter’\\nbetween the police and himself.” Id. at 256–57 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436).\\n\\n Johnson’s stop was not passive acquiescence to a show of authority. For one,\\nJohnson did take some action to actively acquiesce to Officer Wilson’s show of\\nauthority: Johnson stopped walking. This is more than the passive acquiescence in\\nBrendlin where the defendant, a passenger, merely remained in his seat as the driver\\npulled over the vehicle. See 551 U.S. at 252, 263. Also, even assuming Johnson\\n\\n -11-\\n\\npassively acquiesced to the show of authority by merely remaining throughout the\\nencounter, “a reasonable person in [Johnson’s] position . . . would [not] have believed\\nhimself free to ‘terminate the encounter’ between the police and himself,” id. at\\n256–57 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436), for the reasons discussed above.\\n\\n B. Objective Reasonableness\\n\\n Johnson asserts that the alleged seizure was unreasonable and that Officer\\nWilson used excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As recognized\\nin the panel opinion, Defendants do not appear to present any argument that,\\nassuming there was a seizure, the seizure and use of deadly force were nevertheless\\nreasonable. Accordingly, Defendants have abandoned any argument on this issue.\\nSee Glasgow v. Nebraska, 819 F.3d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that claims not\\nmentioned in an appeal brief are forfeited).\\n\\n I would affirm the district court’s denial of the appellants’ motion to dismiss.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4407387/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":"MURPHY; MELLOY; COLLOTON; GRUENDER; BENTON; SHEPHERD; KELLY; ERICKSON"},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4630134/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Dorian JOHNSON Plaintiff - Appellee v. CITY OF FERGUSON, MISSOURI; Thomas Jackson; Darren Wilson Defendants - Appellants National Police Association Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-17\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 16-1697\n ___________________________\n\n Dorian Johnson\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\nCity of Ferguson, Missouri; Thomas Jackson; Darren Wilson\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\n\n ------------------------------\n\n National Police Association\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 10, 2018\n Filed: June 17, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, LOKEN, MURPHY,1 MELLOY,\nCOLLOTON, GRUENDER, BENTON, SHEPHERD, KELLY, and ERICKSON,\nCircuit Judges, En Banc.2\n ____________\n\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\n\n In Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 864 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2017), a panel of our\ncourt affirmed the district court’s ruling that Dorian Johnson had alleged sufficient\nfacts to state 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of unlawful seizure and the use of excessive\nforce against former Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson, as well as a claim of\nsupervisory liability against former Ferguson Police Chief Thomas Jackson, and thus\ndenied the defendants’ motion for dismissal based upon qualified immunity. We\ngranted their petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the panel’s opinion. We now\nreverse the district court’s order and remand with directions to dismiss the federal\nclaims.\n\n As alleged in Johnson’s complaint, he and Michael Brown, Jr. were “peacefully\nand lawfully” walking down Canfield Drive in Ferguson, Missouri, at approximately\n12:00 p.m. on August 9, 2014, when they were approached by Officer Darren Wilson\nin his marked police vehicle. As he approached the pair, Wilson slowed his vehicle\nand ordered them to “Get the f*ck on the sidewalk.” Wilson continued to drive his\nvehicle several more yards, then abruptly put the vehicle in reverse and parked it at\nan angle so as to block the pair’s path. After stopping his vehicle just inches from\nBrown, Wilson forcefully opened his door, striking Brown. Wilson reached through\nhis window, grabbed Brown, and threatened to shoot his weapon. As Brown\n\n 1\n The Honorable Diana E. Murphy participated in oral argument, but died on\nMay 16, 2018.\n 2\n Judge Grasz, Judge Stras, and Judge Kobes did not participate in the\nconsideration or decision of this matter.\n\n -2-\n\nstruggled to break free, Wilson discharged his weapon twice, striking Brown in the\narm. Both Brown and Johnson ran away from Wilson, who at no time ordered either\nof them to “stop” or “freeze,” but rather fired his weapon at the two men, with several\nof the shots striking and killing Brown.\n\n We agree with the panel opinion’s identification of the governing issue in this\ncase: “The crux of the motion to dismiss and this resulting appeal centers on the issue\nof whether there was a seizure. Johnson concedes that if there was no seizure\nvirtually all of his claims fall away.” Johnson, 864 F.3d at 872. We disagree with the\npanel’s ruling that a seizure occurred, and thus we hold that the district court erred\nin not granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss based upon their claim of qualified\nimmunity.\n\n Whatever one might say about Wilson’s expletive-expressed directive that\nBrown and Johnson move from the street to the sidewalk, Johnson’s complaint\nconcedes that neither he nor Brown was ordered to stop and to remain in place.\nJohnson’s decision to remain by Brown’s side during Brown’s altercation with\nWilson rather than complying with Wilson’s lawful command to return to the\nsidewalk was that of his own choosing. That he was able to leave the scene following\nthe discharge of Wilson’s weapon gives the lie to his argument that the placement of\nWilson’s vehicle prevented him from doing so. As was the case in United States v.\nHayden, 759 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2014), Wilson’s police vehicle constituted no\nbarrier to Johnson’s ability to cross to the sidewalk. Any physical or weapon-related\ncontact by Wilson was directed towards Brown alone in the first instance. In a word,\nthen, because Johnson himself was neither physically restrained nor prevented from\nproceeding to the sidewalk in compliance with Wilson’s directive rather than fleeing\nas he did, the question before us is alike to that presented in California v. Hodari D.,\n499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991):\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\n The narrow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of\n authority as with respect to application of physical force, a seizure\n occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does not.\n\nLikewise, what the Court wrote in Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007),\nis equally applicable in this case: “[T]here is no seizure without actual submission.”\nBecause there was no verbal or physical impediment to Johnson’s freedom of\nmovement, there was no submission to authority on his part even in a metaphysical\nsense of the meaning of that word. Accordingly, in the absence of any intentional\nacquisition of physical control terminating Johnson’s freedom of movement through\nmeans intentionally applied, as occurred in both Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S.\n593, 596-99 (1989), and in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4, 7 (1985), we conclude\nthat no seizure occurred in this case. See also United States v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991,\n995 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059, 1065-66 (10th Cir.\n2010); United States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 144, 145-46 (3rd Cir. 2009); United\nStates v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 218-19 (2nd Cir. 2007); United States v. Letsinger,\n93 F.3d 140, 143-45 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1406-\n07 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir.\n1994).\n\n We turn then to the claim of supervisory liability against Police Chief Jackson.\nIn addressing this issue, the panel opinion recognized that “Section 1983 liability\ncannot attach to a supervisor merely because a subordinate violated someone’s\nconstitutional rights.” Johnson, 864 F.3d at 877 (quoting Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d\n1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997)). As we held in Moore v. City of Desloge, 647 F.3d 841,\n849 (8th Cir. 2011), “This circuit has consistently recognized a general rule that, in\norder for municipal liability to attach, individual liability first must be found on an\nunderlying substantive claim.” (quoting McCoy v. City of Monticello, 411 F.3d 920,\n922 (8th Cir. 2005)). Further, “to maintain an action for training or supervisory\nliability, a plaintiff must show the failure to train or supervise caused the injury.\n\n\n -4-\n\nBecause Moore failed to establish Officer Malady violated Moore’s constitutional\nrights, Moore cannot maintain this action against either Chief Bullock or the city.”\nId. (internal citation omitted). In light of our holding that no seizure and thus no\nconstitutional violation occurred in this case, Johnson’s claim of supervisory liability\nagainst Chief Jackson necessarily fails, as perforce does any claim of municipal\nliability against the City of Ferguson. Accord Mahn v. Jefferson Cty., 891 F.3d 1093,\n1099-1100 (8th Cir. 2018).\n\n The district court’s order is reversed and the case is remanded with directions\nto dismiss the federal claims.\n\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge, with whom SMITH, Chief Judge, KELLY and\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Dorian JOHNSON Plaintiff - Appellee v. CITY OF FERGUSON, MISSOURI; Thomas Jackson; Darren Wilson Defendants - Appellants National Police Association Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-17\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 16-1697\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Dorian Johnson\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\nCity of Ferguson, Missouri; Thomas Jackson; Darren Wilson\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n National Police Association\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 10, 2018\\n Filed: June 17, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, LOKEN, MURPHY,1 MELLOY,\\nCOLLOTON, GRUENDER, BENTON, SHEPHERD, KELLY, and ERICKSON,\\nCircuit Judges, En Banc.2\\n ____________\\n\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 864 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2017), a panel of our\\ncourt affirmed the district court’s ruling that Dorian Johnson had alleged sufficient\\nfacts to state 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of unlawful seizure and the use of excessive\\nforce against former Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson, as well as a claim of\\nsupervisory liability against former Ferguson Police Chief Thomas Jackson, and thus\\ndenied the defendants’ motion for dismissal based upon qualified immunity. We\\ngranted their petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the panel’s opinion. We now\\nreverse the district court’s order and remand with directions to dismiss the federal\\nclaims.\\n\\n As alleged in Johnson’s complaint, he and Michael Brown, Jr. were “peacefully\\nand lawfully” walking down Canfield Drive in Ferguson, Missouri, at approximately\\n12:00 p.m. on August 9, 2014, when they were approached by Officer Darren Wilson\\nin his marked police vehicle. As he approached the pair, Wilson slowed his vehicle\\nand ordered them to “Get the f*ck on the sidewalk.” Wilson continued to drive his\\nvehicle several more yards, then abruptly put the vehicle in reverse and parked it at\\nan angle so as to block the pair’s path. After stopping his vehicle just inches from\\nBrown, Wilson forcefully opened his door, striking Brown. Wilson reached through\\nhis window, grabbed Brown, and threatened to shoot his weapon. As Brown\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Diana E. Murphy participated in oral argument, but died on\\nMay 16, 2018.\\n 2\\n Judge Grasz, Judge Stras, and Judge Kobes did not participate in the\\nconsideration or decision of this matter.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nstruggled to break free, Wilson discharged his weapon twice, striking Brown in the\\narm. Both Brown and Johnson ran away from Wilson, who at no time ordered either\\nof them to “stop” or “freeze,” but rather fired his weapon at the two men, with several\\nof the shots striking and killing Brown.\\n\\n We agree with the panel opinion’s identification of the governing issue in this\\ncase: “The crux of the motion to dismiss and this resulting appeal centers on the issue\\nof whether there was a seizure. Johnson concedes that if there was no seizure\\nvirtually all of his claims fall away.” Johnson, 864 F.3d at 872. We disagree with the\\npanel’s ruling that a seizure occurred, and thus we hold that the district court erred\\nin not granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss based upon their claim of qualified\\nimmunity.\\n\\n Whatever one might say about Wilson’s expletive-expressed directive that\\nBrown and Johnson move from the street to the sidewalk, Johnson’s complaint\\nconcedes that neither he nor Brown was ordered to stop and to remain in place.\\nJohnson’s decision to remain by Brown’s side during Brown’s altercation with\\nWilson rather than complying with Wilson’s lawful command to return to the\\nsidewalk was that of his own choosing. That he was able to leave the scene following\\nthe discharge of Wilson’s weapon gives the lie to his argument that the placement of\\nWilson’s vehicle prevented him from doing so. As was the case in United States v.\\nHayden, 759 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2014), Wilson’s police vehicle constituted no\\nbarrier to Johnson’s ability to cross to the sidewalk. Any physical or weapon-related\\ncontact by Wilson was directed towards Brown alone in the first instance. In a word,\\nthen, because Johnson himself was neither physically restrained nor prevented from\\nproceeding to the sidewalk in compliance with Wilson’s directive rather than fleeing\\nas he did, the question before us is alike to that presented in California v. Hodari D.,\\n499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991):\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n The narrow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of\\n authority as with respect to application of physical force, a seizure\\n occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does not.\\n\\nLikewise, what the Court wrote in Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007),\\nis equally applicable in this case: “[T]here is no seizure without actual submission.”\\nBecause there was no verbal or physical impediment to Johnson’s freedom of\\nmovement, there was no submission to authority on his part even in a metaphysical\\nsense of the meaning of that word. Accordingly, in the absence of any intentional\\nacquisition of physical control terminating Johnson’s freedom of movement through\\nmeans intentionally applied, as occurred in both Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S.\\n593, 596-99 (1989), and in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4, 7 (1985), we conclude\\nthat no seizure occurred in this case. See also United States v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991,\\n995 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059, 1065-66 (10th Cir.\\n2010); United States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 144, 145-46 (3rd Cir. 2009); United\\nStates v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 218-19 (2nd Cir. 2007); United States v. Letsinger,\\n93 F.3d 140, 143-45 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1406-\\n07 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir.\\n1994).\\n\\n We turn then to the claim of supervisory liability against Police Chief Jackson.\\nIn addressing this issue, the panel opinion recognized that “Section 1983 liability\\ncannot attach to a supervisor merely because a subordinate violated someone’s\\nconstitutional rights.” Johnson, 864 F.3d at 877 (quoting Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d\\n1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997)). As we held in Moore v. City of Desloge, 647 F.3d 841,\\n849 (8th Cir. 2011), “This circuit has consistently recognized a general rule that, in\\norder for municipal liability to attach, individual liability first must be found on an\\nunderlying substantive claim.” (quoting McCoy v. City of Monticello, 411 F.3d 920,\\n922 (8th Cir. 2005)). Further, “to maintain an action for training or supervisory\\nliability, a plaintiff must show the failure to train or supervise caused the injury.\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\nBecause Moore failed to establish Officer Malady violated Moore’s constitutional\\nrights, Moore cannot maintain this action against either Chief Bullock or the city.”\\nId. (internal citation omitted). In light of our holding that no seizure and thus no\\nconstitutional violation occurred in this case, Johnson’s claim of supervisory liability\\nagainst Chief Jackson necessarily fails, as perforce does any claim of municipal\\nliability against the City of Ferguson. Accord Mahn v. Jefferson Cty., 891 F.3d 1093,\\n1099-1100 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n The district court’s order is reversed and the case is remanded with directions\\nto dismiss the federal claims.\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge, with whom SMITH, Chief Judge, KELLY and\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2679,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4631057,"string":"4,631,057"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Donald Thomas PERRIN, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Donald Thomas Perrin"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1503"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Arnold, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1503\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Donald Thomas Perrin\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 11, 2019\\n Filed: June 19, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Donald Thomas Perrin pled guilty to production of child pornography, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e), and to commission of a felony offense involving\\na minor while being required to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n\\f§ 2260A. The district court1 sentenced him to 360 months imprisonment on the first\\ncount and 120 months imprisonment on the second count, to run consecutively to one\\nanother. The court also imposed a 20-year term of supervised release on the first\\ncount and a 3-year term of supervised release on the second count, to run concurrently\\nto one another. Over Perrin’s objection, the district court imposed a special condition\\nof supervision that he “not possess or use a computer or have access to any online\\nservice without the prior approval of the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services\\nOffice.” Judgment 5, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 111. For the first time on appeal, Perrin\\nchallenges the condition on First Amendment grounds. Having jurisdiction under 28\\nU.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n This Court ordinarily “reviews the district court’s imposition of the terms and\\nconditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion[,] . . . reviews de novo a\\ndistrict court’s legal conclusion that a condition does not violate a defendant’s\\nconstitutional rights, and reviews for clear error the factual findings supporting that\\nconclusion.” United States v. Fonder, 719 F.3d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 2013). This case,\\nhowever, warrants an exception, as Perrin invokes the First Amendment for the first\\ntime on appeal. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en\\nbanc) (“An error by the trial court, even one affecting a constitutional right, is\\nforfeited—that is, not preserved for appeal—‘by the failure to make timely assertion\\nof the right.’” (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993))). It is well\\nestablished that, “[t]o preserve an error for appellate review, an objection must be\\ntimely and must ‘clearly stat[e] the grounds for the objection.’” Id. (quoting United\\nStates v. Williams, 994 F.2d 1287, 1294 (8th Cir. 1993)). This is “so that the trial\\ncourt has an opportunity to prevent or correct the error in the first instance.”\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fWilliams, 994 F.2d at 1294 (quoting United States v. Thornberg, 844 F.2d 573, 575\\n(8th Cir. 1988)).\\n\\n At his sentencing hearing, Perrin objected to the special condition “[t]o the\\nextent that it says that there is no use of computers unless approved by Probation” and\\n“ask[ed] the [district c]ourt to change that to no unlawful use of computers or . . . that\\nhe is allowed to use computers [for] the daily things that computers are now a part of\\nin our lives, paying bills and things of that nature.” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 40, Dist. Ct. Dkt.\\n125. However, he did not raise any of the First Amendment arguments he now urges\\non appeal—namely, that the special condition is “overbroad,” is “an overly\\nburdensome restriction on speech[,]” and “impermissibly restricts [his] right to lawful\\nspeech[.]” Appellant’s Br. i, 8-9. Compare United States v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784,\\n788 (8th Cir. 2013) (concluding that objection was sufficient to preserve due process\\nissue for appellate review because the objection was both “specific and timely” in that\\nit “adequately referenced the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses” and the\\ndistrict court had an opportunity to correct the alleged error), with United States v.\\nStults, 575 F.3d 834, 854 (8th Cir. 2009) (reviewing for plain error the district court’s\\nimposition of a special condition of supervised release because the defendant’s\\nobjection at sentencing specifically invoked the First Amendment and he argued the\\ncondition was overbroad “as it prohibited him from accessing lawful materials” but\\non appeal he argued that the condition was unconstitutionally vague). Perrin objected\\nto a different condition as “overly broad and unnecessary[,]” but not the one germane\\nto this appeal. Sent. Hr’g Tr. 40.\\n\\n Further, at no point did Perrin object to the special condition’s prohibition on\\n“access to any online service[.]” Judgment 5. Nor did he direct the district court\\nto Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), which serves as the\\npredicate for his First Amendment challenge to the special condition. See Appellant’s\\nBr. 11 (asking this Court to “re-examine” the special condition “in light of”\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fPackingham). Perrin cannot claim Packingham was unavailable to him; it was\\ndecided on June 19, 2017, well before his sentencing hearing on February 28, 2018.\\n\\n Nor is it material that the government argued that review is for abuse of\\ndiscretion, rather than for plain error. See United States v. Bain, 586 F.3d 634,\\n639 n.4, 639-40 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (reviewing for plain error despite the\\nparties claiming error was preserved and despite the government advocating for abuse\\nof discretion standard). Indeed, “[a] party’s concession on the standard of review\\ndoes not bind the court, as ‘[s]uch a determination remains for this court to make for\\nitself.’” Id. at 639 n.4 (second alteration in original) (quoting K & T Enters., Inc. v.\\nZurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Ellis, 815\\nF.3d 419, 422 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (reinforcing Bain); accord United States v. Macias,\\n789 F.3d 1011, 1017 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Which standard of review to apply is a\\npure issue of law, and, exercising our discretion, we apply the plain error standard of\\nreview notwithstanding the government’s failure to argue that it should\\napply.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 773 (6th Cir.\\n2011) (Thapar, J., concurring) (citing Bain as holding “that the parties cannot waive\\nplain error review by failing to request it” and stating that “[t]he Eighth Circuit is on\\nthe right side of the split”). But see United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581,\\n586-87 (1st Cir. 2015) (collecting cases from the First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and\\nD.C. Circuits that provide that, “[w]hen the government fails to request plain error\\nreview, . . . the claim [is reviewed] under the standard of review that is applied when\\nthe issue is properly preserved below”); United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690,\\n691 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that “the Government does not seek plain error\\nreview”).\\n\\n Accordingly, Perrin’s objection to the special condition is insufficient, and we\\nwill review for plain error. See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 549 (“Errors not properly\\npreserved are reviewed only for plain error . . . .”); see also United States v. Munjak,\\n669 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing for plain error imposition of special\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fcondition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from “accessing the Internet\\nwithout the prior approval of the probation office”). “The plain-error test is well\\nestablished[.]” United States v. Barthman, 919 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (8th Cir.\\n2019) (describing the four prongs of plain-error review). But we need not go through\\nthe test in depth because “[t]he threshold requirement for relief under the plain-error\\nstandard is the presence of an error and,” here, that is missing. United States v.\\nEvans, 908 F.3d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n It is well established that, “[w]hile a sentencing court has ‘wide discretion’ to\\nimpose special conditions of supervised release, such conditions must satisfy the\\nrequirements set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).” United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d\\n921, 944 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir.\\n2005)).\\n\\n First, the special conditions must be reasonably related to five matters:\\n the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and\\n characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the\\n public from further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s\\n educational, vocational, medical or other correctional needs. Second,\\n the conditions must involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is\\n reasonably necessary to advance deterrence, the protection of the public\\n from future crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s correctional\\n needs. Finally, the conditions must be consistent with any pertinent\\n policy statements issued by the sentencing commission.\\n\\nCrume, 422 F.3d at 733 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations\\nomitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Perrin only disputes the second of these requirements. See Appellant’s Br. 11.2\\nSpecifically, he argues that the special condition violates the First Amendment,\\nciting Packingham. In Packingham, the Supreme Court “held that a North Carolina\\nstatute prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing certain commonplace\\nsocial media websites violated the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.”\\nTimbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 690 (2019). The statute at issue in Packingham\\n“[made] it a felony for a registered sex offender ‘to access a commercial social\\nnetworking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor\\nchildren to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.’”\\n137 S. Ct. at 1733 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5(a), (e) (2015)).\\nPackingham, however, is of no help to Perrin for at least three reasons.\\n\\n First, the Court in Packingham cautioned that its “opinion should not be\\ninterpreted as barring” the enactment of specific laws against specific criminal acts,\\nas such “acts are not protected speech even if speech is the means for their\\ncommission.” Id. at 1737. The Court “assumed that the First Amendment permits\\n[the enactment of] specific, narrowly tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from\\nengaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or\\nusing a website to gather information about a minor.” Id. (emphasis added); see\\nalso United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 293-95 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that the\\ndistrict court can limit the defendant’s First Amendment rights “with appropriately\\n\\n 2\\n At any rate, the special condition satisfies the first and third requirements.\\nSee United States v. Demers, 634 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2011) (per\\ncuriam) (“Demers argues that a ban on his access to the internet is not reasonably\\nrelated to the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors. We have repeatedly rejected this\\nargument.”); see also United States v. Fernandez, 776 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.\\n2015) (per curiam) (“[F]or sex offenses, the Guidelines address computer use,\\nrecommending district courts impose ‘[a] condition limiting the use of a computer or\\nan interactive computer service in cases in which the defendant used such\\nitems.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States Sentencing\\nCommission, Guidelines Manual, § 5D1.3(d)(7)(B))).\\n -6-\\n\\ftailored conditions of supervised release” that achieve “[t]he goal of restricting [the\\ndefendant]’s internet use . . . to keep him from preying on children”). Notably, the\\nCourt in Packingham observed that the State of North Carolina never alleged that the\\npetitioner “contacted a minor—or committed any other illicit act—on the Internet.”\\n137 S. Ct. at 1734; see also United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2019)\\n(distinguishing case from another case where a ban on Internet use was upheld\\nbecause the defendant had not “been charged with or convicted of a sex crime\\ninvolving Internet use” nor did “the crime of conviction or the violation of supervised\\nrelease involve[] using the Internet to prey on children or otherwise endanger the\\npublic”); United States v. Avila, 719 F. App’x 591, 594-95 (9th Cir.\\n2017) (mem.) (vacating, on plain-error review, special condition of supervised release\\nprohibiting the possession or use of a computer or device with access to the Internet\\nunless approved by a probation officer because neither the defendant’s “underlying\\nconviction nor his supervised release violations involved use of the internet”).\\n\\n Here, unlike in Packingham, Perrin did contact a minor. Despite having never\\nmet the minor in person, Perrin used applications like Kik Messenger3 and FaceTime4\\nto have sexually explicit communications with the minor. Perrin sent the minor a\\npicture of his penis via Kik Messenger, and the district court found credible\\ntestimony that the minor and Perrin “engaged in masturbation during their FaceTime\\nconversations.” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 10. Further, the district court found, in relevant part,\\nthat, “over the course of several years[, Perrin] preyed on and . . . victimized a teenage\\ngirl and . . . used technology to invade her home and her bedroom, places that were\\n\\n 3\\n Kik Messenger “is a free app available on most mobile platforms and allows\\npeople to find strangers and communicate with them anonymously, through a user\\nname.” United States v. Jauron, 832 F.3d 859, 861 n.3 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted).\\n 4\\n FaceTime “is a cell phone application that allows users to communicate over\\nvideo.” Hylland v. Flaum, No. 4:16-CV-04060-RAL, 2016 WL 6901267, at *1 n.3\\n(D.S.D. Nov. 22, 2016).\\n -7-\\n\\fsupposed to be her safest and most private spaces[, and] . . . committed [his] crimes\\nso that [he] could satisfy [his] deviant sexual desires . . . .” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 33. The\\ndistrict court noted that, when Perrin was previously on probation for possessing\\nchild pornography, he was “in contact with minor females” and after he had been\\ncharged with the underlying offenses, he “continued to initiate improper contact with\\n[his] victim.” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 34.\\n\\n Second, the statute at issue in Packingham prohibited registered sex offenders\\nfrom accessing commercial social-networking sites, even after “hav[ing] completed\\ntheir sentences.” 137 S. Ct. at 1737; accord United States v. Antczak, 753 F. App’x\\n705, 714-15 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (addressing First Amendment challenge\\nunder Packingham to lifetime supervised release condition prohibiting possession or\\nuse of a computer unless approved by the court, and finding no “error, plain or\\notherwise[,]” primarily because, “unlike the condition imposed on [the defendant] for\\nhis past behavior, the statute at issue in Packingham was prospective: rather than\\nsimply punishing a past crime, the statute there made it a new felony for a person to\\nuse all social-media outlets, even though that person had had all impingements upon\\nhis constitutional rights lifted by fully serving the prior sentence”); United States v.\\nHalverson, 897 F.3d 645, 657-58 (5th Cir. 2018) (addressing First Amendment\\nchallenge under Packingham to lifetime supervised release condition prohibiting\\nInternet access unless approved by a probation officer, and finding no plain error in\\nimposing the condition primarily because “the driving concern of the Court [in\\nPackingham] was the imposition of a severe restriction on persons who had served\\ntheir sentences and were no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice\\nsystem”); United States v. Browder, 866 F.3d 504, 511 n.26 (2d Cir. 2017), cert.\\ndenied, 138 S. Ct. 693 (2018) (noting Packingham “involved an internet ban . . . and\\nthat ban extended beyond the completion of a sentence”); United States v. Rock, 863\\nF.3d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding “no plain error in the imposition\\nof” a supervised-release condition prohibiting the possession or use of a computer “or\\nhaving access to any online service, without the prior approval of the probation\\n\\n -8-\\n\\foffice[,]” notwithstanding Packingham because the condition was “imposed as part\\nof [a] supervised-release sentence, and [was] not a post-custodial restriction of the\\nsort imposed” in Packingham).\\n\\n A term of supervised release, however, is “a part of the sentence,” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(a); United States v. James, 792 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2015), “rather than a\\npost-sentence penalty[,]” Halverson, 897 F.3d at 658, and, therefore, Perrin has not\\ncompleted his sentence. See Holena, 906 F.3d at 295 (“Defendants on supervised\\nrelease enjoy less freedom than those who have finished serving their\\nsentences.” (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001))).\\n\\n Third, the Court in Packingham found that the North Carolina statute was a\\n“complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites integral to the\\nfabric of our modern society and culture.” 137 S. Ct. at 1738. Here, unlike in\\nPackingham, Perrin may possess or use a computer or have access to the Internet so\\nlong as he obtains approval from his probation officer. As Perrin acknowledges, see\\nAppellant’s Br. 10, in United States v. Durham, we held that the district court “did not\\nabuse its discretion, much less plainly err, in imposing” a special condition of\\nsupervised release that prohibited the defendant from accessing the Internet “as long\\nas he obtain[ed] permission from the probation office[.]” 618 F.3d at 945. We\\nexplained that the condition did not “involve[] a greater deprivation of liberty than\\nis reasonably necessary” for two reasons. Id. at 944-45. For one, the condition was\\nnot “a complete ban on Internet access” because it permitted the defendant “to access\\nthe Internet as long as he obtain[ed] permission from the probation office.” Id. at\\n944. Thus, the condition was “treated as merely a partial deprivation of [the\\ndefendant]’s interest in having unfettered access to the Internet.” Id. Additionally,\\nthe defendant in Durham had used his computer for more than simply possessing\\nchild pornography; he had “used his computer to distribute child pornography.” Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Although Durham did not involve a First Amendment challenge to a special\\ncondition of supervised release, Durham is instructive over the question of whether\\nthe special condition at issue “involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is\\nreasonably necessary . . . .” Id.; see also United States v. Newell, 915 F.3d 587,\\n591 (8th Cir. 2019) (“With regard to restricting access to Internet-connected devices,\\nwe consider relevant whether the defendant did more than merely possess child\\npornography and whether the restriction is a total ban.” (internal quotation marks\\nomitted)). We conclude that the special condition at issue does not involve a greater\\ndeprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. Like in Durham, here the special\\ncondition is not a complete ban on Internet access and there is ample evidence in the\\nrecord that Perrin used his devices for activities beyond simply possessing child\\npornography, including producing child pornography. See United States v. Bender,\\n566 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (“This court [has] affirmed computer and internet\\nrestrictions where the defendant . . . produced [child pornography.]”). Accordingly,\\nthe district court did not err, much less plainly err, in imposing the special condition.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4408310/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631057/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Donald Thomas PERRIN, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1503\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Donald Thomas Perrin\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\n ____________\n\n Submitted: March 11, 2019\n Filed: June 19, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\n Donald Thomas Perrin pled guilty to production of child pornography, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e), and to commission of a felony offense involving\na minor while being required to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n\f§ 2260A. The district court1 sentenced him to 360 months imprisonment on the first\ncount and 120 months imprisonment on the second count, to run consecutively to one\nanother. The court also imposed a 20-year term of supervised release on the first\ncount and a 3-year term of supervised release on the second count, to run concurrently\nto one another. Over Perrin’s objection, the district court imposed a special condition\nof supervision that he “not possess or use a computer or have access to any online\nservice without the prior approval of the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services\nOffice.” Judgment 5, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 111. For the first time on appeal, Perrin\nchallenges the condition on First Amendment grounds. Having jurisdiction under 28\nU.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n This Court ordinarily “reviews the district court’s imposition of the terms and\nconditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion[,] . . . reviews de novo a\ndistrict court’s legal conclusion that a condition does not violate a defendant’s\nconstitutional rights, and reviews for clear error the factual findings supporting that\nconclusion.” United States v. Fonder, 719 F.3d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 2013). This case,\nhowever, warrants an exception, as Perrin invokes the First Amendment for the first\ntime on appeal. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en\nbanc) (“An error by the trial court, even one affecting a constitutional right, is\nforfeited—that is, not preserved for appeal—‘by the failure to make timely assertion\nof the right.’” (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993))). It is well\nestablished that, “[t]o preserve an error for appellate review, an objection must be\ntimely and must ‘clearly stat[e] the grounds for the objection.’” Id. (quoting United\nStates v. Williams, 994 F.2d 1287, 1294 (8th Cir. 1993)). This is “so that the trial\ncourt has an opportunity to prevent or correct the error in the first instance.”\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the\nDistrict of Minnesota.\n\n -2-\n\fWilliams, 994 F.2d at 1294 (quoting United States v. Thornberg, 844 F.2d 573, 575\n(8th Cir. 1988)).\n\n At his sentencing hearing, Perrin objected to the special condition “[t]o the\nextent that it says that there is no use of computers unless approved by Probation” and\n“ask[ed] the [district c]ourt to change that to no unlawful use of computers or . . . that\nhe is allowed to use computers [for] the daily things that computers are now a part of\nin our lives, paying bills and things of that nature.” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 40, Dist. Ct. Dkt.\n125. However, he did not raise any of the First Amendment arguments he now urges\non appeal—namely, that the special condition is “overbroad,” is “an overly\nburdensome restriction on speech[,]” and “impermissibly restricts [his] right to lawful\nspeech[.]” Appellant’s Br. i, 8-9. Compare United States v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784,\n788 (8th Cir. 2013) (concluding that objection was sufficient to preserve due process\nissue for appellate review because the objection was both “specific and timely” in that\nit “adequately referenced the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses” and the\ndistrict court had an opportunity to correct the alleged error), with United States v.\nStults, 575 F.3d 834, 854 (8th Cir. 2009) (reviewing for plain error the district court’s\nimposition of a special condition of supervised release because the defendant’s\nobjection at sentencing specifically invoked the First Amendment and he argued the\ncondition was overbroad “as it prohibited him from accessing lawful materials” but\non appeal he argued that the condition was unconstitutionally vague). Perrin objected\nto a different condition as “overly broad and unnecessary[,]” but not the one germane\nto this appeal. Sent. Hr’g Tr. 40.\n\n Further, at no point did Perrin object to the special condition’s prohibition on\n“access to any online service[.]” Judgment 5. Nor did he direct the district court\nto Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), which serves as the\npredicate for his First Amendment challenge to the special condition. See Appellant’s\nBr. 11 (asking this Court to “re-examine” the special condition “in light of”\n\n\n\n -3-\n\fPackingham). Perrin cannot claim Packingham was unavailable to him; it was\ndecided on June 19, 2017, well before his sentencing hearing on February 28, 2018.\n\n Nor is it material that the government argued that review is for abuse of\ndiscretion, rather than for plain error. See United States v. Bain, 586 F.3d 634,\n639 n.4, 639-40 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (reviewing for plain error despite the\nparties claiming error was preserved and despite the government advocating for abuse\nof discretion standard). Indeed, “[a] party’s concession on the standard of review\ndoes not bind the court, as ‘[s]uch a determination remains for this court to make for\nitself.’” Id. at 639 n.4 (second alteration in original) (quoting K & T Enters., Inc. v.\nZurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Ellis, 815\nF.3d 419, 422 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (reinforcing Bain); accord United States v. Macias,\n789 F.3d 1011, 1017 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Which standard of review to apply is a\npure issue of law, and, exercising our discretion, we apply the plain error standard of\nreview notwithstanding the government’s failure to argue that it should\napply.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 773 (6th Cir.\n2011) (Thapar, J., concurring) (citing Bain as holding “that the parties cannot waive\nplain error review by failing to request it” and stating that “[t]he Eighth Circuit is on\nthe right side of the split”). But see United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581,\n586-87 (1st Cir. 2015) (collecting cases from the First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and\nD.C. Circuits that provide that, “[w]hen the government fails to request plain error\nreview, . . . the claim [is reviewed] under the standard of review that is applied when\nthe issue is properly preserved below”); United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690,\n691 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that “the Government does not seek plain error\nreview”).\n\n Accordingly, Perrin’s objection to the special condition is insufficient, and we\nwill review for plain error. See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 549 (“Errors not properly\npreserved are reviewed only for plain error . . . .”); see also United States v. Munjak,\n669 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing for plain error imposition of special\n\n -4-\n\fcondition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from “accessing the Internet\nwithout the prior approval of the probation office”). “The plain-error test is well\nestablished[.]” United States v. Barthman, 919 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (8th Cir.\n2019) (describing the four prongs of plain-error review). But we need not go through\nthe test in depth because “[t]he threshold requirement for relief under the plain-error\nstandard is the presence of an error and,” here, that is missing. United States v.\nEvans, 908 F.3d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 2018).\n\n II.\n\n It is well established that, “[w]hile a sentencing court has ‘wide discretion’ to\nimpose special conditions of supervised release, such conditions must satisfy the\nrequirements set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).” United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d\n921, 944 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir.\n2005)).\n\n First, the special conditions must be reasonably related to five matters:\n the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and\n characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the\n public from further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s\n educational, vocational, medical or other correctional needs. Second,\n the conditions must involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is\n reasonably necessary to advance deterrence, the protection of the public\n from future crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s correctional\n needs. Finally, the conditions must be consistent with any pertinent\n policy statements issued by the sentencing commission.\n\nCrume, 422 F.3d at 733 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations\nomitted).\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f Perrin only disputes the second of these requirements. See Appellant’s Br. 11.2\nSpecifically, he argues that the special condition violates the First Amendment,\nciting Packingham. In Packingham, the Supreme Court “held that a North Carolina\nstatute prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing certain commonplace\nsocial media websites violated the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.”\nTimbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 690 (2019). The statute at issue in Packingham\n“[made] it a felony for a registered sex offender ‘to access a commercial social\nnetworking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor\nchildren to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.’”\n137 S. Ct. at 1733 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5(a), (e) (2015)).\nPackingham, however, is of no help to Perrin for at least three reasons.\n\n First, the Court in Packingham cautioned that its “opinion should not be\ninterpreted as barring” the enactment of specific laws against specific criminal acts,\nas such “acts are not protected speech even if speech is the means for their\ncommission.” Id. at 1737. The Court “assumed that the First Amendment permits\n[the enactment of] specific, narrowly tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from\nengaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or\nusing a website to gather information about a minor.” Id. (emphasis added); see\nalso United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 293-95 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that the\ndistrict court can limit the defendant’s First Amendment rights “with appropriately\n\n 2\n At any rate, the special condition satisfies the first and third requirements.\nSee United States v. Demers, 634 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2011) (per\ncuriam) (“Demers argues that a ban on his access to the internet is not reasonably\nrelated to the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors. We have repeatedly rejected this\nargument.”); see also United States v. Fernandez, 776 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.\n2015) (per curiam) (“[F]or sex offenses, the Guidelines address computer use,\nrecommending district courts impose ‘[a] condition limiting the use of a computer or\nan interactive computer service in cases in which the defendant used such\nitems.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States Sentencing\nCommission, Guidelines Manual, § 5D1.3(d)(7)(B))).\n -6-\n\ftailored conditions of supervised release” that achieve “[t]he goal of restricting [the\ndefendant]’s internet use . . . to keep him from preying on children”). Notably, the\nCourt in Packingham observed that the State of North Carolina never alleged that the\npetitioner “contacted a minor—or committed any other illicit act—on the Internet.”\n137 S. Ct. at 1734; see also United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2019)\n(distinguishing case from another case where a ban on Internet use was upheld\nbecause the defendant had not “been charged with or convicted of a sex crime\ninvolving Internet use” nor did “the crime of conviction or the violation of supervised\nrelease involve[] using the Internet to prey on children or otherwise endanger the\npublic”); United States v. Avila, 719 F. App’x 591, 594-95 (9th Cir.\n2017) (mem.) (vacating, on plain-error review, special condition of supervised release\nprohibiting the possession or use of a computer or device with access to the Internet\nunless approved by a probation officer because neither the defendant’s “underlying\nconviction nor his supervised release violations involved use of the internet”).\n\n Here, unlike in Packingham, Perrin did contact a minor. Despite having never\nmet the minor in person, Perrin used applications like Kik Messenger3 and FaceTime4\nto have sexually explicit communications with the minor. Perrin sent the minor a\npicture of his penis via Kik Messenger, and the district court found credible\ntestimony that the minor and Perrin “engaged in masturbation during their FaceTime\nconversations.” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 10. Further, the district court found, in relevant part,\nthat, “over the course of several years[, Perrin] preyed on and . . . victimized a teenage\ngirl and . . . used technology to invade her home and her bedroom, places that were\n\n 3\n Kik Messenger “is a free app available on most mobile platforms and allows\npeople to find strangers and communicate with them anonymously, through a user\nname.” United States v. Jauron, 832 F.3d 859, 861 n.3 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal\nquotation marks omitted).\n 4\n FaceTime “is a cell phone application that allows users to communicate over\nvideo.” Hylland v. Flaum, No. 4:16-CV-04060-RAL, 2016 WL 6901267, at *1 n.3\n(D.S.D. Nov. 22, 2016).\n -7-\n\fsupposed to be her safest and most private spaces[, and] . . . committed [his] crimes\nso that [he] could satisfy [his] deviant sexual desires . . . .” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 33. The\ndistrict court noted that, when Perrin was previously on probation for possessing\nchild pornography, he was “in contact with minor females” and after he had been\ncharged with the underlying offenses, he “continued to initiate improper contact with\n[his] victim.” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 34.\n\n Second, the statute at issue in Packingham prohibited registered sex offenders\nfrom accessing commercial social-networking sites, even after “hav[ing] completed\ntheir sentences.” 137 S. Ct. at 1737; accord United States v. Antczak, 753 F. App’x\n705, 714-15 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (addressing First Amendment challenge\nunder Packingham to lifetime supervised release condition prohibiting possession or\nuse of a computer unless approved by the court, and finding no “error, plain or\notherwise[,]” primarily because, “unlike the condition imposed on [the defendant] for\nhis past behavior, the statute at issue in Packingham was prospective: rather than\nsimply punishing a past crime, the statute there made it a new felony for a person to\nuse all social-media outlets, even though that person had had all impingements upon\nhis constitutional rights lifted by fully serving the prior sentence”); United States v.\nHalverson, 897 F.3d 645, 657-58 (5th Cir. 2018) (addressing First Amendment\nchallenge under Packingham to lifetime supervised release condition prohibiting\nInternet access unless approved by a probation officer, and finding no plain error in\nimposing the condition primarily because “the driving concern of the Court [in\nPackingham] was the imposition of a severe restriction on persons who had served\ntheir sentences and were no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice\nsystem”); United States v. Browder, 866 F.3d 504, 511 n.26 (2d Cir. 2017), cert.\ndenied, 138 S. Ct. 693 (2018) (noting Packingham “involved an internet ban . . . and\nthat ban extended beyond the completion of a sentence”); United States v. Rock, 863\nF.3d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding “no plain error in the imposition\nof” a supervised-release condition prohibiting the possession or use of a computer “or\nhaving access to any online service, without the prior approval of the probation\n\n -8-\n\foffice[,]” notwithstanding Packingham because the condition was “imposed as part\nof [a] supervised-release sentence, and [was] not a post-custodial restriction of the\nsort imposed” in Packingham).\n\n A term of supervised release, however, is “a part of the sentence,” 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3583(a); United States v. James, 792 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2015), “rather than a\npost-sentence penalty[,]” Halverson, 897 F.3d at 658, and, therefore, Perrin has not\ncompleted his sentence. See Holena, 906 F.3d at 295 (“Defendants on supervised\nrelease enjoy less freedom than those who have finished serving their\nsentences.” (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001))).\n\n Third, the Court in Packingham found that the North Carolina statute was a\n“complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites integral to the\nfabric of our modern society and culture.” 137 S. Ct. at 1738. Here, unlike in\nPackingham, Perrin may possess or use a computer or have access to the Internet so\nlong as he obtains approval from his probation officer. As Perrin acknowledges, see\nAppellant’s Br. 10, in United States v. Durham, we held that the district court “did not\nabuse its discretion, much less plainly err, in imposing” a special condition of\nsupervised release that prohibited the defendant from accessing the Internet “as long\nas he obtain[ed] permission from the probation office[.]” 618 F.3d at 945. We\nexplained that the condition did not “involve[] a greater deprivation of liberty than\nis reasonably necessary” for two reasons. Id. at 944-45. For one, the condition was\nnot “a complete ban on Internet access” because it permitted the defendant “to access\nthe Internet as long as he obtain[ed] permission from the probation office.” Id. at\n944. Thus, the condition was “treated as merely a partial deprivation of [the\ndefendant]’s interest in having unfettered access to the Internet.” Id. Additionally,\nthe defendant in Durham had used his computer for more than simply possessing\nchild pornography; he had “used his computer to distribute child pornography.” Id.\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n\f Although Durham did not involve a First Amendment challenge to a special\ncondition of supervised release, Durham is instructive over the question of whether\nthe special condition at issue “involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is\nreasonably necessary . . . .” Id.; see also United States v. Newell, 915 F.3d 587,\n591 (8th Cir. 2019) (“With regard to restricting access to Internet-connected devices,\nwe consider relevant whether the defendant did more than merely possess child\npornography and whether the restriction is a total ban.” (internal quotation marks\nomitted)). We conclude that the special condition at issue does not involve a greater\ndeprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. Like in Durham, here the special\ncondition is not a complete ban on Internet access and there is ample evidence in the\nrecord that Perrin used his devices for activities beyond simply possessing child\npornography, including producing child pornography. See United States v. Bender,\n566 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (“This court [has] affirmed computer and internet\nrestrictions where the defendant . . . produced [child pornography.]”). Accordingly,\nthe district court did not err, much less plainly err, in imposing the special condition.\n\n III.\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -10-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Donald Thomas PERRIN, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1503\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Donald Thomas Perrin\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 11, 2019\\n Filed: June 19, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Donald Thomas Perrin pled guilty to production of child pornography, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e), and to commission of a felony offense involving\\na minor while being required to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n\\f§ 2260A. The district court1 sentenced him to 360 months imprisonment on the first\\ncount and 120 months imprisonment on the second count, to run consecutively to one\\nanother. The court also imposed a 20-year term of supervised release on the first\\ncount and a 3-year term of supervised release on the second count, to run concurrently\\nto one another. Over Perrin’s objection, the district court imposed a special condition\\nof supervision that he “not possess or use a computer or have access to any online\\nservice without the prior approval of the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services\\nOffice.” Judgment 5, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 111. For the first time on appeal, Perrin\\nchallenges the condition on First Amendment grounds. Having jurisdiction under 28\\nU.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n This Court ordinarily “reviews the district court’s imposition of the terms and\\nconditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion[,] . . . reviews de novo a\\ndistrict court’s legal conclusion that a condition does not violate a defendant’s\\nconstitutional rights, and reviews for clear error the factual findings supporting that\\nconclusion.” United States v. Fonder, 719 F.3d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 2013). This case,\\nhowever, warrants an exception, as Perrin invokes the First Amendment for the first\\ntime on appeal. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en\\nbanc) (“An error by the trial court, even one affecting a constitutional right, is\\nforfeited—that is, not preserved for appeal—‘by the failure to make timely assertion\\nof the right.’” (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993))). It is well\\nestablished that, “[t]o preserve an error for appellate review, an objection must be\\ntimely and must ‘clearly stat[e] the grounds for the objection.’” Id. (quoting United\\nStates v. Williams, 994 F.2d 1287, 1294 (8th Cir. 1993)). This is “so that the trial\\ncourt has an opportunity to prevent or correct the error in the first instance.”\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fWilliams, 994 F.2d at 1294 (quoting United States v. Thornberg, 844 F.2d 573, 575\\n(8th Cir. 1988)).\\n\\n At his sentencing hearing, Perrin objected to the special condition “[t]o the\\nextent that it says that there is no use of computers unless approved by Probation” and\\n“ask[ed] the [district c]ourt to change that to no unlawful use of computers or . . . that\\nhe is allowed to use computers [for] the daily things that computers are now a part of\\nin our lives, paying bills and things of that nature.” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 40, Dist. Ct. Dkt.\\n125. However, he did not raise any of the First Amendment arguments he now urges\\non appeal—namely, that the special condition is “overbroad,” is “an overly\\nburdensome restriction on speech[,]” and “impermissibly restricts [his] right to lawful\\nspeech[.]” Appellant’s Br. i, 8-9. Compare United States v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784,\\n788 (8th Cir. 2013) (concluding that objection was sufficient to preserve due process\\nissue for appellate review because the objection was both “specific and timely” in that\\nit “adequately referenced the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses” and the\\ndistrict court had an opportunity to correct the alleged error), with United States v.\\nStults, 575 F.3d 834, 854 (8th Cir. 2009) (reviewing for plain error the district court’s\\nimposition of a special condition of supervised release because the defendant’s\\nobjection at sentencing specifically invoked the First Amendment and he argued the\\ncondition was overbroad “as it prohibited him from accessing lawful materials” but\\non appeal he argued that the condition was unconstitutionally vague). Perrin objected\\nto a different condition as “overly broad and unnecessary[,]” but not the one germane\\nto this appeal. Sent. Hr’g Tr. 40.\\n\\n Further, at no point did Perrin object to the special condition’s prohibition on\\n“access to any online service[.]” Judgment 5. Nor did he direct the district court\\nto Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), which serves as the\\npredicate for his First Amendment challenge to the special condition. See Appellant’s\\nBr. 11 (asking this Court to “re-examine” the special condition “in light of”\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fPackingham). Perrin cannot claim Packingham was unavailable to him; it was\\ndecided on June 19, 2017, well before his sentencing hearing on February 28, 2018.\\n\\n Nor is it material that the government argued that review is for abuse of\\ndiscretion, rather than for plain error. See United States v. Bain, 586 F.3d 634,\\n639 n.4, 639-40 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (reviewing for plain error despite the\\nparties claiming error was preserved and despite the government advocating for abuse\\nof discretion standard). Indeed, “[a] party’s concession on the standard of review\\ndoes not bind the court, as ‘[s]uch a determination remains for this court to make for\\nitself.’” Id. at 639 n.4 (second alteration in original) (quoting K & T Enters., Inc. v.\\nZurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Ellis, 815\\nF.3d 419, 422 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (reinforcing Bain); accord United States v. Macias,\\n789 F.3d 1011, 1017 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Which standard of review to apply is a\\npure issue of law, and, exercising our discretion, we apply the plain error standard of\\nreview notwithstanding the government’s failure to argue that it should\\napply.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 773 (6th Cir.\\n2011) (Thapar, J., concurring) (citing Bain as holding “that the parties cannot waive\\nplain error review by failing to request it” and stating that “[t]he Eighth Circuit is on\\nthe right side of the split”). But see United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581,\\n586-87 (1st Cir. 2015) (collecting cases from the First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and\\nD.C. Circuits that provide that, “[w]hen the government fails to request plain error\\nreview, . . . the claim [is reviewed] under the standard of review that is applied when\\nthe issue is properly preserved below”); United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690,\\n691 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that “the Government does not seek plain error\\nreview”).\\n\\n Accordingly, Perrin’s objection to the special condition is insufficient, and we\\nwill review for plain error. See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 549 (“Errors not properly\\npreserved are reviewed only for plain error . . . .”); see also United States v. Munjak,\\n669 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing for plain error imposition of special\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fcondition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from “accessing the Internet\\nwithout the prior approval of the probation office”). “The plain-error test is well\\nestablished[.]” United States v. Barthman, 919 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (8th Cir.\\n2019) (describing the four prongs of plain-error review). But we need not go through\\nthe test in depth because “[t]he threshold requirement for relief under the plain-error\\nstandard is the presence of an error and,” here, that is missing. United States v.\\nEvans, 908 F.3d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n It is well established that, “[w]hile a sentencing court has ‘wide discretion’ to\\nimpose special conditions of supervised release, such conditions must satisfy the\\nrequirements set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).” United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d\\n921, 944 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir.\\n2005)).\\n\\n First, the special conditions must be reasonably related to five matters:\\n the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and\\n characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the\\n public from further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s\\n educational, vocational, medical or other correctional needs. Second,\\n the conditions must involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is\\n reasonably necessary to advance deterrence, the protection of the public\\n from future crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s correctional\\n needs. Finally, the conditions must be consistent with any pertinent\\n policy statements issued by the sentencing commission.\\n\\nCrume, 422 F.3d at 733 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations\\nomitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Perrin only disputes the second of these requirements. See Appellant’s Br. 11.2\\nSpecifically, he argues that the special condition violates the First Amendment,\\nciting Packingham. In Packingham, the Supreme Court “held that a North Carolina\\nstatute prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing certain commonplace\\nsocial media websites violated the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.”\\nTimbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 690 (2019). The statute at issue in Packingham\\n“[made] it a felony for a registered sex offender ‘to access a commercial social\\nnetworking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor\\nchildren to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.’”\\n137 S. Ct. at 1733 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5(a), (e) (2015)).\\nPackingham, however, is of no help to Perrin for at least three reasons.\\n\\n First, the Court in Packingham cautioned that its “opinion should not be\\ninterpreted as barring” the enactment of specific laws against specific criminal acts,\\nas such “acts are not protected speech even if speech is the means for their\\ncommission.” Id. at 1737. The Court “assumed that the First Amendment permits\\n[the enactment of] specific, narrowly tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from\\nengaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or\\nusing a website to gather information about a minor.” Id. (emphasis added); see\\nalso United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 293-95 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that the\\ndistrict court can limit the defendant’s First Amendment rights “with appropriately\\n\\n 2\\n At any rate, the special condition satisfies the first and third requirements.\\nSee United States v. Demers, 634 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2011) (per\\ncuriam) (“Demers argues that a ban on his access to the internet is not reasonably\\nrelated to the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors. We have repeatedly rejected this\\nargument.”); see also United States v. Fernandez, 776 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.\\n2015) (per curiam) (“[F]or sex offenses, the Guidelines address computer use,\\nrecommending district courts impose ‘[a] condition limiting the use of a computer or\\nan interactive computer service in cases in which the defendant used such\\nitems.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States Sentencing\\nCommission, Guidelines Manual, § 5D1.3(d)(7)(B))).\\n -6-\\n\\ftailored conditions of supervised release” that achieve “[t]he goal of restricting [the\\ndefendant]’s internet use . . . to keep him from preying on children”). Notably, the\\nCourt in Packingham observed that the State of North Carolina never alleged that the\\npetitioner “contacted a minor—or committed any other illicit act—on the Internet.”\\n137 S. Ct. at 1734; see also United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2019)\\n(distinguishing case from another case where a ban on Internet use was upheld\\nbecause the defendant had not “been charged with or convicted of a sex crime\\ninvolving Internet use” nor did “the crime of conviction or the violation of supervised\\nrelease involve[] using the Internet to prey on children or otherwise endanger the\\npublic”); United States v. Avila, 719 F. App’x 591, 594-95 (9th Cir.\\n2017) (mem.) (vacating, on plain-error review, special condition of supervised release\\nprohibiting the possession or use of a computer or device with access to the Internet\\nunless approved by a probation officer because neither the defendant’s “underlying\\nconviction nor his supervised release violations involved use of the internet”).\\n\\n Here, unlike in Packingham, Perrin did contact a minor. Despite having never\\nmet the minor in person, Perrin used applications like Kik Messenger3 and FaceTime4\\nto have sexually explicit communications with the minor. Perrin sent the minor a\\npicture of his penis via Kik Messenger, and the district court found credible\\ntestimony that the minor and Perrin “engaged in masturbation during their FaceTime\\nconversations.” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 10. Further, the district court found, in relevant part,\\nthat, “over the course of several years[, Perrin] preyed on and . . . victimized a teenage\\ngirl and . . . used technology to invade her home and her bedroom, places that were\\n\\n 3\\n Kik Messenger “is a free app available on most mobile platforms and allows\\npeople to find strangers and communicate with them anonymously, through a user\\nname.” United States v. Jauron, 832 F.3d 859, 861 n.3 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted).\\n 4\\n FaceTime “is a cell phone application that allows users to communicate over\\nvideo.” Hylland v. Flaum, No. 4:16-CV-04060-RAL, 2016 WL 6901267, at *1 n.3\\n(D.S.D. Nov. 22, 2016).\\n -7-\\n\\fsupposed to be her safest and most private spaces[, and] . . . committed [his] crimes\\nso that [he] could satisfy [his] deviant sexual desires . . . .” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 33. The\\ndistrict court noted that, when Perrin was previously on probation for possessing\\nchild pornography, he was “in contact with minor females” and after he had been\\ncharged with the underlying offenses, he “continued to initiate improper contact with\\n[his] victim.” Sent. Hr’g Tr. 34.\\n\\n Second, the statute at issue in Packingham prohibited registered sex offenders\\nfrom accessing commercial social-networking sites, even after “hav[ing] completed\\ntheir sentences.” 137 S. Ct. at 1737; accord United States v. Antczak, 753 F. App’x\\n705, 714-15 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (addressing First Amendment challenge\\nunder Packingham to lifetime supervised release condition prohibiting possession or\\nuse of a computer unless approved by the court, and finding no “error, plain or\\notherwise[,]” primarily because, “unlike the condition imposed on [the defendant] for\\nhis past behavior, the statute at issue in Packingham was prospective: rather than\\nsimply punishing a past crime, the statute there made it a new felony for a person to\\nuse all social-media outlets, even though that person had had all impingements upon\\nhis constitutional rights lifted by fully serving the prior sentence”); United States v.\\nHalverson, 897 F.3d 645, 657-58 (5th Cir. 2018) (addressing First Amendment\\nchallenge under Packingham to lifetime supervised release condition prohibiting\\nInternet access unless approved by a probation officer, and finding no plain error in\\nimposing the condition primarily because “the driving concern of the Court [in\\nPackingham] was the imposition of a severe restriction on persons who had served\\ntheir sentences and were no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice\\nsystem”); United States v. Browder, 866 F.3d 504, 511 n.26 (2d Cir. 2017), cert.\\ndenied, 138 S. Ct. 693 (2018) (noting Packingham “involved an internet ban . . . and\\nthat ban extended beyond the completion of a sentence”); United States v. Rock, 863\\nF.3d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding “no plain error in the imposition\\nof” a supervised-release condition prohibiting the possession or use of a computer “or\\nhaving access to any online service, without the prior approval of the probation\\n\\n -8-\\n\\foffice[,]” notwithstanding Packingham because the condition was “imposed as part\\nof [a] supervised-release sentence, and [was] not a post-custodial restriction of the\\nsort imposed” in Packingham).\\n\\n A term of supervised release, however, is “a part of the sentence,” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(a); United States v. James, 792 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2015), “rather than a\\npost-sentence penalty[,]” Halverson, 897 F.3d at 658, and, therefore, Perrin has not\\ncompleted his sentence. See Holena, 906 F.3d at 295 (“Defendants on supervised\\nrelease enjoy less freedom than those who have finished serving their\\nsentences.” (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001))).\\n\\n Third, the Court in Packingham found that the North Carolina statute was a\\n“complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites integral to the\\nfabric of our modern society and culture.” 137 S. Ct. at 1738. Here, unlike in\\nPackingham, Perrin may possess or use a computer or have access to the Internet so\\nlong as he obtains approval from his probation officer. As Perrin acknowledges, see\\nAppellant’s Br. 10, in United States v. Durham, we held that the district court “did not\\nabuse its discretion, much less plainly err, in imposing” a special condition of\\nsupervised release that prohibited the defendant from accessing the Internet “as long\\nas he obtain[ed] permission from the probation office[.]” 618 F.3d at 945. We\\nexplained that the condition did not “involve[] a greater deprivation of liberty than\\nis reasonably necessary” for two reasons. Id. at 944-45. For one, the condition was\\nnot “a complete ban on Internet access” because it permitted the defendant “to access\\nthe Internet as long as he obtain[ed] permission from the probation office.” Id. at\\n944. Thus, the condition was “treated as merely a partial deprivation of [the\\ndefendant]’s interest in having unfettered access to the Internet.” Id. Additionally,\\nthe defendant in Durham had used his computer for more than simply possessing\\nchild pornography; he had “used his computer to distribute child pornography.” Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Although Durham did not involve a First Amendment challenge to a special\\ncondition of supervised release, Durham is instructive over the question of whether\\nthe special condition at issue “involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is\\nreasonably necessary . . . .” Id.; see also United States v. Newell, 915 F.3d 587,\\n591 (8th Cir. 2019) (“With regard to restricting access to Internet-connected devices,\\nwe consider relevant whether the defendant did more than merely possess child\\npornography and whether the restriction is a total ban.” (internal quotation marks\\nomitted)). We conclude that the special condition at issue does not involve a greater\\ndeprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. Like in Durham, here the special\\ncondition is not a complete ban on Internet access and there is ample evidence in the\\nrecord that Perrin used his devices for activities beyond simply possessing child\\npornography, including producing child pornography. See United States v. Bender,\\n566 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (“This court [has] affirmed computer and internet\\nrestrictions where the defendant . . . produced [child pornography.]”). Accordingly,\\nthe district court did not err, much less plainly err, in imposing the special condition.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2680,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4631410,"string":"4,631,410"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Sergio Diaz-Ortiz"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2948"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"MELLOY, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2948\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Sergio Diaz-Ortiz\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 18, 2019\\n Filed: June 20, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Appellant Sergio Diaz-Ortiz seeks, for the first time on appeal, suppression of\\nevidence obtained after an alleged violation of the knock-and-announce rule under\\nthe Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109. Applying plain-error review, we\\naffirm the judgment of the district court.1\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the\\nWestern District of Missouri.\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n On June 16, 2016, officers with the Ozark Drug Enforcement Team and the\\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives took Justin Thurston, a\\nmethamphetamine dealer, into custody. Prior to being taken into custody, Thurston\\ntold the officers that his supplier, whom he knew as “Pedro,” had a room at the\\nMicrotel Hotel, located in Joplin, Missouri. Thurston also indicated that he had seen\\na large amount of methamphetamine in the room earlier that day. The officers then\\ndrove to the Microtel Hotel and contacted hotel management. They eventually\\nlearned that the man Thurston identified as “Pedro” was actually Diaz-Ortiz and that\\nDiaz-Ortiz was renting room 239. Based upon the information provided by Thurston,\\nthe officers applied for a search warrant.\\n\\n While waiting for the search warrant, the officers learned that Thurston had\\nbeen released from custody. The officers became worried that Thurston would alert\\nDiaz-Ortiz to their presence and that Diaz-Ortiz would begin destroying evidence.\\nThey therefore decided to enter the room and secure Diaz-Ortiz to prevent the\\npotential destruction of evidence. The officers went to room 239 and knocked on the\\ndoor. Hearing Diaz-Ortiz approach the door, they used a key card obtained from\\nhotel management and entered. Upon entering, the officers detained Diaz-Ortiz and\\nadvised him of his Miranda rights. They did not search the room. According to the\\ndistrict court, Diaz-Ortiz implied to the officers that he did not wish to speak with\\nthem until he had a lawyer present. Officers engaged in conversation with Diaz-\\nOrtiz while they were waiting for the search warrant, however, and Diaz-Ortiz told\\nthem that there were three pounds of methamphetamine in the room.\\n\\n A few hours after entering the room and detaining Diaz-Ortiz, more officers\\narrived with a signed search warrant. Only then did the officers search the room.\\nTheir search uncovered: approximately three pounds of methamphetamine, $10,331\\nin cash, a loaded handgun, and sample amounts of heroin and cocaine. Diaz-Ortiz\\nwas arrested and transported to the Newton County Jail.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f At a suppression hearing, Diaz-Ortiz argued that the officers conducted an\\nunlawful, warrantless entry into room 239 and that any evidence or statements\\nobtained as a result of that entry should be suppressed. The district court concluded\\nthat the officers’ entry was unlawful and suppressed Diaz-Ortiz’s unprompted\\nstatement regarding the amount of methamphetamine in the room. The district court,\\nhowever, did not suppress the evidence discovered during the search of the room.\\nThe court held that the search warrant, which was issued based solely on evidence\\nobtained prior to the officers’ unlawful entry, was an independent source of the\\nevidence obtained during the search, and thus suppression was not warranted.\\n\\n On appeal, Diaz-Ortiz argues for the first time that the search evidence should\\nhave been suppressed because it was obtained after an alleged violation of the knock-\\nand-announce rule under the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109.\\n\\n II. Standard of Review\\n\\n Because Diaz-Ortiz did not timely raise the knock-and-announce issue before\\nthe district court, we review his appeal for plain error. United States v. James, 353\\nF.3d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 2003). “To obtain relief under a plain-error standard of\\nreview, [Diaz-Ortiz] must show that there was an error, the error is clear or obvious\\nunder current law, the error affected [his] substantial rights, and the error seriously\\naffects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United\\nStates v. Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n III. Discussion\\n\\n The district court did not commit plain error. The Supreme Court’s ruling in\\nHudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) disposes of this case. In Hudson, the\\nSupreme Court considered whether a gun and drugs seized by officers pursuant to a\\nsearch warrant should be suppressed because the officers had violated the knock-and-\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fannounce rule in the course of executing the warrant. Id. at 592. Based on the facts\\nof that case, the Court found that “whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or\\nnot, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have\\ndiscovered the gun and drugs inside the house.” Id. The Court then held that because\\nthe knock-and-announce violation had “nothing to do with the seizure of the\\nevidence, the exclusionary rule [was] inapplicable.” Id. at 594; see also United States\\nv. Gaver, 452 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[Defendant’s] motion to suppress\\nwas premised entirely on his contention that officers violated the Fourth Amendment\\nby failing to knock and announce their presence, and Hudson disposes of his claim.”).\\n\\n Similarly, in this case, the officers’ alleged violation of the knock-and-\\nannounce rule had nothing to do with their seizure of the gun, drugs, and cash in\\nDiaz-Ortiz’s hotel room pursuant to their search warrant. As the district court found,\\nthe search warrant was based solely on evidence obtained prior to the officers’ entry.\\nTherefore, regardless of whether the officers violated the knock-and-announce rule,\\nthey still would have obtained and executed the warrant and discovered the\\naforementioned evidence. Accordingly, Diaz-Ortiz’s claim is foreclosed.\\n\\n To the extent Diaz-Ortiz argues that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hudson\\ndoes not apply to knock-and-announce violations under 18 U.S.C. § 3109,2 a number\\nof circuits have found otherwise. See United States v. Bruno, 487 F.3d 304, 305–06\\n(5th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases and holding that “Hudson compels the conclusion\\nthat suppression is not the remedy for a violation of § 3109”); see also United States\\nv. Acosta, 502 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he reasoning in Hudson applies with\\nequal force to § 3109.”). This Court has not yet addressed the issue, but even\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Section 3109 reads: “[An] officer may break open any outer or inner door or\\nwindow of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search\\nwarrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when\\nnecessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.”\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fassuming it might be error to apply Hudson to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, that\\nerror is certainly not “clear or obvious under current law.” Poitra, 648 F.3d at 887.\\n\\n IV. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4408663/\", \"author_raw\": \"MELLOY, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SHEPHERD\": \", Circuit\", \"MELLOY\": \", Circuit\", \"GRASZ\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631410/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Sergio Diaz-Ortiz\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2948\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Sergio Diaz-Ortiz\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 18, 2019\n Filed: June 20, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\n\n Appellant Sergio Diaz-Ortiz seeks, for the first time on appeal, suppression of\nevidence obtained after an alleged violation of the knock-and-announce rule under\nthe Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109. Applying plain-error review, we\naffirm the judgment of the district court.1\n\n 1\n The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the\nWestern District of Missouri.\n\f I. Background\n\n On June 16, 2016, officers with the Ozark Drug Enforcement Team and the\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives took Justin Thurston, a\nmethamphetamine dealer, into custody. Prior to being taken into custody, Thurston\ntold the officers that his supplier, whom he knew as “Pedro,” had a room at the\nMicrotel Hotel, located in Joplin, Missouri. Thurston also indicated that he had seen\na large amount of methamphetamine in the room earlier that day. The officers then\ndrove to the Microtel Hotel and contacted hotel management. They eventually\nlearned that the man Thurston identified as “Pedro” was actually Diaz-Ortiz and that\nDiaz-Ortiz was renting room 239. Based upon the information provided by Thurston,\nthe officers applied for a search warrant.\n\n While waiting for the search warrant, the officers learned that Thurston had\nbeen released from custody. The officers became worried that Thurston would alert\nDiaz-Ortiz to their presence and that Diaz-Ortiz would begin destroying evidence.\nThey therefore decided to enter the room and secure Diaz-Ortiz to prevent the\npotential destruction of evidence. The officers went to room 239 and knocked on the\ndoor. Hearing Diaz-Ortiz approach the door, they used a key card obtained from\nhotel management and entered. Upon entering, the officers detained Diaz-Ortiz and\nadvised him of his Miranda rights. They did not search the room. According to the\ndistrict court, Diaz-Ortiz implied to the officers that he did not wish to speak with\nthem until he had a lawyer present. Officers engaged in conversation with Diaz-\nOrtiz while they were waiting for the search warrant, however, and Diaz-Ortiz told\nthem that there were three pounds of methamphetamine in the room.\n\n A few hours after entering the room and detaining Diaz-Ortiz, more officers\narrived with a signed search warrant. Only then did the officers search the room.\nTheir search uncovered: approximately three pounds of methamphetamine, $10,331\nin cash, a loaded handgun, and sample amounts of heroin and cocaine. Diaz-Ortiz\nwas arrested and transported to the Newton County Jail.\n\n -2-\n\f At a suppression hearing, Diaz-Ortiz argued that the officers conducted an\nunlawful, warrantless entry into room 239 and that any evidence or statements\nobtained as a result of that entry should be suppressed. The district court concluded\nthat the officers’ entry was unlawful and suppressed Diaz-Ortiz’s unprompted\nstatement regarding the amount of methamphetamine in the room. The district court,\nhowever, did not suppress the evidence discovered during the search of the room.\nThe court held that the search warrant, which was issued based solely on evidence\nobtained prior to the officers’ unlawful entry, was an independent source of the\nevidence obtained during the search, and thus suppression was not warranted.\n\n On appeal, Diaz-Ortiz argues for the first time that the search evidence should\nhave been suppressed because it was obtained after an alleged violation of the knock-\nand-announce rule under the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109.\n\n II. Standard of Review\n\n Because Diaz-Ortiz did not timely raise the knock-and-announce issue before\nthe district court, we review his appeal for plain error. United States v. James, 353\nF.3d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 2003). “To obtain relief under a plain-error standard of\nreview, [Diaz-Ortiz] must show that there was an error, the error is clear or obvious\nunder current law, the error affected [his] substantial rights, and the error seriously\naffects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United\nStates v. Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2011).\n\n III. Discussion\n\n The district court did not commit plain error. The Supreme Court’s ruling in\nHudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) disposes of this case. In Hudson, the\nSupreme Court considered whether a gun and drugs seized by officers pursuant to a\nsearch warrant should be suppressed because the officers had violated the knock-and-\n\n\n -3-\n\fannounce rule in the course of executing the warrant. Id. at 592. Based on the facts\nof that case, the Court found that “whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or\nnot, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have\ndiscovered the gun and drugs inside the house.” Id. The Court then held that because\nthe knock-and-announce violation had “nothing to do with the seizure of the\nevidence, the exclusionary rule [was] inapplicable.” Id. at 594; see also United States\nv. Gaver, 452 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[Defendant’s] motion to suppress\nwas premised entirely on his contention that officers violated the Fourth Amendment\nby failing to knock and announce their presence, and Hudson disposes of his claim.”).\n\n Similarly, in this case, the officers’ alleged violation of the knock-and-\nannounce rule had nothing to do with their seizure of the gun, drugs, and cash in\nDiaz-Ortiz’s hotel room pursuant to their search warrant. As the district court found,\nthe search warrant was based solely on evidence obtained prior to the officers’ entry.\nTherefore, regardless of whether the officers violated the knock-and-announce rule,\nthey still would have obtained and executed the warrant and discovered the\naforementioned evidence. Accordingly, Diaz-Ortiz’s claim is foreclosed.\n\n To the extent Diaz-Ortiz argues that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hudson\ndoes not apply to knock-and-announce violations under 18 U.S.C. § 3109,2 a number\nof circuits have found otherwise. See United States v. Bruno, 487 F.3d 304, 305–06\n(5th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases and holding that “Hudson compels the conclusion\nthat suppression is not the remedy for a violation of § 3109”); see also United States\nv. Acosta, 502 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he reasoning in Hudson applies with\nequal force to § 3109.”). This Court has not yet addressed the issue, but even\n\n\n 2\n Section 3109 reads: “[An] officer may break open any outer or inner door or\nwindow of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search\nwarrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when\nnecessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.”\n\n\n -4-\n\fassuming it might be error to apply Hudson to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, that\nerror is certainly not “clear or obvious under current law.” Poitra, 648 F.3d at 887.\n\n IV. Conclusion\n\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Sergio Diaz-Ortiz\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2948\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Sergio Diaz-Ortiz\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 18, 2019\\n Filed: June 20, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Appellant Sergio Diaz-Ortiz seeks, for the first time on appeal, suppression of\\nevidence obtained after an alleged violation of the knock-and-announce rule under\\nthe Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109. Applying plain-error review, we\\naffirm the judgment of the district court.1\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the\\nWestern District of Missouri.\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n On June 16, 2016, officers with the Ozark Drug Enforcement Team and the\\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives took Justin Thurston, a\\nmethamphetamine dealer, into custody. Prior to being taken into custody, Thurston\\ntold the officers that his supplier, whom he knew as “Pedro,” had a room at the\\nMicrotel Hotel, located in Joplin, Missouri. Thurston also indicated that he had seen\\na large amount of methamphetamine in the room earlier that day. The officers then\\ndrove to the Microtel Hotel and contacted hotel management. They eventually\\nlearned that the man Thurston identified as “Pedro” was actually Diaz-Ortiz and that\\nDiaz-Ortiz was renting room 239. Based upon the information provided by Thurston,\\nthe officers applied for a search warrant.\\n\\n While waiting for the search warrant, the officers learned that Thurston had\\nbeen released from custody. The officers became worried that Thurston would alert\\nDiaz-Ortiz to their presence and that Diaz-Ortiz would begin destroying evidence.\\nThey therefore decided to enter the room and secure Diaz-Ortiz to prevent the\\npotential destruction of evidence. The officers went to room 239 and knocked on the\\ndoor. Hearing Diaz-Ortiz approach the door, they used a key card obtained from\\nhotel management and entered. Upon entering, the officers detained Diaz-Ortiz and\\nadvised him of his Miranda rights. They did not search the room. According to the\\ndistrict court, Diaz-Ortiz implied to the officers that he did not wish to speak with\\nthem until he had a lawyer present. Officers engaged in conversation with Diaz-\\nOrtiz while they were waiting for the search warrant, however, and Diaz-Ortiz told\\nthem that there were three pounds of methamphetamine in the room.\\n\\n A few hours after entering the room and detaining Diaz-Ortiz, more officers\\narrived with a signed search warrant. Only then did the officers search the room.\\nTheir search uncovered: approximately three pounds of methamphetamine, $10,331\\nin cash, a loaded handgun, and sample amounts of heroin and cocaine. Diaz-Ortiz\\nwas arrested and transported to the Newton County Jail.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f At a suppression hearing, Diaz-Ortiz argued that the officers conducted an\\nunlawful, warrantless entry into room 239 and that any evidence or statements\\nobtained as a result of that entry should be suppressed. The district court concluded\\nthat the officers’ entry was unlawful and suppressed Diaz-Ortiz’s unprompted\\nstatement regarding the amount of methamphetamine in the room. The district court,\\nhowever, did not suppress the evidence discovered during the search of the room.\\nThe court held that the search warrant, which was issued based solely on evidence\\nobtained prior to the officers’ unlawful entry, was an independent source of the\\nevidence obtained during the search, and thus suppression was not warranted.\\n\\n On appeal, Diaz-Ortiz argues for the first time that the search evidence should\\nhave been suppressed because it was obtained after an alleged violation of the knock-\\nand-announce rule under the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109.\\n\\n II. Standard of Review\\n\\n Because Diaz-Ortiz did not timely raise the knock-and-announce issue before\\nthe district court, we review his appeal for plain error. United States v. James, 353\\nF.3d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 2003). “To obtain relief under a plain-error standard of\\nreview, [Diaz-Ortiz] must show that there was an error, the error is clear or obvious\\nunder current law, the error affected [his] substantial rights, and the error seriously\\naffects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United\\nStates v. Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n III. Discussion\\n\\n The district court did not commit plain error. The Supreme Court’s ruling in\\nHudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) disposes of this case. In Hudson, the\\nSupreme Court considered whether a gun and drugs seized by officers pursuant to a\\nsearch warrant should be suppressed because the officers had violated the knock-and-\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fannounce rule in the course of executing the warrant. Id. at 592. Based on the facts\\nof that case, the Court found that “whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or\\nnot, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have\\ndiscovered the gun and drugs inside the house.” Id. The Court then held that because\\nthe knock-and-announce violation had “nothing to do with the seizure of the\\nevidence, the exclusionary rule [was] inapplicable.” Id. at 594; see also United States\\nv. Gaver, 452 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[Defendant’s] motion to suppress\\nwas premised entirely on his contention that officers violated the Fourth Amendment\\nby failing to knock and announce their presence, and Hudson disposes of his claim.”).\\n\\n Similarly, in this case, the officers’ alleged violation of the knock-and-\\nannounce rule had nothing to do with their seizure of the gun, drugs, and cash in\\nDiaz-Ortiz’s hotel room pursuant to their search warrant. As the district court found,\\nthe search warrant was based solely on evidence obtained prior to the officers’ entry.\\nTherefore, regardless of whether the officers violated the knock-and-announce rule,\\nthey still would have obtained and executed the warrant and discovered the\\naforementioned evidence. Accordingly, Diaz-Ortiz’s claim is foreclosed.\\n\\n To the extent Diaz-Ortiz argues that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hudson\\ndoes not apply to knock-and-announce violations under 18 U.S.C. § 3109,2 a number\\nof circuits have found otherwise. See United States v. Bruno, 487 F.3d 304, 305–06\\n(5th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases and holding that “Hudson compels the conclusion\\nthat suppression is not the remedy for a violation of § 3109”); see also United States\\nv. Acosta, 502 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he reasoning in Hudson applies with\\nequal force to § 3109.”). This Court has not yet addressed the issue, but even\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Section 3109 reads: “[An] officer may break open any outer or inner door or\\nwindow of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search\\nwarrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when\\nnecessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.”\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fassuming it might be error to apply Hudson to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, that\\nerror is certainly not “clear or obvious under current law.” Poitra, 648 F.3d at 887.\\n\\n IV. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2681,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4631485,"string":"4,631,485"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Paulette Barbee v. Big River Steel LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2255"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2255\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Paulette Barbee, Administrator of the Estate of Kimberly Hope Gillock\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Big River Steel, LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 19, 2019\\n Filed: June 20, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Paulette Barbee, Administrator of the Estate of Kimberly Hope Gillock\\n(formerly known as Kim Pierce), appeals the district court’s order modifying the\\nattorney fees in the parties’ settlement agreement. Because the district court lacked\\nauthority to review the settled attorney fees, we vacate that portion of its judgment.\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n Kim Pierce filed a proposed class action against Big River Steel, LLC (“Big\\nRiver Steel”) for unpaid overtime wages. She asserted claims under both the Fair\\nLabor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and the Arkansas Minimum\\nWage Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11-4-201 to -222.\\n\\n Pierce and Big River Steel reached a settlement and filed a joint status report\\nnotifying the court they had settled and would soon file a voluntary dismissal. The\\ncourt ordered the parties to submit the settlement for approval, including the proposed\\nagreement and any attorney billing records. The parties complied.\\n\\n After reviewing the parties’ settlement agreement, the district court\\ndisapproved of both the settlement of the wage claims and the settled amount of\\nattorney fees for independent reasons. Pierce passed away shortly thereafter, and the\\ncourt stayed the case until it could substitute her estate for her as a party.\\n\\n Barbee, as the estate’s administrator, and Big River Steel submitted a new\\nagreement addressing only the district court’s concerns on the wage settlement. The\\ndistrict court then approved of the new wage settlement, again disapproved of the\\namount of attorney fees, and entered a judgment with the full wage settlement amount\\nand a reduced attorney fee amount. Barbee appeals, and Big River Steel does not\\ncontest the appeal.\\n\\n II. Analysis\\n\\n Barbee argues on appeal that any required review of the settlement agreement\\ndid not extend to settled attorney fees. We recently addressed the standard of review\\nfor settled attorney fees under the assumption that district courts have authority to\\nreview them. See Melgar v. OK Foods, 902 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2018). Barbee\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fasks a question we left open in Melgar: whether the authority to review FLSA\\nsettlements, or at least review settled attorney fees, exists at all.\\n\\n There is a circuit split on whether to extend older Supreme Court cases so as\\nto require judicial approval of all FLSA settlements. A pair of cases from the 1940s\\nrequire judicial approval for some releases of FLSA claims, but those cases left open\\nthe question of whether the FLSA requires judicial approval to settle bona fide\\ndisputes over hours worked or wages owed. See D.A. Schulte, Inc., v. Gangi, 328\\nU.S. 108, 114 & n.10 (1946); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 703–04,\\n714 (1945). The Fifth Circuit would not extend Gangi and O’Neil to require judicial\\napproval of all FLSA settlements, but the Second and Eleventh Circuits disagree.\\nCompare Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012)\\n(enforcing a settlement of bona fide FLSA disputes over hours worked or wages owed\\nwithout judicial or Department of Labor approval), with Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake\\nHouse, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding parties cannot settle FLSA\\nclaims without approval from the district court or the Department of Labor), and\\nLynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 1982)\\n(same). See also Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 618–31\\n(W.D. Tex. 2005) (extensively reviewing the history behind this statutory\\ninterpretation dispute).\\n\\n We have never taken a side on this issue. We have noted the Eleventh Circuit’s\\nopinion, see Beauford v. ActionLink, LLC, 781 F.3d 396, 405–06 (8th Cir. 2015);\\nCopeland v. ABB, Inc., 521 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2008), but we have never had\\noccasion to interpret whether 29 U.S.C. § 216 requires judicial approval of all FLSA\\nsettlements.\\n\\n Because we agree with Barbee that any authority for judicial approval of FLSA\\nsettlements in 29 U.S.C. § 216 does not extend to review of settled attorney fees, we\\nneed not decide our view on the circuit split today. This is a question of law, and we\\n\\n -3-\\n\\freview the issue de novo. Melgar, 902 F.3d at 778. The statute speaks of allowing\\nfees “in addition to any judgment awarded,” treating the merits of an FLSA claim and\\nthe attorney fees as distinct. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). As a result, any court judgment\\non the settled merits would necessarily be separate from any court review of the\\nsettled attorney fees. This reading of the statute is consistent with the rationale of the\\ncircuits that require approval for all FLSA settlements because such approval serves\\nthe “FLSA’s underlying purpose” of protecting workers’ rights. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at\\n206. When the parties negotiate the reasonable fee amount separately and without\\nregard to the plaintiff’s FLSA claim, the amount the employer pays to the employees’\\ncounsel has no bearing on whether the employer has adequately paid its employees\\nin a settlement. See Bench v. Cheyenne Logistics, LLC, No. 4:14CV1327, 2016 WL\\n2997591, at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 25, 2016) (“The Court’s review of a proposed FLSA\\nsettlement is properly limited only to those terms precisely addressing the\\ncompromised monetary amounts to resolve pending wage and overtime claims.”\\n(quoting King v. Raineri Constr., LLC, No. 4:14CV1828, 2015 WL 631253, at *4\\n(E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2015))). Thus, regardless of whether we read the statute as\\nrequiring approval for FLSA settlements, we do not read it as requiring approval of\\nsettled attorney fees.\\n\\n Since we conclude 29 U.S.C. § 216 does not require approval of settled\\nattorney fees, the district court erred below. “In ordinary litigation, that is, lawsuits\\nbetween private parties, courts recognize that settlement of the dispute is solely in the\\nhands of the parties.” Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir.\\n1984). When all parties to a case sign a dismissal, that dismissal is effective unless\\nfederal law provides otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). This right to\\ndismissal is an “unconditional right.” Gardiner, 747 F.2d at 1190. We also value this\\nright in the attorney fee context because it prevents unnecessary litigation. See\\nHensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (“Ideally, of course, litigants will\\nsettle the amount of a fee.”). Here, the district court agreed the parties’ proposed\\nwage settlement satisfied Barbee’s claims. Regardless of whether that assertion of\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fauthority was proper, the district court’s authority did not extend beyond concluding\\nthe merits settlement was satisfactory. The parties were entitled to settle the attorney\\nfee issue, and no law gave the district court authority to interfere with that\\nunconditional right.1\\n\\n Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the district court’s judgment below that\\naddressed settled attorney fees. We decline Barbee’s request to remand for entry of\\njudgment on the full fee amount because the district court lacks authority under Fed.\\nR. Civ. P. 41 to take any action on the settled attorney fees.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n We note that if FLSA settlements are subject to judicial review, the court\\nwould retain the authority to ensure the attorney fees were in fact negotiated\\nseparately and without regard to the plaintiff’s FLSA claim, and there was no conflict\\nof interest between the attorney and his or her client.\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4408738/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SHEPHERD\": \", Circuit\", \"MELLOY\": \", Circuit\", \"GRASZ\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631485/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Paulette Barbee v. Big River Steel LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2255\n ___________________________\n\n Paulette Barbee, Administrator of the Estate of Kimberly Hope Gillock\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Big River Steel, LLC\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 19, 2019\n Filed: June 20, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Paulette Barbee, Administrator of the Estate of Kimberly Hope Gillock\n(formerly known as Kim Pierce), appeals the district court’s order modifying the\nattorney fees in the parties’ settlement agreement. Because the district court lacked\nauthority to review the settled attorney fees, we vacate that portion of its judgment.\n\f I. Background\n\n Kim Pierce filed a proposed class action against Big River Steel, LLC (“Big\nRiver Steel”) for unpaid overtime wages. She asserted claims under both the Fair\nLabor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and the Arkansas Minimum\nWage Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11-4-201 to -222.\n\n Pierce and Big River Steel reached a settlement and filed a joint status report\nnotifying the court they had settled and would soon file a voluntary dismissal. The\ncourt ordered the parties to submit the settlement for approval, including the proposed\nagreement and any attorney billing records. The parties complied.\n\n After reviewing the parties’ settlement agreement, the district court\ndisapproved of both the settlement of the wage claims and the settled amount of\nattorney fees for independent reasons. Pierce passed away shortly thereafter, and the\ncourt stayed the case until it could substitute her estate for her as a party.\n\n Barbee, as the estate’s administrator, and Big River Steel submitted a new\nagreement addressing only the district court’s concerns on the wage settlement. The\ndistrict court then approved of the new wage settlement, again disapproved of the\namount of attorney fees, and entered a judgment with the full wage settlement amount\nand a reduced attorney fee amount. Barbee appeals, and Big River Steel does not\ncontest the appeal.\n\n II. Analysis\n\n Barbee argues on appeal that any required review of the settlement agreement\ndid not extend to settled attorney fees. We recently addressed the standard of review\nfor settled attorney fees under the assumption that district courts have authority to\nreview them. See Melgar v. OK Foods, 902 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2018). Barbee\n\n -2-\n\fasks a question we left open in Melgar: whether the authority to review FLSA\nsettlements, or at least review settled attorney fees, exists at all.\n\n There is a circuit split on whether to extend older Supreme Court cases so as\nto require judicial approval of all FLSA settlements. A pair of cases from the 1940s\nrequire judicial approval for some releases of FLSA claims, but those cases left open\nthe question of whether the FLSA requires judicial approval to settle bona fide\ndisputes over hours worked or wages owed. See D.A. Schulte, Inc., v. Gangi, 328\nU.S. 108, 114 & n.10 (1946); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 703–04,\n714 (1945). The Fifth Circuit would not extend Gangi and O’Neil to require judicial\napproval of all FLSA settlements, but the Second and Eleventh Circuits disagree.\nCompare Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012)\n(enforcing a settlement of bona fide FLSA disputes over hours worked or wages owed\nwithout judicial or Department of Labor approval), with Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake\nHouse, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding parties cannot settle FLSA\nclaims without approval from the district court or the Department of Labor), and\nLynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 1982)\n(same). See also Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 618–31\n(W.D. Tex. 2005) (extensively reviewing the history behind this statutory\ninterpretation dispute).\n\n We have never taken a side on this issue. We have noted the Eleventh Circuit’s\nopinion, see Beauford v. ActionLink, LLC, 781 F.3d 396, 405–06 (8th Cir. 2015);\nCopeland v. ABB, Inc., 521 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2008), but we have never had\noccasion to interpret whether 29 U.S.C. § 216 requires judicial approval of all FLSA\nsettlements.\n\n Because we agree with Barbee that any authority for judicial approval of FLSA\nsettlements in 29 U.S.C. § 216 does not extend to review of settled attorney fees, we\nneed not decide our view on the circuit split today. This is a question of law, and we\n\n -3-\n\freview the issue de novo. Melgar, 902 F.3d at 778. The statute speaks of allowing\nfees “in addition to any judgment awarded,” treating the merits of an FLSA claim and\nthe attorney fees as distinct. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). As a result, any court judgment\non the settled merits would necessarily be separate from any court review of the\nsettled attorney fees. This reading of the statute is consistent with the rationale of the\ncircuits that require approval for all FLSA settlements because such approval serves\nthe “FLSA’s underlying purpose” of protecting workers’ rights. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at\n206. When the parties negotiate the reasonable fee amount separately and without\nregard to the plaintiff’s FLSA claim, the amount the employer pays to the employees’\ncounsel has no bearing on whether the employer has adequately paid its employees\nin a settlement. See Bench v. Cheyenne Logistics, LLC, No. 4:14CV1327, 2016 WL\n2997591, at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 25, 2016) (“The Court’s review of a proposed FLSA\nsettlement is properly limited only to those terms precisely addressing the\ncompromised monetary amounts to resolve pending wage and overtime claims.”\n(quoting King v. Raineri Constr., LLC, No. 4:14CV1828, 2015 WL 631253, at *4\n(E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2015))). Thus, regardless of whether we read the statute as\nrequiring approval for FLSA settlements, we do not read it as requiring approval of\nsettled attorney fees.\n\n Since we conclude 29 U.S.C. § 216 does not require approval of settled\nattorney fees, the district court erred below. “In ordinary litigation, that is, lawsuits\nbetween private parties, courts recognize that settlement of the dispute is solely in the\nhands of the parties.” Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir.\n1984). When all parties to a case sign a dismissal, that dismissal is effective unless\nfederal law provides otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). This right to\ndismissal is an “unconditional right.” Gardiner, 747 F.2d at 1190. We also value this\nright in the attorney fee context because it prevents unnecessary litigation. See\nHensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (“Ideally, of course, litigants will\nsettle the amount of a fee.”). Here, the district court agreed the parties’ proposed\nwage settlement satisfied Barbee’s claims. Regardless of whether that assertion of\n\n -4-\n\fauthority was proper, the district court’s authority did not extend beyond concluding\nthe merits settlement was satisfactory. The parties were entitled to settle the attorney\nfee issue, and no law gave the district court authority to interfere with that\nunconditional right.1\n\n Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the district court’s judgment below that\naddressed settled attorney fees. We decline Barbee’s request to remand for entry of\njudgment on the full fee amount because the district court lacks authority under Fed.\nR. Civ. P. 41 to take any action on the settled attorney fees.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n 1\n We note that if FLSA settlements are subject to judicial review, the court\nwould retain the authority to ensure the attorney fees were in fact negotiated\nseparately and without regard to the plaintiff’s FLSA claim, and there was no conflict\nof interest between the attorney and his or her client.\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Paulette Barbee v. Big River Steel LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2255\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Paulette Barbee, Administrator of the Estate of Kimberly Hope Gillock\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Big River Steel, LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 19, 2019\\n Filed: June 20, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Paulette Barbee, Administrator of the Estate of Kimberly Hope Gillock\\n(formerly known as Kim Pierce), appeals the district court’s order modifying the\\nattorney fees in the parties’ settlement agreement. Because the district court lacked\\nauthority to review the settled attorney fees, we vacate that portion of its judgment.\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n Kim Pierce filed a proposed class action against Big River Steel, LLC (“Big\\nRiver Steel”) for unpaid overtime wages. She asserted claims under both the Fair\\nLabor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and the Arkansas Minimum\\nWage Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11-4-201 to -222.\\n\\n Pierce and Big River Steel reached a settlement and filed a joint status report\\nnotifying the court they had settled and would soon file a voluntary dismissal. The\\ncourt ordered the parties to submit the settlement for approval, including the proposed\\nagreement and any attorney billing records. The parties complied.\\n\\n After reviewing the parties’ settlement agreement, the district court\\ndisapproved of both the settlement of the wage claims and the settled amount of\\nattorney fees for independent reasons. Pierce passed away shortly thereafter, and the\\ncourt stayed the case until it could substitute her estate for her as a party.\\n\\n Barbee, as the estate’s administrator, and Big River Steel submitted a new\\nagreement addressing only the district court’s concerns on the wage settlement. The\\ndistrict court then approved of the new wage settlement, again disapproved of the\\namount of attorney fees, and entered a judgment with the full wage settlement amount\\nand a reduced attorney fee amount. Barbee appeals, and Big River Steel does not\\ncontest the appeal.\\n\\n II. Analysis\\n\\n Barbee argues on appeal that any required review of the settlement agreement\\ndid not extend to settled attorney fees. We recently addressed the standard of review\\nfor settled attorney fees under the assumption that district courts have authority to\\nreview them. See Melgar v. OK Foods, 902 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2018). Barbee\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fasks a question we left open in Melgar: whether the authority to review FLSA\\nsettlements, or at least review settled attorney fees, exists at all.\\n\\n There is a circuit split on whether to extend older Supreme Court cases so as\\nto require judicial approval of all FLSA settlements. A pair of cases from the 1940s\\nrequire judicial approval for some releases of FLSA claims, but those cases left open\\nthe question of whether the FLSA requires judicial approval to settle bona fide\\ndisputes over hours worked or wages owed. See D.A. Schulte, Inc., v. Gangi, 328\\nU.S. 108, 114 & n.10 (1946); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 703–04,\\n714 (1945). The Fifth Circuit would not extend Gangi and O’Neil to require judicial\\napproval of all FLSA settlements, but the Second and Eleventh Circuits disagree.\\nCompare Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012)\\n(enforcing a settlement of bona fide FLSA disputes over hours worked or wages owed\\nwithout judicial or Department of Labor approval), with Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake\\nHouse, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding parties cannot settle FLSA\\nclaims without approval from the district court or the Department of Labor), and\\nLynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 1982)\\n(same). See also Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 618–31\\n(W.D. Tex. 2005) (extensively reviewing the history behind this statutory\\ninterpretation dispute).\\n\\n We have never taken a side on this issue. We have noted the Eleventh Circuit’s\\nopinion, see Beauford v. ActionLink, LLC, 781 F.3d 396, 405–06 (8th Cir. 2015);\\nCopeland v. ABB, Inc., 521 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2008), but we have never had\\noccasion to interpret whether 29 U.S.C. § 216 requires judicial approval of all FLSA\\nsettlements.\\n\\n Because we agree with Barbee that any authority for judicial approval of FLSA\\nsettlements in 29 U.S.C. § 216 does not extend to review of settled attorney fees, we\\nneed not decide our view on the circuit split today. This is a question of law, and we\\n\\n -3-\\n\\freview the issue de novo. Melgar, 902 F.3d at 778. The statute speaks of allowing\\nfees “in addition to any judgment awarded,” treating the merits of an FLSA claim and\\nthe attorney fees as distinct. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). As a result, any court judgment\\non the settled merits would necessarily be separate from any court review of the\\nsettled attorney fees. This reading of the statute is consistent with the rationale of the\\ncircuits that require approval for all FLSA settlements because such approval serves\\nthe “FLSA’s underlying purpose” of protecting workers’ rights. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at\\n206. When the parties negotiate the reasonable fee amount separately and without\\nregard to the plaintiff’s FLSA claim, the amount the employer pays to the employees’\\ncounsel has no bearing on whether the employer has adequately paid its employees\\nin a settlement. See Bench v. Cheyenne Logistics, LLC, No. 4:14CV1327, 2016 WL\\n2997591, at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 25, 2016) (“The Court’s review of a proposed FLSA\\nsettlement is properly limited only to those terms precisely addressing the\\ncompromised monetary amounts to resolve pending wage and overtime claims.”\\n(quoting King v. Raineri Constr., LLC, No. 4:14CV1828, 2015 WL 631253, at *4\\n(E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2015))). Thus, regardless of whether we read the statute as\\nrequiring approval for FLSA settlements, we do not read it as requiring approval of\\nsettled attorney fees.\\n\\n Since we conclude 29 U.S.C. § 216 does not require approval of settled\\nattorney fees, the district court erred below. “In ordinary litigation, that is, lawsuits\\nbetween private parties, courts recognize that settlement of the dispute is solely in the\\nhands of the parties.” Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir.\\n1984). When all parties to a case sign a dismissal, that dismissal is effective unless\\nfederal law provides otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). This right to\\ndismissal is an “unconditional right.” Gardiner, 747 F.2d at 1190. We also value this\\nright in the attorney fee context because it prevents unnecessary litigation. See\\nHensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (“Ideally, of course, litigants will\\nsettle the amount of a fee.”). Here, the district court agreed the parties’ proposed\\nwage settlement satisfied Barbee’s claims. Regardless of whether that assertion of\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fauthority was proper, the district court’s authority did not extend beyond concluding\\nthe merits settlement was satisfactory. The parties were entitled to settle the attorney\\nfee issue, and no law gave the district court authority to interfere with that\\nunconditional right.1\\n\\n Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the district court’s judgment below that\\naddressed settled attorney fees. We decline Barbee’s request to remand for entry of\\njudgment on the full fee amount because the district court lacks authority under Fed.\\nR. Civ. P. 41 to take any action on the settled attorney fees.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n We note that if FLSA settlements are subject to judicial review, the court\\nwould retain the authority to ensure the attorney fees were in fact negotiated\\nseparately and without regard to the plaintiff’s FLSA claim, and there was no conflict\\nof interest between the attorney and his or her client.\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2682,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4631513,"string":"4,631,513"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Oscar Rivera-Guerrero v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1234"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1234\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Oscar Rivera-Guerrero\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\\n\\n v.\\n\\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\\n ____________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 18, 2019\\n Filed: June 20, 2019\\n [Published]\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nPER CURIAM.\\n\\n Oscar Rivera-Guerrero petitions for review of an order of the Board of\\nImmigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen. He filed the motion many years\\nafter receiving an order of removal and sought reopening to assert claims for asylum,\\nwithholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). To\\njustify reopening, he alleged changed circumstances in Mexico, in particular, an\\n\\fincrease in gang violence generally and a risk of future persecution due to his prior\\ninvolvement with a Christian group that opposed illegal drugs. He also alleged he\\nwas denied due process in his earlier proceedings. The BIA rejected his arguments.\\nWe reject his petition for review and affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Petitioner unlawfully entered the United States in 2001. In 2002, he was\\ncharged with removability. Through counsel, he conceded removability and waived\\nhis hearing. On May 23, 2002, he was ordered removed. A warrant of removal\\nindicates he was removed to Mexico on May 24, 2002, although in his present motion\\nto reopen, he alleges he never left the United States.\\n\\n Almost fifteen years later, in April 2017, Petitioner filed the current motion to\\nreopen. He sought to be excused from the time-bar for his motion due to changed\\ncountry conditions, as permitted by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4). Relying on news\\narticles and an affidavit from a friend, Petitioner alleged that his evidence\\ndemonstrated: (1) gang violence had increased in Mexico such that Mexico was “at\\nleast 20 times more dangerous” than before he left Mexico; (2) Petitioner had been\\ninvolved in a Christian youth group from 1992–98 that opposed illegal drugs; (3)\\nPetitioner had received threatening phone calls for refusing to sell drugs; and (4) gang\\nmembers had threatened to kill Petitioner if he returned to Mexico.\\n\\n An immigration judge rejected his arguments and denied his motion to reopen.\\nThe IJ first held Petitioner failed to show changed country conditions. The IJ\\ndetermined Petitioner’s evidence failed to identify dates of alleged threats and failed\\nto articulate country conditions with sufficient detail to allow a comparison of current\\nconditions to conditions at the time of his earlier proceedings. In addition, the IJ\\nnoted that none of the articles referred to the group Petitioner allegedly belonged to\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fin the 1990s. Finally, the IJ noted that Petitioner’s alleged activities with the group\\nhad occurred years prior to his earlier proceedings.\\n\\n In the alternative, the IJ held Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable\\nlikelihood that his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT\\nprotection would be granted. The IJ held that unfulfilled and vague threats of\\nviolence cited by his friend were not sufficient to establish past persecution. The IJ\\nalso held general documentary evidence of crime and violence in Mexico did not\\nshow Petitioner would be a specific target for persecution on a protected basis or that\\nit was more likely than not that he would be tortured.\\n\\n Petitioner appealed to the BIA. The BIA affirmed, holding, “even if\\n[Petitioner] demonstrated changed country conditions or circumstances in Mexico,\\nthe Immigration Judge properly denied reopening because [Petitioner] did not\\ndemonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief.” Petitioner argued to the BIA that he\\nwas denied due process in that, during his 2002 proceedings, he was not made aware\\nof the various forms of relief that might be available. The BIA found no denial of due\\nprocess, concluding the record demonstrated Petitioner knew of his rights and\\npotential forms of relief yet waived his rights. Petitioner appeals.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n In limited circumstances, the untimeliness of a motion to reopen may be\\nexcused if a petitioner shows changed country conditions based on evidence not\\npreviously available and if he makes a prima facie showing that, if reopened, his case\\nwould lead to relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (providing for relief from the\\ntime limitations for motions to reopen based on evidence that “is material and was not\\navailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”);\\nLee v. Holder, 765 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that to satisfy “the heavy\\nburden required to merit a reopening of proceedings,” the new evidence “must be\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fsuch that [it] would likely change the result in the case” (citation omitted)). “Because\\nmotions to reopen are disfavored, particularly untimely motions to reopen, we review\\nthe BIA’s decision . . . under a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Li\\nYun Lin v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1164, 1165 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting\\nZhong Qin Zheng v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2008)).\\n\\n Here, we find no abuse of discretion. The IJ and BIA permissibly determined\\nPetitioner’s evidence of vague and unfulfilled threats failed to establish past\\npersecution. See Lemus-Arita v. Sessions, 854 F.3d 476, 481 (8th Cir. 2017)\\n(“[T]hough a single death threat may constitute persecution, a threat that is\\nexaggerated, nonspecific, or lacking in immediacy may be insufficient. . . . Rather,\\n[t]hreats alone constitute persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when\\nthe threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” (citations\\nand internal quotation marks omitted)). The IJ and BIA also permissibly determined\\nPetitioner’s evidence of general crime and violence in Mexico failed to establish a\\nwell-founded fear of future persecution based on Petitioner’s alleged involvement\\nwith the Christian anti-drug group. See Agha v. Holder, 743 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir.\\n2014) (noting that, to prove a well-founded fear of future persecution, the harm\\nalleged “must be particularized to the individual rather than suffered by the entire\\npopulation” (citation omitted)). Further, the failure to show eligibility for asylum\\nprecludes satisfaction of the higher standard applicable for withholding of removal.\\nId. at 618. And, Petitioner did not renew his CAT arguments in his brief on appeal.\\n\\n Finally, we find no denial of due process in Petitioner’s earlier proceedings.\\nTo the extent he alleges the IJ’s analysis in the present matter was so infirm as to\\namount to a denial of due process, he did not raise this argument with the BIA. In any\\nevent, his argument is not fully articulated and is without merit. We affirm the BIA\\nand deny the petition for review.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4408766/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SHEPHERD\": \", Circuit\", \"MELLOY\": \", Circuit\", \"GRASZ\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631513/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Oscar Rivera-Guerrero v. William P. Barr\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1234\n ___________________________\n\n Oscar Rivera-Guerrero\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\n\n v.\n\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\n ____________\n\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\n Board of Immigration Appeals\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 18, 2019\n Filed: June 20, 2019\n [Published]\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nPER CURIAM.\n\n Oscar Rivera-Guerrero petitions for review of an order of the Board of\nImmigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen. He filed the motion many years\nafter receiving an order of removal and sought reopening to assert claims for asylum,\nwithholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). To\njustify reopening, he alleged changed circumstances in Mexico, in particular, an\n\fincrease in gang violence generally and a risk of future persecution due to his prior\ninvolvement with a Christian group that opposed illegal drugs. He also alleged he\nwas denied due process in his earlier proceedings. The BIA rejected his arguments.\nWe reject his petition for review and affirm.\n\n I.\n\n Petitioner unlawfully entered the United States in 2001. In 2002, he was\ncharged with removability. Through counsel, he conceded removability and waived\nhis hearing. On May 23, 2002, he was ordered removed. A warrant of removal\nindicates he was removed to Mexico on May 24, 2002, although in his present motion\nto reopen, he alleges he never left the United States.\n\n Almost fifteen years later, in April 2017, Petitioner filed the current motion to\nreopen. He sought to be excused from the time-bar for his motion due to changed\ncountry conditions, as permitted by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4). Relying on news\narticles and an affidavit from a friend, Petitioner alleged that his evidence\ndemonstrated: (1) gang violence had increased in Mexico such that Mexico was “at\nleast 20 times more dangerous” than before he left Mexico; (2) Petitioner had been\ninvolved in a Christian youth group from 1992–98 that opposed illegal drugs; (3)\nPetitioner had received threatening phone calls for refusing to sell drugs; and (4) gang\nmembers had threatened to kill Petitioner if he returned to Mexico.\n\n An immigration judge rejected his arguments and denied his motion to reopen.\nThe IJ first held Petitioner failed to show changed country conditions. The IJ\ndetermined Petitioner’s evidence failed to identify dates of alleged threats and failed\nto articulate country conditions with sufficient detail to allow a comparison of current\nconditions to conditions at the time of his earlier proceedings. In addition, the IJ\nnoted that none of the articles referred to the group Petitioner allegedly belonged to\n\n\n\n -2-\n\fin the 1990s. Finally, the IJ noted that Petitioner’s alleged activities with the group\nhad occurred years prior to his earlier proceedings.\n\n In the alternative, the IJ held Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable\nlikelihood that his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT\nprotection would be granted. The IJ held that unfulfilled and vague threats of\nviolence cited by his friend were not sufficient to establish past persecution. The IJ\nalso held general documentary evidence of crime and violence in Mexico did not\nshow Petitioner would be a specific target for persecution on a protected basis or that\nit was more likely than not that he would be tortured.\n\n Petitioner appealed to the BIA. The BIA affirmed, holding, “even if\n[Petitioner] demonstrated changed country conditions or circumstances in Mexico,\nthe Immigration Judge properly denied reopening because [Petitioner] did not\ndemonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief.” Petitioner argued to the BIA that he\nwas denied due process in that, during his 2002 proceedings, he was not made aware\nof the various forms of relief that might be available. The BIA found no denial of due\nprocess, concluding the record demonstrated Petitioner knew of his rights and\npotential forms of relief yet waived his rights. Petitioner appeals.\n\n II.\n\n In limited circumstances, the untimeliness of a motion to reopen may be\nexcused if a petitioner shows changed country conditions based on evidence not\npreviously available and if he makes a prima facie showing that, if reopened, his case\nwould lead to relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (providing for relief from the\ntime limitations for motions to reopen based on evidence that “is material and was not\navailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”);\nLee v. Holder, 765 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that to satisfy “the heavy\nburden required to merit a reopening of proceedings,” the new evidence “must be\n\n -3-\n\fsuch that [it] would likely change the result in the case” (citation omitted)). “Because\nmotions to reopen are disfavored, particularly untimely motions to reopen, we review\nthe BIA’s decision . . . under a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Li\nYun Lin v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1164, 1165 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting\nZhong Qin Zheng v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2008)).\n\n Here, we find no abuse of discretion. The IJ and BIA permissibly determined\nPetitioner’s evidence of vague and unfulfilled threats failed to establish past\npersecution. See Lemus-Arita v. Sessions, 854 F.3d 476, 481 (8th Cir. 2017)\n(“[T]hough a single death threat may constitute persecution, a threat that is\nexaggerated, nonspecific, or lacking in immediacy may be insufficient. . . . Rather,\n[t]hreats alone constitute persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when\nthe threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” (citations\nand internal quotation marks omitted)). The IJ and BIA also permissibly determined\nPetitioner’s evidence of general crime and violence in Mexico failed to establish a\nwell-founded fear of future persecution based on Petitioner’s alleged involvement\nwith the Christian anti-drug group. See Agha v. Holder, 743 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir.\n2014) (noting that, to prove a well-founded fear of future persecution, the harm\nalleged “must be particularized to the individual rather than suffered by the entire\npopulation” (citation omitted)). Further, the failure to show eligibility for asylum\nprecludes satisfaction of the higher standard applicable for withholding of removal.\nId. at 618. And, Petitioner did not renew his CAT arguments in his brief on appeal.\n\n Finally, we find no denial of due process in Petitioner’s earlier proceedings.\nTo the extent he alleges the IJ’s analysis in the present matter was so infirm as to\namount to a denial of due process, he did not raise this argument with the BIA. In any\nevent, his argument is not fully articulated and is without merit. We affirm the BIA\nand deny the petition for review.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n -4-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Oscar Rivera-Guerrero v. William P. Barr\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1234\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Oscar Rivera-Guerrero\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\\n\\n v.\\n\\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\\n ____________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 18, 2019\\n Filed: June 20, 2019\\n [Published]\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nPER CURIAM.\\n\\n Oscar Rivera-Guerrero petitions for review of an order of the Board of\\nImmigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen. He filed the motion many years\\nafter receiving an order of removal and sought reopening to assert claims for asylum,\\nwithholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). To\\njustify reopening, he alleged changed circumstances in Mexico, in particular, an\\n\\fincrease in gang violence generally and a risk of future persecution due to his prior\\ninvolvement with a Christian group that opposed illegal drugs. He also alleged he\\nwas denied due process in his earlier proceedings. The BIA rejected his arguments.\\nWe reject his petition for review and affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Petitioner unlawfully entered the United States in 2001. In 2002, he was\\ncharged with removability. Through counsel, he conceded removability and waived\\nhis hearing. On May 23, 2002, he was ordered removed. A warrant of removal\\nindicates he was removed to Mexico on May 24, 2002, although in his present motion\\nto reopen, he alleges he never left the United States.\\n\\n Almost fifteen years later, in April 2017, Petitioner filed the current motion to\\nreopen. He sought to be excused from the time-bar for his motion due to changed\\ncountry conditions, as permitted by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4). Relying on news\\narticles and an affidavit from a friend, Petitioner alleged that his evidence\\ndemonstrated: (1) gang violence had increased in Mexico such that Mexico was “at\\nleast 20 times more dangerous” than before he left Mexico; (2) Petitioner had been\\ninvolved in a Christian youth group from 1992–98 that opposed illegal drugs; (3)\\nPetitioner had received threatening phone calls for refusing to sell drugs; and (4) gang\\nmembers had threatened to kill Petitioner if he returned to Mexico.\\n\\n An immigration judge rejected his arguments and denied his motion to reopen.\\nThe IJ first held Petitioner failed to show changed country conditions. The IJ\\ndetermined Petitioner’s evidence failed to identify dates of alleged threats and failed\\nto articulate country conditions with sufficient detail to allow a comparison of current\\nconditions to conditions at the time of his earlier proceedings. In addition, the IJ\\nnoted that none of the articles referred to the group Petitioner allegedly belonged to\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fin the 1990s. Finally, the IJ noted that Petitioner’s alleged activities with the group\\nhad occurred years prior to his earlier proceedings.\\n\\n In the alternative, the IJ held Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable\\nlikelihood that his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT\\nprotection would be granted. The IJ held that unfulfilled and vague threats of\\nviolence cited by his friend were not sufficient to establish past persecution. The IJ\\nalso held general documentary evidence of crime and violence in Mexico did not\\nshow Petitioner would be a specific target for persecution on a protected basis or that\\nit was more likely than not that he would be tortured.\\n\\n Petitioner appealed to the BIA. The BIA affirmed, holding, “even if\\n[Petitioner] demonstrated changed country conditions or circumstances in Mexico,\\nthe Immigration Judge properly denied reopening because [Petitioner] did not\\ndemonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief.” Petitioner argued to the BIA that he\\nwas denied due process in that, during his 2002 proceedings, he was not made aware\\nof the various forms of relief that might be available. The BIA found no denial of due\\nprocess, concluding the record demonstrated Petitioner knew of his rights and\\npotential forms of relief yet waived his rights. Petitioner appeals.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n In limited circumstances, the untimeliness of a motion to reopen may be\\nexcused if a petitioner shows changed country conditions based on evidence not\\npreviously available and if he makes a prima facie showing that, if reopened, his case\\nwould lead to relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (providing for relief from the\\ntime limitations for motions to reopen based on evidence that “is material and was not\\navailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”);\\nLee v. Holder, 765 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that to satisfy “the heavy\\nburden required to merit a reopening of proceedings,” the new evidence “must be\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fsuch that [it] would likely change the result in the case” (citation omitted)). “Because\\nmotions to reopen are disfavored, particularly untimely motions to reopen, we review\\nthe BIA’s decision . . . under a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Li\\nYun Lin v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1164, 1165 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting\\nZhong Qin Zheng v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2008)).\\n\\n Here, we find no abuse of discretion. The IJ and BIA permissibly determined\\nPetitioner’s evidence of vague and unfulfilled threats failed to establish past\\npersecution. See Lemus-Arita v. Sessions, 854 F.3d 476, 481 (8th Cir. 2017)\\n(“[T]hough a single death threat may constitute persecution, a threat that is\\nexaggerated, nonspecific, or lacking in immediacy may be insufficient. . . . Rather,\\n[t]hreats alone constitute persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when\\nthe threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” (citations\\nand internal quotation marks omitted)). The IJ and BIA also permissibly determined\\nPetitioner’s evidence of general crime and violence in Mexico failed to establish a\\nwell-founded fear of future persecution based on Petitioner’s alleged involvement\\nwith the Christian anti-drug group. See Agha v. Holder, 743 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir.\\n2014) (noting that, to prove a well-founded fear of future persecution, the harm\\nalleged “must be particularized to the individual rather than suffered by the entire\\npopulation” (citation omitted)). Further, the failure to show eligibility for asylum\\nprecludes satisfaction of the higher standard applicable for withholding of removal.\\nId. at 618. And, Petitioner did not renew his CAT arguments in his brief on appeal.\\n\\n Finally, we find no denial of due process in Petitioner’s earlier proceedings.\\nTo the extent he alleges the IJ’s analysis in the present matter was so infirm as to\\namount to a denial of due process, he did not raise this argument with the BIA. In any\\nevent, his argument is not fully articulated and is without merit. We affirm the BIA\\nand deny the petition for review.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2683,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8444011,"string":"8,444,011"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Oscar RIVERA-GUERRERO v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Rivera-Guerrero v. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-1234"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Grasz, Melloy, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415446/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444011/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Oscar RIVERA-GUERRERO v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Oscar RIVERA-GUERRERO v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2684,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8444024,"string":"8,444,024"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Adam LANE v. Adam NADING, Probation and Parole Office Joseph M. Boyd, Corporal, Police Officer 4338, Sebastian County Sheriff's Office - Fort Smith Police Department Probation and Parole Office Adam Lane v. Adam Nading, Probation and Parole Office - Joseph M. Boyd, Corporal, Police Officer 4338, Sebastian County Sheriff's Office Fort Smith Police Department Probation and Parole Office"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Lane v. Nading"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-2194; No. 18-2426"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Melloy, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415460/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444024/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Adam LANE v. Adam NADING, Probation and Parole Office Joseph M. Boyd, Corporal, Police Officer 4338, Sebastian County Sheriff's Office - Fort Smith Police Department Probation and Parole Office Adam Lane v. Adam Nading, Probation and Parole Office - Joseph M. Boyd, Corporal, Police Officer 4338, Sebastian County Sheriff's Office Fort Smith Police Department Probation and Parole Office\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Adam LANE v. Adam NADING, Probation and Parole Office Joseph M. Boyd, Corporal, Police Officer 4338, Sebastian County Sheriff's Office - Fort Smith Police Department Probation and Parole Office Adam Lane v. Adam Nading, Probation and Parole Office - Joseph M. Boyd, Corporal, Police Officer 4338, Sebastian County Sheriff's Office Fort Smith Police Department Probation and Parole Office\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2685,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8444025,"string":"8,444,025"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Paulette BARBEE, Administrator of the Estate of Kimberly Hope Gillock v. BIG RIVER STEEL, LLC"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Barbee v. Big River Steel, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-2255"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Grasz, Melloy, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415461/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444025/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Paulette BARBEE, Administrator of the Estate of Kimberly Hope Gillock v. BIG RIVER STEEL, LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Paulette BARBEE, Administrator of the Estate of Kimberly Hope Gillock v. BIG RIVER STEEL, LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2686,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8444026,"string":"8,444,026"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America v. Sergio DIAZ-ORTIZ"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Diaz-Ortiz"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-2948"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Grasz, Melloy, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415462/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444026/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America v. Sergio DIAZ-ORTIZ\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America v. Sergio DIAZ-ORTIZ\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2687,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4632272,"string":"4,632,272"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tywin BENDER, Defendant - Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tywin Bender, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Tywin Bender"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3819; 17-3820"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Arnold, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3819\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Tywin Bender\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3820\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Tywin Bender\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\f Submitted: April 15, 2019\\n Filed: June 24, 2019\\n [Published]\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nPER CURIAM.\\n\\n In 2013, a gang war erupted in Minneapolis, resulting in an exchange of gunfire\\nbetween the members of rival gangs over the course of several months. As a result, the\\ngovernment indicted a host of suspected gang members, including Tywin Bender, on\\nvarious gun charges. Bender pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess firearms as a\\nconvicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(g)(1). While awaiting sentencing, one of\\nBender's codefendants proceeded to a trial where the government presented testimony\\nfrom two gang members—one in the same gang as Bender and one in the rival\\ngang—that provided context for their ongoing conflict. The jury found Bender's\\ncodefendant guilty of the crimes charged against him.\\n\\n The day after his codefendant's conviction, an incarcerated Bender telephoned\\na friend and instructed her to send an email to two fellow gang members housed in\\nanother prison where the two witnesses were housed, giving them the \\\"green light\\\" to\\n\\\"smash\\\" the witnesses. Bender's friend did as he instructed, but prison authorities\\nintercepted one of the two emails before it reached its intended recipient, and they\\nlater found a copy of the email in the other intended recipient's possession. The\\ngovernment indicted Bender with conspiring to retaliate against a federal witness, see\\n18 U.S.C. § 1513(f), and after a trial a jury found him guilty of committing the\\noffense.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f At sentencing the district court1 applied, over Bender's objection, an eight-level\\nenhancement to the Guidelines offense level on Bender's witness-retaliation\\nconviction because the court determined that \\\"the offense involved causing or\\nthreatening to cause physical injury to a person, or property damage, in order to\\nobstruct the administration of justice.\\\" USSG § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). The court sentenced\\nBender to sixty months in prison on the firearms conviction followed by a consecutive\\nseventy months in prison on the witness-retaliation conviction.\\n\\n Bender appealed, maintaining, among other things, that the district court erred\\nin applying the eight-level enhancement to the witness-retaliation charge. A panel of\\nthis court vacated Bender's sentence on other grounds and remanded for resentencing\\nwithout addressing Bender's challenge to the enhancement. See United States v.\\nParker, 871 F.3d 590, 607 (8th Cir. 2017). The issue arose again during resentencing,\\nand the district court2 again denied Bender's challenge to the enhancement. The\\ndistrict court sentenced Bender to sixty months in prison on the firearms charge and\\nfifty-eight months in prison on the witness-retaliation charge.\\n\\n Bender appeals again, asserting that the court erred in applying the eight-level\\nenhancement to his offense level for the witness-retaliation charge. He maintains that\\nhe cannot be viewed as a but-for cause to any threats made against the witnesses\\nbecause the intended recipients of his threatening missive knew, or should have\\nknown, of those witnesses' testimonies, and those intended recipients stood \\\"ready and\\nwilling to impose a sanction\\\" on the witnesses with or without Bender's permission\\nor encouragement. He argues that, under Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota, now retired.\\n 2\\n The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f(2014), the government had to prove \\\"Bender's efforts were the singular cause of the\\nthreats, as opposed to incidental, tangential, [or] even contributing\\\" causes.\\n\\n In Burrage, a defendant was convicted of unlawfully distributing heroin that\\nresulted in someone's death. Because a death resulted, the defendant faced a\\nmandatory minimum twenty-year sentence. The evidence showed that the decedent\\ncombined the heroin with other substances and died, and experts opined only that the\\nheroin contributed to the decedent's death, not that the decedent would have lived but\\nfor taking the heroin. The Supreme Court held that the defendant could not be held\\nresponsible for the decedent's death since the heroin he distributed was not a but-for\\ncause of death. Id. at 218–19.\\n\\n Burrage simply has no application here. The enhancement Bender challenges\\nrequires only that he \\\"caus[e] or threaten[] to cause physical injury to a person, or\\nproperty damage, in order to obstruct the administration of justice.\\\" See USSG\\n§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). It does not require that Bender's acts cause some type of harm, such\\nas death, injury, or even an apprehension of retaliation; Bender triggered the\\nenhancement the moment he sent a threat by way of his friend. The offense was\\ncomplete. Because the action required to apply the enhancement occurred when\\nBender dispatched his friend with the threatening message, we affirm the district\\ncourt's application of the eight-level enhancement under § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B).\\n\\n Affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4409525/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632272/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tywin BENDER, Defendant - Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tywin Bender, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3819\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Tywin Bender\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3820\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Tywin Bender\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeals from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\n ____________\n\f Submitted: April 15, 2019\n Filed: June 24, 2019\n [Published]\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nPER CURIAM.\n\n In 2013, a gang war erupted in Minneapolis, resulting in an exchange of gunfire\nbetween the members of rival gangs over the course of several months. As a result, the\ngovernment indicted a host of suspected gang members, including Tywin Bender, on\nvarious gun charges. Bender pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess firearms as a\nconvicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(g)(1). While awaiting sentencing, one of\nBender's codefendants proceeded to a trial where the government presented testimony\nfrom two gang members—one in the same gang as Bender and one in the rival\ngang—that provided context for their ongoing conflict. The jury found Bender's\ncodefendant guilty of the crimes charged against him.\n\n The day after his codefendant's conviction, an incarcerated Bender telephoned\na friend and instructed her to send an email to two fellow gang members housed in\nanother prison where the two witnesses were housed, giving them the \"green light\" to\n\"smash\" the witnesses. Bender's friend did as he instructed, but prison authorities\nintercepted one of the two emails before it reached its intended recipient, and they\nlater found a copy of the email in the other intended recipient's possession. The\ngovernment indicted Bender with conspiring to retaliate against a federal witness, see\n18 U.S.C. § 1513(f), and after a trial a jury found him guilty of committing the\noffense.\n\n\n\n\n -2-\n\f At sentencing the district court1 applied, over Bender's objection, an eight-level\nenhancement to the Guidelines offense level on Bender's witness-retaliation\nconviction because the court determined that \"the offense involved causing or\nthreatening to cause physical injury to a person, or property damage, in order to\nobstruct the administration of justice.\" USSG § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). The court sentenced\nBender to sixty months in prison on the firearms conviction followed by a consecutive\nseventy months in prison on the witness-retaliation conviction.\n\n Bender appealed, maintaining, among other things, that the district court erred\nin applying the eight-level enhancement to the witness-retaliation charge. A panel of\nthis court vacated Bender's sentence on other grounds and remanded for resentencing\nwithout addressing Bender's challenge to the enhancement. See United States v.\nParker, 871 F.3d 590, 607 (8th Cir. 2017). The issue arose again during resentencing,\nand the district court2 again denied Bender's challenge to the enhancement. The\ndistrict court sentenced Bender to sixty months in prison on the firearms charge and\nfifty-eight months in prison on the witness-retaliation charge.\n\n Bender appeals again, asserting that the court erred in applying the eight-level\nenhancement to his offense level for the witness-retaliation charge. He maintains that\nhe cannot be viewed as a but-for cause to any threats made against the witnesses\nbecause the intended recipients of his threatening missive knew, or should have\nknown, of those witnesses' testimonies, and those intended recipients stood \"ready and\nwilling to impose a sanction\" on the witnesses with or without Bender's permission\nor encouragement. He argues that, under Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District\nof Minnesota, now retired.\n 2\n The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District\nof Minnesota.\n\n -3-\n\f(2014), the government had to prove \"Bender's efforts were the singular cause of the\nthreats, as opposed to incidental, tangential, [or] even contributing\" causes.\n\n In Burrage, a defendant was convicted of unlawfully distributing heroin that\nresulted in someone's death. Because a death resulted, the defendant faced a\nmandatory minimum twenty-year sentence. The evidence showed that the decedent\ncombined the heroin with other substances and died, and experts opined only that the\nheroin contributed to the decedent's death, not that the decedent would have lived but\nfor taking the heroin. The Supreme Court held that the defendant could not be held\nresponsible for the decedent's death since the heroin he distributed was not a but-for\ncause of death. Id. at 218–19.\n\n Burrage simply has no application here. The enhancement Bender challenges\nrequires only that he \"caus[e] or threaten[] to cause physical injury to a person, or\nproperty damage, in order to obstruct the administration of justice.\" See USSG\n§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). It does not require that Bender's acts cause some type of harm, such\nas death, injury, or even an apprehension of retaliation; Bender triggered the\nenhancement the moment he sent a threat by way of his friend. The offense was\ncomplete. Because the action required to apply the enhancement occurred when\nBender dispatched his friend with the threatening message, we affirm the district\ncourt's application of the eight-level enhancement under § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B).\n\n Affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tywin BENDER, Defendant - Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tywin Bender, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3819\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Tywin Bender\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3820\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Tywin Bender\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\f Submitted: April 15, 2019\\n Filed: June 24, 2019\\n [Published]\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nPER CURIAM.\\n\\n In 2013, a gang war erupted in Minneapolis, resulting in an exchange of gunfire\\nbetween the members of rival gangs over the course of several months. As a result, the\\ngovernment indicted a host of suspected gang members, including Tywin Bender, on\\nvarious gun charges. Bender pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess firearms as a\\nconvicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(g)(1). While awaiting sentencing, one of\\nBender's codefendants proceeded to a trial where the government presented testimony\\nfrom two gang members—one in the same gang as Bender and one in the rival\\ngang—that provided context for their ongoing conflict. The jury found Bender's\\ncodefendant guilty of the crimes charged against him.\\n\\n The day after his codefendant's conviction, an incarcerated Bender telephoned\\na friend and instructed her to send an email to two fellow gang members housed in\\nanother prison where the two witnesses were housed, giving them the \\\"green light\\\" to\\n\\\"smash\\\" the witnesses. Bender's friend did as he instructed, but prison authorities\\nintercepted one of the two emails before it reached its intended recipient, and they\\nlater found a copy of the email in the other intended recipient's possession. The\\ngovernment indicted Bender with conspiring to retaliate against a federal witness, see\\n18 U.S.C. § 1513(f), and after a trial a jury found him guilty of committing the\\noffense.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f At sentencing the district court1 applied, over Bender's objection, an eight-level\\nenhancement to the Guidelines offense level on Bender's witness-retaliation\\nconviction because the court determined that \\\"the offense involved causing or\\nthreatening to cause physical injury to a person, or property damage, in order to\\nobstruct the administration of justice.\\\" USSG § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). The court sentenced\\nBender to sixty months in prison on the firearms conviction followed by a consecutive\\nseventy months in prison on the witness-retaliation conviction.\\n\\n Bender appealed, maintaining, among other things, that the district court erred\\nin applying the eight-level enhancement to the witness-retaliation charge. A panel of\\nthis court vacated Bender's sentence on other grounds and remanded for resentencing\\nwithout addressing Bender's challenge to the enhancement. See United States v.\\nParker, 871 F.3d 590, 607 (8th Cir. 2017). The issue arose again during resentencing,\\nand the district court2 again denied Bender's challenge to the enhancement. The\\ndistrict court sentenced Bender to sixty months in prison on the firearms charge and\\nfifty-eight months in prison on the witness-retaliation charge.\\n\\n Bender appeals again, asserting that the court erred in applying the eight-level\\nenhancement to his offense level for the witness-retaliation charge. He maintains that\\nhe cannot be viewed as a but-for cause to any threats made against the witnesses\\nbecause the intended recipients of his threatening missive knew, or should have\\nknown, of those witnesses' testimonies, and those intended recipients stood \\\"ready and\\nwilling to impose a sanction\\\" on the witnesses with or without Bender's permission\\nor encouragement. He argues that, under Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota, now retired.\\n 2\\n The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f(2014), the government had to prove \\\"Bender's efforts were the singular cause of the\\nthreats, as opposed to incidental, tangential, [or] even contributing\\\" causes.\\n\\n In Burrage, a defendant was convicted of unlawfully distributing heroin that\\nresulted in someone's death. Because a death resulted, the defendant faced a\\nmandatory minimum twenty-year sentence. The evidence showed that the decedent\\ncombined the heroin with other substances and died, and experts opined only that the\\nheroin contributed to the decedent's death, not that the decedent would have lived but\\nfor taking the heroin. The Supreme Court held that the defendant could not be held\\nresponsible for the decedent's death since the heroin he distributed was not a but-for\\ncause of death. Id. at 218–19.\\n\\n Burrage simply has no application here. The enhancement Bender challenges\\nrequires only that he \\\"caus[e] or threaten[] to cause physical injury to a person, or\\nproperty damage, in order to obstruct the administration of justice.\\\" See USSG\\n§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). It does not require that Bender's acts cause some type of harm, such\\nas death, injury, or even an apprehension of retaliation; Bender triggered the\\nenhancement the moment he sent a threat by way of his friend. The offense was\\ncomplete. Because the action required to apply the enhancement occurred when\\nBender dispatched his friend with the threatening message, we affirm the district\\ncourt's application of the eight-level enhancement under § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B).\\n\\n Affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2688,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4632275,"string":"4,632,275"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Israel Angeles-Moctezuma"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3227"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-3227\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Israel Angeles-Moctezuma\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: June 10, 2019\\n Filed: June 24, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In 2018, Israel Angeles-Moctezuma pled guilty to Conspiracy to Distribute and\\nPossession with Intent to Distribute Actual Methamphetamine, in violation of 21\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Angeles-Moctezuma objected to the\\nPresentence Investigation Report’s (“PSIR”) description of the offense conduct and\\nits proposed Sentencing Guidelines calculations.\\n\\f The district court1 held a contested evidentiary sentencing hearing on October\\n5, 2018, and after considering the evidence, overruled Angeles-Moctezuma’s\\nobjections, found a Guidelines range of 360 months to life, and imposed a low-end\\nsentence of 360 months’ imprisonment. Angeles-Moctezuma appeals asserting the\\ndistrict court erred in three ways: (1) by basing its Guidelines calculations on\\nunreliable hearsay evidence, (2) by denying his motion for a downward departure\\npursuant to U.S.S.G. §5H1.6, and (3) by denying his motion for a downward variance.\\nWe affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n In 2015, the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) began investigating a large-\\nscale drug-trafficking ring that transported methamphetamine from California and\\nKansas City, Missouri, to the St. Louis, Missouri, area for distribution. The\\ninvestigation revealed that Angeles-Moctezuma and Alan Cardenas served as sources\\nof supply of the methamphetamine.\\n\\n On October 12, 2016, a grand jury returned a 21-count Superseding Indictment\\nagainst 42 defendants. Angeles-Moctezuma was charged in Count One with\\nconspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine. On the morning of the first\\nday of trial, he entered an open plea of guilty. In the factual basis Angeles-\\nMoctezuma admitted that he agreed with other people to bring methamphetamine to\\nMissouri and distribute it, he knew the quantity was 50 grams or more of actual\\nmethamphetamine, and he understood that his conduct was illegal.\\n\\n A PSIR was prepared in anticipation of sentencing that detailed Angeles-\\nMoctezuma’s extensive involvement in the conspiracy. The PSIR recommended a\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fbase offense level of 38 based on a drug quantity of at least 4.5 kilograms of actual\\nmethamphetamine, a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon\\nunder U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1), and a four-level aggravating role enhancement under\\nU.S.S.G. §3B1.1(a). Angeles-Moctezuma filed objections to the PSIR’s description\\nof the offense conduct, calculation of the drug quantity and corresponding base\\noffense level, and application of sentencing enhancements. He also filed motions for\\na downward departure under U.S.S.G. §4A1.3 for overstated criminal history and\\nU.S.S.G. §5H1.6 for his difficult upbringing in Mexico. In addition to the departures\\nAngeles-Moctezuma sought a downward variance based on his acceptance of\\nresponsibility and his lack of violence in the conspiracy.\\n\\n The sentencing hearing consisted of the testimony of a single witness, DEA\\nSpecial Agent David Wilmsmeyer (“SA Wilmsmeyer”), who served as the primary\\ncase agent for most of the investigation. SA Wilmsmeyer’s testimony touched upon\\na number of law enforcement operations, seizures of drugs and money, and interviews\\nwith cooperating witnesses. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds to\\ntestimony about co-conspirator Judy Collins’s statements to the Utah Highway Patrol,\\narguing that the hearsay evidence lacked significant indicia of reliability. The court\\noverruled the objection. Later when SA Wilmsmeyer began to testify about\\nincriminating statements made by Angeles-Moctezuma, defense counsel made a\\ncontinuing objection on hearsay grounds. The court overruled the objection.\\n\\n At the close of testimony, the court overruled Angeles-Moctezuma’s objections\\nto the PSIR and adopted the PSIR, finding “that the Government has shown by way\\nmore than a preponderance of the evidence that the calculations in the [PSIR] are not\\nonly correct but conservative” and that “when you take [Angeles-Moctezuma’s]\\nadmission of the elements of the crime along with [the government’s] evidence, it’s\\noverwhelming.” The district court found a total offense level of 42 and a criminal\\nhistory category of II, which placed Angeles-Moctezuma in an advisory Guidelines\\nrange of 360 months to life.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f The court denied Angeles-Moctezuma’s motions for a downward departure and\\na downward variance and sentenced him to the low-end 360 months’ imprisonment,\\nfollowed by five years of supervised release. During the sentencing the district court\\naddressed each of Angeles-Moctezuma’s motions in turn. The court rejected\\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s argument that his criminal history was overstated, noting that\\nhe had three unscored prior convictions. The court acknowledged that Angeles-\\nMoctezuma had a difficult upbringing, but after considering it, determined that his\\nupbringing did not warrant a downward departure.\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n A. Guidelines Calculations\\n\\n Angeles-Moctezuma challenges the drug-quantity calculation and sentencing\\nenhancements claiming the district court erred when it based its findings solely on the\\nunreliable testimony “of a lone DEA agent” who based his testimony on the\\nstatements of “a cast of unsavory characters caught with illegal narcotics” without\\nany independent corroboration. We review the district court’s interpretation and\\napplication of the Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United\\nStates v. Sheridan, 859 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 2017). Where a proper objection is\\nmade to the district court’s consideration of hearsay evidence, we review for abuse\\nof discretion. Id. (citation omitted). If a defendant fails to object to the admission of\\nhearsay evidence, we review using the more deferential standard, plain error. See\\nUnited States v. Woods, 183 F. App’x 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing\\nUnited States v. Sharpfish, 408 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\n Angeles-Moctezuma specifically objected to SA Wilmsmeyer’s testimony\\nabout Collins’s statements to law enforcement and later made a continuing objection\\nto SA Wilmsmeyer’s testimony about Angeles-Moctezuma’s own incriminating\\nstatements. No objection was raised to other extensive testimony relaying statements\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fmade by other co-conspirators, which we understand to be within the “cast of\\nunsavory characters” claim on appeal.\\n\\n When confronted with disputed fact issues, a district court may rely on relevant\\nhearsay evidence and other evidence that is inadmissible under the rules of evidence\\n“so long as that evidence possesses sufficient indicia of reliability to support its\\nprobable accuracy.” Sheridan, 859 F.3d at 583 (citation and internal quotation marks\\nomitted). “This includes uncorroborated hearsay if the defendant has the opportunity\\nto respond to and rebut the testimony.” Id. In evaluating the reliability of hearsay\\nevidence, we will consider the consistency of the proffered hearsay testimony, the\\ntiming and nature of the statements, the witness’s impressions of the demeanor of the\\ndeclarant’s testimony, and any other evidence that tends to corroborate or contradict\\nthe statements. Id.\\n\\n The hearsay evidence relayed by SA Wilmsmeyer possessed sufficient indicia\\nof reliability to be considered by the district court. The co-conspirators’ statements\\nwere corroborated by statements of other co-conspirators, searches and seizures made\\nby law enforcement, law enforcement’s visual and audio surveillance of Angeles-\\nMoctezuma and his co-conspirators, and Angeles-Moctezuma’s own statements in a\\npost-Miranda interview. We find no abuse of discretion as to the hearsay evidence\\nAngeles-Moctezuma objected to and no plain error as to the unobjected-to testimony.\\nWe further find no clear error in the court’s findings regarding drug quantity,\\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s possession of a firearm, or his role in the offense.\\n\\n B. Motion for Downward Departure\\n\\n Angeles-Moctezuma next contends that the district court erred when it denied\\nhis motion for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. §5H1.6. “[A] district court’s\\ndecision to deny [a] downward departure[] is unreviewable ‘unless the district court\\nhad an unconstitutional motive or erroneously thought that it was without authority\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fto grant the departure[].’” United States v. Phelps, 536 F.3d 862, 868 (8th Cir. 2008)\\n(quoting United States v. Montgomery, 525 F.3d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 2008)). Because\\nwe find that neither circumstance exists here, the denial of Angeles-Moctezuma’s\\nrequested departure is unreviewable.\\n\\n C. Motion for Downward Variance\\n\\n Lastly, Angeles-Moctezuma challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\\nfor a downward variance. We review the denial of a motion for downward variance\\nby reviewing the sentence for reasonableness, applying a deferential\\nabuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Acosta, 619 F.3d 956, 962–63 (8th Cir.\\n2010) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 573 F.3d 600, 607 (8th Cir. 2009)).\\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, and\\nwe find on this record no clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant aggravating\\nand mitigating factors. See United States v. Mitchell, 914 F.3d 581, 587–88 (8th Cir.\\n2019) (citation omitted). The record demonstrates the court considered the parties’\\narguments and provided a reasoned basis for imposing the sentence it did. The court\\nwas within its discretion to rely primarily upon the seriousness of the offense,\\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s extensive role in the conspiracy, and his criminal history.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4409528/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"LOKEN\": \", Circuit\", \"KELLY\": \", Circuit\", \"ERICKSON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632275/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Israel Angeles-Moctezuma\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-3227\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Israel Angeles-Moctezuma\n\n Defendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: June 10, 2019\n Filed: June 24, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\n\n In 2018, Israel Angeles-Moctezuma pled guilty to Conspiracy to Distribute and\nPossession with Intent to Distribute Actual Methamphetamine, in violation of 21\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Angeles-Moctezuma objected to the\nPresentence Investigation Report’s (“PSIR”) description of the offense conduct and\nits proposed Sentencing Guidelines calculations.\n\f The district court1 held a contested evidentiary sentencing hearing on October\n5, 2018, and after considering the evidence, overruled Angeles-Moctezuma’s\nobjections, found a Guidelines range of 360 months to life, and imposed a low-end\nsentence of 360 months’ imprisonment. Angeles-Moctezuma appeals asserting the\ndistrict court erred in three ways: (1) by basing its Guidelines calculations on\nunreliable hearsay evidence, (2) by denying his motion for a downward departure\npursuant to U.S.S.G. §5H1.6, and (3) by denying his motion for a downward variance.\nWe affirm.\n\nI. Background\n\n In 2015, the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) began investigating a large-\nscale drug-trafficking ring that transported methamphetamine from California and\nKansas City, Missouri, to the St. Louis, Missouri, area for distribution. The\ninvestigation revealed that Angeles-Moctezuma and Alan Cardenas served as sources\nof supply of the methamphetamine.\n\n On October 12, 2016, a grand jury returned a 21-count Superseding Indictment\nagainst 42 defendants. Angeles-Moctezuma was charged in Count One with\nconspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine. On the morning of the first\nday of trial, he entered an open plea of guilty. In the factual basis Angeles-\nMoctezuma admitted that he agreed with other people to bring methamphetamine to\nMissouri and distribute it, he knew the quantity was 50 grams or more of actual\nmethamphetamine, and he understood that his conduct was illegal.\n\n A PSIR was prepared in anticipation of sentencing that detailed Angeles-\nMoctezuma’s extensive involvement in the conspiracy. The PSIR recommended a\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Missouri.\n\n -2-\n\fbase offense level of 38 based on a drug quantity of at least 4.5 kilograms of actual\nmethamphetamine, a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon\nunder U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1), and a four-level aggravating role enhancement under\nU.S.S.G. §3B1.1(a). Angeles-Moctezuma filed objections to the PSIR’s description\nof the offense conduct, calculation of the drug quantity and corresponding base\noffense level, and application of sentencing enhancements. He also filed motions for\na downward departure under U.S.S.G. §4A1.3 for overstated criminal history and\nU.S.S.G. §5H1.6 for his difficult upbringing in Mexico. In addition to the departures\nAngeles-Moctezuma sought a downward variance based on his acceptance of\nresponsibility and his lack of violence in the conspiracy.\n\n The sentencing hearing consisted of the testimony of a single witness, DEA\nSpecial Agent David Wilmsmeyer (“SA Wilmsmeyer”), who served as the primary\ncase agent for most of the investigation. SA Wilmsmeyer’s testimony touched upon\na number of law enforcement operations, seizures of drugs and money, and interviews\nwith cooperating witnesses. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds to\ntestimony about co-conspirator Judy Collins’s statements to the Utah Highway Patrol,\narguing that the hearsay evidence lacked significant indicia of reliability. The court\noverruled the objection. Later when SA Wilmsmeyer began to testify about\nincriminating statements made by Angeles-Moctezuma, defense counsel made a\ncontinuing objection on hearsay grounds. The court overruled the objection.\n\n At the close of testimony, the court overruled Angeles-Moctezuma’s objections\nto the PSIR and adopted the PSIR, finding “that the Government has shown by way\nmore than a preponderance of the evidence that the calculations in the [PSIR] are not\nonly correct but conservative” and that “when you take [Angeles-Moctezuma’s]\nadmission of the elements of the crime along with [the government’s] evidence, it’s\noverwhelming.” The district court found a total offense level of 42 and a criminal\nhistory category of II, which placed Angeles-Moctezuma in an advisory Guidelines\nrange of 360 months to life.\n\n -3-\n\f The court denied Angeles-Moctezuma’s motions for a downward departure and\na downward variance and sentenced him to the low-end 360 months’ imprisonment,\nfollowed by five years of supervised release. During the sentencing the district court\naddressed each of Angeles-Moctezuma’s motions in turn. The court rejected\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s argument that his criminal history was overstated, noting that\nhe had three unscored prior convictions. The court acknowledged that Angeles-\nMoctezuma had a difficult upbringing, but after considering it, determined that his\nupbringing did not warrant a downward departure.\n\nII. Discussion\n\n A. Guidelines Calculations\n\n Angeles-Moctezuma challenges the drug-quantity calculation and sentencing\nenhancements claiming the district court erred when it based its findings solely on the\nunreliable testimony “of a lone DEA agent” who based his testimony on the\nstatements of “a cast of unsavory characters caught with illegal narcotics” without\nany independent corroboration. We review the district court’s interpretation and\napplication of the Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United\nStates v. Sheridan, 859 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 2017). Where a proper objection is\nmade to the district court’s consideration of hearsay evidence, we review for abuse\nof discretion. Id. (citation omitted). If a defendant fails to object to the admission of\nhearsay evidence, we review using the more deferential standard, plain error. See\nUnited States v. Woods, 183 F. App’x 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing\nUnited States v. Sharpfish, 408 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir. 2005)).\n\n Angeles-Moctezuma specifically objected to SA Wilmsmeyer’s testimony\nabout Collins’s statements to law enforcement and later made a continuing objection\nto SA Wilmsmeyer’s testimony about Angeles-Moctezuma’s own incriminating\nstatements. No objection was raised to other extensive testimony relaying statements\n\n -4-\n\fmade by other co-conspirators, which we understand to be within the “cast of\nunsavory characters” claim on appeal.\n\n When confronted with disputed fact issues, a district court may rely on relevant\nhearsay evidence and other evidence that is inadmissible under the rules of evidence\n“so long as that evidence possesses sufficient indicia of reliability to support its\nprobable accuracy.” Sheridan, 859 F.3d at 583 (citation and internal quotation marks\nomitted). “This includes uncorroborated hearsay if the defendant has the opportunity\nto respond to and rebut the testimony.” Id. In evaluating the reliability of hearsay\nevidence, we will consider the consistency of the proffered hearsay testimony, the\ntiming and nature of the statements, the witness’s impressions of the demeanor of the\ndeclarant’s testimony, and any other evidence that tends to corroborate or contradict\nthe statements. Id.\n\n The hearsay evidence relayed by SA Wilmsmeyer possessed sufficient indicia\nof reliability to be considered by the district court. The co-conspirators’ statements\nwere corroborated by statements of other co-conspirators, searches and seizures made\nby law enforcement, law enforcement’s visual and audio surveillance of Angeles-\nMoctezuma and his co-conspirators, and Angeles-Moctezuma’s own statements in a\npost-Miranda interview. We find no abuse of discretion as to the hearsay evidence\nAngeles-Moctezuma objected to and no plain error as to the unobjected-to testimony.\nWe further find no clear error in the court’s findings regarding drug quantity,\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s possession of a firearm, or his role in the offense.\n\n B. Motion for Downward Departure\n\n Angeles-Moctezuma next contends that the district court erred when it denied\nhis motion for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. §5H1.6. “[A] district court’s\ndecision to deny [a] downward departure[] is unreviewable ‘unless the district court\nhad an unconstitutional motive or erroneously thought that it was without authority\n\n -5-\n\fto grant the departure[].’” United States v. Phelps, 536 F.3d 862, 868 (8th Cir. 2008)\n(quoting United States v. Montgomery, 525 F.3d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 2008)). Because\nwe find that neither circumstance exists here, the denial of Angeles-Moctezuma’s\nrequested departure is unreviewable.\n\n C. Motion for Downward Variance\n\n Lastly, Angeles-Moctezuma challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\nfor a downward variance. We review the denial of a motion for downward variance\nby reviewing the sentence for reasonableness, applying a deferential\nabuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Acosta, 619 F.3d 956, 962–63 (8th Cir.\n2010) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 573 F.3d 600, 607 (8th Cir. 2009)).\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, and\nwe find on this record no clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant aggravating\nand mitigating factors. See United States v. Mitchell, 914 F.3d 581, 587–88 (8th Cir.\n2019) (citation omitted). The record demonstrates the court considered the parties’\narguments and provided a reasoned basis for imposing the sentence it did. The court\nwas within its discretion to rely primarily upon the seriousness of the offense,\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s extensive role in the conspiracy, and his criminal history.\n\nIII. Conclusion\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Israel Angeles-Moctezuma\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-3227\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Israel Angeles-Moctezuma\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: June 10, 2019\\n Filed: June 24, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In 2018, Israel Angeles-Moctezuma pled guilty to Conspiracy to Distribute and\\nPossession with Intent to Distribute Actual Methamphetamine, in violation of 21\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Angeles-Moctezuma objected to the\\nPresentence Investigation Report’s (“PSIR”) description of the offense conduct and\\nits proposed Sentencing Guidelines calculations.\\n\\f The district court1 held a contested evidentiary sentencing hearing on October\\n5, 2018, and after considering the evidence, overruled Angeles-Moctezuma’s\\nobjections, found a Guidelines range of 360 months to life, and imposed a low-end\\nsentence of 360 months’ imprisonment. Angeles-Moctezuma appeals asserting the\\ndistrict court erred in three ways: (1) by basing its Guidelines calculations on\\nunreliable hearsay evidence, (2) by denying his motion for a downward departure\\npursuant to U.S.S.G. §5H1.6, and (3) by denying his motion for a downward variance.\\nWe affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n In 2015, the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) began investigating a large-\\nscale drug-trafficking ring that transported methamphetamine from California and\\nKansas City, Missouri, to the St. Louis, Missouri, area for distribution. The\\ninvestigation revealed that Angeles-Moctezuma and Alan Cardenas served as sources\\nof supply of the methamphetamine.\\n\\n On October 12, 2016, a grand jury returned a 21-count Superseding Indictment\\nagainst 42 defendants. Angeles-Moctezuma was charged in Count One with\\nconspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine. On the morning of the first\\nday of trial, he entered an open plea of guilty. In the factual basis Angeles-\\nMoctezuma admitted that he agreed with other people to bring methamphetamine to\\nMissouri and distribute it, he knew the quantity was 50 grams or more of actual\\nmethamphetamine, and he understood that his conduct was illegal.\\n\\n A PSIR was prepared in anticipation of sentencing that detailed Angeles-\\nMoctezuma’s extensive involvement in the conspiracy. The PSIR recommended a\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fbase offense level of 38 based on a drug quantity of at least 4.5 kilograms of actual\\nmethamphetamine, a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon\\nunder U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1), and a four-level aggravating role enhancement under\\nU.S.S.G. §3B1.1(a). Angeles-Moctezuma filed objections to the PSIR’s description\\nof the offense conduct, calculation of the drug quantity and corresponding base\\noffense level, and application of sentencing enhancements. He also filed motions for\\na downward departure under U.S.S.G. §4A1.3 for overstated criminal history and\\nU.S.S.G. §5H1.6 for his difficult upbringing in Mexico. In addition to the departures\\nAngeles-Moctezuma sought a downward variance based on his acceptance of\\nresponsibility and his lack of violence in the conspiracy.\\n\\n The sentencing hearing consisted of the testimony of a single witness, DEA\\nSpecial Agent David Wilmsmeyer (“SA Wilmsmeyer”), who served as the primary\\ncase agent for most of the investigation. SA Wilmsmeyer’s testimony touched upon\\na number of law enforcement operations, seizures of drugs and money, and interviews\\nwith cooperating witnesses. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds to\\ntestimony about co-conspirator Judy Collins’s statements to the Utah Highway Patrol,\\narguing that the hearsay evidence lacked significant indicia of reliability. The court\\noverruled the objection. Later when SA Wilmsmeyer began to testify about\\nincriminating statements made by Angeles-Moctezuma, defense counsel made a\\ncontinuing objection on hearsay grounds. The court overruled the objection.\\n\\n At the close of testimony, the court overruled Angeles-Moctezuma’s objections\\nto the PSIR and adopted the PSIR, finding “that the Government has shown by way\\nmore than a preponderance of the evidence that the calculations in the [PSIR] are not\\nonly correct but conservative” and that “when you take [Angeles-Moctezuma’s]\\nadmission of the elements of the crime along with [the government’s] evidence, it’s\\noverwhelming.” The district court found a total offense level of 42 and a criminal\\nhistory category of II, which placed Angeles-Moctezuma in an advisory Guidelines\\nrange of 360 months to life.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f The court denied Angeles-Moctezuma’s motions for a downward departure and\\na downward variance and sentenced him to the low-end 360 months’ imprisonment,\\nfollowed by five years of supervised release. During the sentencing the district court\\naddressed each of Angeles-Moctezuma’s motions in turn. The court rejected\\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s argument that his criminal history was overstated, noting that\\nhe had three unscored prior convictions. The court acknowledged that Angeles-\\nMoctezuma had a difficult upbringing, but after considering it, determined that his\\nupbringing did not warrant a downward departure.\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n A. Guidelines Calculations\\n\\n Angeles-Moctezuma challenges the drug-quantity calculation and sentencing\\nenhancements claiming the district court erred when it based its findings solely on the\\nunreliable testimony “of a lone DEA agent” who based his testimony on the\\nstatements of “a cast of unsavory characters caught with illegal narcotics” without\\nany independent corroboration. We review the district court’s interpretation and\\napplication of the Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United\\nStates v. Sheridan, 859 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 2017). Where a proper objection is\\nmade to the district court’s consideration of hearsay evidence, we review for abuse\\nof discretion. Id. (citation omitted). If a defendant fails to object to the admission of\\nhearsay evidence, we review using the more deferential standard, plain error. See\\nUnited States v. Woods, 183 F. App’x 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing\\nUnited States v. Sharpfish, 408 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\n Angeles-Moctezuma specifically objected to SA Wilmsmeyer’s testimony\\nabout Collins’s statements to law enforcement and later made a continuing objection\\nto SA Wilmsmeyer’s testimony about Angeles-Moctezuma’s own incriminating\\nstatements. No objection was raised to other extensive testimony relaying statements\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fmade by other co-conspirators, which we understand to be within the “cast of\\nunsavory characters” claim on appeal.\\n\\n When confronted with disputed fact issues, a district court may rely on relevant\\nhearsay evidence and other evidence that is inadmissible under the rules of evidence\\n“so long as that evidence possesses sufficient indicia of reliability to support its\\nprobable accuracy.” Sheridan, 859 F.3d at 583 (citation and internal quotation marks\\nomitted). “This includes uncorroborated hearsay if the defendant has the opportunity\\nto respond to and rebut the testimony.” Id. In evaluating the reliability of hearsay\\nevidence, we will consider the consistency of the proffered hearsay testimony, the\\ntiming and nature of the statements, the witness’s impressions of the demeanor of the\\ndeclarant’s testimony, and any other evidence that tends to corroborate or contradict\\nthe statements. Id.\\n\\n The hearsay evidence relayed by SA Wilmsmeyer possessed sufficient indicia\\nof reliability to be considered by the district court. The co-conspirators’ statements\\nwere corroborated by statements of other co-conspirators, searches and seizures made\\nby law enforcement, law enforcement’s visual and audio surveillance of Angeles-\\nMoctezuma and his co-conspirators, and Angeles-Moctezuma’s own statements in a\\npost-Miranda interview. We find no abuse of discretion as to the hearsay evidence\\nAngeles-Moctezuma objected to and no plain error as to the unobjected-to testimony.\\nWe further find no clear error in the court’s findings regarding drug quantity,\\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s possession of a firearm, or his role in the offense.\\n\\n B. Motion for Downward Departure\\n\\n Angeles-Moctezuma next contends that the district court erred when it denied\\nhis motion for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. §5H1.6. “[A] district court’s\\ndecision to deny [a] downward departure[] is unreviewable ‘unless the district court\\nhad an unconstitutional motive or erroneously thought that it was without authority\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fto grant the departure[].’” United States v. Phelps, 536 F.3d 862, 868 (8th Cir. 2008)\\n(quoting United States v. Montgomery, 525 F.3d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 2008)). Because\\nwe find that neither circumstance exists here, the denial of Angeles-Moctezuma’s\\nrequested departure is unreviewable.\\n\\n C. Motion for Downward Variance\\n\\n Lastly, Angeles-Moctezuma challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\\nfor a downward variance. We review the denial of a motion for downward variance\\nby reviewing the sentence for reasonableness, applying a deferential\\nabuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Acosta, 619 F.3d 956, 962–63 (8th Cir.\\n2010) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 573 F.3d 600, 607 (8th Cir. 2009)).\\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, and\\nwe find on this record no clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant aggravating\\nand mitigating factors. See United States v. Mitchell, 914 F.3d 581, 587–88 (8th Cir.\\n2019) (citation omitted). The record demonstrates the court considered the parties’\\narguments and provided a reasoned basis for imposing the sentence it did. The court\\nwas within its discretion to rely primarily upon the seriousness of the offense,\\nAngeles-Moctezuma’s extensive role in the conspiracy, and his criminal history.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2689,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4632639,"string":"4,632,639"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Kalil Wesley DUNN Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Kalil Dunn"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2393"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Erickson, Kobes\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2393\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Kalil Wesley Dunn\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 15, 2019\\n Filed: June 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Kalil Dunn appeals the district court’s1 order denying his two motions to\\nsuppress evidence, arguing that the vehicle searches that revealed the evidence had\\nno legal basis. Dunn also appeals his 57-month sentence for being a felon in\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota.\\n\\fpossession of a firearm, arguing that the district court should have applied a\\ndownward variance. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Around 1:00 AM on April 12, 2017, Dunn fell asleep at the wheel of a moving\\nBuick sedan on a Minneapolis, Minnesota street. The Buick ran into three parked\\ncars before spinning to a stop in the middle of the street, sustaining heavy front-end\\ndamage and a flat tire which rendered the vehicle undriveable. Minneapolis police\\nofficers arrived on the scene and found the Buick sitting in the street, facing the\\nwrong direction and blocking traffic. The officers observed the vehicle’s condition\\nand location and, pursuant to Minneapolis Police Department policy, chose to tow\\nand impound it. They did so despite the fact that Dunn had already contacted a\\nprivate tow truck. The officers, continuing to follow departmental policy, conducted\\nan inventory search of the Buick before towing it. During the search, they discovered\\ntwo semi-automatic pistols, two baggies containing crack cocaine, and two digital\\nscales. Dunn was arrested and detained by local authorities, but released from local\\ncustody on April 26, 2017.\\n\\n Two months later, on June 20, 2017, two Minneapolis Police Department\\nofficers in an unmarked car encountered Dunn as he was driving on a city street.\\nDunn sped away from the officers, who followed him and observed him make several\\nturns at a high rate of speed without using his turn signal. The officers considered\\nthis conduct to be reckless driving, especially in an area where children were playing,\\nand activated the vehicle’s police lights to pull Dunn over. Dunn pulled over, got out\\nof his vehicle, and began to walk away. Officer Donnell Crayton exited the police\\nvehicle, directed Dunn to put his hands up, and escorted him to the police vehicle.\\n\\n While Officer Crayton handcuffed and detained Dunn, including frisking him\\nfor weapons, Officer Kong Moua walked up to Dunn’s vehicle to see if anyone else\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fwas inside. As he looked through the driver’s side window, Officer Moua saw a\\nplastic bag that appeared to contain crack cocaine in an open compartment on the\\ndashboard. Officer Moua then obtained the vehicle’s key from Dunn and conducted\\nan automobile search. In addition to the crack cocaine, he discovered a loaded\\nhandgun and a magazine drum with ammunition in the passenger compartment.\\nOfficer Moua removed the handgun and ammunition from the vehicle first and\\nphotographed them before returning to the vehicle and removing and photographing\\nthe crack cocaine.\\n\\n Dunn was indicted on five counts arising from his two encounters with law\\nenforcement: one count of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug\\ntrafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), arising from the April\\n12th incident; two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), with one count arising from each incident; and\\ntwo counts of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21\\nU.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), with one count arising from each incident. He\\nmoved to suppress all evidence obtained in the searches of his vehicles.\\n\\n After an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate judge recommended denial of Dunn’s\\nmotions to suppress, finding that the April 12th search was a valid inventory search\\nand that the June 20th search was justified by Officer Moua’s observation of crack\\ncocaine in plain view inside the car. The district court adopted the Report and\\nRecommendation over Dunn’s objections, stating that nothing in the law or\\nMinneapolis Police Department policy requires officers to consult a vehicle’s driver\\nbefore making towing arrangements and that Officer Moua credibly testified that he\\nsaw crack cocaine in plain view before conducting the June 20th search.\\n\\n Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dunn pled guilty to Count 1—being a felon in\\npossession of a firearm—and Count 3—carrying a firearm during and in relation to\\na drug trafficking crime—of the indictment, reserving his right to appeal the denial\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof his suppression motions. Both of these charges stemmed from the April 12th\\nincident. The government agreed to dismiss the three remaining counts of the\\nindictment, including both of the charges arising from the June 20th search.2 With\\nan offense level of 21 and a criminal history that placed him in category IV, Dunn’s\\nUnited States Sentencing Guidelines range for Count 1 was 57 to 71 months. His\\nGuidelines range for Count 3 was 60 months, the mandatory minimum, to be served\\nconsecutively to his Count 1 sentence.\\n\\n Dunn sought a downward variance to 36 months on Count 1, citing his difficult\\nchildhood. The district court denied the variance but imposed a sentence at the\\nbottom of the Guidelines range—57 months on Count 1 and 60 months on Count 3.\\nDunn now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motions to\\nsuppress because the police had no legal basis to search his vehicles and that the\\ndistrict court abused its discretion at sentencing in failing to grant a downward\\nvariance based on his difficult childhood.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we\\nreview factual findings for clear error, giving “great deference” to the district court’s\\ncredibility findings. United States v. Guide, 891 F.3d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 2018);\\nUnited States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 772-73 (8th Cir. 2005). “[T]he ultimate\\nquestion of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated” is reviewed de novo.\\nUnited States v. Poggemiller, 375 F.3d 686, 687 (8th Cir. 2004). We will affirm the\\ndistrict court’s decision unless it misstates the law, is unsupported by substantial\\n\\n 2\\n Although the district court dismissed all the charges stemming from the June\\n20th search, it applied a two-level enhancement for possessing three or more firearms\\nbased in part on the firearm discovered by Officer Moua during that search. Further,\\nat sentencing, the district court used Dunn’s possession of a loaded firearm on June\\n20, 2017 as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fevidence, or, after reviewing the record, we are “left with the definite and firm\\nconviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Layne, 973 F.2d 1417,\\n1420 (8th Cir. 1992).\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches, subject to a\\nfew narrow exceptions. United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2011).\\n“One such exception allows law enforcement to inventory the contents of a lawfully\\nimpounded vehicle without a warrant or probable cause.” Id. Another exception\\nallows officers to search a vehicle if, before searching, they “[have] probable cause\\nto believe the vehicle contain[s] contraband or other evidence of a crime . . . .”\\nUnited States v. Vore, 743 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2014). Dunn contends that none\\nof the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied to the searches of his vehicles.\\nWe examine each of the searches in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Dunn moved to suppress evidence gathered in the April 12th inventory search,\\narguing that the search was unreasonable because Minneapolis police should have\\nwaited and deferred to his private towing arrangements rather than impounding his\\nvehicle. An inventory search is considered reasonable if it “is conducted according\\nto standardized police procedures . . . .” Taylor, 636 F.3d at 464. Here, it is\\nundisputed that Minneapolis Police Department policy allows officers to tow and\\nimpound a vehicle that is impeding traffic when the owner cannot immediately\\nremove the vehicle on his own. It is also undisputed that officers must conduct an\\ninventory search before impounding a car.\\n\\n Dunn acknowledges that departmental policy does not require officers to ask\\nvehicle owners if they wish to make private towing arrangements before the officers\\ntow and impound a vehicle. He contends, however, that the standard policy did not\\napply because he informed the officers that he had already made private towing\\n\\n -5-\\n\\farrangements and the officers should have deferred to those arrangements. Dunn\\ncites no legal authority for this proposition, nor any legal authority showing that the\\nMinneapolis Police Department’s towing policy is unreasonable. Because Dunn\\nadmits that the officers followed departmental policy in impounding and inventorying\\nhis vehicle, and because an inventory search conducted according to standard\\ndepartmental policies is reasonable, we find that the April 12th search of Dunn’s\\nvehicle was reasonable. See United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.\\n1993). The district court properly denied Dunn’s motion to suppress the evidence\\ngathered during that search.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Dunn also moved to suppress evidence gathered in the June 20th search,\\narguing that Officer Moua had no legal justification to search his vehicle. The district\\ncourt found that the June 20th search was justified because Officer Moua observed\\ncrack cocaine in plain view inside the car before initiating the search. We agree.\\n\\n “As long as the law enforcement officials have probable cause, they may search\\nan automobile without a warrant under the automobile exception.” United States v.\\nFladten, 230 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2000). This is because a vehicle’s “ready\\nmobility” creates an exigency and because individuals have a “reduced expectation\\nof privacy in an automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation.” Pennsylvania v.\\nLabron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam). If an officer views contraband in\\nplain sight through an automobile’s window, he has probable cause to search that\\nvehicle. Fladten, 230 F.3d at 1086.\\n\\n At the hearing on Dunn’s motions to suppress, Officer Moua testified that he\\nsaw a baggie of crack cocaine in a dashboard compartment through the driver’s side\\nwindow when he initially approached Dunn’s vehicle. Dunn argues that the district\\ncourt erroneously credited Officer Moua’s testimony because the baggie was the last\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fthing the officer removed from the vehicle and, therefore, must have been the last\\nthing he discovered in the search. However, “[a] credibility determination made by\\na district court after a hearing on the merits of a motion to suppress is ‘virtually\\nunassailable on appeal.’” United States v. Frencher, 503 F.3d 701, 701 (8th Cir.\\n2007) (quoting United States v. Guel-Contreras, 468 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2006)).\\n\\n Officer Moua indicated that he removed the firearm from the vehicle before the\\ncrack cocaine due to safety concerns, despite discovering the crack cocaine first, and\\nthe district court found this explanation adequate. The district court further\\ndetermined that the record, including Officer Crayton’s testimony that Officer Moua\\nsaid he saw narcotics in Dunn’s vehicle and discovered the firearm later, supported\\nOfficer Moua’s testimony. We find no clear error in the district court’s credibility\\ndetermination, and we thus conclude that the district court properly denied Dunn’s\\nmotion to suppress evidence gathered in the June 20th search.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Dunn also challenges his sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm\\nas substantively unreasonable, claiming that the district court failed to properly\\nevaluate the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in determining his sentence. We review the\\nsubstantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United\\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it “fails to\\nconsider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives\\nsignificant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the\\nappropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”\\nUnited States v. Watson, 480 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n The sentencing court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors and may\\nassign some factors greater weight than others. United States v. Wilcox, 666 F.3d\\n1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 2012). “After all, the sentencing judge is in the best position to\\n\\n -7-\\n\\ffind facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.” Id. at 1157-\\n58 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 2010)) (internal\\nalterations and quotation marks omitted). If a sentence imposed is within the range\\nrecommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, we presume that sentence is reasonable.\\nRita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).\\n\\n Here, the district court imposed a 57-month sentence on Count 1. Because that\\nsentence is within the 57- to 71-month Guidelines range, we presume that it is\\nreasonable. Dunn argues that the district court misweighed the § 3553(a) factors and\\nabused its discretion by failing to grant him a downward variance based on his\\ndifficult childhood. The district court acknowledged that Dunn presented mitigating\\ncircumstances for it to consider, but it ultimately declined to vary downward from the\\nGuidelines range because of Dunn’s criminal history, the nature and circumstances\\nof the offense, and the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public and deter\\nDunn from committing future crimes. Allotting “relatively greater weight to the\\nnature and circumstances of the offense than to the mitigating personal characteristics\\nof the defendant is well within the wide latitude [given] to individual district court\\njudges in weighing relevant factors.” United States v. Wisecarver, 644 F.3d 764, 774\\n(8th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\nWe therefore decline to find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to\\nimpose a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, and we uphold that sentence\\nas substantively reasonable.\\n\\n We affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4409892/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KOBES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632639/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Kalil Wesley DUNN Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2393\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Kalil Wesley Dunn\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\n ____________\n\n Submitted: March 15, 2019\n Filed: June 25, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\n Kalil Dunn appeals the district court’s1 order denying his two motions to\nsuppress evidence, arguing that the vehicle searches that revealed the evidence had\nno legal basis. Dunn also appeals his 57-month sentence for being a felon in\n\n 1\n The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the\nDistrict of Minnesota.\n\fpossession of a firearm, arguing that the district court should have applied a\ndownward variance. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n Around 1:00 AM on April 12, 2017, Dunn fell asleep at the wheel of a moving\nBuick sedan on a Minneapolis, Minnesota street. The Buick ran into three parked\ncars before spinning to a stop in the middle of the street, sustaining heavy front-end\ndamage and a flat tire which rendered the vehicle undriveable. Minneapolis police\nofficers arrived on the scene and found the Buick sitting in the street, facing the\nwrong direction and blocking traffic. The officers observed the vehicle’s condition\nand location and, pursuant to Minneapolis Police Department policy, chose to tow\nand impound it. They did so despite the fact that Dunn had already contacted a\nprivate tow truck. The officers, continuing to follow departmental policy, conducted\nan inventory search of the Buick before towing it. During the search, they discovered\ntwo semi-automatic pistols, two baggies containing crack cocaine, and two digital\nscales. Dunn was arrested and detained by local authorities, but released from local\ncustody on April 26, 2017.\n\n Two months later, on June 20, 2017, two Minneapolis Police Department\nofficers in an unmarked car encountered Dunn as he was driving on a city street.\nDunn sped away from the officers, who followed him and observed him make several\nturns at a high rate of speed without using his turn signal. The officers considered\nthis conduct to be reckless driving, especially in an area where children were playing,\nand activated the vehicle’s police lights to pull Dunn over. Dunn pulled over, got out\nof his vehicle, and began to walk away. Officer Donnell Crayton exited the police\nvehicle, directed Dunn to put his hands up, and escorted him to the police vehicle.\n\n While Officer Crayton handcuffed and detained Dunn, including frisking him\nfor weapons, Officer Kong Moua walked up to Dunn’s vehicle to see if anyone else\n\n -2-\n\fwas inside. As he looked through the driver’s side window, Officer Moua saw a\nplastic bag that appeared to contain crack cocaine in an open compartment on the\ndashboard. Officer Moua then obtained the vehicle’s key from Dunn and conducted\nan automobile search. In addition to the crack cocaine, he discovered a loaded\nhandgun and a magazine drum with ammunition in the passenger compartment.\nOfficer Moua removed the handgun and ammunition from the vehicle first and\nphotographed them before returning to the vehicle and removing and photographing\nthe crack cocaine.\n\n Dunn was indicted on five counts arising from his two encounters with law\nenforcement: one count of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug\ntrafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), arising from the April\n12th incident; two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of\n18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), with one count arising from each incident; and\ntwo counts of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21\nU.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), with one count arising from each incident. He\nmoved to suppress all evidence obtained in the searches of his vehicles.\n\n After an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate judge recommended denial of Dunn’s\nmotions to suppress, finding that the April 12th search was a valid inventory search\nand that the June 20th search was justified by Officer Moua’s observation of crack\ncocaine in plain view inside the car. The district court adopted the Report and\nRecommendation over Dunn’s objections, stating that nothing in the law or\nMinneapolis Police Department policy requires officers to consult a vehicle’s driver\nbefore making towing arrangements and that Officer Moua credibly testified that he\nsaw crack cocaine in plain view before conducting the June 20th search.\n\n Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dunn pled guilty to Count 1—being a felon in\npossession of a firearm—and Count 3—carrying a firearm during and in relation to\na drug trafficking crime—of the indictment, reserving his right to appeal the denial\n\n -3-\n\fof his suppression motions. Both of these charges stemmed from the April 12th\nincident. The government agreed to dismiss the three remaining counts of the\nindictment, including both of the charges arising from the June 20th search.2 With\nan offense level of 21 and a criminal history that placed him in category IV, Dunn’s\nUnited States Sentencing Guidelines range for Count 1 was 57 to 71 months. His\nGuidelines range for Count 3 was 60 months, the mandatory minimum, to be served\nconsecutively to his Count 1 sentence.\n\n Dunn sought a downward variance to 36 months on Count 1, citing his difficult\nchildhood. The district court denied the variance but imposed a sentence at the\nbottom of the Guidelines range—57 months on Count 1 and 60 months on Count 3.\nDunn now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motions to\nsuppress because the police had no legal basis to search his vehicles and that the\ndistrict court abused its discretion at sentencing in failing to grant a downward\nvariance based on his difficult childhood.\n\n II.\n\n When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we\nreview factual findings for clear error, giving “great deference” to the district court’s\ncredibility findings. United States v. Guide, 891 F.3d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 2018);\nUnited States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 772-73 (8th Cir. 2005). “[T]he ultimate\nquestion of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated” is reviewed de novo.\nUnited States v. Poggemiller, 375 F.3d 686, 687 (8th Cir. 2004). We will affirm the\ndistrict court’s decision unless it misstates the law, is unsupported by substantial\n\n 2\n Although the district court dismissed all the charges stemming from the June\n20th search, it applied a two-level enhancement for possessing three or more firearms\nbased in part on the firearm discovered by Officer Moua during that search. Further,\nat sentencing, the district court used Dunn’s possession of a loaded firearm on June\n20, 2017 as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes.\n\n -4-\n\fevidence, or, after reviewing the record, we are “left with the definite and firm\nconviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Layne, 973 F.2d 1417,\n1420 (8th Cir. 1992).\n\n The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches, subject to a\nfew narrow exceptions. United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2011).\n“One such exception allows law enforcement to inventory the contents of a lawfully\nimpounded vehicle without a warrant or probable cause.” Id. Another exception\nallows officers to search a vehicle if, before searching, they “[have] probable cause\nto believe the vehicle contain[s] contraband or other evidence of a crime . . . .”\nUnited States v. Vore, 743 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2014). Dunn contends that none\nof the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied to the searches of his vehicles.\nWe examine each of the searches in turn.\n\n A.\n\n Dunn moved to suppress evidence gathered in the April 12th inventory search,\narguing that the search was unreasonable because Minneapolis police should have\nwaited and deferred to his private towing arrangements rather than impounding his\nvehicle. An inventory search is considered reasonable if it “is conducted according\nto standardized police procedures . . . .” Taylor, 636 F.3d at 464. Here, it is\nundisputed that Minneapolis Police Department policy allows officers to tow and\nimpound a vehicle that is impeding traffic when the owner cannot immediately\nremove the vehicle on his own. It is also undisputed that officers must conduct an\ninventory search before impounding a car.\n\n Dunn acknowledges that departmental policy does not require officers to ask\nvehicle owners if they wish to make private towing arrangements before the officers\ntow and impound a vehicle. He contends, however, that the standard policy did not\napply because he informed the officers that he had already made private towing\n\n -5-\n\farrangements and the officers should have deferred to those arrangements. Dunn\ncites no legal authority for this proposition, nor any legal authority showing that the\nMinneapolis Police Department’s towing policy is unreasonable. Because Dunn\nadmits that the officers followed departmental policy in impounding and inventorying\nhis vehicle, and because an inventory search conducted according to standard\ndepartmental policies is reasonable, we find that the April 12th search of Dunn’s\nvehicle was reasonable. See United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.\n1993). The district court properly denied Dunn’s motion to suppress the evidence\ngathered during that search.\n\n B.\n\n Dunn also moved to suppress evidence gathered in the June 20th search,\narguing that Officer Moua had no legal justification to search his vehicle. The district\ncourt found that the June 20th search was justified because Officer Moua observed\ncrack cocaine in plain view inside the car before initiating the search. We agree.\n\n “As long as the law enforcement officials have probable cause, they may search\nan automobile without a warrant under the automobile exception.” United States v.\nFladten, 230 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2000). This is because a vehicle’s “ready\nmobility” creates an exigency and because individuals have a “reduced expectation\nof privacy in an automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation.” Pennsylvania v.\nLabron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam). If an officer views contraband in\nplain sight through an automobile’s window, he has probable cause to search that\nvehicle. Fladten, 230 F.3d at 1086.\n\n At the hearing on Dunn’s motions to suppress, Officer Moua testified that he\nsaw a baggie of crack cocaine in a dashboard compartment through the driver’s side\nwindow when he initially approached Dunn’s vehicle. Dunn argues that the district\ncourt erroneously credited Officer Moua’s testimony because the baggie was the last\n\n -6-\n\fthing the officer removed from the vehicle and, therefore, must have been the last\nthing he discovered in the search. However, “[a] credibility determination made by\na district court after a hearing on the merits of a motion to suppress is ‘virtually\nunassailable on appeal.’” United States v. Frencher, 503 F.3d 701, 701 (8th Cir.\n2007) (quoting United States v. Guel-Contreras, 468 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2006)).\n\n Officer Moua indicated that he removed the firearm from the vehicle before the\ncrack cocaine due to safety concerns, despite discovering the crack cocaine first, and\nthe district court found this explanation adequate. The district court further\ndetermined that the record, including Officer Crayton’s testimony that Officer Moua\nsaid he saw narcotics in Dunn’s vehicle and discovered the firearm later, supported\nOfficer Moua’s testimony. We find no clear error in the district court’s credibility\ndetermination, and we thus conclude that the district court properly denied Dunn’s\nmotion to suppress evidence gathered in the June 20th search.\n\n III.\n\n Dunn also challenges his sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm\nas substantively unreasonable, claiming that the district court failed to properly\nevaluate the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in determining his sentence. We review the\nsubstantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it “fails to\nconsider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives\nsignificant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the\nappropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”\nUnited States v. Watson, 480 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 2007).\n\n The sentencing court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors and may\nassign some factors greater weight than others. United States v. Wilcox, 666 F.3d\n1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 2012). “After all, the sentencing judge is in the best position to\n\n -7-\n\ffind facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.” Id. at 1157-\n58 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 2010)) (internal\nalterations and quotation marks omitted). If a sentence imposed is within the range\nrecommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, we presume that sentence is reasonable.\nRita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).\n\n Here, the district court imposed a 57-month sentence on Count 1. Because that\nsentence is within the 57- to 71-month Guidelines range, we presume that it is\nreasonable. Dunn argues that the district court misweighed the § 3553(a) factors and\nabused its discretion by failing to grant him a downward variance based on his\ndifficult childhood. The district court acknowledged that Dunn presented mitigating\ncircumstances for it to consider, but it ultimately declined to vary downward from the\nGuidelines range because of Dunn’s criminal history, the nature and circumstances\nof the offense, and the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public and deter\nDunn from committing future crimes. Allotting “relatively greater weight to the\nnature and circumstances of the offense than to the mitigating personal characteristics\nof the defendant is well within the wide latitude [given] to individual district court\njudges in weighing relevant factors.” United States v. Wisecarver, 644 F.3d 764, 774\n(8th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\nWe therefore decline to find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to\nimpose a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, and we uphold that sentence\nas substantively reasonable.\n\n We affirm the district court’s judgment.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Kalil Wesley DUNN Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2393\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Kalil Wesley Dunn\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 15, 2019\\n Filed: June 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Kalil Dunn appeals the district court’s1 order denying his two motions to\\nsuppress evidence, arguing that the vehicle searches that revealed the evidence had\\nno legal basis. Dunn also appeals his 57-month sentence for being a felon in\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota.\\n\\fpossession of a firearm, arguing that the district court should have applied a\\ndownward variance. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Around 1:00 AM on April 12, 2017, Dunn fell asleep at the wheel of a moving\\nBuick sedan on a Minneapolis, Minnesota street. The Buick ran into three parked\\ncars before spinning to a stop in the middle of the street, sustaining heavy front-end\\ndamage and a flat tire which rendered the vehicle undriveable. Minneapolis police\\nofficers arrived on the scene and found the Buick sitting in the street, facing the\\nwrong direction and blocking traffic. The officers observed the vehicle’s condition\\nand location and, pursuant to Minneapolis Police Department policy, chose to tow\\nand impound it. They did so despite the fact that Dunn had already contacted a\\nprivate tow truck. The officers, continuing to follow departmental policy, conducted\\nan inventory search of the Buick before towing it. During the search, they discovered\\ntwo semi-automatic pistols, two baggies containing crack cocaine, and two digital\\nscales. Dunn was arrested and detained by local authorities, but released from local\\ncustody on April 26, 2017.\\n\\n Two months later, on June 20, 2017, two Minneapolis Police Department\\nofficers in an unmarked car encountered Dunn as he was driving on a city street.\\nDunn sped away from the officers, who followed him and observed him make several\\nturns at a high rate of speed without using his turn signal. The officers considered\\nthis conduct to be reckless driving, especially in an area where children were playing,\\nand activated the vehicle’s police lights to pull Dunn over. Dunn pulled over, got out\\nof his vehicle, and began to walk away. Officer Donnell Crayton exited the police\\nvehicle, directed Dunn to put his hands up, and escorted him to the police vehicle.\\n\\n While Officer Crayton handcuffed and detained Dunn, including frisking him\\nfor weapons, Officer Kong Moua walked up to Dunn’s vehicle to see if anyone else\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fwas inside. As he looked through the driver’s side window, Officer Moua saw a\\nplastic bag that appeared to contain crack cocaine in an open compartment on the\\ndashboard. Officer Moua then obtained the vehicle’s key from Dunn and conducted\\nan automobile search. In addition to the crack cocaine, he discovered a loaded\\nhandgun and a magazine drum with ammunition in the passenger compartment.\\nOfficer Moua removed the handgun and ammunition from the vehicle first and\\nphotographed them before returning to the vehicle and removing and photographing\\nthe crack cocaine.\\n\\n Dunn was indicted on five counts arising from his two encounters with law\\nenforcement: one count of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug\\ntrafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), arising from the April\\n12th incident; two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), with one count arising from each incident; and\\ntwo counts of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21\\nU.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), with one count arising from each incident. He\\nmoved to suppress all evidence obtained in the searches of his vehicles.\\n\\n After an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate judge recommended denial of Dunn’s\\nmotions to suppress, finding that the April 12th search was a valid inventory search\\nand that the June 20th search was justified by Officer Moua’s observation of crack\\ncocaine in plain view inside the car. The district court adopted the Report and\\nRecommendation over Dunn’s objections, stating that nothing in the law or\\nMinneapolis Police Department policy requires officers to consult a vehicle’s driver\\nbefore making towing arrangements and that Officer Moua credibly testified that he\\nsaw crack cocaine in plain view before conducting the June 20th search.\\n\\n Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dunn pled guilty to Count 1—being a felon in\\npossession of a firearm—and Count 3—carrying a firearm during and in relation to\\na drug trafficking crime—of the indictment, reserving his right to appeal the denial\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof his suppression motions. Both of these charges stemmed from the April 12th\\nincident. The government agreed to dismiss the three remaining counts of the\\nindictment, including both of the charges arising from the June 20th search.2 With\\nan offense level of 21 and a criminal history that placed him in category IV, Dunn’s\\nUnited States Sentencing Guidelines range for Count 1 was 57 to 71 months. His\\nGuidelines range for Count 3 was 60 months, the mandatory minimum, to be served\\nconsecutively to his Count 1 sentence.\\n\\n Dunn sought a downward variance to 36 months on Count 1, citing his difficult\\nchildhood. The district court denied the variance but imposed a sentence at the\\nbottom of the Guidelines range—57 months on Count 1 and 60 months on Count 3.\\nDunn now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motions to\\nsuppress because the police had no legal basis to search his vehicles and that the\\ndistrict court abused its discretion at sentencing in failing to grant a downward\\nvariance based on his difficult childhood.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we\\nreview factual findings for clear error, giving “great deference” to the district court’s\\ncredibility findings. United States v. Guide, 891 F.3d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 2018);\\nUnited States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 772-73 (8th Cir. 2005). “[T]he ultimate\\nquestion of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated” is reviewed de novo.\\nUnited States v. Poggemiller, 375 F.3d 686, 687 (8th Cir. 2004). We will affirm the\\ndistrict court’s decision unless it misstates the law, is unsupported by substantial\\n\\n 2\\n Although the district court dismissed all the charges stemming from the June\\n20th search, it applied a two-level enhancement for possessing three or more firearms\\nbased in part on the firearm discovered by Officer Moua during that search. Further,\\nat sentencing, the district court used Dunn’s possession of a loaded firearm on June\\n20, 2017 as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fevidence, or, after reviewing the record, we are “left with the definite and firm\\nconviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Layne, 973 F.2d 1417,\\n1420 (8th Cir. 1992).\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches, subject to a\\nfew narrow exceptions. United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2011).\\n“One such exception allows law enforcement to inventory the contents of a lawfully\\nimpounded vehicle without a warrant or probable cause.” Id. Another exception\\nallows officers to search a vehicle if, before searching, they “[have] probable cause\\nto believe the vehicle contain[s] contraband or other evidence of a crime . . . .”\\nUnited States v. Vore, 743 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2014). Dunn contends that none\\nof the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied to the searches of his vehicles.\\nWe examine each of the searches in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Dunn moved to suppress evidence gathered in the April 12th inventory search,\\narguing that the search was unreasonable because Minneapolis police should have\\nwaited and deferred to his private towing arrangements rather than impounding his\\nvehicle. An inventory search is considered reasonable if it “is conducted according\\nto standardized police procedures . . . .” Taylor, 636 F.3d at 464. Here, it is\\nundisputed that Minneapolis Police Department policy allows officers to tow and\\nimpound a vehicle that is impeding traffic when the owner cannot immediately\\nremove the vehicle on his own. It is also undisputed that officers must conduct an\\ninventory search before impounding a car.\\n\\n Dunn acknowledges that departmental policy does not require officers to ask\\nvehicle owners if they wish to make private towing arrangements before the officers\\ntow and impound a vehicle. He contends, however, that the standard policy did not\\napply because he informed the officers that he had already made private towing\\n\\n -5-\\n\\farrangements and the officers should have deferred to those arrangements. Dunn\\ncites no legal authority for this proposition, nor any legal authority showing that the\\nMinneapolis Police Department’s towing policy is unreasonable. Because Dunn\\nadmits that the officers followed departmental policy in impounding and inventorying\\nhis vehicle, and because an inventory search conducted according to standard\\ndepartmental policies is reasonable, we find that the April 12th search of Dunn’s\\nvehicle was reasonable. See United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.\\n1993). The district court properly denied Dunn’s motion to suppress the evidence\\ngathered during that search.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Dunn also moved to suppress evidence gathered in the June 20th search,\\narguing that Officer Moua had no legal justification to search his vehicle. The district\\ncourt found that the June 20th search was justified because Officer Moua observed\\ncrack cocaine in plain view inside the car before initiating the search. We agree.\\n\\n “As long as the law enforcement officials have probable cause, they may search\\nan automobile without a warrant under the automobile exception.” United States v.\\nFladten, 230 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2000). This is because a vehicle’s “ready\\nmobility” creates an exigency and because individuals have a “reduced expectation\\nof privacy in an automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation.” Pennsylvania v.\\nLabron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam). If an officer views contraband in\\nplain sight through an automobile’s window, he has probable cause to search that\\nvehicle. Fladten, 230 F.3d at 1086.\\n\\n At the hearing on Dunn’s motions to suppress, Officer Moua testified that he\\nsaw a baggie of crack cocaine in a dashboard compartment through the driver’s side\\nwindow when he initially approached Dunn’s vehicle. Dunn argues that the district\\ncourt erroneously credited Officer Moua’s testimony because the baggie was the last\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fthing the officer removed from the vehicle and, therefore, must have been the last\\nthing he discovered in the search. However, “[a] credibility determination made by\\na district court after a hearing on the merits of a motion to suppress is ‘virtually\\nunassailable on appeal.’” United States v. Frencher, 503 F.3d 701, 701 (8th Cir.\\n2007) (quoting United States v. Guel-Contreras, 468 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2006)).\\n\\n Officer Moua indicated that he removed the firearm from the vehicle before the\\ncrack cocaine due to safety concerns, despite discovering the crack cocaine first, and\\nthe district court found this explanation adequate. The district court further\\ndetermined that the record, including Officer Crayton’s testimony that Officer Moua\\nsaid he saw narcotics in Dunn’s vehicle and discovered the firearm later, supported\\nOfficer Moua’s testimony. We find no clear error in the district court’s credibility\\ndetermination, and we thus conclude that the district court properly denied Dunn’s\\nmotion to suppress evidence gathered in the June 20th search.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Dunn also challenges his sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm\\nas substantively unreasonable, claiming that the district court failed to properly\\nevaluate the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in determining his sentence. We review the\\nsubstantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United\\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it “fails to\\nconsider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives\\nsignificant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the\\nappropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”\\nUnited States v. Watson, 480 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n The sentencing court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors and may\\nassign some factors greater weight than others. United States v. Wilcox, 666 F.3d\\n1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 2012). “After all, the sentencing judge is in the best position to\\n\\n -7-\\n\\ffind facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.” Id. at 1157-\\n58 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 2010)) (internal\\nalterations and quotation marks omitted). If a sentence imposed is within the range\\nrecommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, we presume that sentence is reasonable.\\nRita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).\\n\\n Here, the district court imposed a 57-month sentence on Count 1. Because that\\nsentence is within the 57- to 71-month Guidelines range, we presume that it is\\nreasonable. Dunn argues that the district court misweighed the § 3553(a) factors and\\nabused its discretion by failing to grant him a downward variance based on his\\ndifficult childhood. The district court acknowledged that Dunn presented mitigating\\ncircumstances for it to consider, but it ultimately declined to vary downward from the\\nGuidelines range because of Dunn’s criminal history, the nature and circumstances\\nof the offense, and the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public and deter\\nDunn from committing future crimes. Allotting “relatively greater weight to the\\nnature and circumstances of the offense than to the mitigating personal characteristics\\nof the defendant is well within the wide latitude [given] to individual district court\\njudges in weighing relevant factors.” United States v. Wisecarver, 644 F.3d 764, 774\\n(8th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\nWe therefore decline to find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to\\nimpose a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, and we uphold that sentence\\nas substantively reasonable.\\n\\n We affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2690,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4633049,"string":"4,633,049"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Melvin PRYOR Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Melvin Pryor"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2627"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Beam, Colloton, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BEAM, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2627\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Melvin Pryor\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 13, 2019\\n Filed: June 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, BEAM, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In October 2014, Melvin Pryor pleaded guilty to a single-count indictment of\\nbeing a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In the\\npresentence investigation report, the probation officer concluded that Pryor was an\\nArmed Career Criminal (ACC) based on the existence of at least three prior\\nconvictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both, and thus suggested\\n\\fthat the district court1 enhance Pryor's Guidelines sentence accordingly. Pryor argued\\nthat although our circuit law dictates otherwise, certain of his prior convictions should\\nnot qualify as \\\"violent felonies\\\" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and\\nthe legal matter should be revisited by the en banc court. The district court, applying\\ncircuit precedent, sentenced Pryor as an ACC (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)) to the statutory\\nminimum term of 180 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised\\nrelease.\\n\\n When a defendant has three prior convictions \\\"for a violent felony or a serious\\ndrug offense,\\\" 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of\\nfifteen years. Relevant here, a violent felony is a crime punishable by imprisonment\\nfor at least one year and \\\"has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use\\nof physical force against the person of another.\\\" Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). When\\ndetermining whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony, we are generally limited to\\nexamining only the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement,\\ntranscript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which\\nthe defendant assented, rather than the underlying facts of the crime committed.\\nShepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d\\n784, 788 (8th Cir. 2009). \\\"This court reviews de novo whether a prior conviction is\\na crime of violence.\\\" United States v. Minnis, 872 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 2017), cert.\\ndenied, 138 S. Ct. 1581 (2018).\\n\\n On appeal Pryor challenges the application of the ACCA at his sentencing,\\nparticularly challenging the inclusion of two of his Missouri convictions as violent\\nfelonies for purposes of the enhancement–his Missouri conviction for the offense of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the Eastern District of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\funlawful use of a weapon, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4);2 and his Missouri conviction\\nfor first-degree assault, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.050.1.3 This panel's response to each of\\nPryor's arguments is dictated by circuit precedent but Pryor advances his claims in\\nhopes of en banc review of these settled analyses.\\n\\n As to the unlawful use of a weapon offense, this court has plainly held that\\n\\\"Missouri's crime of unlawful use of a weapon meets the statutory definition of violent\\nfelony in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), because it involves the use, attempted use, or threatened\\nuse of physical force against the person of another.\\\" Pulliam, 566 F.3d at 788\\n(quotation omitted). \\\"It goes without saying that displaying an operational weapon\\nbefore another in an angry or threatening manner qualifies as threatened use of\\nphysical force against another person.\\\" Id. Pryor argues that although Pulliam is\\nbinding precedent, and has been reaffirmed recently in United States v. Hudson, 851\\nF.3d 807, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Swopes, 892 F.3d 961, 962 (8th\\nCir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1546 (2019), en banc review is necessary because\\nthis court has not adequately considered Missouri's own interpretation of this statute.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Under Missouri law a person commits the crime of unlawful use of a weapon\\nif he knowingly \\\"[e]xhibits, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon\\nreadily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner.\\\" Mo. Rev. Stat. §\\n571.030.1(4).\\n 3\\n Under Missouri law relevant at the time of Pryor's offense:\\n\\n 1. A person commits the crime of assault in the first degree if he\\n attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical\\n injury to another person.\\n\\n 2. Assault in the first degree is a class B felony unless in the course\\n thereof the actor inflicts serious physical injury on the victim in which\\n case it is a class A felony.\\n\\nMo. Rev. Stat. § 565.050 (2000).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fEssentially he claims that as interpreted by the state courts, the Missouri statute falls\\nshort of the requirement that it \\\"has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened\\nuse of physical force against the person of another.\\\" 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).\\nHowever, even with the factual scenarios he posits (including, for example, the mental\\nstate required, and to whom or at what the exhibiting must be directed), Pryor has not\\nidentified any pertinent developments in Missouri law after 2009 that undermine this\\ncourt's conclusion in Pulliam. Although Pryor believes our court's cases on the matter\\nwere wrongly decided, we are bound by them absent en banc review. United States\\nv. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 641 (8th Cir. 2016) (\\\"It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that\\none panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.\\\" (quoting United States v.\\nAnderson, 771 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2014))).\\n\\n Pryor additionally argues that his Missouri conviction for first-degree assault\\ndoes not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. Again, while acknowledging\\ncontrary, binding circuit precedent in United States v. Winston, 845 F.3d 876, 878\\n(8th Cir. 2017), Pryor claims that because the Missouri statute can be satisfied by\\nmere causation of serious injury, which may be accomplished by use of non-violent\\nforce such as poisoning, it does not necessarily require the use of \\\"violent\\\" force\\nagainst another person as contemplated by the ACCA (i.e., that the Missouri statute\\ncriminalizes conduct that is broader than the necessary violent force contemplated by\\nthe ACCA). He argues this particular matter was not adequately addressed in Winston\\nand remains ripe for review en banc. However, this court recently reviewed the matter\\nin Minnis. In Minnis, we affirmed the analysis in Winston, which likewise cited\\nguidance from United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414-15 (2014), and held\\nthat \\\"[p]hysical force . . . need not be applied directly to the body of the victim.\\nHypothetical scenarios involving no physical contact by the perpetrator (luring a\\nvictim to drink poison or infecting a victim with a disease) do not avoid coverage\\nunder § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).\\\" Minnis, 872 F.3d at 892 (quoting Winston, 845 F.3d at 878)\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f(second alteration in original). Absent en banc review, this court is bound by Winston\\nand Minnis. Eason, 829 F.3d at 641.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4410302/\", \"author_raw\": \"BEAM, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BEAM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633049/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Melvin PRYOR Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2627\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Melvin Pryor\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: May 13, 2019\n Filed: June 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, BEAM, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\n\n In October 2014, Melvin Pryor pleaded guilty to a single-count indictment of\nbeing a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In the\npresentence investigation report, the probation officer concluded that Pryor was an\nArmed Career Criminal (ACC) based on the existence of at least three prior\nconvictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both, and thus suggested\n\fthat the district court1 enhance Pryor's Guidelines sentence accordingly. Pryor argued\nthat although our circuit law dictates otherwise, certain of his prior convictions should\nnot qualify as \"violent felonies\" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and\nthe legal matter should be revisited by the en banc court. The district court, applying\ncircuit precedent, sentenced Pryor as an ACC (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)) to the statutory\nminimum term of 180 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised\nrelease.\n\n When a defendant has three prior convictions \"for a violent felony or a serious\ndrug offense,\" 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of\nfifteen years. Relevant here, a violent felony is a crime punishable by imprisonment\nfor at least one year and \"has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use\nof physical force against the person of another.\" Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). When\ndetermining whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony, we are generally limited to\nexamining only the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement,\ntranscript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which\nthe defendant assented, rather than the underlying facts of the crime committed.\nShepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d\n784, 788 (8th Cir. 2009). \"This court reviews de novo whether a prior conviction is\na crime of violence.\" United States v. Minnis, 872 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 2017), cert.\ndenied, 138 S. Ct. 1581 (2018).\n\n On appeal Pryor challenges the application of the ACCA at his sentencing,\nparticularly challenging the inclusion of two of his Missouri convictions as violent\nfelonies for purposes of the enhancement–his Missouri conviction for the offense of\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, Chief Judge, United States District Court\nfor the Eastern District of Missouri.\n\n -2-\n\funlawful use of a weapon, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4);2 and his Missouri conviction\nfor first-degree assault, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.050.1.3 This panel's response to each of\nPryor's arguments is dictated by circuit precedent but Pryor advances his claims in\nhopes of en banc review of these settled analyses.\n\n As to the unlawful use of a weapon offense, this court has plainly held that\n\"Missouri's crime of unlawful use of a weapon meets the statutory definition of violent\nfelony in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), because it involves the use, attempted use, or threatened\nuse of physical force against the person of another.\" Pulliam, 566 F.3d at 788\n(quotation omitted). \"It goes without saying that displaying an operational weapon\nbefore another in an angry or threatening manner qualifies as threatened use of\nphysical force against another person.\" Id. Pryor argues that although Pulliam is\nbinding precedent, and has been reaffirmed recently in United States v. Hudson, 851\nF.3d 807, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Swopes, 892 F.3d 961, 962 (8th\nCir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1546 (2019), en banc review is necessary because\nthis court has not adequately considered Missouri's own interpretation of this statute.\n\n\n 2\n Under Missouri law a person commits the crime of unlawful use of a weapon\nif he knowingly \"[e]xhibits, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon\nreadily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner.\" Mo. Rev. Stat. §\n571.030.1(4).\n 3\n Under Missouri law relevant at the time of Pryor's offense:\n\n 1. A person commits the crime of assault in the first degree if he\n attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical\n injury to another person.\n\n 2. Assault in the first degree is a class B felony unless in the course\n thereof the actor inflicts serious physical injury on the victim in which\n case it is a class A felony.\n\nMo. Rev. Stat. § 565.050 (2000).\n\n -3-\n\fEssentially he claims that as interpreted by the state courts, the Missouri statute falls\nshort of the requirement that it \"has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened\nuse of physical force against the person of another.\" 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).\nHowever, even with the factual scenarios he posits (including, for example, the mental\nstate required, and to whom or at what the exhibiting must be directed), Pryor has not\nidentified any pertinent developments in Missouri law after 2009 that undermine this\ncourt's conclusion in Pulliam. Although Pryor believes our court's cases on the matter\nwere wrongly decided, we are bound by them absent en banc review. United States\nv. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 641 (8th Cir. 2016) (\"It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that\none panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.\" (quoting United States v.\nAnderson, 771 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2014))).\n\n Pryor additionally argues that his Missouri conviction for first-degree assault\ndoes not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. Again, while acknowledging\ncontrary, binding circuit precedent in United States v. Winston, 845 F.3d 876, 878\n(8th Cir. 2017), Pryor claims that because the Missouri statute can be satisfied by\nmere causation of serious injury, which may be accomplished by use of non-violent\nforce such as poisoning, it does not necessarily require the use of \"violent\" force\nagainst another person as contemplated by the ACCA (i.e., that the Missouri statute\ncriminalizes conduct that is broader than the necessary violent force contemplated by\nthe ACCA). He argues this particular matter was not adequately addressed in Winston\nand remains ripe for review en banc. However, this court recently reviewed the matter\nin Minnis. In Minnis, we affirmed the analysis in Winston, which likewise cited\nguidance from United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414-15 (2014), and held\nthat \"[p]hysical force . . . need not be applied directly to the body of the victim.\nHypothetical scenarios involving no physical contact by the perpetrator (luring a\nvictim to drink poison or infecting a victim with a disease) do not avoid coverage\nunder § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).\" Minnis, 872 F.3d at 892 (quoting Winston, 845 F.3d at 878)\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\f(second alteration in original). Absent en banc review, this court is bound by Winston\nand Minnis. Eason, 829 F.3d at 641.\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Melvin PRYOR Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2627\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Melvin Pryor\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 13, 2019\\n Filed: June 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, BEAM, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In October 2014, Melvin Pryor pleaded guilty to a single-count indictment of\\nbeing a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In the\\npresentence investigation report, the probation officer concluded that Pryor was an\\nArmed Career Criminal (ACC) based on the existence of at least three prior\\nconvictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both, and thus suggested\\n\\fthat the district court1 enhance Pryor's Guidelines sentence accordingly. Pryor argued\\nthat although our circuit law dictates otherwise, certain of his prior convictions should\\nnot qualify as \\\"violent felonies\\\" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and\\nthe legal matter should be revisited by the en banc court. The district court, applying\\ncircuit precedent, sentenced Pryor as an ACC (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)) to the statutory\\nminimum term of 180 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised\\nrelease.\\n\\n When a defendant has three prior convictions \\\"for a violent felony or a serious\\ndrug offense,\\\" 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of\\nfifteen years. Relevant here, a violent felony is a crime punishable by imprisonment\\nfor at least one year and \\\"has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use\\nof physical force against the person of another.\\\" Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). When\\ndetermining whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony, we are generally limited to\\nexamining only the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement,\\ntranscript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which\\nthe defendant assented, rather than the underlying facts of the crime committed.\\nShepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d\\n784, 788 (8th Cir. 2009). \\\"This court reviews de novo whether a prior conviction is\\na crime of violence.\\\" United States v. Minnis, 872 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 2017), cert.\\ndenied, 138 S. Ct. 1581 (2018).\\n\\n On appeal Pryor challenges the application of the ACCA at his sentencing,\\nparticularly challenging the inclusion of two of his Missouri convictions as violent\\nfelonies for purposes of the enhancement–his Missouri conviction for the offense of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the Eastern District of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\funlawful use of a weapon, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4);2 and his Missouri conviction\\nfor first-degree assault, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.050.1.3 This panel's response to each of\\nPryor's arguments is dictated by circuit precedent but Pryor advances his claims in\\nhopes of en banc review of these settled analyses.\\n\\n As to the unlawful use of a weapon offense, this court has plainly held that\\n\\\"Missouri's crime of unlawful use of a weapon meets the statutory definition of violent\\nfelony in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), because it involves the use, attempted use, or threatened\\nuse of physical force against the person of another.\\\" Pulliam, 566 F.3d at 788\\n(quotation omitted). \\\"It goes without saying that displaying an operational weapon\\nbefore another in an angry or threatening manner qualifies as threatened use of\\nphysical force against another person.\\\" Id. Pryor argues that although Pulliam is\\nbinding precedent, and has been reaffirmed recently in United States v. Hudson, 851\\nF.3d 807, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Swopes, 892 F.3d 961, 962 (8th\\nCir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1546 (2019), en banc review is necessary because\\nthis court has not adequately considered Missouri's own interpretation of this statute.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Under Missouri law a person commits the crime of unlawful use of a weapon\\nif he knowingly \\\"[e]xhibits, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon\\nreadily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner.\\\" Mo. Rev. Stat. §\\n571.030.1(4).\\n 3\\n Under Missouri law relevant at the time of Pryor's offense:\\n\\n 1. A person commits the crime of assault in the first degree if he\\n attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical\\n injury to another person.\\n\\n 2. Assault in the first degree is a class B felony unless in the course\\n thereof the actor inflicts serious physical injury on the victim in which\\n case it is a class A felony.\\n\\nMo. Rev. Stat. § 565.050 (2000).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fEssentially he claims that as interpreted by the state courts, the Missouri statute falls\\nshort of the requirement that it \\\"has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened\\nuse of physical force against the person of another.\\\" 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).\\nHowever, even with the factual scenarios he posits (including, for example, the mental\\nstate required, and to whom or at what the exhibiting must be directed), Pryor has not\\nidentified any pertinent developments in Missouri law after 2009 that undermine this\\ncourt's conclusion in Pulliam. Although Pryor believes our court's cases on the matter\\nwere wrongly decided, we are bound by them absent en banc review. United States\\nv. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 641 (8th Cir. 2016) (\\\"It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that\\none panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.\\\" (quoting United States v.\\nAnderson, 771 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2014))).\\n\\n Pryor additionally argues that his Missouri conviction for first-degree assault\\ndoes not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. Again, while acknowledging\\ncontrary, binding circuit precedent in United States v. Winston, 845 F.3d 876, 878\\n(8th Cir. 2017), Pryor claims that because the Missouri statute can be satisfied by\\nmere causation of serious injury, which may be accomplished by use of non-violent\\nforce such as poisoning, it does not necessarily require the use of \\\"violent\\\" force\\nagainst another person as contemplated by the ACCA (i.e., that the Missouri statute\\ncriminalizes conduct that is broader than the necessary violent force contemplated by\\nthe ACCA). He argues this particular matter was not adequately addressed in Winston\\nand remains ripe for review en banc. However, this court recently reviewed the matter\\nin Minnis. In Minnis, we affirmed the analysis in Winston, which likewise cited\\nguidance from United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414-15 (2014), and held\\nthat \\\"[p]hysical force . . . need not be applied directly to the body of the victim.\\nHypothetical scenarios involving no physical contact by the perpetrator (luring a\\nvictim to drink poison or infecting a victim with a disease) do not avoid coverage\\nunder § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).\\\" Minnis, 872 F.3d at 892 (quoting Winston, 845 F.3d at 878)\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f(second alteration in original). Absent en banc review, this court is bound by Winston\\nand Minnis. Eason, 829 F.3d at 641.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2691,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4633050,"string":"4,633,050"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Meamen Jean NYAH, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Meamen Nyah"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3730"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Shepherd, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3730\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Meamen Jean Nyah,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\\n Filed: June 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Meamen Nyah entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of\\na firearm as an unlawful user of a controlled substance. The district court1 denied\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe Southern District of Iowa.\\n\\nNyah’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his Facebook account.\\nNyah appeals, and we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n On July 7, 2016, Des Moines Police Detective Jeffrey Shannon submitted an\\naffidavit requesting a search and seizure warrant for Facebook, Inc., to disclose the\\ncontents of accounts belonging to Nyah and three other people. He sought the warrant\\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2703, which governs the required disclosure of customer\\ncommunications or records by a provider of electronic communication service or\\nremote computing service.\\n\\n Shannon started by recounting information that was obtained during an\\ninvestigation seven months earlier. He averred that on December 3, 2015, he had\\nreceived a tip that members of a local gang would be filming a music video while in\\npossession of firearms at an apartment in Des Moines. The affidavit said that police\\nofficers searched the apartment on December 3, discovered several firearms, and\\nencountered Nyah among the people present for the filming of the video. The music\\nvideo was then posted to Facebook and YouTube on approximately January 7, 2016.\\nThe affidavit stated that Nyah, along with three other people, was “clearly visible in\\nthe video,” and was handling at least one of the firearms recovered during the\\nDecember search.\\n\\n The affidavit explained that each of the four people identified had “utilized his\\nFacebook account to post the music video, display photographs carrying firearms,\\ndisplay photographs of what appear to be marijuana, and/or proclaim his gang\\naffiliation.” The affidavit also stated that Nyah had been arrested on December 7,\\n2015, for carrying weapons after a police officer found a loaded gun in the glove\\ncompartment of a car in which Nyah was the front-seat passenger. The officer\\ndetected the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle and saw Nyah reach into\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nthe glove compartment and appear to dig inside frantically. The weapons charge\\nagainst Nyah eventually was dropped after the driver admitted that the firearm\\nbelonged to him. Police also found marijuana in a backpack in the trunk of the car.\\nFinally, the affidavit stated that between December 2015 and May 2016, Shannon and\\nother law enforcement officers had observed Nyah in photographs posted to his\\nFacebook profile “that include him posing with firearms and smoking what appears\\nto be marijuana.”\\n\\n A magistrate judge issued a warrant on July 7, 2016, authorizing law\\nenforcement officers to search for information associated with Nyah’s Facebook\\naccount that was stored at Facebook’s corporate premises, for the period from\\nNovember 1, 2015, to July 7, 2016. The warrant commanded the officers to execute\\nthe warrant on or before July 21. On July 8, Shannon delivered the warrant to\\nFacebook, and the company turned over the requested material on July 22. The\\nFacebook records seized by the government included photographs and messages that\\nwere evidence of Nyah’s drug use and possession of firearms. A grand jury then\\ncharged Nyah with one count of possession of a firearm as an unlawful user of a\\ncontrolled substance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).\\n\\n Nyah moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his Facebook\\naccount. He argued that there was insufficient probable cause to support issuance of\\nthe warrant, that the affiant made false statements in the supporting affidavit, and that\\nthe warrant was not executed within the proper time frame. The district court denied\\nthe motion, and Nyah entered a conditional guilty plea that preserved his right to\\nappeal the denial of the motion.\\n\\n When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district\\ncourt’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States\\nv. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2013). We review for abuse of discretion\\na district court’s refusal to grant a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n(1978), concerning alleged false statements in an affidavit. United States v. Stropes,\\n387 F.3d 766, 771 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Nyah first contends that Shannon’s affidavit did not establish probable cause\\nto support the issuance of the search warrant. Probable cause exists when there is a\\n“fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular\\nplace.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). We review the matter to\\ndetermine whether the issuing magistrate judge had a substantial basis for concluding\\nthat probable cause existed. Id. at 238-39.\\n\\n We conclude that the affidavit established probable cause that Nyah’s Facebook\\naccount contained evidence of Nyah possessing firearms as an unlawful drug user.\\nShannon reported that he and other officers had observed photographs posted to\\nNyah’s Facebook profile “that include him posing with firearms and smoking what\\nappears to be marijuana.” Nyah responds that the affidavit was devoid of evidence\\nthat the photographs show him posing with real firearms and smoking real marijuana.\\nBut there was an ample basis for the magistrate judge to infer a fair probability that\\nNyah possessed real guns and drugs. Shannon, a trained drug investigator with many\\nyears of experience investigating violent crime, reported that the items appeared\\nauthentic in the Facebook photographs. He also averred that Nyah possessed an\\napparently genuine firearm in the music video; that conclusion was corroborated by\\na seizure of real firearms from the site where the music video was filmed on the date\\nof the filming. The affidavit also contained evidence that Nyah was found in a car\\nemitting an odor of marijuana, with real marijuana in the trunk, during the traffic stop\\non December 7. There was thus a substantial basis to support the issuing judge’s\\ndetermination of probable cause.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Nyah next argues that the warrant was invalid because it contained false\\nstatements that were necessary to establish probable cause. A defendant is entitled to\\na hearing on that question if he makes “a substantial preliminary showing that a false\\nstatement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was\\nincluded by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is\\nnecessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. We\\nconclude that Nyah did not make the requisite showing.\\n\\n Nyah alleges that the affidavit contained several false statements. First, Nyah\\nprotests that he is not a gang member, but the affidavit said only that Nyah was\\n“connected to” a gang; that statement was supported by the affidavit’s uncontested\\ndescription of Nyah creating a music video with at least one gang member. Second,\\nNyah argues that the affidavit falsely stated that he used his Facebook account to post\\nthe music video and to proclaim his gang affiliation. The relevant part of the affidavit,\\nhowever, used the imprecise conjunction “and/or” when describing the evidence:\\n“each of the individuals identified in this Affidavit have utilized his Facebook account\\nto post the music video, display photographs carrying firearms, display photographs\\nof what appear to be marijuana, and/or proclaim his gang affiliation.” By employing\\nthe ambiguous “and/or” conjunction in that list, the affidavit fell short of claiming that\\nNyah posted the video or proclaimed gang affiliation; the affiant claimed only that\\nNyah did at least one of the actions in the list.\\n\\n Nyah also complains that the affidavit falsely said that officers encountered him\\nin the apartment during the search on December 3. But even if the statement was\\nwrong, it was immaterial. Nyah does not dispute that the affidavit accurately\\nidentified him as a participant holding a firearm in the video produced at the\\napartment on December 3. So even if he was not present in the apartment at the\\nmoment of the search, the affidavit still set forth ample probable cause to search his\\n\\n -5-\\n\\nFacebook account. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the\\nFranks claim without a hearing.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Nyah’s final argument is that the evidence from Facebook should be excluded\\nbecause law enforcement officers failed to execute the warrant within the fourteen-day\\nlimit set forth in the warrant. The warrant commanded the officers to execute the\\nwarrant on or before July 21, 2016, but Facebook did not produce material from\\nNyah’s account until July 22. As a result, Nyah contends, there was a violation of\\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which requires that a warrant command\\nofficers to “execute the warrant within a specified time no longer than 14 days.” Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i) (2011). And he argues that the search was “warrantless,”\\nbecause no search warrant authorized a search at Facebook after July 21.\\n\\n Whether there was a violation of Rule 41 turns on the meaning of the term\\n“execute.” The district court thought the warrant was executed when the officers\\ndelivered it to Facebook, because the warrant was dependent on cooperation by the\\nrecipient: “The police have no ability to enter the premises of a company like\\nFacebook and manipulate its computers to its satisfaction.” R. Doc. 128, at 9. Nyah\\ncounters that the warrant was not executed until the officers seized the evidence from\\nFacebook.\\n\\n Despite the practical concerns raised by the district court, the text of Rule 41\\nsuggests that a warrant is not fully executed until officers have seized the property that\\nthey are authorized to take. The subsection entitled “Executing and Returning the\\nWarrant” first addresses a “Warrant to Search for and Seize a Person or Property.”\\nFed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1) (2011) (emphasis added). The subsidiary provision on\\n“Inventory” states that “[a]n officer present during the execution of the warrant must\\nprepare and verify an inventory of any property seized.” Id. R. 41(f)(1)(B) (emphases\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nadded). Similarly, “[t]he officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the\\nwarrant and a receipt for the property taken” to the appropriate person. Id. R.\\n41(f)(1)(C) (emphases added). And “[t]he officer executing the warrant must\\npromptly return it—together with a copy of the inventory—to the magistrate judge.”\\nId. R. 41(f)(1)(D) (emphases added). A special rule governing warrants seeking\\nelectronically stored information states that the time for “executing” such a warrant\\n“refers to the seizure or on-site copying of the media or information.” Id. R.\\n41(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). These provisions suggest that the authorized seizure\\nof property under the warrant constitutes part of the execution of the warrant.2\\n\\n Although law enforcement officers may not be able to control when the\\nrecipient of a warrant like this one produces the items sought under the warrant, the\\ngovernment likely has a means to overcome any timing problem that arises from delay\\nby the third party. If the recipient does not produce property for seizure within the\\ntime prescribed in the warrant, then officers may simply obtain a fresh warrant with\\na renewed period of fourteen days within which to execute the warrant.\\n\\n At least two courts, however, have ruled in cursory fashion that a warrant\\ndirected to a service provider is executed when an officer serves it on the provider.\\nSee United States v. Farrad, 895 F.3d 859, 890 & n.23 (6th Cir. 2018); see also\\nUnited States v. Allen, No. 16-10141-01-EFM, 2018 WL 1726349, at *8 (D. Kan.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The provision requiring that a warrant must command an officer to “execute”\\nthe warrant within a defined time period was adopted in 2002. The 2002 amendment\\nwas part of a restyling project that was not designed to change any substance that is\\nrelevant here. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 advisory committee’s note to 2002\\namendments. The “receipt” provisions of the former and amended rules appear to\\nequate “[t]he officer taking property under the warrant,” id. R. 41(d) (2001) (emphasis\\nadded), with “[t]he officer executing the warrant,” id. R. 41(f)(3) (2002), R.\\n41(f)(1)(C) (2011) (emphasis added). This usage further suggests that “execution” of\\na warrant includes the taking of the property in question.\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nApr. 10, 2018). The government also points to United States v. Welch, 811 F.3d 275,\\n280 (8th Cir. 2016), where this court said that a Network Investigative Technique\\nwarrant was executed on the date when law enforcement installed software on a\\nprivate computer server. In Welch, however, the court did not appear to address\\nwhether “execution” of the warrant continued through a period after installation\\nduring which the software collected information for investigators, as neither party\\nraised the question, and the opinion does not mention it. See id. at 279-80; Brief of\\nAppellant at 7-8, 14, Welch, 811 F.3d 275 (No. 15-1993); Brief of Appellee at 14, 25,\\nWelch, 811 F.3d 275 (No. 15-1993).\\n\\n We need not resolve definitively whether the warrant for information from\\nNyah’s Facebook account was executed within fourteen days after the warrant was\\nissued, because any violation of Rule 41 in this case would not call for suppressing\\nthe evidence obtained from Facebook.3 Except when there is a constitutional\\ninfirmity, noncompliance with Rule 41 justifies exclusion of evidence “only if a\\ndefendant is prejudiced or if reckless disregard of proper procedure is evident.”\\nUnited States v. Spencer, 439 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2006). Neither criterion is\\nsatisfied here.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The principal briefs in this case include only one paragraph each concerning\\nwhen the warrant served on Facebook was “executed.” This is thus an appropriate\\ncase in which to raise questions about the government’s position without\\nunnecessarily creating a conflict in the circuits on sparse briefing. As noted, the\\ngovernment can avoid the issue in future cases by seeking a fresh warrant; a future\\npanel may benefit from more fulsome briefing and argument if the issue arises again;\\nand rulemakers over time might elect to amend or clarify Rule 41 in light of judicial\\ndecisions. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta\\nAbout Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1253 (2006) (noting that “dicta often serve\\nextremely valuable purposes”). In our judgment, it is more constructive to prompt\\nfuller consideration of the “execution” issue in the future than to withhold all\\ndiscussion of the point until a litigant is actually prejudiced by alleged untimeliness.\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\n Even if the warrant was “executed” one day late when an officer seized the\\nmaterial from Facebook on July 22, probable cause continued to exist. The warrant\\ntargeted pre-existing account information, so the affiant’s probable cause did not\\nbecome stale. The search would have occurred on July 22 even if a new warrant were\\nrequired. See United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374, 387 (8th Cir. 2015). There also\\nwas no reckless disregard of proper procedure, as the officer delivered the warrant to\\nFacebook the day after the warrant was issued. No clearly established law dictated\\nthat the officer must secure a new warrant to seize the property if it was produced after\\nJuly 21. Thus, the executing officer was not reckless, and Nyah was not prejudiced,\\nso any violation of Rule 41 does not justify exclusion of evidence here. See United\\nStates v. Beckmann, 786 F.3d 672, 680-81 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n Nyah contends that if there was a one-day violation of the time limit on\\nexecution of a warrant under Rule 41, then the search and seizure was “warrantless,”\\nand the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of the evidence. Not every violation\\nof Rule 41, however, rises to the level of a constitutional violation. United States v.\\nFreeman, 897 F.2d 346, 348-49 (8th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Amendment does not\\nrequire that search and seizure warrants include expiration dates; the fourteen-day\\ntime limit at issue here is a creature of federal rule. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d\\n1078, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009). The officer in this case obtained a valid search warrant\\nfrom a neutral magistrate based on probable cause and delivered it to Facebook in a\\ntimely manner. The seizure of evidence was authorized by a magistrate judge at least\\nuntil the fourteenth day after the warrant was issued. Even if there was a minor\\nviolation of Rule 41 in seizing the evidence on the fifteenth day, the search and\\nseizure was “reasonable” under traditional Fourth Amendment standards, and any\\nviolation of the rule does not rise to the level of a constitutional infirmity.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4410303/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.\\n\\n The court says more than it needs to about an issue that it never decides:\\nwhether a warrant is “executed” when it is delivered to someone in possession of\\ndigital data or, instead, when the data is finally turned over to the authorities.\\nAlthough the court claims not to “definitively” resolve this difficult question, it\\ndevotes over two pages to it and all but supplies us with the answer.4 Because I agree\\nthat the officers were not reckless and that Nyah suffered no prejudice, see United\\nStates v. Spencer, 439 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2006), my analysis would end there and\\nit would leave a future panel with a chance to decide the question on a clean slate.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The court’s observation in footnote 3 that there is inadequate briefing on the\\nwarrant-execution question highlights one of the reasons why we should not address\\nit at all, much less suggest an answer to it. Another being, of course, that we can fully\\nresolve this case without doing so.\\n\\n\\n -10-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4410303/\", \"author_raw\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633050/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Meamen Jean NYAH, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3730\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n Meamen Jean Nyah,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\n Filed: June 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Meamen Nyah entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of\na firearm as an unlawful user of a controlled substance. The district court1 denied\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\nthe Southern District of Iowa.\n\nNyah’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his Facebook account.\nNyah appeals, and we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n On July 7, 2016, Des Moines Police Detective Jeffrey Shannon submitted an\naffidavit requesting a search and seizure warrant for Facebook, Inc., to disclose the\ncontents of accounts belonging to Nyah and three other people. He sought the warrant\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2703, which governs the required disclosure of customer\ncommunications or records by a provider of electronic communication service or\nremote computing service.\n\n Shannon started by recounting information that was obtained during an\ninvestigation seven months earlier. He averred that on December 3, 2015, he had\nreceived a tip that members of a local gang would be filming a music video while in\npossession of firearms at an apartment in Des Moines. The affidavit said that police\nofficers searched the apartment on December 3, discovered several firearms, and\nencountered Nyah among the people present for the filming of the video. The music\nvideo was then posted to Facebook and YouTube on approximately January 7, 2016.\nThe affidavit stated that Nyah, along with three other people, was “clearly visible in\nthe video,” and was handling at least one of the firearms recovered during the\nDecember search.\n\n The affidavit explained that each of the four people identified had “utilized his\nFacebook account to post the music video, display photographs carrying firearms,\ndisplay photographs of what appear to be marijuana, and/or proclaim his gang\naffiliation.” The affidavit also stated that Nyah had been arrested on December 7,\n2015, for carrying weapons after a police officer found a loaded gun in the glove\ncompartment of a car in which Nyah was the front-seat passenger. The officer\ndetected the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle and saw Nyah reach into\n\n -2-\n\nthe glove compartment and appear to dig inside frantically. The weapons charge\nagainst Nyah eventually was dropped after the driver admitted that the firearm\nbelonged to him. Police also found marijuana in a backpack in the trunk of the car.\nFinally, the affidavit stated that between December 2015 and May 2016, Shannon and\nother law enforcement officers had observed Nyah in photographs posted to his\nFacebook profile “that include him posing with firearms and smoking what appears\nto be marijuana.”\n\n A magistrate judge issued a warrant on July 7, 2016, authorizing law\nenforcement officers to search for information associated with Nyah’s Facebook\naccount that was stored at Facebook’s corporate premises, for the period from\nNovember 1, 2015, to July 7, 2016. The warrant commanded the officers to execute\nthe warrant on or before July 21. On July 8, Shannon delivered the warrant to\nFacebook, and the company turned over the requested material on July 22. The\nFacebook records seized by the government included photographs and messages that\nwere evidence of Nyah’s drug use and possession of firearms. A grand jury then\ncharged Nyah with one count of possession of a firearm as an unlawful user of a\ncontrolled substance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).\n\n Nyah moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his Facebook\naccount. He argued that there was insufficient probable cause to support issuance of\nthe warrant, that the affiant made false statements in the supporting affidavit, and that\nthe warrant was not executed within the proper time frame. The district court denied\nthe motion, and Nyah entered a conditional guilty plea that preserved his right to\nappeal the denial of the motion.\n\n When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district\ncourt’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States\nv. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2013). We review for abuse of discretion\na district court’s refusal to grant a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154\n\n -3-\n\n(1978), concerning alleged false statements in an affidavit. United States v. Stropes,\n387 F.3d 766, 771 (8th Cir. 2004).\n\n II.\n\n A.\n\n Nyah first contends that Shannon’s affidavit did not establish probable cause\nto support the issuance of the search warrant. Probable cause exists when there is a\n“fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular\nplace.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). We review the matter to\ndetermine whether the issuing magistrate judge had a substantial basis for concluding\nthat probable cause existed. Id. at 238-39.\n\n We conclude that the affidavit established probable cause that Nyah’s Facebook\naccount contained evidence of Nyah possessing firearms as an unlawful drug user.\nShannon reported that he and other officers had observed photographs posted to\nNyah’s Facebook profile “that include him posing with firearms and smoking what\nappears to be marijuana.” Nyah responds that the affidavit was devoid of evidence\nthat the photographs show him posing with real firearms and smoking real marijuana.\nBut there was an ample basis for the magistrate judge to infer a fair probability that\nNyah possessed real guns and drugs. Shannon, a trained drug investigator with many\nyears of experience investigating violent crime, reported that the items appeared\nauthentic in the Facebook photographs. He also averred that Nyah possessed an\napparently genuine firearm in the music video; that conclusion was corroborated by\na seizure of real firearms from the site where the music video was filmed on the date\nof the filming. The affidavit also contained evidence that Nyah was found in a car\nemitting an odor of marijuana, with real marijuana in the trunk, during the traffic stop\non December 7. There was thus a substantial basis to support the issuing judge’s\ndetermination of probable cause.\n\n -4-\n\n B.\n\n Nyah next argues that the warrant was invalid because it contained false\nstatements that were necessary to establish probable cause. A defendant is entitled to\na hearing on that question if he makes “a substantial preliminary showing that a false\nstatement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was\nincluded by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is\nnecessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. We\nconclude that Nyah did not make the requisite showing.\n\n Nyah alleges that the affidavit contained several false statements. First, Nyah\nprotests that he is not a gang member, but the affidavit said only that Nyah was\n“connected to” a gang; that statement was supported by the affidavit’s uncontested\ndescription of Nyah creating a music video with at least one gang member. Second,\nNyah argues that the affidavit falsely stated that he used his Facebook account to post\nthe music video and to proclaim his gang affiliation. The relevant part of the affidavit,\nhowever, used the imprecise conjunction “and/or” when describing the evidence:\n“each of the individuals identified in this Affidavit have utilized his Facebook account\nto post the music video, display photographs carrying firearms, display photographs\nof what appear to be marijuana, and/or proclaim his gang affiliation.” By employing\nthe ambiguous “and/or” conjunction in that list, the affidavit fell short of claiming that\nNyah posted the video or proclaimed gang affiliation; the affiant claimed only that\nNyah did at least one of the actions in the list.\n\n Nyah also complains that the affidavit falsely said that officers encountered him\nin the apartment during the search on December 3. But even if the statement was\nwrong, it was immaterial. Nyah does not dispute that the affidavit accurately\nidentified him as a participant holding a firearm in the video produced at the\napartment on December 3. So even if he was not present in the apartment at the\nmoment of the search, the affidavit still set forth ample probable cause to search his\n\n -5-\n\nFacebook account. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the\nFranks claim without a hearing.\n\n C.\n\n Nyah’s final argument is that the evidence from Facebook should be excluded\nbecause law enforcement officers failed to execute the warrant within the fourteen-day\nlimit set forth in the warrant. The warrant commanded the officers to execute the\nwarrant on or before July 21, 2016, but Facebook did not produce material from\nNyah’s account until July 22. As a result, Nyah contends, there was a violation of\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which requires that a warrant command\nofficers to “execute the warrant within a specified time no longer than 14 days.” Fed.\nR. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i) (2011). And he argues that the search was “warrantless,”\nbecause no search warrant authorized a search at Facebook after July 21.\n\n Whether there was a violation of Rule 41 turns on the meaning of the term\n“execute.” The district court thought the warrant was executed when the officers\ndelivered it to Facebook, because the warrant was dependent on cooperation by the\nrecipient: “The police have no ability to enter the premises of a company like\nFacebook and manipulate its computers to its satisfaction.” R. Doc. 128, at 9. Nyah\ncounters that the warrant was not executed until the officers seized the evidence from\nFacebook.\n\n Despite the practical concerns raised by the district court, the text of Rule 41\nsuggests that a warrant is not fully executed until officers have seized the property that\nthey are authorized to take. The subsection entitled “Executing and Returning the\nWarrant” first addresses a “Warrant to Search for and Seize a Person or Property.”\nFed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1) (2011) (emphasis added). The subsidiary provision on\n“Inventory” states that “[a]n officer present during the execution of the warrant must\nprepare and verify an inventory of any property seized.” Id. R. 41(f)(1)(B) (emphases\n\n -6-\n\nadded). Similarly, “[t]he officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the\nwarrant and a receipt for the property taken” to the appropriate person. Id. R.\n41(f)(1)(C) (emphases added). And “[t]he officer executing the warrant must\npromptly return it—together with a copy of the inventory—to the magistrate judge.”\nId. R. 41(f)(1)(D) (emphases added). A special rule governing warrants seeking\nelectronically stored information states that the time for “executing” such a warrant\n“refers to the seizure or on-site copying of the media or information.” Id. R.\n41(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). These provisions suggest that the authorized seizure\nof property under the warrant constitutes part of the execution of the warrant.2\n\n Although law enforcement officers may not be able to control when the\nrecipient of a warrant like this one produces the items sought under the warrant, the\ngovernment likely has a means to overcome any timing problem that arises from delay\nby the third party. If the recipient does not produce property for seizure within the\ntime prescribed in the warrant, then officers may simply obtain a fresh warrant with\na renewed period of fourteen days within which to execute the warrant.\n\n At least two courts, however, have ruled in cursory fashion that a warrant\ndirected to a service provider is executed when an officer serves it on the provider.\nSee United States v. Farrad, 895 F.3d 859, 890 & n.23 (6th Cir. 2018); see also\nUnited States v. Allen, No. 16-10141-01-EFM, 2018 WL 1726349, at *8 (D. Kan.\n\n\n 2\n The provision requiring that a warrant must command an officer to “execute”\nthe warrant within a defined time period was adopted in 2002. The 2002 amendment\nwas part of a restyling project that was not designed to change any substance that is\nrelevant here. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 advisory committee’s note to 2002\namendments. The “receipt” provisions of the former and amended rules appear to\nequate “[t]he officer taking property under the warrant,” id. R. 41(d) (2001) (emphasis\nadded), with “[t]he officer executing the warrant,” id. R. 41(f)(3) (2002), R.\n41(f)(1)(C) (2011) (emphasis added). This usage further suggests that “execution” of\na warrant includes the taking of the property in question.\n\n\n -7-\n\nApr. 10, 2018). The government also points to United States v. Welch, 811 F.3d 275,\n280 (8th Cir. 2016), where this court said that a Network Investigative Technique\nwarrant was executed on the date when law enforcement installed software on a\nprivate computer server. In Welch, however, the court did not appear to address\nwhether “execution” of the warrant continued through a period after installation\nduring which the software collected information for investigators, as neither party\nraised the question, and the opinion does not mention it. See id. at 279-80; Brief of\nAppellant at 7-8, 14, Welch, 811 F.3d 275 (No. 15-1993); Brief of Appellee at 14, 25,\nWelch, 811 F.3d 275 (No. 15-1993).\n\n We need not resolve definitively whether the warrant for information from\nNyah’s Facebook account was executed within fourteen days after the warrant was\nissued, because any violation of Rule 41 in this case would not call for suppressing\nthe evidence obtained from Facebook.3 Except when there is a constitutional\ninfirmity, noncompliance with Rule 41 justifies exclusion of evidence “only if a\ndefendant is prejudiced or if reckless disregard of proper procedure is evident.”\nUnited States v. Spencer, 439 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2006). Neither criterion is\nsatisfied here.\n\n\n\n 3\n The principal briefs in this case include only one paragraph each concerning\nwhen the warrant served on Facebook was “executed.” This is thus an appropriate\ncase in which to raise questions about the government’s position without\nunnecessarily creating a conflict in the circuits on sparse briefing. As noted, the\ngovernment can avoid the issue in future cases by seeking a fresh warrant; a future\npanel may benefit from more fulsome briefing and argument if the issue arises again;\nand rulemakers over time might elect to amend or clarify Rule 41 in light of judicial\ndecisions. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta\nAbout Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1253 (2006) (noting that “dicta often serve\nextremely valuable purposes”). In our judgment, it is more constructive to prompt\nfuller consideration of the “execution” issue in the future than to withhold all\ndiscussion of the point until a litigant is actually prejudiced by alleged untimeliness.\n\n\n -8-\n\n Even if the warrant was “executed” one day late when an officer seized the\nmaterial from Facebook on July 22, probable cause continued to exist. The warrant\ntargeted pre-existing account information, so the affiant’s probable cause did not\nbecome stale. The search would have occurred on July 22 even if a new warrant were\nrequired. See United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374, 387 (8th Cir. 2015). There also\nwas no reckless disregard of proper procedure, as the officer delivered the warrant to\nFacebook the day after the warrant was issued. No clearly established law dictated\nthat the officer must secure a new warrant to seize the property if it was produced after\nJuly 21. Thus, the executing officer was not reckless, and Nyah was not prejudiced,\nso any violation of Rule 41 does not justify exclusion of evidence here. See United\nStates v. Beckmann, 786 F.3d 672, 680-81 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n Nyah contends that if there was a one-day violation of the time limit on\nexecution of a warrant under Rule 41, then the search and seizure was “warrantless,”\nand the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of the evidence. Not every violation\nof Rule 41, however, rises to the level of a constitutional violation. United States v.\nFreeman, 897 F.2d 346, 348-49 (8th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Amendment does not\nrequire that search and seizure warrants include expiration dates; the fourteen-day\ntime limit at issue here is a creature of federal rule. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d\n1078, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009). The officer in this case obtained a valid search warrant\nfrom a neutral magistrate based on probable cause and delivered it to Facebook in a\ntimely manner. The seizure of evidence was authorized by a magistrate judge at least\nuntil the fourteenth day after the warrant was issued. Even if there was a minor\nviolation of Rule 41 in seizing the evidence on the fifteenth day, the search and\nseizure was “reasonable” under traditional Fourth Amendment standards, and any\nviolation of the rule does not rise to the level of a constitutional infirmity.\n\n * * *\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n\n\n\n -9-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Meamen Jean NYAH, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3730\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Meamen Jean Nyah,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\\n Filed: June 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Meamen Nyah entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of\\na firearm as an unlawful user of a controlled substance. The district court1 denied\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe Southern District of Iowa.\\n\\nNyah’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his Facebook account.\\nNyah appeals, and we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n On July 7, 2016, Des Moines Police Detective Jeffrey Shannon submitted an\\naffidavit requesting a search and seizure warrant for Facebook, Inc., to disclose the\\ncontents of accounts belonging to Nyah and three other people. He sought the warrant\\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2703, which governs the required disclosure of customer\\ncommunications or records by a provider of electronic communication service or\\nremote computing service.\\n\\n Shannon started by recounting information that was obtained during an\\ninvestigation seven months earlier. He averred that on December 3, 2015, he had\\nreceived a tip that members of a local gang would be filming a music video while in\\npossession of firearms at an apartment in Des Moines. The affidavit said that police\\nofficers searched the apartment on December 3, discovered several firearms, and\\nencountered Nyah among the people present for the filming of the video. The music\\nvideo was then posted to Facebook and YouTube on approximately January 7, 2016.\\nThe affidavit stated that Nyah, along with three other people, was “clearly visible in\\nthe video,” and was handling at least one of the firearms recovered during the\\nDecember search.\\n\\n The affidavit explained that each of the four people identified had “utilized his\\nFacebook account to post the music video, display photographs carrying firearms,\\ndisplay photographs of what appear to be marijuana, and/or proclaim his gang\\naffiliation.” The affidavit also stated that Nyah had been arrested on December 7,\\n2015, for carrying weapons after a police officer found a loaded gun in the glove\\ncompartment of a car in which Nyah was the front-seat passenger. The officer\\ndetected the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle and saw Nyah reach into\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nthe glove compartment and appear to dig inside frantically. The weapons charge\\nagainst Nyah eventually was dropped after the driver admitted that the firearm\\nbelonged to him. Police also found marijuana in a backpack in the trunk of the car.\\nFinally, the affidavit stated that between December 2015 and May 2016, Shannon and\\nother law enforcement officers had observed Nyah in photographs posted to his\\nFacebook profile “that include him posing with firearms and smoking what appears\\nto be marijuana.”\\n\\n A magistrate judge issued a warrant on July 7, 2016, authorizing law\\nenforcement officers to search for information associated with Nyah’s Facebook\\naccount that was stored at Facebook’s corporate premises, for the period from\\nNovember 1, 2015, to July 7, 2016. The warrant commanded the officers to execute\\nthe warrant on or before July 21. On July 8, Shannon delivered the warrant to\\nFacebook, and the company turned over the requested material on July 22. The\\nFacebook records seized by the government included photographs and messages that\\nwere evidence of Nyah’s drug use and possession of firearms. A grand jury then\\ncharged Nyah with one count of possession of a firearm as an unlawful user of a\\ncontrolled substance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).\\n\\n Nyah moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his Facebook\\naccount. He argued that there was insufficient probable cause to support issuance of\\nthe warrant, that the affiant made false statements in the supporting affidavit, and that\\nthe warrant was not executed within the proper time frame. The district court denied\\nthe motion, and Nyah entered a conditional guilty plea that preserved his right to\\nappeal the denial of the motion.\\n\\n When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district\\ncourt’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States\\nv. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2013). We review for abuse of discretion\\na district court’s refusal to grant a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n(1978), concerning alleged false statements in an affidavit. United States v. Stropes,\\n387 F.3d 766, 771 (8th Cir. 2004).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Nyah first contends that Shannon’s affidavit did not establish probable cause\\nto support the issuance of the search warrant. Probable cause exists when there is a\\n“fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular\\nplace.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). We review the matter to\\ndetermine whether the issuing magistrate judge had a substantial basis for concluding\\nthat probable cause existed. Id. at 238-39.\\n\\n We conclude that the affidavit established probable cause that Nyah’s Facebook\\naccount contained evidence of Nyah possessing firearms as an unlawful drug user.\\nShannon reported that he and other officers had observed photographs posted to\\nNyah’s Facebook profile “that include him posing with firearms and smoking what\\nappears to be marijuana.” Nyah responds that the affidavit was devoid of evidence\\nthat the photographs show him posing with real firearms and smoking real marijuana.\\nBut there was an ample basis for the magistrate judge to infer a fair probability that\\nNyah possessed real guns and drugs. Shannon, a trained drug investigator with many\\nyears of experience investigating violent crime, reported that the items appeared\\nauthentic in the Facebook photographs. He also averred that Nyah possessed an\\napparently genuine firearm in the music video; that conclusion was corroborated by\\na seizure of real firearms from the site where the music video was filmed on the date\\nof the filming. The affidavit also contained evidence that Nyah was found in a car\\nemitting an odor of marijuana, with real marijuana in the trunk, during the traffic stop\\non December 7. There was thus a substantial basis to support the issuing judge’s\\ndetermination of probable cause.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Nyah next argues that the warrant was invalid because it contained false\\nstatements that were necessary to establish probable cause. A defendant is entitled to\\na hearing on that question if he makes “a substantial preliminary showing that a false\\nstatement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was\\nincluded by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is\\nnecessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. We\\nconclude that Nyah did not make the requisite showing.\\n\\n Nyah alleges that the affidavit contained several false statements. First, Nyah\\nprotests that he is not a gang member, but the affidavit said only that Nyah was\\n“connected to” a gang; that statement was supported by the affidavit’s uncontested\\ndescription of Nyah creating a music video with at least one gang member. Second,\\nNyah argues that the affidavit falsely stated that he used his Facebook account to post\\nthe music video and to proclaim his gang affiliation. The relevant part of the affidavit,\\nhowever, used the imprecise conjunction “and/or” when describing the evidence:\\n“each of the individuals identified in this Affidavit have utilized his Facebook account\\nto post the music video, display photographs carrying firearms, display photographs\\nof what appear to be marijuana, and/or proclaim his gang affiliation.” By employing\\nthe ambiguous “and/or” conjunction in that list, the affidavit fell short of claiming that\\nNyah posted the video or proclaimed gang affiliation; the affiant claimed only that\\nNyah did at least one of the actions in the list.\\n\\n Nyah also complains that the affidavit falsely said that officers encountered him\\nin the apartment during the search on December 3. But even if the statement was\\nwrong, it was immaterial. Nyah does not dispute that the affidavit accurately\\nidentified him as a participant holding a firearm in the video produced at the\\napartment on December 3. So even if he was not present in the apartment at the\\nmoment of the search, the affidavit still set forth ample probable cause to search his\\n\\n -5-\\n\\nFacebook account. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the\\nFranks claim without a hearing.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Nyah’s final argument is that the evidence from Facebook should be excluded\\nbecause law enforcement officers failed to execute the warrant within the fourteen-day\\nlimit set forth in the warrant. The warrant commanded the officers to execute the\\nwarrant on or before July 21, 2016, but Facebook did not produce material from\\nNyah’s account until July 22. As a result, Nyah contends, there was a violation of\\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which requires that a warrant command\\nofficers to “execute the warrant within a specified time no longer than 14 days.” Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i) (2011). And he argues that the search was “warrantless,”\\nbecause no search warrant authorized a search at Facebook after July 21.\\n\\n Whether there was a violation of Rule 41 turns on the meaning of the term\\n“execute.” The district court thought the warrant was executed when the officers\\ndelivered it to Facebook, because the warrant was dependent on cooperation by the\\nrecipient: “The police have no ability to enter the premises of a company like\\nFacebook and manipulate its computers to its satisfaction.” R. Doc. 128, at 9. Nyah\\ncounters that the warrant was not executed until the officers seized the evidence from\\nFacebook.\\n\\n Despite the practical concerns raised by the district court, the text of Rule 41\\nsuggests that a warrant is not fully executed until officers have seized the property that\\nthey are authorized to take. The subsection entitled “Executing and Returning the\\nWarrant” first addresses a “Warrant to Search for and Seize a Person or Property.”\\nFed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1) (2011) (emphasis added). The subsidiary provision on\\n“Inventory” states that “[a]n officer present during the execution of the warrant must\\nprepare and verify an inventory of any property seized.” Id. R. 41(f)(1)(B) (emphases\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nadded). Similarly, “[t]he officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the\\nwarrant and a receipt for the property taken” to the appropriate person. Id. R.\\n41(f)(1)(C) (emphases added). And “[t]he officer executing the warrant must\\npromptly return it—together with a copy of the inventory—to the magistrate judge.”\\nId. R. 41(f)(1)(D) (emphases added). A special rule governing warrants seeking\\nelectronically stored information states that the time for “executing” such a warrant\\n“refers to the seizure or on-site copying of the media or information.” Id. R.\\n41(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). These provisions suggest that the authorized seizure\\nof property under the warrant constitutes part of the execution of the warrant.2\\n\\n Although law enforcement officers may not be able to control when the\\nrecipient of a warrant like this one produces the items sought under the warrant, the\\ngovernment likely has a means to overcome any timing problem that arises from delay\\nby the third party. If the recipient does not produce property for seizure within the\\ntime prescribed in the warrant, then officers may simply obtain a fresh warrant with\\na renewed period of fourteen days within which to execute the warrant.\\n\\n At least two courts, however, have ruled in cursory fashion that a warrant\\ndirected to a service provider is executed when an officer serves it on the provider.\\nSee United States v. Farrad, 895 F.3d 859, 890 & n.23 (6th Cir. 2018); see also\\nUnited States v. Allen, No. 16-10141-01-EFM, 2018 WL 1726349, at *8 (D. Kan.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The provision requiring that a warrant must command an officer to “execute”\\nthe warrant within a defined time period was adopted in 2002. The 2002 amendment\\nwas part of a restyling project that was not designed to change any substance that is\\nrelevant here. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 advisory committee’s note to 2002\\namendments. The “receipt” provisions of the former and amended rules appear to\\nequate “[t]he officer taking property under the warrant,” id. R. 41(d) (2001) (emphasis\\nadded), with “[t]he officer executing the warrant,” id. R. 41(f)(3) (2002), R.\\n41(f)(1)(C) (2011) (emphasis added). This usage further suggests that “execution” of\\na warrant includes the taking of the property in question.\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nApr. 10, 2018). The government also points to United States v. Welch, 811 F.3d 275,\\n280 (8th Cir. 2016), where this court said that a Network Investigative Technique\\nwarrant was executed on the date when law enforcement installed software on a\\nprivate computer server. In Welch, however, the court did not appear to address\\nwhether “execution” of the warrant continued through a period after installation\\nduring which the software collected information for investigators, as neither party\\nraised the question, and the opinion does not mention it. See id. at 279-80; Brief of\\nAppellant at 7-8, 14, Welch, 811 F.3d 275 (No. 15-1993); Brief of Appellee at 14, 25,\\nWelch, 811 F.3d 275 (No. 15-1993).\\n\\n We need not resolve definitively whether the warrant for information from\\nNyah’s Facebook account was executed within fourteen days after the warrant was\\nissued, because any violation of Rule 41 in this case would not call for suppressing\\nthe evidence obtained from Facebook.3 Except when there is a constitutional\\ninfirmity, noncompliance with Rule 41 justifies exclusion of evidence “only if a\\ndefendant is prejudiced or if reckless disregard of proper procedure is evident.”\\nUnited States v. Spencer, 439 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2006). Neither criterion is\\nsatisfied here.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The principal briefs in this case include only one paragraph each concerning\\nwhen the warrant served on Facebook was “executed.” This is thus an appropriate\\ncase in which to raise questions about the government’s position without\\nunnecessarily creating a conflict in the circuits on sparse briefing. As noted, the\\ngovernment can avoid the issue in future cases by seeking a fresh warrant; a future\\npanel may benefit from more fulsome briefing and argument if the issue arises again;\\nand rulemakers over time might elect to amend or clarify Rule 41 in light of judicial\\ndecisions. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta\\nAbout Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1253 (2006) (noting that “dicta often serve\\nextremely valuable purposes”). In our judgment, it is more constructive to prompt\\nfuller consideration of the “execution” issue in the future than to withhold all\\ndiscussion of the point until a litigant is actually prejudiced by alleged untimeliness.\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\n Even if the warrant was “executed” one day late when an officer seized the\\nmaterial from Facebook on July 22, probable cause continued to exist. The warrant\\ntargeted pre-existing account information, so the affiant’s probable cause did not\\nbecome stale. The search would have occurred on July 22 even if a new warrant were\\nrequired. See United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374, 387 (8th Cir. 2015). There also\\nwas no reckless disregard of proper procedure, as the officer delivered the warrant to\\nFacebook the day after the warrant was issued. No clearly established law dictated\\nthat the officer must secure a new warrant to seize the property if it was produced after\\nJuly 21. Thus, the executing officer was not reckless, and Nyah was not prejudiced,\\nso any violation of Rule 41 does not justify exclusion of evidence here. See United\\nStates v. Beckmann, 786 F.3d 672, 680-81 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n Nyah contends that if there was a one-day violation of the time limit on\\nexecution of a warrant under Rule 41, then the search and seizure was “warrantless,”\\nand the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of the evidence. Not every violation\\nof Rule 41, however, rises to the level of a constitutional violation. United States v.\\nFreeman, 897 F.2d 346, 348-49 (8th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Amendment does not\\nrequire that search and seizure warrants include expiration dates; the fourteen-day\\ntime limit at issue here is a creature of federal rule. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d\\n1078, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009). The officer in this case obtained a valid search warrant\\nfrom a neutral magistrate based on probable cause and delivered it to Facebook in a\\ntimely manner. The seizure of evidence was authorized by a magistrate judge at least\\nuntil the fourteenth day after the warrant was issued. Even if there was a minor\\nviolation of Rule 41 in seizing the evidence on the fifteenth day, the search and\\nseizure was “reasonable” under traditional Fourth Amendment standards, and any\\nviolation of the rule does not rise to the level of a constitutional infirmity.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2692,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4633053,"string":"4,633,053"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Gregorio RAMIREZ-MALDONADO; Alejandro Llamas-Delgado; Erick Parra-Salazar, Defendants-Appellants"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Gregorio Ramirez-Maldonado"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2068; 18-2088; 18-2090"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Nos. 18-2068, 18-2088, 18-2090\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Gregorio Ramirez-Maldonado;\\n Alejandro Llamas-Delgado;\\n Erick Parra-Salazar\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 12, 2019\\n Filed: June 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Alejandro Llamas-Delgado (“Llamas”) and Erick Parra-Salazar (“Parra”)\\nappeal their convictions for drug trafficking crimes. Parra and another co-defendant,\\n\\fGregorio Ramirez-Maldonado (“Ramirez”), appeal the sentences the district court1\\nimposed after trial. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n In May 2017, law enforcement officials arrested Llamas, Ramirez, and Parra\\nfollowing an extensive investigation into a suspected drug conspiracy to distribute\\nsubstantial quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine. Because both Llamas and\\nParra challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, many of the facts introduced at trial\\nregarding that investigation are recounted below.\\n\\n A. Facts\\n\\n For purposes of this case, the investigation began in 2014 when the Drug\\nEnforcement Administration (“DEA”) intercepted a transport truck in California that\\nwas hauling a 2005 Mini Cooper automobile. Earlier, Omar Ornelas-Garcia\\n(“Ornelas”) and A.L., a confidential informant who testified at trial, had met Llamas\\nat an auto body shop in southern California that had constructed hidden compartments\\nin the Mini Cooper. A.L. later picked up the Mini Cooper after Ornelas told him that\\nhe had loaded it with 22 pounds of methamphetamine and seven or eight kilograms\\n(15.4 or 17.6 pounds) of cocaine. A.L. met with a truck driver to load the Mini\\nCooper onto the transport truck and subsequently sent a text to Llamas to tell him the\\nMini Cooper was on its way. The DEA learned about the transport truck and set up\\na “controlled delivery” of the Mini Cooper. The DEA met the truck driver at a\\nparking lot in Plymouth, Minnesota, unloaded the vehicle, parked it, and disabled it.\\nThe truck driver then called someone named “Oscar,” whom he had been told to call\\nwhen he arrived.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f The DEA encountered Llamas during the controlled delivery of the Mini\\nCooper. Almost an hour after the truck driver’s phone call to “Oscar,” Llamas and\\na woman pulled into the parking lot. Llamas met with the truck driver, put California\\nlicense plates on the Mini Cooper, and unsuccessfully tried to start it. Llamas\\neventually returned with several other people and a tow truck. They loaded the Mini\\nCooper on the tow truck and departed. The DEA did not arrest anyone but had local\\npolice seize the Mini Cooper from the tow truck.\\n\\n In September 2015, the DEA again saw Llamas when agents were at the\\nAlbertville Outlet Mall just west of the Twin Cities. Llamas sat on a park bench\\nholding two cell phones. A short time later, Eric Winter drove into the parking lot.\\nLlamas walked directly to Winter’s vehicle and got into the front passenger seat. A\\nfew minutes later, Llamas got out of the vehicle, walked to his own vehicle, and\\ndrove off. Police officers stopped Llamas and Winter. The officers found about an\\nounce of methamphetamine in the center console of Winter’s vehicle and $1,880 cash\\non Llamas. The record indicates they arrested Llamas but does not indicate whether\\nany further proceedings occurred.\\n\\n In January 2017, police officers began extensive surveillance that included\\nwatching two houses linked to Llamas. These houses were a large, single-family\\nhome on Bellvue Lane in Brooklyn Center (the “Bellvue House”) and a small\\nrambler-style home on Dupont Avenue in Minneapolis (the “Dupont House”). The\\nofficers also identified several vehicles linked to Llamas, including a Chevrolet\\nSilverado and a GMC Sierra. Between January and May 2017, Llamas often drove\\nbetween the two houses. Llamas would meet with various people and engage in\\n“short term traffic,” only staying at residences for a short time. The officers testified\\nLlamas would travel to locations using non-direct routes and side streets and would\\ncircle around the block in a manner consistent with one conducting counter-\\nsurveillance. They did not observe Llamas engage in any conventional work\\nactivities.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f In February 2017, police officers encountered Llamas and Ramirez when\\ntracking a cell phone that Llamas has previously contacted. The officers had set up\\nsurveillance at a travel plaza near Albert Lea, Minnesota. They spotted Ramirez\\ndriving a Honda registered to Jacqueline Myra Machuca-Arana (“Machuca”) with a\\npassenger they later identified as Machuca. The officers followed the vehicle to the\\nDupont House. Llamas arrived and met with Machuca and Ramirez. Machuca\\nreturned to the Honda and drove into the garage. Soon after, Llamas left the\\nresidence carrying a duffle bag and headed toward the garage. Llamas then drove\\naway in another vehicle, while Ramirez and Machuca drove off in Llamas’s\\nChevrolet. Ramirez and Machuca returned to the Dupont House later that night. The\\nnext evening, the officers located Ramirez and Machuca out driving the Honda,\\nstopped the car, and seized $20,000 in cash from a modified storage area in the rear\\nseat.\\n\\n In March 2017, police officers received information from investigators in\\nCalifornia that Llamas would be meeting with a money courier. The officers tracked\\nLlamas and an unknown male to a hotel near the Mall of America in Minnesota.\\nThey also noted a car parked at the hotel: a Honda Odyssey with California plates\\nregistered to Hubert Cuevas. Cuevas and Llamas talked 28 times by phone that day.\\nTwo days later, officers stopped Cuevas in the Honda Odyssey in California and\\nseized $53,000 in cash from a hidden compartment in his vehicle.\\n\\n In April 2017, police officers learned about a call between Llamas and Ornelas,\\nwho they suspected was a drug associate of Llamas. During the call, Ornelas used\\ncoded language interpreted by police officers to mean suppliers in Mexico had\\nstopped sending drugs because the suppliers had not been paid. Ornelas and Llamas\\ndiscussed a plan for Llamas to provide money to a courier in Minnesota to settle the\\ndebt. During a later call, Ornelas told Llamas the courier was in the area, and Llamas\\nagreed to meet the courier.\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f That same afternoon, police officers intercepted three phone calls and some\\ntext messages between Llamas and Ishmael Torrecillas, the courier. The two men\\nagreed to meet at the Mall of America. Llamas left the Bellvue House in the\\nChevrolet. When Llamas arrived, Torrecillas and his girlfriend got into Llamas’s\\nvehicle. The officers did not follow Llamas after that meeting.\\n\\n In May 2017, a pole camera at the Dupont House recorded Parra and Ramirez\\narriving in Ramirez’s Cadillac Escalade. Llamas met Parra and Ramirez there. Parra\\nand Ramirez then drove the Cadillac to the Bellvue House, and Llamas followed in\\na separate vehicle. Parra drove the Cadillac into the Bellvue garage and the door\\nclosed. About twenty minutes later, Parra backed the Cadillac out, and he and\\nRamirez returned to the Dupont house. Ramirez later told police two kilograms of\\ncocaine had been concealed behind the headlights of the Cadillac.\\n\\n On May 15, 2017, police officers arrested Llamas, Ramirez, and Parra, and\\nsearched several locations linked to the investigation. At the Bellvue House, police\\nfound Llamas, roughly $43,000 in cash, a cell phone, vehicle keys, and a permanent\\nresident card with Llamas’s photograph. At the Dupont House, the officers found\\nParra and Ramirez, drugs, and extensive drug paraphernalia. It appeared no one\\nresided at the house, as there were no pictures on the walls, no food in the\\nrefrigerator, no dining utensils, and no dry goods in the kitchen. The officers seized\\nabout 139 grams of cocaine sitting on a top shelf in the kitchen, about 252 grams of\\ncocaine in the kitchen broiler, 28 pounds of marijuana in the basement, a digital scale,\\ndisposable latex gloves, a handgun, food saver bags, a heat-sealing machine,\\npackaging tape, a money counting machine, and two kilogram-sized wrappers. They\\nalso found hidden compartments behind the front headlights of the Cadillac.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f B. Procedural History\\n\\n In June 2017, a grand jury indicted Llamas, Ramirez, and Parra on two counts:\\n(1) conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams\\nor more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; and\\n(2) possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of\\n21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At trial in December 2017, a jury convicted all three\\ndefendants on both counts. The jury found, however, that Ramirez’s and Parra’s\\nconduct involved no methamphetamine and that Parra’s conduct involved less than\\n500 grams of cocaine.\\n\\n The district court sentenced Llamas to 300 months of imprisonment. Llamas\\ndoes not challenge his sentence on appeal.\\n\\n The district court sentenced Parra to 41 months of imprisonment. The district\\ncourt concluded based on the evidence it heard at trial that Parra was responsible for\\nmore than 500 grams of drugs. Thus, it calculated the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines\\nManual (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range as 51 to 63 months. The district court\\nthen varied downward to 41 months. The district court referenced this was the\\nbottom of the “imaginary” Guidelines range that would apply if the sentence were\\nbased on less than 500 grams of drugs and explained it was varying downward\\nbecause it thought the applicable Guidelines range was “more than is necessary” for\\nParra.\\n\\n The district court sentenced Ramirez to a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence\\nof 63 months of imprisonment. Ramirez argued for application of the safety valve\\nprovision and a reduction in his sentence based on U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 because he had\\nonly a minor role in the conspiracy. The district court rejected the argument. It noted\\nthat Ramirez recruited Parra to join the conspiracy. The district court then determined\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f63 months was appropriate because of Ramirez’s immigration status, his family\\nsituation, and because the Government did not ask for more.\\n\\n All three defendants timely appealed.\\n\\n II. Analysis\\n\\n Because Llamas and Parra challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we\\naddress the evidence at trial for those two defendants before addressing the two\\nsentencing issues.\\n\\n A. Sufficiency of the Evidence\\n\\n “We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction,\\nviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and accepting all\\nreasonable inferences supporting the verdict.” United States v. Colton, 742 F.3d 345,\\n348 (8th Cir. 2014). This is a strict standard of review, and we will overturn a\\nconviction “only if no reasonable jury could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond\\na reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bell, 477 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir.\\n2007)). “It is well-established that ‘the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice\\nis sufficient to sustain a conviction if the testimony is not otherwise incredible or\\nunsubstantial on its face.’” United States v. Vaughn, 410 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir.\\n2005) (quoting United States v. Dunn, 494 F.2d 1280, 1281–82 (8th Cir. 1974)).\\n\\n To establish a defendant’s membership in a conspiracy, the Government needs\\nto prove “(1) the existence of an agreement among two or more people to achieve an\\nillegal purpose, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the agreement, and (3) that the\\ndefendant knowingly joined and participated in the agreement.” United States v.\\nPeebles, 883 F.3d 1062, 1067–68 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Whirlwind\\nSoldier, 499 F.3d 862, 869 (8th Cir. 2007)). To establish a defendant’s possession\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fof illegal drugs with the intent to distribute, the Government needs to prove the\\ndefendant (1) knowingly possessed the drug in question and (2) intended to distribute\\nit. See id. at 1068.\\n\\n The evidence of Llamas’s guilt was overwhelming. First, Llamas participated\\nin using a modified Mini Cooper to transport drugs. Llamas protests that evidence\\nof his role was primarily based on the confidential informant’s testimony, but his\\nparticipation in picking up the Mini Cooper confirms his role in that transaction.\\nSecond, police officers’ surveillance of the outlet mall and subsequent discovery of\\ndrugs with Winter could allow a reasonable jury to infer that Llamas sold drugs to\\nWinter. Third, Llamas was repeatedly present at the Dupont House where police\\nofficers found drugs (and no evidence anyone lived there). While this is not an\\nexhaustive recollection of the evidence against Llamas, this evidence alone prevents\\nany reasonable argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict Llamas.\\n\\n The evidence of Parra’s role in the conspiracy to distribute drugs was also\\nsufficient. First, circumstantial evidence indicated Parra helped Ramirez transport\\ntwo kilograms of cocaine and distribute it to Llamas for further distribution. Second,\\npolice officers found Parra at the House with drugs and other drug paraphernalia.\\nThis evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the reasonable\\nconclusion Parra had a role in the drug conspiracy and possessed drugs with intent\\nto distribute them. Thus, ample evidence supports Parra’s conviction.\\n\\n B. Parra’s Drug Quantity at Sentencing\\n\\n Parra argues the district court committed procedural error in calculating his\\nGuidelines range by holding him accountable for more cocaine than found by the\\njury. We review de novo the legal question of whether the district court could find\\na higher quantity of drugs than the jury found. See United States v. Webb, 545 F.3d\\n673, 676–77 (8th Cir. 2008). This court has held “a district court may impose a\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fsentence based on a drug quantity determination greater than that found by the jury\\nso long as the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum of the convicted\\noffense and the district court’s calculation is supported by sufficient evidence.” Id.\\nat 677. Parra tries to distinguish Webb on the ground it involved a jury finding with\\nonly one option for drug quantity rather than a finding among multiple options. That\\ndistinction in the jury form does not evade Webb’s core holding that a district court’s\\nsentencing finding may exceed the jury’s finding on drug quantity. The district court\\ndid not err in following our precedent.\\n\\n We also see no indication the district court committed a clear error in\\ncalculating the drug quantity on the evidence presented. The calculation is a factual\\ndetermination reviewed for clear error. Id. Police officers seized over 445 grams of\\ncocaine and two kilogram-sized wrappers from the stash house where Parra was\\nstaying. Ramirez also told police officers Parra helped transport two kilograms of\\ncocaine from Texas to Minnesota. This evidence is sufficient under a preponderance\\nof the evidence standard. See United States v. Eberspracher, 936 F.2d 387, 389 (8th\\nCir. 1991) (affirming attributing four kilograms of cocaine to a defendant based on\\nfinding four kilogram wrappers at his business).\\n\\n C. Ramirez’s Role in the Offense\\n\\n Ramirez challenges the district court’s determination that he was not entitled\\nto a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). This is also a factual\\ndetermination that is reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Cartagena, 856\\nF.3d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 2017). The Guidelines direct district courts to decrease the\\noffense level by two levels “[i]f the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal\\nactivity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). This court has recently explained “this deduction is\\navailable where the defendant’s role ‘makes him substantially less culpable than the\\naverage participant in the criminal activity.’” United States v. Sharkey, 895 F.3d\\n1077, 1081 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3). It is the defendant’s\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fburden to establish both that “he or she is [a] minor participant by comparison with\\nother participants and by comparison with the offense for which he or she is\\naccountable.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bradley, 643 F.3d\\n1121, 1129 (8th Cir. 2011)). “[T]his court has consistently rejected the argument that\\na distributor of controlled substances deserves a minor-role reduction simply because\\nof the presence of a larger-scale upstream distributor.” Id. (quoting same).\\n\\n The district court’s decision to deny a minor-role reduction to Ramirez was\\nconsistent with the evidence. The jury heard evidence that Ramirez was involved in\\nthe conspiracy for at least three months and delivered drugs to Llamas on at least one\\nif not two occasions. We have repeatedly found no clear error in the denial of a\\nminor-role reduction on similar facts. See, e.g., United States v. Almazan, 552 F.\\nApp’x 610, 611 (8th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (finding no clear error where defendant\\nadmitted knowledge of transporting hidden cocaine in the vehicle he was driving and\\nreceived $1,000 for transporting the cocaine); United States v. Pruneda, 518 F.3d\\n597, 606 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding no clear error where defendant was merely a\\ncourier); United States v. O’Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding no clear\\nerror where defendant was less culpable than co-defendants but helped transport\\ndrugs several times). We see no distinguishing reason to find clear error here.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4410306/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"GRUENDER\": \", Circuit\", \"BENTON\": \", Circuit\", \"GRASZ\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633053/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Gregorio RAMIREZ-MALDONADO; Alejandro Llamas-Delgado; Erick Parra-Salazar, Defendants-Appellants\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n Nos. 18-2068, 18-2088, 18-2090\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Gregorio Ramirez-Maldonado;\n Alejandro Llamas-Delgado;\n Erick Parra-Salazar\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\n ____________\n\n Appeals from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota\n ____________\n\n Submitted: March 12, 2019\n Filed: June 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Alejandro Llamas-Delgado (“Llamas”) and Erick Parra-Salazar (“Parra”)\nappeal their convictions for drug trafficking crimes. Parra and another co-defendant,\n\fGregorio Ramirez-Maldonado (“Ramirez”), appeal the sentences the district court1\nimposed after trial. We affirm.\n\n I. Background\n\n In May 2017, law enforcement officials arrested Llamas, Ramirez, and Parra\nfollowing an extensive investigation into a suspected drug conspiracy to distribute\nsubstantial quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine. Because both Llamas and\nParra challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, many of the facts introduced at trial\nregarding that investigation are recounted below.\n\n A. Facts\n\n For purposes of this case, the investigation began in 2014 when the Drug\nEnforcement Administration (“DEA”) intercepted a transport truck in California that\nwas hauling a 2005 Mini Cooper automobile. Earlier, Omar Ornelas-Garcia\n(“Ornelas”) and A.L., a confidential informant who testified at trial, had met Llamas\nat an auto body shop in southern California that had constructed hidden compartments\nin the Mini Cooper. A.L. later picked up the Mini Cooper after Ornelas told him that\nhe had loaded it with 22 pounds of methamphetamine and seven or eight kilograms\n(15.4 or 17.6 pounds) of cocaine. A.L. met with a truck driver to load the Mini\nCooper onto the transport truck and subsequently sent a text to Llamas to tell him the\nMini Cooper was on its way. The DEA learned about the transport truck and set up\na “controlled delivery” of the Mini Cooper. The DEA met the truck driver at a\nparking lot in Plymouth, Minnesota, unloaded the vehicle, parked it, and disabled it.\nThe truck driver then called someone named “Oscar,” whom he had been told to call\nwhen he arrived.\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District\nof Minnesota.\n\n -2-\n\f The DEA encountered Llamas during the controlled delivery of the Mini\nCooper. Almost an hour after the truck driver’s phone call to “Oscar,” Llamas and\na woman pulled into the parking lot. Llamas met with the truck driver, put California\nlicense plates on the Mini Cooper, and unsuccessfully tried to start it. Llamas\neventually returned with several other people and a tow truck. They loaded the Mini\nCooper on the tow truck and departed. The DEA did not arrest anyone but had local\npolice seize the Mini Cooper from the tow truck.\n\n In September 2015, the DEA again saw Llamas when agents were at the\nAlbertville Outlet Mall just west of the Twin Cities. Llamas sat on a park bench\nholding two cell phones. A short time later, Eric Winter drove into the parking lot.\nLlamas walked directly to Winter’s vehicle and got into the front passenger seat. A\nfew minutes later, Llamas got out of the vehicle, walked to his own vehicle, and\ndrove off. Police officers stopped Llamas and Winter. The officers found about an\nounce of methamphetamine in the center console of Winter’s vehicle and $1,880 cash\non Llamas. The record indicates they arrested Llamas but does not indicate whether\nany further proceedings occurred.\n\n In January 2017, police officers began extensive surveillance that included\nwatching two houses linked to Llamas. These houses were a large, single-family\nhome on Bellvue Lane in Brooklyn Center (the “Bellvue House”) and a small\nrambler-style home on Dupont Avenue in Minneapolis (the “Dupont House”). The\nofficers also identified several vehicles linked to Llamas, including a Chevrolet\nSilverado and a GMC Sierra. Between January and May 2017, Llamas often drove\nbetween the two houses. Llamas would meet with various people and engage in\n“short term traffic,” only staying at residences for a short time. The officers testified\nLlamas would travel to locations using non-direct routes and side streets and would\ncircle around the block in a manner consistent with one conducting counter-\nsurveillance. They did not observe Llamas engage in any conventional work\nactivities.\n\n -3-\n\f In February 2017, police officers encountered Llamas and Ramirez when\ntracking a cell phone that Llamas has previously contacted. The officers had set up\nsurveillance at a travel plaza near Albert Lea, Minnesota. They spotted Ramirez\ndriving a Honda registered to Jacqueline Myra Machuca-Arana (“Machuca”) with a\npassenger they later identified as Machuca. The officers followed the vehicle to the\nDupont House. Llamas arrived and met with Machuca and Ramirez. Machuca\nreturned to the Honda and drove into the garage. Soon after, Llamas left the\nresidence carrying a duffle bag and headed toward the garage. Llamas then drove\naway in another vehicle, while Ramirez and Machuca drove off in Llamas’s\nChevrolet. Ramirez and Machuca returned to the Dupont House later that night. The\nnext evening, the officers located Ramirez and Machuca out driving the Honda,\nstopped the car, and seized $20,000 in cash from a modified storage area in the rear\nseat.\n\n In March 2017, police officers received information from investigators in\nCalifornia that Llamas would be meeting with a money courier. The officers tracked\nLlamas and an unknown male to a hotel near the Mall of America in Minnesota.\nThey also noted a car parked at the hotel: a Honda Odyssey with California plates\nregistered to Hubert Cuevas. Cuevas and Llamas talked 28 times by phone that day.\nTwo days later, officers stopped Cuevas in the Honda Odyssey in California and\nseized $53,000 in cash from a hidden compartment in his vehicle.\n\n In April 2017, police officers learned about a call between Llamas and Ornelas,\nwho they suspected was a drug associate of Llamas. During the call, Ornelas used\ncoded language interpreted by police officers to mean suppliers in Mexico had\nstopped sending drugs because the suppliers had not been paid. Ornelas and Llamas\ndiscussed a plan for Llamas to provide money to a courier in Minnesota to settle the\ndebt. During a later call, Ornelas told Llamas the courier was in the area, and Llamas\nagreed to meet the courier.\n\n\n\n -4-\n\f That same afternoon, police officers intercepted three phone calls and some\ntext messages between Llamas and Ishmael Torrecillas, the courier. The two men\nagreed to meet at the Mall of America. Llamas left the Bellvue House in the\nChevrolet. When Llamas arrived, Torrecillas and his girlfriend got into Llamas’s\nvehicle. The officers did not follow Llamas after that meeting.\n\n In May 2017, a pole camera at the Dupont House recorded Parra and Ramirez\narriving in Ramirez’s Cadillac Escalade. Llamas met Parra and Ramirez there. Parra\nand Ramirez then drove the Cadillac to the Bellvue House, and Llamas followed in\na separate vehicle. Parra drove the Cadillac into the Bellvue garage and the door\nclosed. About twenty minutes later, Parra backed the Cadillac out, and he and\nRamirez returned to the Dupont house. Ramirez later told police two kilograms of\ncocaine had been concealed behind the headlights of the Cadillac.\n\n On May 15, 2017, police officers arrested Llamas, Ramirez, and Parra, and\nsearched several locations linked to the investigation. At the Bellvue House, police\nfound Llamas, roughly $43,000 in cash, a cell phone, vehicle keys, and a permanent\nresident card with Llamas’s photograph. At the Dupont House, the officers found\nParra and Ramirez, drugs, and extensive drug paraphernalia. It appeared no one\nresided at the house, as there were no pictures on the walls, no food in the\nrefrigerator, no dining utensils, and no dry goods in the kitchen. The officers seized\nabout 139 grams of cocaine sitting on a top shelf in the kitchen, about 252 grams of\ncocaine in the kitchen broiler, 28 pounds of marijuana in the basement, a digital scale,\ndisposable latex gloves, a handgun, food saver bags, a heat-sealing machine,\npackaging tape, a money counting machine, and two kilogram-sized wrappers. They\nalso found hidden compartments behind the front headlights of the Cadillac.\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f B. Procedural History\n\n In June 2017, a grand jury indicted Llamas, Ramirez, and Parra on two counts:\n(1) conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams\nor more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; and\n(2) possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of\n21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At trial in December 2017, a jury convicted all three\ndefendants on both counts. The jury found, however, that Ramirez’s and Parra’s\nconduct involved no methamphetamine and that Parra’s conduct involved less than\n500 grams of cocaine.\n\n The district court sentenced Llamas to 300 months of imprisonment. Llamas\ndoes not challenge his sentence on appeal.\n\n The district court sentenced Parra to 41 months of imprisonment. The district\ncourt concluded based on the evidence it heard at trial that Parra was responsible for\nmore than 500 grams of drugs. Thus, it calculated the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines\nManual (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range as 51 to 63 months. The district court\nthen varied downward to 41 months. The district court referenced this was the\nbottom of the “imaginary” Guidelines range that would apply if the sentence were\nbased on less than 500 grams of drugs and explained it was varying downward\nbecause it thought the applicable Guidelines range was “more than is necessary” for\nParra.\n\n The district court sentenced Ramirez to a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence\nof 63 months of imprisonment. Ramirez argued for application of the safety valve\nprovision and a reduction in his sentence based on U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 because he had\nonly a minor role in the conspiracy. The district court rejected the argument. It noted\nthat Ramirez recruited Parra to join the conspiracy. The district court then determined\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f63 months was appropriate because of Ramirez’s immigration status, his family\nsituation, and because the Government did not ask for more.\n\n All three defendants timely appealed.\n\n II. Analysis\n\n Because Llamas and Parra challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we\naddress the evidence at trial for those two defendants before addressing the two\nsentencing issues.\n\n A. Sufficiency of the Evidence\n\n “We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction,\nviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and accepting all\nreasonable inferences supporting the verdict.” United States v. Colton, 742 F.3d 345,\n348 (8th Cir. 2014). This is a strict standard of review, and we will overturn a\nconviction “only if no reasonable jury could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond\na reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bell, 477 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir.\n2007)). “It is well-established that ‘the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice\nis sufficient to sustain a conviction if the testimony is not otherwise incredible or\nunsubstantial on its face.’” United States v. Vaughn, 410 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir.\n2005) (quoting United States v. Dunn, 494 F.2d 1280, 1281–82 (8th Cir. 1974)).\n\n To establish a defendant’s membership in a conspiracy, the Government needs\nto prove “(1) the existence of an agreement among two or more people to achieve an\nillegal purpose, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the agreement, and (3) that the\ndefendant knowingly joined and participated in the agreement.” United States v.\nPeebles, 883 F.3d 1062, 1067–68 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Whirlwind\nSoldier, 499 F.3d 862, 869 (8th Cir. 2007)). To establish a defendant’s possession\n\n -7-\n\fof illegal drugs with the intent to distribute, the Government needs to prove the\ndefendant (1) knowingly possessed the drug in question and (2) intended to distribute\nit. See id. at 1068.\n\n The evidence of Llamas’s guilt was overwhelming. First, Llamas participated\nin using a modified Mini Cooper to transport drugs. Llamas protests that evidence\nof his role was primarily based on the confidential informant’s testimony, but his\nparticipation in picking up the Mini Cooper confirms his role in that transaction.\nSecond, police officers’ surveillance of the outlet mall and subsequent discovery of\ndrugs with Winter could allow a reasonable jury to infer that Llamas sold drugs to\nWinter. Third, Llamas was repeatedly present at the Dupont House where police\nofficers found drugs (and no evidence anyone lived there). While this is not an\nexhaustive recollection of the evidence against Llamas, this evidence alone prevents\nany reasonable argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict Llamas.\n\n The evidence of Parra’s role in the conspiracy to distribute drugs was also\nsufficient. First, circumstantial evidence indicated Parra helped Ramirez transport\ntwo kilograms of cocaine and distribute it to Llamas for further distribution. Second,\npolice officers found Parra at the House with drugs and other drug paraphernalia.\nThis evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the reasonable\nconclusion Parra had a role in the drug conspiracy and possessed drugs with intent\nto distribute them. Thus, ample evidence supports Parra’s conviction.\n\n B. Parra’s Drug Quantity at Sentencing\n\n Parra argues the district court committed procedural error in calculating his\nGuidelines range by holding him accountable for more cocaine than found by the\njury. We review de novo the legal question of whether the district court could find\na higher quantity of drugs than the jury found. See United States v. Webb, 545 F.3d\n673, 676–77 (8th Cir. 2008). This court has held “a district court may impose a\n\n -8-\n\fsentence based on a drug quantity determination greater than that found by the jury\nso long as the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum of the convicted\noffense and the district court’s calculation is supported by sufficient evidence.” Id.\nat 677. Parra tries to distinguish Webb on the ground it involved a jury finding with\nonly one option for drug quantity rather than a finding among multiple options. That\ndistinction in the jury form does not evade Webb’s core holding that a district court’s\nsentencing finding may exceed the jury’s finding on drug quantity. The district court\ndid not err in following our precedent.\n\n We also see no indication the district court committed a clear error in\ncalculating the drug quantity on the evidence presented. The calculation is a factual\ndetermination reviewed for clear error. Id. Police officers seized over 445 grams of\ncocaine and two kilogram-sized wrappers from the stash house where Parra was\nstaying. Ramirez also told police officers Parra helped transport two kilograms of\ncocaine from Texas to Minnesota. This evidence is sufficient under a preponderance\nof the evidence standard. See United States v. Eberspracher, 936 F.2d 387, 389 (8th\nCir. 1991) (affirming attributing four kilograms of cocaine to a defendant based on\nfinding four kilogram wrappers at his business).\n\n C. Ramirez’s Role in the Offense\n\n Ramirez challenges the district court’s determination that he was not entitled\nto a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). This is also a factual\ndetermination that is reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Cartagena, 856\nF.3d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 2017). The Guidelines direct district courts to decrease the\noffense level by two levels “[i]f the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal\nactivity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). This court has recently explained “this deduction is\navailable where the defendant’s role ‘makes him substantially less culpable than the\naverage participant in the criminal activity.’” United States v. Sharkey, 895 F.3d\n1077, 1081 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3). It is the defendant’s\n\n -9-\n\fburden to establish both that “he or she is [a] minor participant by comparison with\nother participants and by comparison with the offense for which he or she is\naccountable.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bradley, 643 F.3d\n1121, 1129 (8th Cir. 2011)). “[T]his court has consistently rejected the argument that\na distributor of controlled substances deserves a minor-role reduction simply because\nof the presence of a larger-scale upstream distributor.” Id. (quoting same).\n\n The district court’s decision to deny a minor-role reduction to Ramirez was\nconsistent with the evidence. The jury heard evidence that Ramirez was involved in\nthe conspiracy for at least three months and delivered drugs to Llamas on at least one\nif not two occasions. We have repeatedly found no clear error in the denial of a\nminor-role reduction on similar facts. See, e.g., United States v. Almazan, 552 F.\nApp’x 610, 611 (8th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (finding no clear error where defendant\nadmitted knowledge of transporting hidden cocaine in the vehicle he was driving and\nreceived $1,000 for transporting the cocaine); United States v. Pruneda, 518 F.3d\n597, 606 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding no clear error where defendant was merely a\ncourier); United States v. O’Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding no clear\nerror where defendant was less culpable than co-defendants but helped transport\ndrugs several times). We see no distinguishing reason to find clear error here.\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -10-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Gregorio RAMIREZ-MALDONADO; Alejandro Llamas-Delgado; Erick Parra-Salazar, Defendants-Appellants\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Nos. 18-2068, 18-2088, 18-2090\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Gregorio Ramirez-Maldonado;\\n Alejandro Llamas-Delgado;\\n Erick Parra-Salazar\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 12, 2019\\n Filed: June 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Alejandro Llamas-Delgado (“Llamas”) and Erick Parra-Salazar (“Parra”)\\nappeal their convictions for drug trafficking crimes. Parra and another co-defendant,\\n\\fGregorio Ramirez-Maldonado (“Ramirez”), appeal the sentences the district court1\\nimposed after trial. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n In May 2017, law enforcement officials arrested Llamas, Ramirez, and Parra\\nfollowing an extensive investigation into a suspected drug conspiracy to distribute\\nsubstantial quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine. Because both Llamas and\\nParra challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, many of the facts introduced at trial\\nregarding that investigation are recounted below.\\n\\n A. Facts\\n\\n For purposes of this case, the investigation began in 2014 when the Drug\\nEnforcement Administration (“DEA”) intercepted a transport truck in California that\\nwas hauling a 2005 Mini Cooper automobile. Earlier, Omar Ornelas-Garcia\\n(“Ornelas”) and A.L., a confidential informant who testified at trial, had met Llamas\\nat an auto body shop in southern California that had constructed hidden compartments\\nin the Mini Cooper. A.L. later picked up the Mini Cooper after Ornelas told him that\\nhe had loaded it with 22 pounds of methamphetamine and seven or eight kilograms\\n(15.4 or 17.6 pounds) of cocaine. A.L. met with a truck driver to load the Mini\\nCooper onto the transport truck and subsequently sent a text to Llamas to tell him the\\nMini Cooper was on its way. The DEA learned about the transport truck and set up\\na “controlled delivery” of the Mini Cooper. The DEA met the truck driver at a\\nparking lot in Plymouth, Minnesota, unloaded the vehicle, parked it, and disabled it.\\nThe truck driver then called someone named “Oscar,” whom he had been told to call\\nwhen he arrived.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f The DEA encountered Llamas during the controlled delivery of the Mini\\nCooper. Almost an hour after the truck driver’s phone call to “Oscar,” Llamas and\\na woman pulled into the parking lot. Llamas met with the truck driver, put California\\nlicense plates on the Mini Cooper, and unsuccessfully tried to start it. Llamas\\neventually returned with several other people and a tow truck. They loaded the Mini\\nCooper on the tow truck and departed. The DEA did not arrest anyone but had local\\npolice seize the Mini Cooper from the tow truck.\\n\\n In September 2015, the DEA again saw Llamas when agents were at the\\nAlbertville Outlet Mall just west of the Twin Cities. Llamas sat on a park bench\\nholding two cell phones. A short time later, Eric Winter drove into the parking lot.\\nLlamas walked directly to Winter’s vehicle and got into the front passenger seat. A\\nfew minutes later, Llamas got out of the vehicle, walked to his own vehicle, and\\ndrove off. Police officers stopped Llamas and Winter. The officers found about an\\nounce of methamphetamine in the center console of Winter’s vehicle and $1,880 cash\\non Llamas. The record indicates they arrested Llamas but does not indicate whether\\nany further proceedings occurred.\\n\\n In January 2017, police officers began extensive surveillance that included\\nwatching two houses linked to Llamas. These houses were a large, single-family\\nhome on Bellvue Lane in Brooklyn Center (the “Bellvue House”) and a small\\nrambler-style home on Dupont Avenue in Minneapolis (the “Dupont House”). The\\nofficers also identified several vehicles linked to Llamas, including a Chevrolet\\nSilverado and a GMC Sierra. Between January and May 2017, Llamas often drove\\nbetween the two houses. Llamas would meet with various people and engage in\\n“short term traffic,” only staying at residences for a short time. The officers testified\\nLlamas would travel to locations using non-direct routes and side streets and would\\ncircle around the block in a manner consistent with one conducting counter-\\nsurveillance. They did not observe Llamas engage in any conventional work\\nactivities.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f In February 2017, police officers encountered Llamas and Ramirez when\\ntracking a cell phone that Llamas has previously contacted. The officers had set up\\nsurveillance at a travel plaza near Albert Lea, Minnesota. They spotted Ramirez\\ndriving a Honda registered to Jacqueline Myra Machuca-Arana (“Machuca”) with a\\npassenger they later identified as Machuca. The officers followed the vehicle to the\\nDupont House. Llamas arrived and met with Machuca and Ramirez. Machuca\\nreturned to the Honda and drove into the garage. Soon after, Llamas left the\\nresidence carrying a duffle bag and headed toward the garage. Llamas then drove\\naway in another vehicle, while Ramirez and Machuca drove off in Llamas’s\\nChevrolet. Ramirez and Machuca returned to the Dupont House later that night. The\\nnext evening, the officers located Ramirez and Machuca out driving the Honda,\\nstopped the car, and seized $20,000 in cash from a modified storage area in the rear\\nseat.\\n\\n In March 2017, police officers received information from investigators in\\nCalifornia that Llamas would be meeting with a money courier. The officers tracked\\nLlamas and an unknown male to a hotel near the Mall of America in Minnesota.\\nThey also noted a car parked at the hotel: a Honda Odyssey with California plates\\nregistered to Hubert Cuevas. Cuevas and Llamas talked 28 times by phone that day.\\nTwo days later, officers stopped Cuevas in the Honda Odyssey in California and\\nseized $53,000 in cash from a hidden compartment in his vehicle.\\n\\n In April 2017, police officers learned about a call between Llamas and Ornelas,\\nwho they suspected was a drug associate of Llamas. During the call, Ornelas used\\ncoded language interpreted by police officers to mean suppliers in Mexico had\\nstopped sending drugs because the suppliers had not been paid. Ornelas and Llamas\\ndiscussed a plan for Llamas to provide money to a courier in Minnesota to settle the\\ndebt. During a later call, Ornelas told Llamas the courier was in the area, and Llamas\\nagreed to meet the courier.\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f That same afternoon, police officers intercepted three phone calls and some\\ntext messages between Llamas and Ishmael Torrecillas, the courier. The two men\\nagreed to meet at the Mall of America. Llamas left the Bellvue House in the\\nChevrolet. When Llamas arrived, Torrecillas and his girlfriend got into Llamas’s\\nvehicle. The officers did not follow Llamas after that meeting.\\n\\n In May 2017, a pole camera at the Dupont House recorded Parra and Ramirez\\narriving in Ramirez’s Cadillac Escalade. Llamas met Parra and Ramirez there. Parra\\nand Ramirez then drove the Cadillac to the Bellvue House, and Llamas followed in\\na separate vehicle. Parra drove the Cadillac into the Bellvue garage and the door\\nclosed. About twenty minutes later, Parra backed the Cadillac out, and he and\\nRamirez returned to the Dupont house. Ramirez later told police two kilograms of\\ncocaine had been concealed behind the headlights of the Cadillac.\\n\\n On May 15, 2017, police officers arrested Llamas, Ramirez, and Parra, and\\nsearched several locations linked to the investigation. At the Bellvue House, police\\nfound Llamas, roughly $43,000 in cash, a cell phone, vehicle keys, and a permanent\\nresident card with Llamas’s photograph. At the Dupont House, the officers found\\nParra and Ramirez, drugs, and extensive drug paraphernalia. It appeared no one\\nresided at the house, as there were no pictures on the walls, no food in the\\nrefrigerator, no dining utensils, and no dry goods in the kitchen. The officers seized\\nabout 139 grams of cocaine sitting on a top shelf in the kitchen, about 252 grams of\\ncocaine in the kitchen broiler, 28 pounds of marijuana in the basement, a digital scale,\\ndisposable latex gloves, a handgun, food saver bags, a heat-sealing machine,\\npackaging tape, a money counting machine, and two kilogram-sized wrappers. They\\nalso found hidden compartments behind the front headlights of the Cadillac.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f B. Procedural History\\n\\n In June 2017, a grand jury indicted Llamas, Ramirez, and Parra on two counts:\\n(1) conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams\\nor more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; and\\n(2) possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of\\n21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At trial in December 2017, a jury convicted all three\\ndefendants on both counts. The jury found, however, that Ramirez’s and Parra’s\\nconduct involved no methamphetamine and that Parra’s conduct involved less than\\n500 grams of cocaine.\\n\\n The district court sentenced Llamas to 300 months of imprisonment. Llamas\\ndoes not challenge his sentence on appeal.\\n\\n The district court sentenced Parra to 41 months of imprisonment. The district\\ncourt concluded based on the evidence it heard at trial that Parra was responsible for\\nmore than 500 grams of drugs. Thus, it calculated the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines\\nManual (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range as 51 to 63 months. The district court\\nthen varied downward to 41 months. The district court referenced this was the\\nbottom of the “imaginary” Guidelines range that would apply if the sentence were\\nbased on less than 500 grams of drugs and explained it was varying downward\\nbecause it thought the applicable Guidelines range was “more than is necessary” for\\nParra.\\n\\n The district court sentenced Ramirez to a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence\\nof 63 months of imprisonment. Ramirez argued for application of the safety valve\\nprovision and a reduction in his sentence based on U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 because he had\\nonly a minor role in the conspiracy. The district court rejected the argument. It noted\\nthat Ramirez recruited Parra to join the conspiracy. The district court then determined\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f63 months was appropriate because of Ramirez’s immigration status, his family\\nsituation, and because the Government did not ask for more.\\n\\n All three defendants timely appealed.\\n\\n II. Analysis\\n\\n Because Llamas and Parra challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we\\naddress the evidence at trial for those two defendants before addressing the two\\nsentencing issues.\\n\\n A. Sufficiency of the Evidence\\n\\n “We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction,\\nviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and accepting all\\nreasonable inferences supporting the verdict.” United States v. Colton, 742 F.3d 345,\\n348 (8th Cir. 2014). This is a strict standard of review, and we will overturn a\\nconviction “only if no reasonable jury could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond\\na reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bell, 477 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir.\\n2007)). “It is well-established that ‘the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice\\nis sufficient to sustain a conviction if the testimony is not otherwise incredible or\\nunsubstantial on its face.’” United States v. Vaughn, 410 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir.\\n2005) (quoting United States v. Dunn, 494 F.2d 1280, 1281–82 (8th Cir. 1974)).\\n\\n To establish a defendant’s membership in a conspiracy, the Government needs\\nto prove “(1) the existence of an agreement among two or more people to achieve an\\nillegal purpose, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the agreement, and (3) that the\\ndefendant knowingly joined and participated in the agreement.” United States v.\\nPeebles, 883 F.3d 1062, 1067–68 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Whirlwind\\nSoldier, 499 F.3d 862, 869 (8th Cir. 2007)). To establish a defendant’s possession\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fof illegal drugs with the intent to distribute, the Government needs to prove the\\ndefendant (1) knowingly possessed the drug in question and (2) intended to distribute\\nit. See id. at 1068.\\n\\n The evidence of Llamas’s guilt was overwhelming. First, Llamas participated\\nin using a modified Mini Cooper to transport drugs. Llamas protests that evidence\\nof his role was primarily based on the confidential informant’s testimony, but his\\nparticipation in picking up the Mini Cooper confirms his role in that transaction.\\nSecond, police officers’ surveillance of the outlet mall and subsequent discovery of\\ndrugs with Winter could allow a reasonable jury to infer that Llamas sold drugs to\\nWinter. Third, Llamas was repeatedly present at the Dupont House where police\\nofficers found drugs (and no evidence anyone lived there). While this is not an\\nexhaustive recollection of the evidence against Llamas, this evidence alone prevents\\nany reasonable argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict Llamas.\\n\\n The evidence of Parra’s role in the conspiracy to distribute drugs was also\\nsufficient. First, circumstantial evidence indicated Parra helped Ramirez transport\\ntwo kilograms of cocaine and distribute it to Llamas for further distribution. Second,\\npolice officers found Parra at the House with drugs and other drug paraphernalia.\\nThis evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the reasonable\\nconclusion Parra had a role in the drug conspiracy and possessed drugs with intent\\nto distribute them. Thus, ample evidence supports Parra’s conviction.\\n\\n B. Parra’s Drug Quantity at Sentencing\\n\\n Parra argues the district court committed procedural error in calculating his\\nGuidelines range by holding him accountable for more cocaine than found by the\\njury. We review de novo the legal question of whether the district court could find\\na higher quantity of drugs than the jury found. See United States v. Webb, 545 F.3d\\n673, 676–77 (8th Cir. 2008). This court has held “a district court may impose a\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fsentence based on a drug quantity determination greater than that found by the jury\\nso long as the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum of the convicted\\noffense and the district court’s calculation is supported by sufficient evidence.” Id.\\nat 677. Parra tries to distinguish Webb on the ground it involved a jury finding with\\nonly one option for drug quantity rather than a finding among multiple options. That\\ndistinction in the jury form does not evade Webb’s core holding that a district court’s\\nsentencing finding may exceed the jury’s finding on drug quantity. The district court\\ndid not err in following our precedent.\\n\\n We also see no indication the district court committed a clear error in\\ncalculating the drug quantity on the evidence presented. The calculation is a factual\\ndetermination reviewed for clear error. Id. Police officers seized over 445 grams of\\ncocaine and two kilogram-sized wrappers from the stash house where Parra was\\nstaying. Ramirez also told police officers Parra helped transport two kilograms of\\ncocaine from Texas to Minnesota. This evidence is sufficient under a preponderance\\nof the evidence standard. See United States v. Eberspracher, 936 F.2d 387, 389 (8th\\nCir. 1991) (affirming attributing four kilograms of cocaine to a defendant based on\\nfinding four kilogram wrappers at his business).\\n\\n C. Ramirez’s Role in the Offense\\n\\n Ramirez challenges the district court’s determination that he was not entitled\\nto a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). This is also a factual\\ndetermination that is reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Cartagena, 856\\nF.3d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 2017). The Guidelines direct district courts to decrease the\\noffense level by two levels “[i]f the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal\\nactivity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). This court has recently explained “this deduction is\\navailable where the defendant’s role ‘makes him substantially less culpable than the\\naverage participant in the criminal activity.’” United States v. Sharkey, 895 F.3d\\n1077, 1081 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3). It is the defendant’s\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fburden to establish both that “he or she is [a] minor participant by comparison with\\nother participants and by comparison with the offense for which he or she is\\naccountable.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bradley, 643 F.3d\\n1121, 1129 (8th Cir. 2011)). “[T]his court has consistently rejected the argument that\\na distributor of controlled substances deserves a minor-role reduction simply because\\nof the presence of a larger-scale upstream distributor.” Id. (quoting same).\\n\\n The district court’s decision to deny a minor-role reduction to Ramirez was\\nconsistent with the evidence. The jury heard evidence that Ramirez was involved in\\nthe conspiracy for at least three months and delivered drugs to Llamas on at least one\\nif not two occasions. We have repeatedly found no clear error in the denial of a\\nminor-role reduction on similar facts. See, e.g., United States v. Almazan, 552 F.\\nApp’x 610, 611 (8th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (finding no clear error where defendant\\nadmitted knowledge of transporting hidden cocaine in the vehicle he was driving and\\nreceived $1,000 for transporting the cocaine); United States v. Pruneda, 518 F.3d\\n597, 606 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding no clear error where defendant was merely a\\ncourier); United States v. O’Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding no clear\\nerror where defendant was less culpable than co-defendants but helped transport\\ndrugs several times). We see no distinguishing reason to find clear error here.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2693,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4633056,"string":"4,633,056"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Paula Christy L. SCHMIDT; Holly Woprice Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Richard NEWLAND, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Trust, Amended and Restated February 19, 2016; John Doe, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased Defendants Newland & Associates PLLC, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Revocable Trust, Amended and Restated February 19, 2016; Relyance Bank N.A., as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Paula Schmidt v. Newland & Associates PLLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2083"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Grasz, Melloy, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2083\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Paula Christy L. Schmidt; Holly Woprice\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Richard Newland, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Trust, Amended and\\nRestated February 19, 2016; John Doe, as Personal Representative of the Estate of\\n Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n\\n Newland & Associates PLLC, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Revocable\\n Trust, Amended and Restated February 19, 2016; Relyance Bank N.A., as\\n Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\\n Filed: June 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f Christy Schmidt and Holly Woprice filed an action in United States District\\nCourt for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against Newland & Associates, PLLC,\\ntrustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Revocable Trust, and Relyance Bank, N.A.,\\npersonal representative of Michael Lasiter’s estate. The district court,1 sitting in\\ndiversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, dismissed Christy and Holly’s claims as\\nbarred by the applicable Arkansas statute of limitations. We have jurisdiction\\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Mannie Lasiter founded and was the chief operating officer of Lasiter\\nConstruction, Inc. (formerly Lasiter Asphalt Maintenance Company) from the\\nCompany’s incorporation in 1985 until 2000. While Mannie originally held all of the\\n1,000 outstanding shares of stock in the Company, he transferred 176 of his shares\\nto his son Michael between 1985 and 1992. Mannie’s 1999 Federal Gift Tax Return,\\nsigned by the preparer on October 16, 2002, shows that Mannie gave Michael 314\\nmore shares of the Company in 1999.\\n\\n On September 15, 2000, Mannie and Michael entered into a succession\\nagreement that determined the fate of the Company once Mannie retired as COO.\\nThe agreement laid out terms for Mannie’s continued employment with the Company;\\nprovided for transfer of all Mannie’s stock to Michael through gifts, sale, and\\ninheritance; and ensured Mannie would be released from liability on certain loans.\\nOn October 19, 2000, pursuant to the succession agreement, Mannie and Michael\\nsigned a stock purchase agreement by which Mannie agreed to sell Michael\\n“controlling interest” in the Company for $50,000. Michael also agreed to purchase\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Billy Roy Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthe remainder of Mannie’s Company stock when Mannie retired. That same day,\\nMannie purportedly transferred 410 shares of Company stock to Michael.\\n\\n Mannie and Michael also signed an employment agreement, which guaranteed\\nMannie employment with the Company until July 31, 2005 at a salary of $110,000\\nannually. The employment agreement additionally guaranteed Mannie five further\\nyears of employment at $65,000 annually. Mannie continued to work for the\\nCompany until a few months before his death in 2004. His income tax returns for the\\nrelevant period consistently show annual compensation from the Company that falls\\nshort of the promised $110,000.\\n\\n On September 17, 2002, Mannie created the Mannie Lasiter Trust, for which\\nhe served as trustee until his death. The Trust provided that, after Mannie’s death,\\nall his stock in the Company would go to Michael. The remainder of Mannie’s estate\\nwould be split between Michael, Mannie’s grandchildren, and Mannie’s daughters,\\nChristy and Holly. Mannie also executed a will, which left his entire estate to the\\nTrust and named Michael as trustee.\\n\\n Mannie died on June 28, 2004. On July 2, Mannie’s attorney, Richard\\nNewland, met with Holly, Christy, and Michael for a reading of the will. Holly and\\nChristy were provided with an abridged version of the Trust and a list of Trust\\nproperty. Mannie’s will was never admitted to probate.\\n\\n On July 15, 2004, Holly emailed Newland requesting a copy of Mannie’s will\\nand a complete copy of the Trust. Newland provided Christy and Holly with the\\nrequested copies and told them that all legal fees for the estate would be paid from the\\nTrust. Newland also informed Christy and Holly that he was Mannie’s attorney and\\nthat it was his job to carry out Mannie’s wishes, but he assured them that he could\\nanswer questions for them as long as those questions would not harm any other\\nbeneficiary of the Trust. Christy and Holly responded by asking specific questions\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fabout the Trust, the employment agreement, and the will, and by expressing concern\\nthat Michael had a conflict of interest by acting as trustee when he was a beneficiary\\nof the Trust. Despite their concerns, Christy and Holly never hired independent\\ncounsel or took any legal action.\\n\\n In February 2016, Michael transferred 824 shares of his Company stock to his\\nown trust, the Michael Allen Lasiter Trust (the MALT). Michael died on May 31,\\n2016, and the MALT contracted to convey away 750 shares of Company stock the\\nnext month.\\n\\n Holly and Christy allege they discovered the employment agreement,\\nsuccession agreement, and stock purchase agreement at some unspecified point after\\nMichael’s death. In October 2017, they filed suit against Michael’s estate and the\\nMALT. They later amended their Complaint, identifying the defendants as Newland\\n& Associates, trustee of the MALT, and Relyance Bank, personal representative of\\nMichael’s estate. Holly and Christy alleged Michael had breached his fiduciary duty\\nas trustee of Mannie’s trust by misrepresenting trust assets and intentionally failing\\nto disclose those assets to them. They further claimed that Michael received 724\\nshares of Company stock from Mannie through fraudulent transfers,2 that these shares\\nactually belonged to Mannie’s estate, and that Mannie died intestate. Because\\nMannie owned 100 shares of Company stock at his death, Holly and Christy claimed\\n824 shares of Company stock should have been distributed to them and Michael\\naccording to intestacy instead of unilaterally transferred to Michael.\\n\\n Based on these claims, Holly and Christy requested that the district court\\nrescind the allegedly-fraudulent transfers of the 724 shares of stock. They each\\nsought the sales proceeds from 274.67 shares of stock apiece, or one-third of the 824\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Holly and Christy allege that the 1999 transfer of 314 shares and the 2000\\ntransfer of 410 shares were fraudulent.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fshares they alleged Mannie owned at his death. In addition, they sought payment of\\nall dividends paid on those shares from 2004 until 2016, prejudgment interest,\\nrescission of the succession agreement, monetary damages for Michael’s breach of\\nfiduciary duty, attorney’s fees, and costs.\\n\\n Newland & Associates moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant\\nto Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Relyance Bank joined the motion. The parties agreed that\\nArkansas’s three-year statute of limitations facially barred Christy and Holly’s claims.\\n See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (implementing a three-year statute of limitations);\\nAlexander v. Flake, 322 Ark. 239, 241, 910 S.W.2d 190, 191 (1995) (applying § 16-\\n56-105 to fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims). Christy and Holly argued,\\nhowever, that Michael’s fraudulent concealment of his actions tolled the statute of\\nlimitations. The district court found that Christy and Holly could have brought their\\nclaims in 2004 based on information they possessed at that time. Instead, the sisters\\nwaited over a decade to file suit. Accordingly, the district court held that the\\nlimitations period was not tolled, and it granted the motion to dismiss. Holly and\\nChristy appeal.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo.\\nVarner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2004). If a defendant raises\\na statute of limitations defense and the face of the complaint indicates that the\\nlimitations period has expired, the plaintiff can only survive a 12(b)(6) motion to\\ndismiss by showing, by a preponderance, that the statute of limitations was tolled.\\nSee id.; see also Cherepski v. Walker, 323 Ark. 43, 50, 913 S.W.2d 761, 765 (1996).\\nUnder Arkansas law, to toll a limitations period because of fraudulent concealment,\\na plaintiff must show “(1) a positive act of fraud (2) that is actively concealed, and (3)\\nis not discoverable by reasonable diligence.” Bomar v. Moser, 369 Ark. 123, 132,\\n251 S.W.3d 234, 242 (2007).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f In Varner v. Peterson Farms, this Court applied Arkansas law and concluded\\nplaintiffs could not toll the statute of limitations when they suspected fraud before the\\nlimitations period expired but failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the\\nalleged fraud. 371 F.3d at 1017-18. The Varner panel stated,\\n\\n [W]e do not inquire as to when the plaintiffs should have discovered or\\n did discover the alleged fraudulent conduct. Instead, the question is\\n whether the plaintiffs used due diligence to discover the alleged fraud.\\n The burden is on the plaintiff to exercise due diligence to discover the\\n fraud if apprised of facts that should place the plaintiff on notice. The\\n beneficiaries’ ignorance of their rights does not prevent the operation of\\n the statute of limitations.\\n\\nId. (citations omitted); see also Alexander v. Flake, 322 Ark. 239, 242, 910 S.W.2d\\n190, 191 (1995).\\n\\n On appeal, Holly and Christy essentially rest on the factual allegations\\ncontained in their Amended Complaint and assert that these facts show the existence\\nof fraudulent concealment by Michael which would toll the running of the limitations\\nperiod. See Bomar, 369 Ark. at 132-33, 251 S.W.3d at 242-43 (holding that the\\nplaintiff showed possible fraudulent concealment and could toll the limitations period\\nwhen the defendants, his attorneys, told him that two corporations were their clients\\nwhen the corporations were actually the attorneys’ alter egos, and the only way the\\nplaintiff could have discovered the truth was by examining financial records he could\\nnot access). Appellees respond that Holly and Christy expressed concerns about\\nMichael’s conduct in 2004 but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in investigating\\nthose concerns. We agree with Appellees and the district court that Holly and Christy\\npossessed enough information in 2004 to put them on notice of Michael’s allegedly\\nfraudulent conduct.\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f Holly and Christy now assert that they were entitled to rely on Michael’s\\nrepresentations as the trustee and did not have to investigate further. However, the\\nexhibits attached to the Amended Complaint show that, in 2004, Holly and Christy\\nexpressed concerns about Michael’s activities with respect to the Company, its stock,\\nMannie’s Trust, and Michael’s dealings with Mannie. They asked Newland questions\\nabout the employment agreement, the value of the stock Mannie gave Michael, and\\nthe math behind the division of Mannie’s assets. Holly and Christy further expressed\\nto Newland that they felt Michael had a conflict of interest as both trustee and a\\nbeneficiary of the Trust. They indicated, however, that they did not want Michael to\\nknow about their questions “in order to avoid creating a fuss about something [they\\nmight] decide not to address once [they knew] the answer.” Am. Compl. 102, Dist.\\nCt. Dkt. 2.\\n\\n Further, within a month of Mannie’s death in 2004, Holly and Christy received\\na list of Trust assets and copies of both Mannie’s will and the Trust. Both the Trust\\nand Mannie’s will mentioned the employment agreement—which Holly and Christy\\ndid not request—and indicated that Michael was to receive all of Mannie’s stock.\\nThus, in 2004, at the latest, Holly and Christy knew about the employment agreement,\\nknew that Michael received all of Mannie’s stock, and expressed concerns about\\nMichael’s behavior as trustee of the Trust and his potential conflict of interest.\\n\\n Despite being expressly told in July 2004 that Newland was Mannie’s attorney,\\nnot theirs, Holly and Christy did not engage independent counsel and did not take any\\nlegal action until 2017—thirteen years after they were put on notice of possible\\nmisconduct and a decade after the statute of limitations expired. Based on these facts,\\nclearly delineated in the record, we find that Christy and Holly, had they exercised\\ndue diligence, could have discovered Michael’s alleged fraudulent misconduct in\\n2004. We agree with the district court that Holly and Christy’s tolling argument is\\nwithout merit and their claims are barred by the limitations.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4410309/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633056/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Paula Christy L. SCHMIDT; Holly Woprice Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Richard NEWLAND, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Trust, Amended and Restated February 19, 2016; John Doe, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased Defendants Newland & Associates PLLC, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Revocable Trust, Amended and Restated February 19, 2016; Relyance Bank N.A., as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2083\n ___________________________\n\n Paula Christy L. Schmidt; Holly Woprice\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\n\n v.\n\n Richard Newland, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Trust, Amended and\nRestated February 19, 2016; John Doe, as Personal Representative of the Estate of\n Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\n\n Newland & Associates PLLC, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Revocable\n Trust, Amended and Restated February 19, 2016; Relyance Bank N.A., as\n Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\n Filed: June 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\f Christy Schmidt and Holly Woprice filed an action in United States District\nCourt for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against Newland & Associates, PLLC,\ntrustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Revocable Trust, and Relyance Bank, N.A.,\npersonal representative of Michael Lasiter’s estate. The district court,1 sitting in\ndiversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, dismissed Christy and Holly’s claims as\nbarred by the applicable Arkansas statute of limitations. We have jurisdiction\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n Mannie Lasiter founded and was the chief operating officer of Lasiter\nConstruction, Inc. (formerly Lasiter Asphalt Maintenance Company) from the\nCompany’s incorporation in 1985 until 2000. While Mannie originally held all of the\n1,000 outstanding shares of stock in the Company, he transferred 176 of his shares\nto his son Michael between 1985 and 1992. Mannie’s 1999 Federal Gift Tax Return,\nsigned by the preparer on October 16, 2002, shows that Mannie gave Michael 314\nmore shares of the Company in 1999.\n\n On September 15, 2000, Mannie and Michael entered into a succession\nagreement that determined the fate of the Company once Mannie retired as COO.\nThe agreement laid out terms for Mannie’s continued employment with the Company;\nprovided for transfer of all Mannie’s stock to Michael through gifts, sale, and\ninheritance; and ensured Mannie would be released from liability on certain loans.\nOn October 19, 2000, pursuant to the succession agreement, Mannie and Michael\nsigned a stock purchase agreement by which Mannie agreed to sell Michael\n“controlling interest” in the Company for $50,000. Michael also agreed to purchase\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Billy Roy Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Arkansas.\n\n -2-\n\fthe remainder of Mannie’s Company stock when Mannie retired. That same day,\nMannie purportedly transferred 410 shares of Company stock to Michael.\n\n Mannie and Michael also signed an employment agreement, which guaranteed\nMannie employment with the Company until July 31, 2005 at a salary of $110,000\nannually. The employment agreement additionally guaranteed Mannie five further\nyears of employment at $65,000 annually. Mannie continued to work for the\nCompany until a few months before his death in 2004. His income tax returns for the\nrelevant period consistently show annual compensation from the Company that falls\nshort of the promised $110,000.\n\n On September 17, 2002, Mannie created the Mannie Lasiter Trust, for which\nhe served as trustee until his death. The Trust provided that, after Mannie’s death,\nall his stock in the Company would go to Michael. The remainder of Mannie’s estate\nwould be split between Michael, Mannie’s grandchildren, and Mannie’s daughters,\nChristy and Holly. Mannie also executed a will, which left his entire estate to the\nTrust and named Michael as trustee.\n\n Mannie died on June 28, 2004. On July 2, Mannie’s attorney, Richard\nNewland, met with Holly, Christy, and Michael for a reading of the will. Holly and\nChristy were provided with an abridged version of the Trust and a list of Trust\nproperty. Mannie’s will was never admitted to probate.\n\n On July 15, 2004, Holly emailed Newland requesting a copy of Mannie’s will\nand a complete copy of the Trust. Newland provided Christy and Holly with the\nrequested copies and told them that all legal fees for the estate would be paid from the\nTrust. Newland also informed Christy and Holly that he was Mannie’s attorney and\nthat it was his job to carry out Mannie’s wishes, but he assured them that he could\nanswer questions for them as long as those questions would not harm any other\nbeneficiary of the Trust. Christy and Holly responded by asking specific questions\n\n -3-\n\fabout the Trust, the employment agreement, and the will, and by expressing concern\nthat Michael had a conflict of interest by acting as trustee when he was a beneficiary\nof the Trust. Despite their concerns, Christy and Holly never hired independent\ncounsel or took any legal action.\n\n In February 2016, Michael transferred 824 shares of his Company stock to his\nown trust, the Michael Allen Lasiter Trust (the MALT). Michael died on May 31,\n2016, and the MALT contracted to convey away 750 shares of Company stock the\nnext month.\n\n Holly and Christy allege they discovered the employment agreement,\nsuccession agreement, and stock purchase agreement at some unspecified point after\nMichael’s death. In October 2017, they filed suit against Michael’s estate and the\nMALT. They later amended their Complaint, identifying the defendants as Newland\n& Associates, trustee of the MALT, and Relyance Bank, personal representative of\nMichael’s estate. Holly and Christy alleged Michael had breached his fiduciary duty\nas trustee of Mannie’s trust by misrepresenting trust assets and intentionally failing\nto disclose those assets to them. They further claimed that Michael received 724\nshares of Company stock from Mannie through fraudulent transfers,2 that these shares\nactually belonged to Mannie’s estate, and that Mannie died intestate. Because\nMannie owned 100 shares of Company stock at his death, Holly and Christy claimed\n824 shares of Company stock should have been distributed to them and Michael\naccording to intestacy instead of unilaterally transferred to Michael.\n\n Based on these claims, Holly and Christy requested that the district court\nrescind the allegedly-fraudulent transfers of the 724 shares of stock. They each\nsought the sales proceeds from 274.67 shares of stock apiece, or one-third of the 824\n\n\n 2\n Holly and Christy allege that the 1999 transfer of 314 shares and the 2000\ntransfer of 410 shares were fraudulent.\n\n -4-\n\fshares they alleged Mannie owned at his death. In addition, they sought payment of\nall dividends paid on those shares from 2004 until 2016, prejudgment interest,\nrescission of the succession agreement, monetary damages for Michael’s breach of\nfiduciary duty, attorney’s fees, and costs.\n\n Newland & Associates moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant\nto Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Relyance Bank joined the motion. The parties agreed that\nArkansas’s three-year statute of limitations facially barred Christy and Holly’s claims.\n See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (implementing a three-year statute of limitations);\nAlexander v. Flake, 322 Ark. 239, 241, 910 S.W.2d 190, 191 (1995) (applying § 16-\n56-105 to fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims). Christy and Holly argued,\nhowever, that Michael’s fraudulent concealment of his actions tolled the statute of\nlimitations. The district court found that Christy and Holly could have brought their\nclaims in 2004 based on information they possessed at that time. Instead, the sisters\nwaited over a decade to file suit. Accordingly, the district court held that the\nlimitations period was not tolled, and it granted the motion to dismiss. Holly and\nChristy appeal.\n\n II.\n\n We review a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo.\nVarner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2004). If a defendant raises\na statute of limitations defense and the face of the complaint indicates that the\nlimitations period has expired, the plaintiff can only survive a 12(b)(6) motion to\ndismiss by showing, by a preponderance, that the statute of limitations was tolled.\nSee id.; see also Cherepski v. Walker, 323 Ark. 43, 50, 913 S.W.2d 761, 765 (1996).\nUnder Arkansas law, to toll a limitations period because of fraudulent concealment,\na plaintiff must show “(1) a positive act of fraud (2) that is actively concealed, and (3)\nis not discoverable by reasonable diligence.” Bomar v. Moser, 369 Ark. 123, 132,\n251 S.W.3d 234, 242 (2007).\n\n -5-\n\f In Varner v. Peterson Farms, this Court applied Arkansas law and concluded\nplaintiffs could not toll the statute of limitations when they suspected fraud before the\nlimitations period expired but failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the\nalleged fraud. 371 F.3d at 1017-18. The Varner panel stated,\n\n [W]e do not inquire as to when the plaintiffs should have discovered or\n did discover the alleged fraudulent conduct. Instead, the question is\n whether the plaintiffs used due diligence to discover the alleged fraud.\n The burden is on the plaintiff to exercise due diligence to discover the\n fraud if apprised of facts that should place the plaintiff on notice. The\n beneficiaries’ ignorance of their rights does not prevent the operation of\n the statute of limitations.\n\nId. (citations omitted); see also Alexander v. Flake, 322 Ark. 239, 242, 910 S.W.2d\n190, 191 (1995).\n\n On appeal, Holly and Christy essentially rest on the factual allegations\ncontained in their Amended Complaint and assert that these facts show the existence\nof fraudulent concealment by Michael which would toll the running of the limitations\nperiod. See Bomar, 369 Ark. at 132-33, 251 S.W.3d at 242-43 (holding that the\nplaintiff showed possible fraudulent concealment and could toll the limitations period\nwhen the defendants, his attorneys, told him that two corporations were their clients\nwhen the corporations were actually the attorneys’ alter egos, and the only way the\nplaintiff could have discovered the truth was by examining financial records he could\nnot access). Appellees respond that Holly and Christy expressed concerns about\nMichael’s conduct in 2004 but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in investigating\nthose concerns. We agree with Appellees and the district court that Holly and Christy\npossessed enough information in 2004 to put them on notice of Michael’s allegedly\nfraudulent conduct.\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f Holly and Christy now assert that they were entitled to rely on Michael’s\nrepresentations as the trustee and did not have to investigate further. However, the\nexhibits attached to the Amended Complaint show that, in 2004, Holly and Christy\nexpressed concerns about Michael’s activities with respect to the Company, its stock,\nMannie’s Trust, and Michael’s dealings with Mannie. They asked Newland questions\nabout the employment agreement, the value of the stock Mannie gave Michael, and\nthe math behind the division of Mannie’s assets. Holly and Christy further expressed\nto Newland that they felt Michael had a conflict of interest as both trustee and a\nbeneficiary of the Trust. They indicated, however, that they did not want Michael to\nknow about their questions “in order to avoid creating a fuss about something [they\nmight] decide not to address once [they knew] the answer.” Am. Compl. 102, Dist.\nCt. Dkt. 2.\n\n Further, within a month of Mannie’s death in 2004, Holly and Christy received\na list of Trust assets and copies of both Mannie’s will and the Trust. Both the Trust\nand Mannie’s will mentioned the employment agreement—which Holly and Christy\ndid not request—and indicated that Michael was to receive all of Mannie’s stock.\nThus, in 2004, at the latest, Holly and Christy knew about the employment agreement,\nknew that Michael received all of Mannie’s stock, and expressed concerns about\nMichael’s behavior as trustee of the Trust and his potential conflict of interest.\n\n Despite being expressly told in July 2004 that Newland was Mannie’s attorney,\nnot theirs, Holly and Christy did not engage independent counsel and did not take any\nlegal action until 2017—thirteen years after they were put on notice of possible\nmisconduct and a decade after the statute of limitations expired. Based on these facts,\nclearly delineated in the record, we find that Christy and Holly, had they exercised\ndue diligence, could have discovered Michael’s alleged fraudulent misconduct in\n2004. We agree with the district court that Holly and Christy’s tolling argument is\nwithout merit and their claims are barred by the limitations.\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Paula Christy L. SCHMIDT; Holly Woprice Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Richard NEWLAND, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Trust, Amended and Restated February 19, 2016; John Doe, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased Defendants Newland & Associates PLLC, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Revocable Trust, Amended and Restated February 19, 2016; Relyance Bank N.A., as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2083\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Paula Christy L. Schmidt; Holly Woprice\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Richard Newland, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Trust, Amended and\\nRestated February 19, 2016; John Doe, as Personal Representative of the Estate of\\n Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n\\n Newland & Associates PLLC, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Revocable\\n Trust, Amended and Restated February 19, 2016; Relyance Bank N.A., as\\n Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\\n Filed: June 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f Christy Schmidt and Holly Woprice filed an action in United States District\\nCourt for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against Newland & Associates, PLLC,\\ntrustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Revocable Trust, and Relyance Bank, N.A.,\\npersonal representative of Michael Lasiter’s estate. The district court,1 sitting in\\ndiversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, dismissed Christy and Holly’s claims as\\nbarred by the applicable Arkansas statute of limitations. We have jurisdiction\\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Mannie Lasiter founded and was the chief operating officer of Lasiter\\nConstruction, Inc. (formerly Lasiter Asphalt Maintenance Company) from the\\nCompany’s incorporation in 1985 until 2000. While Mannie originally held all of the\\n1,000 outstanding shares of stock in the Company, he transferred 176 of his shares\\nto his son Michael between 1985 and 1992. Mannie’s 1999 Federal Gift Tax Return,\\nsigned by the preparer on October 16, 2002, shows that Mannie gave Michael 314\\nmore shares of the Company in 1999.\\n\\n On September 15, 2000, Mannie and Michael entered into a succession\\nagreement that determined the fate of the Company once Mannie retired as COO.\\nThe agreement laid out terms for Mannie’s continued employment with the Company;\\nprovided for transfer of all Mannie’s stock to Michael through gifts, sale, and\\ninheritance; and ensured Mannie would be released from liability on certain loans.\\nOn October 19, 2000, pursuant to the succession agreement, Mannie and Michael\\nsigned a stock purchase agreement by which Mannie agreed to sell Michael\\n“controlling interest” in the Company for $50,000. Michael also agreed to purchase\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Billy Roy Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthe remainder of Mannie’s Company stock when Mannie retired. That same day,\\nMannie purportedly transferred 410 shares of Company stock to Michael.\\n\\n Mannie and Michael also signed an employment agreement, which guaranteed\\nMannie employment with the Company until July 31, 2005 at a salary of $110,000\\nannually. The employment agreement additionally guaranteed Mannie five further\\nyears of employment at $65,000 annually. Mannie continued to work for the\\nCompany until a few months before his death in 2004. His income tax returns for the\\nrelevant period consistently show annual compensation from the Company that falls\\nshort of the promised $110,000.\\n\\n On September 17, 2002, Mannie created the Mannie Lasiter Trust, for which\\nhe served as trustee until his death. The Trust provided that, after Mannie’s death,\\nall his stock in the Company would go to Michael. The remainder of Mannie’s estate\\nwould be split between Michael, Mannie’s grandchildren, and Mannie’s daughters,\\nChristy and Holly. Mannie also executed a will, which left his entire estate to the\\nTrust and named Michael as trustee.\\n\\n Mannie died on June 28, 2004. On July 2, Mannie’s attorney, Richard\\nNewland, met with Holly, Christy, and Michael for a reading of the will. Holly and\\nChristy were provided with an abridged version of the Trust and a list of Trust\\nproperty. Mannie’s will was never admitted to probate.\\n\\n On July 15, 2004, Holly emailed Newland requesting a copy of Mannie’s will\\nand a complete copy of the Trust. Newland provided Christy and Holly with the\\nrequested copies and told them that all legal fees for the estate would be paid from the\\nTrust. Newland also informed Christy and Holly that he was Mannie’s attorney and\\nthat it was his job to carry out Mannie’s wishes, but he assured them that he could\\nanswer questions for them as long as those questions would not harm any other\\nbeneficiary of the Trust. Christy and Holly responded by asking specific questions\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fabout the Trust, the employment agreement, and the will, and by expressing concern\\nthat Michael had a conflict of interest by acting as trustee when he was a beneficiary\\nof the Trust. Despite their concerns, Christy and Holly never hired independent\\ncounsel or took any legal action.\\n\\n In February 2016, Michael transferred 824 shares of his Company stock to his\\nown trust, the Michael Allen Lasiter Trust (the MALT). Michael died on May 31,\\n2016, and the MALT contracted to convey away 750 shares of Company stock the\\nnext month.\\n\\n Holly and Christy allege they discovered the employment agreement,\\nsuccession agreement, and stock purchase agreement at some unspecified point after\\nMichael’s death. In October 2017, they filed suit against Michael’s estate and the\\nMALT. They later amended their Complaint, identifying the defendants as Newland\\n& Associates, trustee of the MALT, and Relyance Bank, personal representative of\\nMichael’s estate. Holly and Christy alleged Michael had breached his fiduciary duty\\nas trustee of Mannie’s trust by misrepresenting trust assets and intentionally failing\\nto disclose those assets to them. They further claimed that Michael received 724\\nshares of Company stock from Mannie through fraudulent transfers,2 that these shares\\nactually belonged to Mannie’s estate, and that Mannie died intestate. Because\\nMannie owned 100 shares of Company stock at his death, Holly and Christy claimed\\n824 shares of Company stock should have been distributed to them and Michael\\naccording to intestacy instead of unilaterally transferred to Michael.\\n\\n Based on these claims, Holly and Christy requested that the district court\\nrescind the allegedly-fraudulent transfers of the 724 shares of stock. They each\\nsought the sales proceeds from 274.67 shares of stock apiece, or one-third of the 824\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Holly and Christy allege that the 1999 transfer of 314 shares and the 2000\\ntransfer of 410 shares were fraudulent.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fshares they alleged Mannie owned at his death. In addition, they sought payment of\\nall dividends paid on those shares from 2004 until 2016, prejudgment interest,\\nrescission of the succession agreement, monetary damages for Michael’s breach of\\nfiduciary duty, attorney’s fees, and costs.\\n\\n Newland & Associates moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant\\nto Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Relyance Bank joined the motion. The parties agreed that\\nArkansas’s three-year statute of limitations facially barred Christy and Holly’s claims.\\n See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (implementing a three-year statute of limitations);\\nAlexander v. Flake, 322 Ark. 239, 241, 910 S.W.2d 190, 191 (1995) (applying § 16-\\n56-105 to fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims). Christy and Holly argued,\\nhowever, that Michael’s fraudulent concealment of his actions tolled the statute of\\nlimitations. The district court found that Christy and Holly could have brought their\\nclaims in 2004 based on information they possessed at that time. Instead, the sisters\\nwaited over a decade to file suit. Accordingly, the district court held that the\\nlimitations period was not tolled, and it granted the motion to dismiss. Holly and\\nChristy appeal.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo.\\nVarner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2004). If a defendant raises\\na statute of limitations defense and the face of the complaint indicates that the\\nlimitations period has expired, the plaintiff can only survive a 12(b)(6) motion to\\ndismiss by showing, by a preponderance, that the statute of limitations was tolled.\\nSee id.; see also Cherepski v. Walker, 323 Ark. 43, 50, 913 S.W.2d 761, 765 (1996).\\nUnder Arkansas law, to toll a limitations period because of fraudulent concealment,\\na plaintiff must show “(1) a positive act of fraud (2) that is actively concealed, and (3)\\nis not discoverable by reasonable diligence.” Bomar v. Moser, 369 Ark. 123, 132,\\n251 S.W.3d 234, 242 (2007).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f In Varner v. Peterson Farms, this Court applied Arkansas law and concluded\\nplaintiffs could not toll the statute of limitations when they suspected fraud before the\\nlimitations period expired but failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the\\nalleged fraud. 371 F.3d at 1017-18. The Varner panel stated,\\n\\n [W]e do not inquire as to when the plaintiffs should have discovered or\\n did discover the alleged fraudulent conduct. Instead, the question is\\n whether the plaintiffs used due diligence to discover the alleged fraud.\\n The burden is on the plaintiff to exercise due diligence to discover the\\n fraud if apprised of facts that should place the plaintiff on notice. The\\n beneficiaries’ ignorance of their rights does not prevent the operation of\\n the statute of limitations.\\n\\nId. (citations omitted); see also Alexander v. Flake, 322 Ark. 239, 242, 910 S.W.2d\\n190, 191 (1995).\\n\\n On appeal, Holly and Christy essentially rest on the factual allegations\\ncontained in their Amended Complaint and assert that these facts show the existence\\nof fraudulent concealment by Michael which would toll the running of the limitations\\nperiod. See Bomar, 369 Ark. at 132-33, 251 S.W.3d at 242-43 (holding that the\\nplaintiff showed possible fraudulent concealment and could toll the limitations period\\nwhen the defendants, his attorneys, told him that two corporations were their clients\\nwhen the corporations were actually the attorneys’ alter egos, and the only way the\\nplaintiff could have discovered the truth was by examining financial records he could\\nnot access). Appellees respond that Holly and Christy expressed concerns about\\nMichael’s conduct in 2004 but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in investigating\\nthose concerns. We agree with Appellees and the district court that Holly and Christy\\npossessed enough information in 2004 to put them on notice of Michael’s allegedly\\nfraudulent conduct.\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f Holly and Christy now assert that they were entitled to rely on Michael’s\\nrepresentations as the trustee and did not have to investigate further. However, the\\nexhibits attached to the Amended Complaint show that, in 2004, Holly and Christy\\nexpressed concerns about Michael’s activities with respect to the Company, its stock,\\nMannie’s Trust, and Michael’s dealings with Mannie. They asked Newland questions\\nabout the employment agreement, the value of the stock Mannie gave Michael, and\\nthe math behind the division of Mannie’s assets. Holly and Christy further expressed\\nto Newland that they felt Michael had a conflict of interest as both trustee and a\\nbeneficiary of the Trust. They indicated, however, that they did not want Michael to\\nknow about their questions “in order to avoid creating a fuss about something [they\\nmight] decide not to address once [they knew] the answer.” Am. Compl. 102, Dist.\\nCt. Dkt. 2.\\n\\n Further, within a month of Mannie’s death in 2004, Holly and Christy received\\na list of Trust assets and copies of both Mannie’s will and the Trust. Both the Trust\\nand Mannie’s will mentioned the employment agreement—which Holly and Christy\\ndid not request—and indicated that Michael was to receive all of Mannie’s stock.\\nThus, in 2004, at the latest, Holly and Christy knew about the employment agreement,\\nknew that Michael received all of Mannie’s stock, and expressed concerns about\\nMichael’s behavior as trustee of the Trust and his potential conflict of interest.\\n\\n Despite being expressly told in July 2004 that Newland was Mannie’s attorney,\\nnot theirs, Holly and Christy did not engage independent counsel and did not take any\\nlegal action until 2017—thirteen years after they were put on notice of possible\\nmisconduct and a decade after the statute of limitations expired. Based on these facts,\\nclearly delineated in the record, we find that Christy and Holly, had they exercised\\ndue diligence, could have discovered Michael’s alleged fraudulent misconduct in\\n2004. We agree with the district court that Holly and Christy’s tolling argument is\\nwithout merit and their claims are barred by the limitations.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2694,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4633557,"string":"4,633,557"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dominic L. SMITH Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Dominic Smith"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-27"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3760"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Grasz, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3760\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Dominic L. Smith\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Western Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 14, 2019\\n Filed: June 27, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Dominic L. Smith appeals the sentence imposed after his guilty plea to one\\ncount of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).\\nHe argues the district court1 erred in calculating his Guidelines range. We affirm.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\\n\\f At sentencing, the district court calculated Smith’s base offense level at 26\\nbecause he had at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a\\ncontrolled substance offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.” or\\n“Guidelines”) § 2K2.1(a)(1). Smith had a criminal history of VI, and other\\nadjustments led to a final offense level of 29, which resulted in a recommended range\\nof 151 to 188 months of imprisonment. The statute, however, restricted Smith’s\\nactual Guidelines range to a maximum of 120 months. The district court imposed the\\nstatutory maximum.\\n\\n Smith concedes he has a conviction for a controlled substance offense but\\nargues for the first time on appeal that his prior conviction for Arkansas aggravated\\nrobbery does not qualify as a crime of violence. Although we generally review the\\ninterpretation of the Guidelines de novo, United States v. Watson, 650 F.3d 1084,\\n1091 (8th Cir. 2011), we review issues raised for the first time on appeal for plain\\nerror, United States v. Thomas, 790 F.3d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 2015). In order to prevail,\\nSmith must show “(1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error\\naffected his substantial rights.” Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910,\\n916 (8th Cir. 2009)).\\n\\n We have previously held Arkansas robbery is not a violent felony under the\\nArmed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 642\\n(8th Cir. 2016). The ACCA defines violent felonies to include any felony that “has\\nas an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the\\nperson of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (referred to as the “elements clause”\\nor the “force clause”). In Eason, we observed that Arkansas robbery requires less\\nforce than the violent force required by the elements clause, 829 F.3d at 642, and the\\nsame definition applies to a ‘crime of violence’ under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G.\\n§ 4B1.2(a)(1); see also United States v. Furqueron, 605 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir.\\n2010). Our opinion in Eason relied on applying the standard for violent force thought\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto be required by Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010), to the\\nelements clause of the ACCA. 829 F.3d at 640–41.\\n\\n Recently, though, the Supreme Court, also considering the ACCA, has\\nconcluded the force required in the elements clause is the same as the force in generic\\nrobbery in the enumerated offenses clause. See Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct.\\n544, 551 (2019). Thus, after Stokeling, for purposes of robbery we treat the level of\\nforce as the same under both the elements clause and the enumerated offense.\\n\\n Plainly stated, Stokeling abrogated our force analysis in Eason. Stokeling\\nelucidated Curtis Johnson by clarifying that the elements clause only requires that\\n“[s]ufficient force must be used to overcome resistance . . . however slight the\\nresistance.” See Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting W. Clark & W. Marshall, Law\\nof Crimes 553 (H. Lazell ed., 2d ed. 1905)). The Court noted the force in the\\nelements clause is derived from the definition of common law robbery. See id. The\\nkey distinction in determining whether a state robbery statute meets this definition of\\nforce is whether the “statute requires ‘resistance by the victim that is overcome by the\\nphysical force of the offender’” or encompasses “[m]ere ‘snatching of property from\\nanother.’” Id. at 555 (quoting Robinson v. State, 692 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997)).\\n\\n This court’s recent decision in United States v. Swopes reached a similar\\nconclusion on the definition of force. 886 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc).\\n We found a Missouri robbery statute satisfied the elements clause because the statute\\nrequired sufficient force to overcome a victim’s resistance. Id. at 671. We observed\\nthat Missouri courts allowed a conviction where “there was a ‘[t]ussle’ between the\\ndefendant and the victim,” id. at 672 (quoting State v. Childs, 257 S.W.3d 655, 660\\n(Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (alteration in original)), but overturned a conviction “where the\\ndefendant merely ‘grabbed the [victim’s] purse by its strap, took it from her shoulder\\nand ran off,’” id. (quoting State v. Tivis, 884 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)).\\nWe also applied this definition from both Swopes and Stokeling in another recent\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fdecision reviewing a Minnesota robbery statute. See Taylor v. United States, No.\\n17-1760, 2019 WL 2407746, at *2 (8th Cir. June 7, 2019).\\n\\n Here, we conclude Arkansas robbery also requires the same level of force as\\nthis understanding of common law robbery. In determining whether an offense is a\\ncrime of violence, “we apply a categorical approach, looking to the elements of the\\noffense to determine whether the conviction constitutes a crime of violence.”\\nFurqueron, 605 F.3d at 614. We consider “both the text of the statute and how the\\nstate courts have applied the statute.” Swopes, 886 F.3d at 671.\\n\\n In relevant part, the Arkansas robbery statute provides that “[a] person commits\\nrobbery if . . . the person employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force\\nupon another person.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102. The Arkansas Supreme Court\\nhas explained that the adoption of a criminal code in 1975 changed Arkansas’s\\nrobbery statute from emphasizing “the taking of property to ‘the threat of physical\\nharm to the victim.’” McElyea v. State, 200 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Ark. 2005) (quoting\\nJarrett v. State, 580 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Ark. 1979)). It has found “jerking the door\\nfrom [a victim], cornering her in the back hallway and grabbing her dress” constitutes\\nsufficient force for robbery because that conduct overcame resistance. Fairchild v.\\nState, 600 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Ark. 1980). In contrast, the Arkansas Supreme Court has\\nstated “the mere snatching of money or goods from the hand of another is not\\nrobbery, unless some injury is done to the person or there be some struggle for\\npossession of the property prior to the actual taking or some force used in order to\\ntake it.” Parker v. State, 529 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Ark. 1975).\\n\\n From these decisions, we understand that Arkansas robbery requires sufficient\\nforce to overcome a victim’s resistance and does not criminalize mere snatching of\\nproperty. Arkansas robbery, then, satisfies both the elements clause and generic\\nrobbery in the enumerated offenses clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f As a result, we conclude both Arkansas robbery and Arkansas aggravated\\nrobbery are crimes of violence. An offense is a crime of violence if its lesser included\\noffense is a crime of violence. See United States v. Douglas, No. 11CR324, 2017 WL\\n4737243, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2017). Under Arkansas law, “[r]obbery is a lesser-\\nincluded offense of aggravated robbery.” Brown v. State, 60 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Ark.\\n2001). It follows that because Arkansas robbery is a crime of violence, Arkansas\\naggravated robbery is also a crime of violence. Thus, we hold the district court\\nproperly categorized Smith’s prior conviction for Arkansas aggravated robbery as a\\ncrime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1).\\n\\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4410810/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633557/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dominic L. SMITH Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3760\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Dominic L. Smith\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Western Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 14, 2019\n Filed: June 27, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Dominic L. Smith appeals the sentence imposed after his guilty plea to one\ncount of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).\nHe argues the district court1 erred in calculating his Guidelines range. We affirm.\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\n\f At sentencing, the district court calculated Smith’s base offense level at 26\nbecause he had at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a\ncontrolled substance offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.” or\n“Guidelines”) § 2K2.1(a)(1). Smith had a criminal history of VI, and other\nadjustments led to a final offense level of 29, which resulted in a recommended range\nof 151 to 188 months of imprisonment. The statute, however, restricted Smith’s\nactual Guidelines range to a maximum of 120 months. The district court imposed the\nstatutory maximum.\n\n Smith concedes he has a conviction for a controlled substance offense but\nargues for the first time on appeal that his prior conviction for Arkansas aggravated\nrobbery does not qualify as a crime of violence. Although we generally review the\ninterpretation of the Guidelines de novo, United States v. Watson, 650 F.3d 1084,\n1091 (8th Cir. 2011), we review issues raised for the first time on appeal for plain\nerror, United States v. Thomas, 790 F.3d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 2015). In order to prevail,\nSmith must show “(1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error\naffected his substantial rights.” Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910,\n916 (8th Cir. 2009)).\n\n We have previously held Arkansas robbery is not a violent felony under the\nArmed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 642\n(8th Cir. 2016). The ACCA defines violent felonies to include any felony that “has\nas an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the\nperson of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (referred to as the “elements clause”\nor the “force clause”). In Eason, we observed that Arkansas robbery requires less\nforce than the violent force required by the elements clause, 829 F.3d at 642, and the\nsame definition applies to a ‘crime of violence’ under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G.\n§ 4B1.2(a)(1); see also United States v. Furqueron, 605 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir.\n2010). Our opinion in Eason relied on applying the standard for violent force thought\n\n\n\n -2-\n\fto be required by Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010), to the\nelements clause of the ACCA. 829 F.3d at 640–41.\n\n Recently, though, the Supreme Court, also considering the ACCA, has\nconcluded the force required in the elements clause is the same as the force in generic\nrobbery in the enumerated offenses clause. See Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct.\n544, 551 (2019). Thus, after Stokeling, for purposes of robbery we treat the level of\nforce as the same under both the elements clause and the enumerated offense.\n\n Plainly stated, Stokeling abrogated our force analysis in Eason. Stokeling\nelucidated Curtis Johnson by clarifying that the elements clause only requires that\n“[s]ufficient force must be used to overcome resistance . . . however slight the\nresistance.” See Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting W. Clark & W. Marshall, Law\nof Crimes 553 (H. Lazell ed., 2d ed. 1905)). The Court noted the force in the\nelements clause is derived from the definition of common law robbery. See id. The\nkey distinction in determining whether a state robbery statute meets this definition of\nforce is whether the “statute requires ‘resistance by the victim that is overcome by the\nphysical force of the offender’” or encompasses “[m]ere ‘snatching of property from\nanother.’” Id. at 555 (quoting Robinson v. State, 692 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997)).\n\n This court’s recent decision in United States v. Swopes reached a similar\nconclusion on the definition of force. 886 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc).\n We found a Missouri robbery statute satisfied the elements clause because the statute\nrequired sufficient force to overcome a victim’s resistance. Id. at 671. We observed\nthat Missouri courts allowed a conviction where “there was a ‘[t]ussle’ between the\ndefendant and the victim,” id. at 672 (quoting State v. Childs, 257 S.W.3d 655, 660\n(Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (alteration in original)), but overturned a conviction “where the\ndefendant merely ‘grabbed the [victim’s] purse by its strap, took it from her shoulder\nand ran off,’” id. (quoting State v. Tivis, 884 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)).\nWe also applied this definition from both Swopes and Stokeling in another recent\n\n -3-\n\fdecision reviewing a Minnesota robbery statute. See Taylor v. United States, No.\n17-1760, 2019 WL 2407746, at *2 (8th Cir. June 7, 2019).\n\n Here, we conclude Arkansas robbery also requires the same level of force as\nthis understanding of common law robbery. In determining whether an offense is a\ncrime of violence, “we apply a categorical approach, looking to the elements of the\noffense to determine whether the conviction constitutes a crime of violence.”\nFurqueron, 605 F.3d at 614. We consider “both the text of the statute and how the\nstate courts have applied the statute.” Swopes, 886 F.3d at 671.\n\n In relevant part, the Arkansas robbery statute provides that “[a] person commits\nrobbery if . . . the person employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force\nupon another person.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102. The Arkansas Supreme Court\nhas explained that the adoption of a criminal code in 1975 changed Arkansas’s\nrobbery statute from emphasizing “the taking of property to ‘the threat of physical\nharm to the victim.’” McElyea v. State, 200 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Ark. 2005) (quoting\nJarrett v. State, 580 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Ark. 1979)). It has found “jerking the door\nfrom [a victim], cornering her in the back hallway and grabbing her dress” constitutes\nsufficient force for robbery because that conduct overcame resistance. Fairchild v.\nState, 600 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Ark. 1980). In contrast, the Arkansas Supreme Court has\nstated “the mere snatching of money or goods from the hand of another is not\nrobbery, unless some injury is done to the person or there be some struggle for\npossession of the property prior to the actual taking or some force used in order to\ntake it.” Parker v. State, 529 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Ark. 1975).\n\n From these decisions, we understand that Arkansas robbery requires sufficient\nforce to overcome a victim’s resistance and does not criminalize mere snatching of\nproperty. Arkansas robbery, then, satisfies both the elements clause and generic\nrobbery in the enumerated offenses clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.\n\n\n\n -4-\n\f As a result, we conclude both Arkansas robbery and Arkansas aggravated\nrobbery are crimes of violence. An offense is a crime of violence if its lesser included\noffense is a crime of violence. See United States v. Douglas, No. 11CR324, 2017 WL\n4737243, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2017). Under Arkansas law, “[r]obbery is a lesser-\nincluded offense of aggravated robbery.” Brown v. State, 60 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Ark.\n2001). It follows that because Arkansas robbery is a crime of violence, Arkansas\naggravated robbery is also a crime of violence. Thus, we hold the district court\nproperly categorized Smith’s prior conviction for Arkansas aggravated robbery as a\ncrime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1).\n\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dominic L. SMITH Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3760\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Dominic L. Smith\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Western Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 14, 2019\\n Filed: June 27, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Dominic L. Smith appeals the sentence imposed after his guilty plea to one\\ncount of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).\\nHe argues the district court1 erred in calculating his Guidelines range. We affirm.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\\n\\f At sentencing, the district court calculated Smith’s base offense level at 26\\nbecause he had at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a\\ncontrolled substance offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.” or\\n“Guidelines”) § 2K2.1(a)(1). Smith had a criminal history of VI, and other\\nadjustments led to a final offense level of 29, which resulted in a recommended range\\nof 151 to 188 months of imprisonment. The statute, however, restricted Smith’s\\nactual Guidelines range to a maximum of 120 months. The district court imposed the\\nstatutory maximum.\\n\\n Smith concedes he has a conviction for a controlled substance offense but\\nargues for the first time on appeal that his prior conviction for Arkansas aggravated\\nrobbery does not qualify as a crime of violence. Although we generally review the\\ninterpretation of the Guidelines de novo, United States v. Watson, 650 F.3d 1084,\\n1091 (8th Cir. 2011), we review issues raised for the first time on appeal for plain\\nerror, United States v. Thomas, 790 F.3d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 2015). In order to prevail,\\nSmith must show “(1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error\\naffected his substantial rights.” Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910,\\n916 (8th Cir. 2009)).\\n\\n We have previously held Arkansas robbery is not a violent felony under the\\nArmed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 642\\n(8th Cir. 2016). The ACCA defines violent felonies to include any felony that “has\\nas an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the\\nperson of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (referred to as the “elements clause”\\nor the “force clause”). In Eason, we observed that Arkansas robbery requires less\\nforce than the violent force required by the elements clause, 829 F.3d at 642, and the\\nsame definition applies to a ‘crime of violence’ under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G.\\n§ 4B1.2(a)(1); see also United States v. Furqueron, 605 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir.\\n2010). Our opinion in Eason relied on applying the standard for violent force thought\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto be required by Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010), to the\\nelements clause of the ACCA. 829 F.3d at 640–41.\\n\\n Recently, though, the Supreme Court, also considering the ACCA, has\\nconcluded the force required in the elements clause is the same as the force in generic\\nrobbery in the enumerated offenses clause. See Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct.\\n544, 551 (2019). Thus, after Stokeling, for purposes of robbery we treat the level of\\nforce as the same under both the elements clause and the enumerated offense.\\n\\n Plainly stated, Stokeling abrogated our force analysis in Eason. Stokeling\\nelucidated Curtis Johnson by clarifying that the elements clause only requires that\\n“[s]ufficient force must be used to overcome resistance . . . however slight the\\nresistance.” See Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting W. Clark & W. Marshall, Law\\nof Crimes 553 (H. Lazell ed., 2d ed. 1905)). The Court noted the force in the\\nelements clause is derived from the definition of common law robbery. See id. The\\nkey distinction in determining whether a state robbery statute meets this definition of\\nforce is whether the “statute requires ‘resistance by the victim that is overcome by the\\nphysical force of the offender’” or encompasses “[m]ere ‘snatching of property from\\nanother.’” Id. at 555 (quoting Robinson v. State, 692 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997)).\\n\\n This court’s recent decision in United States v. Swopes reached a similar\\nconclusion on the definition of force. 886 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc).\\n We found a Missouri robbery statute satisfied the elements clause because the statute\\nrequired sufficient force to overcome a victim’s resistance. Id. at 671. We observed\\nthat Missouri courts allowed a conviction where “there was a ‘[t]ussle’ between the\\ndefendant and the victim,” id. at 672 (quoting State v. Childs, 257 S.W.3d 655, 660\\n(Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (alteration in original)), but overturned a conviction “where the\\ndefendant merely ‘grabbed the [victim’s] purse by its strap, took it from her shoulder\\nand ran off,’” id. (quoting State v. Tivis, 884 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)).\\nWe also applied this definition from both Swopes and Stokeling in another recent\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fdecision reviewing a Minnesota robbery statute. See Taylor v. United States, No.\\n17-1760, 2019 WL 2407746, at *2 (8th Cir. June 7, 2019).\\n\\n Here, we conclude Arkansas robbery also requires the same level of force as\\nthis understanding of common law robbery. In determining whether an offense is a\\ncrime of violence, “we apply a categorical approach, looking to the elements of the\\noffense to determine whether the conviction constitutes a crime of violence.”\\nFurqueron, 605 F.3d at 614. We consider “both the text of the statute and how the\\nstate courts have applied the statute.” Swopes, 886 F.3d at 671.\\n\\n In relevant part, the Arkansas robbery statute provides that “[a] person commits\\nrobbery if . . . the person employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force\\nupon another person.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102. The Arkansas Supreme Court\\nhas explained that the adoption of a criminal code in 1975 changed Arkansas’s\\nrobbery statute from emphasizing “the taking of property to ‘the threat of physical\\nharm to the victim.’” McElyea v. State, 200 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Ark. 2005) (quoting\\nJarrett v. State, 580 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Ark. 1979)). It has found “jerking the door\\nfrom [a victim], cornering her in the back hallway and grabbing her dress” constitutes\\nsufficient force for robbery because that conduct overcame resistance. Fairchild v.\\nState, 600 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Ark. 1980). In contrast, the Arkansas Supreme Court has\\nstated “the mere snatching of money or goods from the hand of another is not\\nrobbery, unless some injury is done to the person or there be some struggle for\\npossession of the property prior to the actual taking or some force used in order to\\ntake it.” Parker v. State, 529 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Ark. 1975).\\n\\n From these decisions, we understand that Arkansas robbery requires sufficient\\nforce to overcome a victim’s resistance and does not criminalize mere snatching of\\nproperty. Arkansas robbery, then, satisfies both the elements clause and generic\\nrobbery in the enumerated offenses clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f As a result, we conclude both Arkansas robbery and Arkansas aggravated\\nrobbery are crimes of violence. An offense is a crime of violence if its lesser included\\noffense is a crime of violence. See United States v. Douglas, No. 11CR324, 2017 WL\\n4737243, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2017). Under Arkansas law, “[r]obbery is a lesser-\\nincluded offense of aggravated robbery.” Brown v. State, 60 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Ark.\\n2001). It follows that because Arkansas robbery is a crime of violence, Arkansas\\naggravated robbery is also a crime of violence. Thus, we hold the district court\\nproperly categorized Smith’s prior conviction for Arkansas aggravated robbery as a\\ncrime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1).\\n\\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2695,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4633559,"string":"4,633,559"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Jose Luis MENDEZ-GOMEZ, Also Known as Julio Cesar Estrada-Escobar, Also Known as Jose Aul Torres-Santiago, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Jose Luis Mendez-Gomez v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-27"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2109"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Arnold, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2109\\n ___________________________\\n\\nJose Luis Mendez-Gomez, also known as Julio Cesar Estrada-Escobar, also known\\n as Jose Aul Torres-Santiago\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\\n\\n v.\\n\\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\\n ____________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 13, 2019\\n Filed: June 27, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jose Luis Mendez-Gomez, a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of (1)\\nthe Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) reinstatement of a prior order for his\\nremoval, and (2) a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that affirmed an\\nimmigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for withholding of removal and\\n\\fdeferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in withholding-only\\nproceedings.1 Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny the petition.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Mendez-Gomez, a Guatemalan citizen, unlawfully entered the United States\\nin December 2002. In August 2003, after Mendez-Gomez was convicted of making\\na false claim of United States citizenship in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911, an IJ issued\\na final order of removal. Mendez-Gomez was removed from the United States. He\\nreentered the United States in late 2003, using a fraudulent lawful permanent resident\\ncard, or “green card,” to obtain entry through a checkpoint just inside the United\\nStates-Mexico border.\\n\\n In July 2017, an Otter Tail County, Minnesota police deputy stopped Mendez-\\nGomez’s vehicle for an equipment violation. When Mendez-Gomez produced only\\na Guatemalan passport as identification, the deputy requested immigration assistance.\\nA Border Patrol agent telephoned the deputy and spoke to Mendez-Gomez, who\\nadmitted that he had entered the United States roughly 16 years prior and had no\\ndocuments allowing him to legally remain in the country. Mendez-Gomez claimed\\nhe had never been arrested by immigration officials before, but he presented no\\ndocumentation allowing him to enter or remain in the United States and was taken\\ninto immigration custody.\\n\\n Upon entering Mendez-Gomez into the immigration database, Border Patrol\\nagents discovered his prior order of removal. Mendez-Gomez then made a\\nconclusory statement about legally entering the United States, refused to answer any\\n\\n 1\\n Withholding-only proceedings are “limited to a determination of whether the\\nalien is eligible for withholding or deferral of removal. During such proceedings, all\\nparties are prohibited from raising or considering any other issues, including but not\\nlimited to issues of admissibility [and] deportability . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(c)(3)(i).\\n -2-\\n\\fmore questions or sign any immigration documents, and requested to speak with his\\nattorney. Subsequently, DHS filed a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate regarding\\nMendez-Gomez’s prior removal order. Mendez-Gomez checked a box on that form\\nindicating he wished to make a statement contesting the reinstatement, but there is\\nnothing in the administrative record showing that he did so.\\n\\n After Mendez-Gomez indicated that he feared return to Guatemala, the United\\nStates Citizenship and Immigration Services conducted a reasonable fear hearing. At\\nthis hearing, Mendez-Gomez testified that, in 2001, he borrowed money from a loan\\nshark named Don Lucho to pay for his mother’s lung surgery. Mendez-Gomez has\\nnot repaid the loan. Although he has never been attacked because of the unpaid debt,\\nhe testified that two armed men appeared at a soccer game in the summer of 2001 and\\nasked whether members of his family were in attendance and that the men were\\nlooking for him because he had not repaid the loan. Mendez-Gomez believes that the\\nmen would have tortured or killed him for failing to pay the money back. He further\\nbelieves that three of his cousins were murdered for being with him at the soccer field\\nthat day. Mendez-Gomez’s father and other family members in Guatemala received\\ntelephone calls as late as 2016 threatening Mendez-Gomez’s life due to the unpaid\\nloan. Mendez-Gomez has never reported any of these incidents to the police because\\nhe is afraid they may be corrupt or subject to bribes.\\n\\n The asylum officer denied Mendez-Gomez’s reasonable fear application. An\\nIJ then vacated the asylum officer’s determination and placed Mendez-Gomez into\\nwithholding-only proceedings for review of his applications for withholding of\\nremoval and CAT review. The IJ ultimately denied Mendez-Gomez’s applications.\\nThe BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, finding that Mendez-Gomez failed to present any\\nargument that he had been improperly placed in reinstatement proceedings, failed to\\npresent meaningful argument on his CAT claim, and failed to show the Guatemalan\\ngovernment was unable or unwilling to protect him. Mendez-Gomez now petitions\\nthis Court for review of the BIA’s decision.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f II.\\n\\n We first address Mendez-Gomez’s claim that DHS violated his due process\\nrights by improperly reinstating his prior removal order. “For some time, the law has\\nprovided that an order for removing an alien present unlawfully may be reinstated if\\nhe leaves and unlawfully enters again.” Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30,\\n33 (2006). In a challenge to reinstatement of a prior final order of removal, our\\njurisdiction is limited to the reinstatement itself and we may not reopen or review the\\nprior order. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).\\n\\n “We consistently have required issue exhaustion in post-[Illegal Immigration\\nReform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996] immigration cases, and referred\\nto the rule as ‘jurisdictional’ . . . .” Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 583 (8th\\nCir. 2005). Thus, failure to raise an issue before the administrative agency precludes\\na petitioner from raising it on appeal. See Escoto-Castillo v. Napolitano, 658 F.3d\\n864, 866 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We have repeatedly held that failure to exhaust\\nadministrative immigration remedies precludes merits review of the unexhausted\\nissue.”).\\n\\n Mendez-Gomez argues that DHS violated his due process rights by reinstating\\nthe prior order of removal against him when he lawfully reentered the United States.\\nSee 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (allowing reinstatement of a prior order of removal when\\nan alien reenters the United States illegally). He contends that his reentry was lawful\\nbecause a border agent at a second checkpoint 20 to 60 miles within the United States\\nwaved him through. However, Mendez-Gomez told immigration officials over the\\ntelephone at his initial detention that he was unlawfully present in the United States,\\nadmitted that he reentered the United States within four months of being deported,\\nand never effectively contested the unlawful nature of his reentry during the\\nreinstatement process.\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Furthermore, all the evidence Mendez-Gomez now relies on was not submitted\\nuntil he entered withholding-only proceedings before the IJ. Withholding-only\\nproceedings solely review an alien’s applications for protection; they do not address\\nwhether DHS properly reinstated a prior removal order. See 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.2(c)(3)(i). The decision to reinstate a prior removal order lies with DHS, and\\nMendez-Gomez failed to raise this issue to DHS before the agency reinstated his prior\\nremoval order. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the reinstatement of the prior\\nremoval order, as the issue was not exhausted. See Escoto-Castillo, 658 F.3d at 866.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Mendez-Gomez also contends that DHS violated his due process rights by\\ncontinuing to interrogate him without his attorney present after he requested an\\nattorney. “[T]o succeed on a due process claim, an alien must prove that he was\\nactually prejudiced by the lack of process afforded to him.” Briones-Sanchez v.\\nHeinauer, 319 F.3d 324, 327 (8th Cir. 2003). To show actual prejudice in a\\nreinstatement proceeding, he must show that, but for the alleged due process\\nviolation, the government “would not have reinstated his removal order.” Id.\\n\\n The only issues in a reinstatement proceeding are “the alien’s identity, the\\nexistence of a prior removal order, and whether the alien has unlawfully reentered.”\\nOchoa-Carrillo v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvarez-\\nPortillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2002)). Because Mendez-Gomez\\nconcedes his identity and the existence of the prior removal order, he must show he\\nlawfully reentered the United States to show prejudice. However, Mendez-Gomez\\ncannot do so as a matter of law because he did not have the Attorney General’s\\nconsent to reenter the United States within ten years of his removal, as required by\\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)-(iii). Because “the presence of an attorney . . . would\\n[not] have changed [Mendez-Gomez]’s status as an alien who illegally reentered the\\nUnited States following the entry of a removal order against him[,]” see Gomez-\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fOlvera v. Napolitano, 451 F. App’x 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), we\\nconclude that he has failed to show prejudice and cannot succeed on his due process\\nclaim.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Mendez-Gomez further argues that, even if DHS properly reinstated the prior\\norder of removal, the IJ and the BIA improperly determined he was ineligible for\\nwithholding of removal or protection under CAT.2 We review denial of an\\napplication for withholding of removal or CAT protection under “the deferential\\nsubstantial evidence standard.” Osonowo v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir.\\n2008). “Only the BIA order is subject to our review, including the IJ’s findings and\\nreasoning to the extent they were expressly adopted by the BIA.” Fofanah v.\\nGonzales, 447 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2006). We may only grant relief if the\\nevidence in the record is “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to\\nfind in favor of the petitioner.” Bernal-Rendon v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 877, 880 (8th\\nCir. 2005).\\n\\n To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must show a “clear\\nprobability,” see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984), that his “life or freedom\\nwould be threatened in [the potential country of removal] because of [his] race,\\nreligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”\\n8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Similarly, an applicant for CAT protection must show that\\n“it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed\\ncountry of removal.” Mervil v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1108, 1110 (8th Cir. 2018). If the\\n\\n 2\\n While reinstatement of a prior order of removal prevents an alien from seeking\\n“relief,” such as asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), withholding of removal and\\nprotection under CAT are considered “protection,” not relief, and are thus not barred.\\nSee Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478,\\n8485 (Feb. 19, 1999) (background information to interim rule).\\n -6-\\n\\fapplicant fears such harm from private actors, he must show that the government of\\nthe proposed country of removal is “unable or unwilling to control” those actors. De\\nCastro-Gutierrez v. Holder, 713 F.3d 375, 380 (8th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n In order to qualify for withholding of removal, therefore, Mendez-Gomez must\\nshow that the Guatemalan government would be “unable or unwilling” to protect him\\nfrom Don Lucho. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). However, the IJ found that Mendez-Gomez\\nfailed to make this showing, and Mendez-Gomez did not challenge that finding\\nbefore the BIA. Mendez-Gomez thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies\\nwith respect to this issue. See Ateka v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2004)\\n(“If a petitioner fails to raise a particular issue when he appeals to the Board and has\\nnot presented the Board with the need or opportunity to address that issue, the\\npetitioner has not exhausted administrative remedies with respect to it.”).\\n\\n Similarly, Mendez-Gomez failed to offer any meaningful argument to the BIA\\nregarding his CAT claim. See Matter of R-A-M, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA\\n2012) (holding that a claim is waived if the alien fails to raise it before the BIA).\\nMendez-Gomez thus also failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect\\nto his CAT claim. We conclude that these unexhausted issues are “not properly\\nbefore us” and we decline to address them. See Ateka, 384 F.3d at 957.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n We deny Mendez-Gomez’s petition.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4410812/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633559/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Jose Luis MENDEZ-GOMEZ, Also Known as Julio Cesar Estrada-Escobar, Also Known as Jose Aul Torres-Santiago, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2109\n ___________________________\n\nJose Luis Mendez-Gomez, also known as Julio Cesar Estrada-Escobar, also known\n as Jose Aul Torres-Santiago\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\n\n v.\n\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\n ____________\n\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\n Board of Immigration Appeals\n ____________\n\n Submitted: March 13, 2019\n Filed: June 27, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\n Jose Luis Mendez-Gomez, a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of (1)\nthe Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) reinstatement of a prior order for his\nremoval, and (2) a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that affirmed an\nimmigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for withholding of removal and\n\fdeferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in withholding-only\nproceedings.1 Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny the petition.\n\n I.\n\n Mendez-Gomez, a Guatemalan citizen, unlawfully entered the United States\nin December 2002. In August 2003, after Mendez-Gomez was convicted of making\na false claim of United States citizenship in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911, an IJ issued\na final order of removal. Mendez-Gomez was removed from the United States. He\nreentered the United States in late 2003, using a fraudulent lawful permanent resident\ncard, or “green card,” to obtain entry through a checkpoint just inside the United\nStates-Mexico border.\n\n In July 2017, an Otter Tail County, Minnesota police deputy stopped Mendez-\nGomez’s vehicle for an equipment violation. When Mendez-Gomez produced only\na Guatemalan passport as identification, the deputy requested immigration assistance.\nA Border Patrol agent telephoned the deputy and spoke to Mendez-Gomez, who\nadmitted that he had entered the United States roughly 16 years prior and had no\ndocuments allowing him to legally remain in the country. Mendez-Gomez claimed\nhe had never been arrested by immigration officials before, but he presented no\ndocumentation allowing him to enter or remain in the United States and was taken\ninto immigration custody.\n\n Upon entering Mendez-Gomez into the immigration database, Border Patrol\nagents discovered his prior order of removal. Mendez-Gomez then made a\nconclusory statement about legally entering the United States, refused to answer any\n\n 1\n Withholding-only proceedings are “limited to a determination of whether the\nalien is eligible for withholding or deferral of removal. During such proceedings, all\nparties are prohibited from raising or considering any other issues, including but not\nlimited to issues of admissibility [and] deportability . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(c)(3)(i).\n -2-\n\fmore questions or sign any immigration documents, and requested to speak with his\nattorney. Subsequently, DHS filed a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate regarding\nMendez-Gomez’s prior removal order. Mendez-Gomez checked a box on that form\nindicating he wished to make a statement contesting the reinstatement, but there is\nnothing in the administrative record showing that he did so.\n\n After Mendez-Gomez indicated that he feared return to Guatemala, the United\nStates Citizenship and Immigration Services conducted a reasonable fear hearing. At\nthis hearing, Mendez-Gomez testified that, in 2001, he borrowed money from a loan\nshark named Don Lucho to pay for his mother’s lung surgery. Mendez-Gomez has\nnot repaid the loan. Although he has never been attacked because of the unpaid debt,\nhe testified that two armed men appeared at a soccer game in the summer of 2001 and\nasked whether members of his family were in attendance and that the men were\nlooking for him because he had not repaid the loan. Mendez-Gomez believes that the\nmen would have tortured or killed him for failing to pay the money back. He further\nbelieves that three of his cousins were murdered for being with him at the soccer field\nthat day. Mendez-Gomez’s father and other family members in Guatemala received\ntelephone calls as late as 2016 threatening Mendez-Gomez’s life due to the unpaid\nloan. Mendez-Gomez has never reported any of these incidents to the police because\nhe is afraid they may be corrupt or subject to bribes.\n\n The asylum officer denied Mendez-Gomez’s reasonable fear application. An\nIJ then vacated the asylum officer’s determination and placed Mendez-Gomez into\nwithholding-only proceedings for review of his applications for withholding of\nremoval and CAT review. The IJ ultimately denied Mendez-Gomez’s applications.\nThe BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, finding that Mendez-Gomez failed to present any\nargument that he had been improperly placed in reinstatement proceedings, failed to\npresent meaningful argument on his CAT claim, and failed to show the Guatemalan\ngovernment was unable or unwilling to protect him. Mendez-Gomez now petitions\nthis Court for review of the BIA’s decision.\n\n -3-\n\f II.\n\n We first address Mendez-Gomez’s claim that DHS violated his due process\nrights by improperly reinstating his prior removal order. “For some time, the law has\nprovided that an order for removing an alien present unlawfully may be reinstated if\nhe leaves and unlawfully enters again.” Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30,\n33 (2006). In a challenge to reinstatement of a prior final order of removal, our\njurisdiction is limited to the reinstatement itself and we may not reopen or review the\nprior order. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).\n\n “We consistently have required issue exhaustion in post-[Illegal Immigration\nReform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996] immigration cases, and referred\nto the rule as ‘jurisdictional’ . . . .” Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 583 (8th\nCir. 2005). Thus, failure to raise an issue before the administrative agency precludes\na petitioner from raising it on appeal. See Escoto-Castillo v. Napolitano, 658 F.3d\n864, 866 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We have repeatedly held that failure to exhaust\nadministrative immigration remedies precludes merits review of the unexhausted\nissue.”).\n\n Mendez-Gomez argues that DHS violated his due process rights by reinstating\nthe prior order of removal against him when he lawfully reentered the United States.\nSee 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (allowing reinstatement of a prior order of removal when\nan alien reenters the United States illegally). He contends that his reentry was lawful\nbecause a border agent at a second checkpoint 20 to 60 miles within the United States\nwaved him through. However, Mendez-Gomez told immigration officials over the\ntelephone at his initial detention that he was unlawfully present in the United States,\nadmitted that he reentered the United States within four months of being deported,\nand never effectively contested the unlawful nature of his reentry during the\nreinstatement process.\n\n\n\n -4-\n\f Furthermore, all the evidence Mendez-Gomez now relies on was not submitted\nuntil he entered withholding-only proceedings before the IJ. Withholding-only\nproceedings solely review an alien’s applications for protection; they do not address\nwhether DHS properly reinstated a prior removal order. See 8 C.F.R.\n§ 1208.2(c)(3)(i). The decision to reinstate a prior removal order lies with DHS, and\nMendez-Gomez failed to raise this issue to DHS before the agency reinstated his prior\nremoval order. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the reinstatement of the prior\nremoval order, as the issue was not exhausted. See Escoto-Castillo, 658 F.3d at 866.\n\n III.\n\n Mendez-Gomez also contends that DHS violated his due process rights by\ncontinuing to interrogate him without his attorney present after he requested an\nattorney. “[T]o succeed on a due process claim, an alien must prove that he was\nactually prejudiced by the lack of process afforded to him.” Briones-Sanchez v.\nHeinauer, 319 F.3d 324, 327 (8th Cir. 2003). To show actual prejudice in a\nreinstatement proceeding, he must show that, but for the alleged due process\nviolation, the government “would not have reinstated his removal order.” Id.\n\n The only issues in a reinstatement proceeding are “the alien’s identity, the\nexistence of a prior removal order, and whether the alien has unlawfully reentered.”\nOchoa-Carrillo v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvarez-\nPortillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2002)). Because Mendez-Gomez\nconcedes his identity and the existence of the prior removal order, he must show he\nlawfully reentered the United States to show prejudice. However, Mendez-Gomez\ncannot do so as a matter of law because he did not have the Attorney General’s\nconsent to reenter the United States within ten years of his removal, as required by\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)-(iii). Because “the presence of an attorney . . . would\n[not] have changed [Mendez-Gomez]’s status as an alien who illegally reentered the\nUnited States following the entry of a removal order against him[,]” see Gomez-\n\n -5-\n\fOlvera v. Napolitano, 451 F. App’x 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), we\nconclude that he has failed to show prejudice and cannot succeed on his due process\nclaim.\n\n IV.\n\n Mendez-Gomez further argues that, even if DHS properly reinstated the prior\norder of removal, the IJ and the BIA improperly determined he was ineligible for\nwithholding of removal or protection under CAT.2 We review denial of an\napplication for withholding of removal or CAT protection under “the deferential\nsubstantial evidence standard.” Osonowo v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir.\n2008). “Only the BIA order is subject to our review, including the IJ’s findings and\nreasoning to the extent they were expressly adopted by the BIA.” Fofanah v.\nGonzales, 447 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2006). We may only grant relief if the\nevidence in the record is “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to\nfind in favor of the petitioner.” Bernal-Rendon v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 877, 880 (8th\nCir. 2005).\n\n To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must show a “clear\nprobability,” see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984), that his “life or freedom\nwould be threatened in [the potential country of removal] because of [his] race,\nreligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”\n8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Similarly, an applicant for CAT protection must show that\n“it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed\ncountry of removal.” Mervil v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1108, 1110 (8th Cir. 2018). If the\n\n 2\n While reinstatement of a prior order of removal prevents an alien from seeking\n“relief,” such as asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), withholding of removal and\nprotection under CAT are considered “protection,” not relief, and are thus not barred.\nSee Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478,\n8485 (Feb. 19, 1999) (background information to interim rule).\n -6-\n\fapplicant fears such harm from private actors, he must show that the government of\nthe proposed country of removal is “unable or unwilling to control” those actors. De\nCastro-Gutierrez v. Holder, 713 F.3d 375, 380 (8th Cir. 2013).\n\n In order to qualify for withholding of removal, therefore, Mendez-Gomez must\nshow that the Guatemalan government would be “unable or unwilling” to protect him\nfrom Don Lucho. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). However, the IJ found that Mendez-Gomez\nfailed to make this showing, and Mendez-Gomez did not challenge that finding\nbefore the BIA. Mendez-Gomez thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies\nwith respect to this issue. See Ateka v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2004)\n(“If a petitioner fails to raise a particular issue when he appeals to the Board and has\nnot presented the Board with the need or opportunity to address that issue, the\npetitioner has not exhausted administrative remedies with respect to it.”).\n\n Similarly, Mendez-Gomez failed to offer any meaningful argument to the BIA\nregarding his CAT claim. See Matter of R-A-M, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA\n2012) (holding that a claim is waived if the alien fails to raise it before the BIA).\nMendez-Gomez thus also failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect\nto his CAT claim. We conclude that these unexhausted issues are “not properly\nbefore us” and we decline to address them. See Ateka, 384 F.3d at 957.\n\n V.\n\n We deny Mendez-Gomez’s petition.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Jose Luis MENDEZ-GOMEZ, Also Known as Julio Cesar Estrada-Escobar, Also Known as Jose Aul Torres-Santiago, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2109\\n ___________________________\\n\\nJose Luis Mendez-Gomez, also known as Julio Cesar Estrada-Escobar, also known\\n as Jose Aul Torres-Santiago\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\\n\\n v.\\n\\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\\n ____________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 13, 2019\\n Filed: June 27, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jose Luis Mendez-Gomez, a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of (1)\\nthe Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) reinstatement of a prior order for his\\nremoval, and (2) a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that affirmed an\\nimmigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for withholding of removal and\\n\\fdeferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in withholding-only\\nproceedings.1 Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny the petition.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Mendez-Gomez, a Guatemalan citizen, unlawfully entered the United States\\nin December 2002. In August 2003, after Mendez-Gomez was convicted of making\\na false claim of United States citizenship in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911, an IJ issued\\na final order of removal. Mendez-Gomez was removed from the United States. He\\nreentered the United States in late 2003, using a fraudulent lawful permanent resident\\ncard, or “green card,” to obtain entry through a checkpoint just inside the United\\nStates-Mexico border.\\n\\n In July 2017, an Otter Tail County, Minnesota police deputy stopped Mendez-\\nGomez’s vehicle for an equipment violation. When Mendez-Gomez produced only\\na Guatemalan passport as identification, the deputy requested immigration assistance.\\nA Border Patrol agent telephoned the deputy and spoke to Mendez-Gomez, who\\nadmitted that he had entered the United States roughly 16 years prior and had no\\ndocuments allowing him to legally remain in the country. Mendez-Gomez claimed\\nhe had never been arrested by immigration officials before, but he presented no\\ndocumentation allowing him to enter or remain in the United States and was taken\\ninto immigration custody.\\n\\n Upon entering Mendez-Gomez into the immigration database, Border Patrol\\nagents discovered his prior order of removal. Mendez-Gomez then made a\\nconclusory statement about legally entering the United States, refused to answer any\\n\\n 1\\n Withholding-only proceedings are “limited to a determination of whether the\\nalien is eligible for withholding or deferral of removal. During such proceedings, all\\nparties are prohibited from raising or considering any other issues, including but not\\nlimited to issues of admissibility [and] deportability . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(c)(3)(i).\\n -2-\\n\\fmore questions or sign any immigration documents, and requested to speak with his\\nattorney. Subsequently, DHS filed a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate regarding\\nMendez-Gomez’s prior removal order. Mendez-Gomez checked a box on that form\\nindicating he wished to make a statement contesting the reinstatement, but there is\\nnothing in the administrative record showing that he did so.\\n\\n After Mendez-Gomez indicated that he feared return to Guatemala, the United\\nStates Citizenship and Immigration Services conducted a reasonable fear hearing. At\\nthis hearing, Mendez-Gomez testified that, in 2001, he borrowed money from a loan\\nshark named Don Lucho to pay for his mother’s lung surgery. Mendez-Gomez has\\nnot repaid the loan. Although he has never been attacked because of the unpaid debt,\\nhe testified that two armed men appeared at a soccer game in the summer of 2001 and\\nasked whether members of his family were in attendance and that the men were\\nlooking for him because he had not repaid the loan. Mendez-Gomez believes that the\\nmen would have tortured or killed him for failing to pay the money back. He further\\nbelieves that three of his cousins were murdered for being with him at the soccer field\\nthat day. Mendez-Gomez’s father and other family members in Guatemala received\\ntelephone calls as late as 2016 threatening Mendez-Gomez’s life due to the unpaid\\nloan. Mendez-Gomez has never reported any of these incidents to the police because\\nhe is afraid they may be corrupt or subject to bribes.\\n\\n The asylum officer denied Mendez-Gomez’s reasonable fear application. An\\nIJ then vacated the asylum officer’s determination and placed Mendez-Gomez into\\nwithholding-only proceedings for review of his applications for withholding of\\nremoval and CAT review. The IJ ultimately denied Mendez-Gomez’s applications.\\nThe BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, finding that Mendez-Gomez failed to present any\\nargument that he had been improperly placed in reinstatement proceedings, failed to\\npresent meaningful argument on his CAT claim, and failed to show the Guatemalan\\ngovernment was unable or unwilling to protect him. Mendez-Gomez now petitions\\nthis Court for review of the BIA’s decision.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f II.\\n\\n We first address Mendez-Gomez’s claim that DHS violated his due process\\nrights by improperly reinstating his prior removal order. “For some time, the law has\\nprovided that an order for removing an alien present unlawfully may be reinstated if\\nhe leaves and unlawfully enters again.” Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30,\\n33 (2006). In a challenge to reinstatement of a prior final order of removal, our\\njurisdiction is limited to the reinstatement itself and we may not reopen or review the\\nprior order. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).\\n\\n “We consistently have required issue exhaustion in post-[Illegal Immigration\\nReform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996] immigration cases, and referred\\nto the rule as ‘jurisdictional’ . . . .” Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 583 (8th\\nCir. 2005). Thus, failure to raise an issue before the administrative agency precludes\\na petitioner from raising it on appeal. See Escoto-Castillo v. Napolitano, 658 F.3d\\n864, 866 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We have repeatedly held that failure to exhaust\\nadministrative immigration remedies precludes merits review of the unexhausted\\nissue.”).\\n\\n Mendez-Gomez argues that DHS violated his due process rights by reinstating\\nthe prior order of removal against him when he lawfully reentered the United States.\\nSee 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (allowing reinstatement of a prior order of removal when\\nan alien reenters the United States illegally). He contends that his reentry was lawful\\nbecause a border agent at a second checkpoint 20 to 60 miles within the United States\\nwaved him through. However, Mendez-Gomez told immigration officials over the\\ntelephone at his initial detention that he was unlawfully present in the United States,\\nadmitted that he reentered the United States within four months of being deported,\\nand never effectively contested the unlawful nature of his reentry during the\\nreinstatement process.\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Furthermore, all the evidence Mendez-Gomez now relies on was not submitted\\nuntil he entered withholding-only proceedings before the IJ. Withholding-only\\nproceedings solely review an alien’s applications for protection; they do not address\\nwhether DHS properly reinstated a prior removal order. See 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.2(c)(3)(i). The decision to reinstate a prior removal order lies with DHS, and\\nMendez-Gomez failed to raise this issue to DHS before the agency reinstated his prior\\nremoval order. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the reinstatement of the prior\\nremoval order, as the issue was not exhausted. See Escoto-Castillo, 658 F.3d at 866.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Mendez-Gomez also contends that DHS violated his due process rights by\\ncontinuing to interrogate him without his attorney present after he requested an\\nattorney. “[T]o succeed on a due process claim, an alien must prove that he was\\nactually prejudiced by the lack of process afforded to him.” Briones-Sanchez v.\\nHeinauer, 319 F.3d 324, 327 (8th Cir. 2003). To show actual prejudice in a\\nreinstatement proceeding, he must show that, but for the alleged due process\\nviolation, the government “would not have reinstated his removal order.” Id.\\n\\n The only issues in a reinstatement proceeding are “the alien’s identity, the\\nexistence of a prior removal order, and whether the alien has unlawfully reentered.”\\nOchoa-Carrillo v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvarez-\\nPortillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2002)). Because Mendez-Gomez\\nconcedes his identity and the existence of the prior removal order, he must show he\\nlawfully reentered the United States to show prejudice. However, Mendez-Gomez\\ncannot do so as a matter of law because he did not have the Attorney General’s\\nconsent to reenter the United States within ten years of his removal, as required by\\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)-(iii). Because “the presence of an attorney . . . would\\n[not] have changed [Mendez-Gomez]’s status as an alien who illegally reentered the\\nUnited States following the entry of a removal order against him[,]” see Gomez-\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fOlvera v. Napolitano, 451 F. App’x 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), we\\nconclude that he has failed to show prejudice and cannot succeed on his due process\\nclaim.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Mendez-Gomez further argues that, even if DHS properly reinstated the prior\\norder of removal, the IJ and the BIA improperly determined he was ineligible for\\nwithholding of removal or protection under CAT.2 We review denial of an\\napplication for withholding of removal or CAT protection under “the deferential\\nsubstantial evidence standard.” Osonowo v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir.\\n2008). “Only the BIA order is subject to our review, including the IJ’s findings and\\nreasoning to the extent they were expressly adopted by the BIA.” Fofanah v.\\nGonzales, 447 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2006). We may only grant relief if the\\nevidence in the record is “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to\\nfind in favor of the petitioner.” Bernal-Rendon v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 877, 880 (8th\\nCir. 2005).\\n\\n To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must show a “clear\\nprobability,” see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984), that his “life or freedom\\nwould be threatened in [the potential country of removal] because of [his] race,\\nreligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”\\n8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Similarly, an applicant for CAT protection must show that\\n“it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed\\ncountry of removal.” Mervil v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1108, 1110 (8th Cir. 2018). If the\\n\\n 2\\n While reinstatement of a prior order of removal prevents an alien from seeking\\n“relief,” such as asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), withholding of removal and\\nprotection under CAT are considered “protection,” not relief, and are thus not barred.\\nSee Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478,\\n8485 (Feb. 19, 1999) (background information to interim rule).\\n -6-\\n\\fapplicant fears such harm from private actors, he must show that the government of\\nthe proposed country of removal is “unable or unwilling to control” those actors. De\\nCastro-Gutierrez v. Holder, 713 F.3d 375, 380 (8th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n In order to qualify for withholding of removal, therefore, Mendez-Gomez must\\nshow that the Guatemalan government would be “unable or unwilling” to protect him\\nfrom Don Lucho. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). However, the IJ found that Mendez-Gomez\\nfailed to make this showing, and Mendez-Gomez did not challenge that finding\\nbefore the BIA. Mendez-Gomez thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies\\nwith respect to this issue. See Ateka v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2004)\\n(“If a petitioner fails to raise a particular issue when he appeals to the Board and has\\nnot presented the Board with the need or opportunity to address that issue, the\\npetitioner has not exhausted administrative remedies with respect to it.”).\\n\\n Similarly, Mendez-Gomez failed to offer any meaningful argument to the BIA\\nregarding his CAT claim. See Matter of R-A-M, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA\\n2012) (holding that a claim is waived if the alien fails to raise it before the BIA).\\nMendez-Gomez thus also failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect\\nto his CAT claim. We conclude that these unexhausted issues are “not properly\\nbefore us” and we decline to address them. See Ateka, 384 F.3d at 957.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n We deny Mendez-Gomez’s petition.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2696,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4633560,"string":"4,633,560"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Jane DOE, (Originally Named as John Doe Individually and as a Parent and Next Friend to Jane Doe, a Minor) Plaintiff - Appellant v. DARDANELLE SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Jane Doe v. Dardanelle School District"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-27"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2816"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Gruender, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2816\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Jane Doe, (originally named as John Doe individually and as a parent and next\\n friend to Jane Doe, a minor)\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Dardanelle School District\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 18, 2019\\n Filed: June 27, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jane Doe appeals the district court’s1 grant of Dardanelle School District’s\\n(“Dardanelle”) motion for summary judgment and its partial denial of her motion for\\nleave to amend her complaint. We affirm.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Arkansas.\\n\\f While Doe was a student at Dardanelle, she claims that another student, R.C.,\\nsexually assaulted her at least twice. The first incident took place in October 2014\\nduring a kickball game. While running the bases, R.C. ran into Doe, who was\\nstanding on second base. Doe testified that R.C.’s upper arm “bump[ed]” her breast\\nand that he called her a bitch. Doe said she did not know why R.C. called her a bitch\\nbut that she may have been “blocking his way” and that the comment may have been\\n“out of frustration.”\\n\\n The second incident took place in October 2015. Doe and R.C. were seated\\nnext to each other while watching a movie with the lights off in a home economics\\nclass. Doe testified that R.C. reached up her shorts and touched the outside of her\\n“private parts.” After Doe pushed him away, R.C. attempted to force Doe to touch his\\ngroin. Doe pulled her arm away, and R.C. “grabbed” Doe’s breast over her shirt. Doe\\ntestified that nobody else at the table at which she and R.C. sat saw or heard what\\nhappened.\\n\\n Doe reported both incidents to Dardanelle administrators, who discussed them\\nwith R.C. Alleging that Dardanelle was deliberately indifferent, Doe filed a complaint\\nunder 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in May 2017. Doe\\nlater moved to amend the complaint, and the district court denied her motion in part.\\nDardanelle moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted its motion.\\nDoe appeals both orders.\\n\\n We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, considering the facts “in the\\nlight most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC v.\\nNat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 847 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 2017). A\\nmotion for summary judgment will be granted where “the movant shows that there is\\nno genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as\\na matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthe outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of\\nsummary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).\\n\\n The district court explained that Title IX and § 1983 have the same deliberate\\nindifference standard and concluded that Dardanelle was not deliberately indifferent.2\\nIt reasoned that the first incident did not put Dardanelle on notice that R.C. might\\nsexually assault Doe and that though Dardanelle might have taken more “prudent”\\nsteps after the second incident, it is not liable for “failing to take the most reasonable\\ncourse of action or even for responding negligently.” Doe v. Dardanelle School\\nDistrict, No. 4:17cv00359, 2018 WL 3795235, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 9, 2018). It\\nadditionally observed that even if Dardanelle were deliberately indifferent, the\\nharassment was not “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” that it deprived\\nDoe “of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”\\nId. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 650). The district court therefore granted Dardanelle’s\\nmotion for summary judgment.\\n\\n “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault that cannot be predicated\\nupon mere negligence.” Doe v. Flaherty, 623 F.3d 577, 584 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal\\nquotation marks and citation omitted). Under Title IX, Dardanelle is liable only if its\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Doe does not argue that the district court erroneously applied the same\\ndeliberate indifference standard to her Title IX and § 1983 claims. Thus, we do not\\naddress whether the district court should have separately considered whether\\nDardanelle was deliberately indifferent to unconstitutional conduct and the rights of\\nstudents under Doe’s § 1983 claim and to student-on-student harassment under her\\nTitle IX claim. Compare Plamp v. Mitchell School Dist. No. 17-2, 565 F.3d 450, 459,\\n461 (8th Cir. 2009) (requiring deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of\\nunconstitutional misconduct for § 1983 failure-to-act claims and deliberate\\nindifference to the rights of students for § 1983 failure-to-train claims), with Davis\\nNext Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)\\n(requiring “deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in . . . programs or\\nactivities” for Title IX student-on-student harassment claims).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f“deliberate indifference effectively ‘cause[d]’ the discrimination.” Davis, 526 U.S.\\nat 642-43 (alteration in original). We “should refrain from second-guessing the\\ndisciplinary decisions made by school administrators.” Id. at 648. Summary\\njudgment is proper unless Dardanelle was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known\\ncircumstances.” Id. at 648-49.\\n\\n First, Doe claims that Dardanelle was deliberately indifferent because it had\\n“received at least one other report from a second student, T.R., complaining that R.C.\\nhad attempted to touch her inappropriately.” R.C. said that he sometimes hit T.R. on\\nthe arm. Vice Principal Lynn Balloun discussed T.R.’s complaint with R.C., who\\npromised that he would stop. The record does not indicate when T.R. made the\\ncomplaint. Even if we assume the complaint came before the first incident with Doe\\nas she claims, we cannot say that Dardanelle’s response to the complaint “effectively\\ncaused” the first incident with Doe. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 642.\\n\\n Doe next argues that Dardanelle’s “inaction in the face of” the first incident\\ninvolving Doe “led to the second, more severe assault.” But Dardanelle did take\\naction after the first incident. Doe reported the first incident to a teacher and to\\nPrincipal Marcia Lawrence. In response, Balloun and Counselor Cynthia Hutchins\\ndiscussed the incident with R.C. Both Balloun and Hutchins “sternly” talked to R.C.\\n“about proper behavior.”\\n\\n While Balloun’s notes from his discussion with R.C. after the first incident\\nindicate that he believed R.C. had touched Doe several times, Doe testified in\\ndeposition and without reservation that R.C. had never touched her before the kickball\\nincident. She also testified that, according to her memory of the 2014 school year,\\nthere was only one incident when R.C. touched her. Accepting Doe’s statement is not\\na “failure to apply the proper summary judgment standard,” as Doe contends. Rather,\\nthe unambiguous testimony of the only witness with firsthand knowledge\\ndemonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of fact. Cf. Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We have held that a party cannot avoid summary\\njudgment by contradicting his own earlier testimony.”)\\n\\n Dardanelle’s response to the allegation that R.C. ran into Doe during a kickball\\ngame, hitting her breast with his upper arm and calling her a bitch, is not “clearly\\nunreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-49.\\nIndeed, the “clearly unreasonable standard is intended to afford flexibility to school\\nadministrators.” Estate of Barnwell by and through Barnwell v. Watson, 880 F.3d\\n998, 1007 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Dardanelle’s\\nalleged deliberate indifference did not effectively cause the second incident.\\n\\n Doe additionally argues that Dardanelle’s response to the second incident\\n“exacerbated [her] injuries.” Dardanelle again took steps to address R.C.’s\\nmisconduct. Immediately after the incident, Doe went to the school office to speak\\nwith Lawrence. According to Lawrence, Doe did not tell her at that time that R.C. had\\ntried to touch her vagina, but Doe testified that she had told Lawrence.3 During the\\nconversation, Lawrence asked Doe whether she was “feeling more upset about this\\nthan [she was] showing” and called a school counselor to talk with Doe.\\n\\n Lawrence referred the incident to Balloun, who met with R.C. and the school\\nresource officer, the school’s police officer. Balloun testified that he and the resource\\nofficer questioned R.C. “extensively,” and R.C. denied the incident. Lawrence and\\nBalloun also talked with the home economics teacher “about keeping a light on”\\nduring movies and informed her that some “inappropriate touching” had been alleged.\\nThey told the teacher to separate Doe and R.C. in her class. R.C. was eventually\\nmoved to a different class in April 2016. Balloun testified that after the second\\n\\n\\n 3\\n We view the facts “in the light most favorable to” Doe, giving her “the benefit\\nof all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record.” Pedersen v. Bio-Med.\\nApplications of Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 1053 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fincident, he “tried to pay particular attention, as it was warranted,” to R.C. and that\\nLawrence likewise “was trying to keep an eye on” Doe. In light of the fact that R.C.\\ndenied the second incident and nobody else in the home economics class witnessed\\nit, Dardanelle’s response was not “clearly unreasonable in light of the known\\ncircumstances.” See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-49.\\n\\n Doe claims that Dardanelle’s response to the incidents led to depression, self-\\nharm, and isolation, as evidenced by her counselor’s notes. Doe told her counselor\\nthat she was afraid that R.C. would “harm her again” and that R.C. “calls her names.”\\nBut Doe testified that after the October 2015 incident she only interacted with R.C.\\nonce and sometimes saw him at Walmart. Further, we agree with the district court\\nthat, even if Dardanelle were deliberately indifferent, it was not “deliberately\\nindifferent to sexual harassment . . . that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively\\noffensive that it can be said to [have deprived Doe] of access to the educational\\nopportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. Doe’s\\ngrade point average increased in both her junior and senior years, and she graduated\\non time. See also id. at 652 (“Damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and\\nname-calling among school children, however, even where these comments target\\ndifferences in gender.”). In sum, the district court properly granted Dardanelle’s\\nmotion for summary judgment.\\n\\n Finally, Doe argues that the district court should have granted her motion to\\namend her complaint in full. Doe sought to add a negligence claim against Dardanelle\\nthrough a direct action against its insurance provider and a claim that Arkansas Code\\nAnnotated section 21-9-301 violates the Arkansas constitution.4 The district court\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Section 21-9-301 provides that school districts “shall be immune from liability\\nand from suit for damages except to the extent that they may be covered by liability\\ninsurance.”\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fdenied her motion as futile.5 “We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of\\ndiscretion and questions of futility de novo.” United States ex rel. Roop v. Hypoguard\\nUSA, Inc., 559 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2009). “Denial of a motion for leave to amend\\non the basis of futility means the district court has reached the legal conclusion that\\nthe amended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\\nof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 850 (8th Cir.\\n2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n reviewing a denial of leave to amend\\nwe ask whether the proposed amended complaint states a cause of action under the\\n[Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),] pleading standard . . . .” Id.\\nat 850-51. Under the Twombly standard, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss\\nif it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that\\nis plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted).\\n\\n We agree with the district court that Doe’s negligence claim is futile. As the\\ndistrict court correctly noted, Dardanelle’s insurance policy includes an exclusion for\\nclaims or suits “alleging Sexual Abuse and Molestation,” and Doe does not contest\\nthat the policy contains an exclusion against such lawsuits. The court therefore\\nconcluded that the plaintiff’s proposed amendment to add a direct claim against the\\ninsurer is futile.\\n\\n Doe argues that the district court “erred by drawing inferences in [Dardanelle’s]\\nfavor.” This argument is not persuasive. Though the district court must take her\\nfactual allegations as true and draw all inferences in her favor, see Braden v. Wal-\\nMart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594-95 (8th Cir. 2009), Doe offered no factual basis\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Doe’s motion to amend also included a request to substitute the “parental claim\\non behalf of Jane Doe with Jane Doe herself.” The district court granted that portion\\nof her motion.\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fto support the possibility that the policy exclusion does not exist or does not apply.\\nThus, we agree with the district court that Doe’s negligence claim is futile.\\n\\n Likewise, the district court correctly determined that Doe’s Arkansas\\nconstitutional claim is futile. It relied on an Arkansas Supreme Court decision holding\\nthat Ark. Code Ann. section 21-9-301 is consistent with the same Arkansas\\nconstitutional provisions to which Doe points. See White v. City of Newport, 326 Ark.\\n667, 672 (1996). Doe nevertheless claims that the Arkansas Supreme Court “signaled\\na sea change” in Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Arkansas v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12 (2018).\\nShe contends that Andrews “singled out [the court’s] 1996-era caselaw,” which\\nincludes White, “for failing to strictly construe and enforce constitutional provisions.”\\nBut Andrews involved sovereign immunity, and we see no reason why its dicta affects\\nthe holding in White. Thus, we agree with the district court that this claim is likewise\\nfutile.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4410813/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633560/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Jane DOE, (Originally Named as John Doe Individually and as a Parent and Next Friend to Jane Doe, a Minor) Plaintiff - Appellant v. DARDANELLE SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2816\n ___________________________\n\n Jane Doe, (originally named as John Doe individually and as a parent and next\n friend to Jane Doe, a minor)\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Dardanelle School District\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 18, 2019\n Filed: June 27, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\n\n Jane Doe appeals the district court’s1 grant of Dardanelle School District’s\n(“Dardanelle”) motion for summary judgment and its partial denial of her motion for\nleave to amend her complaint. We affirm.\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Arkansas.\n\f While Doe was a student at Dardanelle, she claims that another student, R.C.,\nsexually assaulted her at least twice. The first incident took place in October 2014\nduring a kickball game. While running the bases, R.C. ran into Doe, who was\nstanding on second base. Doe testified that R.C.’s upper arm “bump[ed]” her breast\nand that he called her a bitch. Doe said she did not know why R.C. called her a bitch\nbut that she may have been “blocking his way” and that the comment may have been\n“out of frustration.”\n\n The second incident took place in October 2015. Doe and R.C. were seated\nnext to each other while watching a movie with the lights off in a home economics\nclass. Doe testified that R.C. reached up her shorts and touched the outside of her\n“private parts.” After Doe pushed him away, R.C. attempted to force Doe to touch his\ngroin. Doe pulled her arm away, and R.C. “grabbed” Doe’s breast over her shirt. Doe\ntestified that nobody else at the table at which she and R.C. sat saw or heard what\nhappened.\n\n Doe reported both incidents to Dardanelle administrators, who discussed them\nwith R.C. Alleging that Dardanelle was deliberately indifferent, Doe filed a complaint\nunder 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in May 2017. Doe\nlater moved to amend the complaint, and the district court denied her motion in part.\nDardanelle moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted its motion.\nDoe appeals both orders.\n\n We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, considering the facts “in the\nlight most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC v.\nNat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 847 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 2017). A\nmotion for summary judgment will be granted where “the movant shows that there is\nno genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as\na matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect\n\n\n\n -2-\n\fthe outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of\nsummary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).\n\n The district court explained that Title IX and § 1983 have the same deliberate\nindifference standard and concluded that Dardanelle was not deliberately indifferent.2\nIt reasoned that the first incident did not put Dardanelle on notice that R.C. might\nsexually assault Doe and that though Dardanelle might have taken more “prudent”\nsteps after the second incident, it is not liable for “failing to take the most reasonable\ncourse of action or even for responding negligently.” Doe v. Dardanelle School\nDistrict, No. 4:17cv00359, 2018 WL 3795235, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 9, 2018). It\nadditionally observed that even if Dardanelle were deliberately indifferent, the\nharassment was not “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” that it deprived\nDoe “of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”\nId. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 650). The district court therefore granted Dardanelle’s\nmotion for summary judgment.\n\n “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault that cannot be predicated\nupon mere negligence.” Doe v. Flaherty, 623 F.3d 577, 584 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal\nquotation marks and citation omitted). Under Title IX, Dardanelle is liable only if its\n\n\n 2\n Doe does not argue that the district court erroneously applied the same\ndeliberate indifference standard to her Title IX and § 1983 claims. Thus, we do not\naddress whether the district court should have separately considered whether\nDardanelle was deliberately indifferent to unconstitutional conduct and the rights of\nstudents under Doe’s § 1983 claim and to student-on-student harassment under her\nTitle IX claim. Compare Plamp v. Mitchell School Dist. No. 17-2, 565 F.3d 450, 459,\n461 (8th Cir. 2009) (requiring deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of\nunconstitutional misconduct for § 1983 failure-to-act claims and deliberate\nindifference to the rights of students for § 1983 failure-to-train claims), with Davis\nNext Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)\n(requiring “deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in . . . programs or\nactivities” for Title IX student-on-student harassment claims).\n\n -3-\n\f“deliberate indifference effectively ‘cause[d]’ the discrimination.” Davis, 526 U.S.\nat 642-43 (alteration in original). We “should refrain from second-guessing the\ndisciplinary decisions made by school administrators.” Id. at 648. Summary\njudgment is proper unless Dardanelle was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known\ncircumstances.” Id. at 648-49.\n\n First, Doe claims that Dardanelle was deliberately indifferent because it had\n“received at least one other report from a second student, T.R., complaining that R.C.\nhad attempted to touch her inappropriately.” R.C. said that he sometimes hit T.R. on\nthe arm. Vice Principal Lynn Balloun discussed T.R.’s complaint with R.C., who\npromised that he would stop. The record does not indicate when T.R. made the\ncomplaint. Even if we assume the complaint came before the first incident with Doe\nas she claims, we cannot say that Dardanelle’s response to the complaint “effectively\ncaused” the first incident with Doe. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 642.\n\n Doe next argues that Dardanelle’s “inaction in the face of” the first incident\ninvolving Doe “led to the second, more severe assault.” But Dardanelle did take\naction after the first incident. Doe reported the first incident to a teacher and to\nPrincipal Marcia Lawrence. In response, Balloun and Counselor Cynthia Hutchins\ndiscussed the incident with R.C. Both Balloun and Hutchins “sternly” talked to R.C.\n“about proper behavior.”\n\n While Balloun’s notes from his discussion with R.C. after the first incident\nindicate that he believed R.C. had touched Doe several times, Doe testified in\ndeposition and without reservation that R.C. had never touched her before the kickball\nincident. She also testified that, according to her memory of the 2014 school year,\nthere was only one incident when R.C. touched her. Accepting Doe’s statement is not\na “failure to apply the proper summary judgment standard,” as Doe contends. Rather,\nthe unambiguous testimony of the only witness with firsthand knowledge\ndemonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of fact. Cf. Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d\n\n -4-\n\f1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We have held that a party cannot avoid summary\njudgment by contradicting his own earlier testimony.”)\n\n Dardanelle’s response to the allegation that R.C. ran into Doe during a kickball\ngame, hitting her breast with his upper arm and calling her a bitch, is not “clearly\nunreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-49.\nIndeed, the “clearly unreasonable standard is intended to afford flexibility to school\nadministrators.” Estate of Barnwell by and through Barnwell v. Watson, 880 F.3d\n998, 1007 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Dardanelle’s\nalleged deliberate indifference did not effectively cause the second incident.\n\n Doe additionally argues that Dardanelle’s response to the second incident\n“exacerbated [her] injuries.” Dardanelle again took steps to address R.C.’s\nmisconduct. Immediately after the incident, Doe went to the school office to speak\nwith Lawrence. According to Lawrence, Doe did not tell her at that time that R.C. had\ntried to touch her vagina, but Doe testified that she had told Lawrence.3 During the\nconversation, Lawrence asked Doe whether she was “feeling more upset about this\nthan [she was] showing” and called a school counselor to talk with Doe.\n\n Lawrence referred the incident to Balloun, who met with R.C. and the school\nresource officer, the school’s police officer. Balloun testified that he and the resource\nofficer questioned R.C. “extensively,” and R.C. denied the incident. Lawrence and\nBalloun also talked with the home economics teacher “about keeping a light on”\nduring movies and informed her that some “inappropriate touching” had been alleged.\nThey told the teacher to separate Doe and R.C. in her class. R.C. was eventually\nmoved to a different class in April 2016. Balloun testified that after the second\n\n\n 3\n We view the facts “in the light most favorable to” Doe, giving her “the benefit\nof all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record.” Pedersen v. Bio-Med.\nApplications of Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 1053 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n -5-\n\fincident, he “tried to pay particular attention, as it was warranted,” to R.C. and that\nLawrence likewise “was trying to keep an eye on” Doe. In light of the fact that R.C.\ndenied the second incident and nobody else in the home economics class witnessed\nit, Dardanelle’s response was not “clearly unreasonable in light of the known\ncircumstances.” See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-49.\n\n Doe claims that Dardanelle’s response to the incidents led to depression, self-\nharm, and isolation, as evidenced by her counselor’s notes. Doe told her counselor\nthat she was afraid that R.C. would “harm her again” and that R.C. “calls her names.”\nBut Doe testified that after the October 2015 incident she only interacted with R.C.\nonce and sometimes saw him at Walmart. Further, we agree with the district court\nthat, even if Dardanelle were deliberately indifferent, it was not “deliberately\nindifferent to sexual harassment . . . that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively\noffensive that it can be said to [have deprived Doe] of access to the educational\nopportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. Doe’s\ngrade point average increased in both her junior and senior years, and she graduated\non time. See also id. at 652 (“Damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and\nname-calling among school children, however, even where these comments target\ndifferences in gender.”). In sum, the district court properly granted Dardanelle’s\nmotion for summary judgment.\n\n Finally, Doe argues that the district court should have granted her motion to\namend her complaint in full. Doe sought to add a negligence claim against Dardanelle\nthrough a direct action against its insurance provider and a claim that Arkansas Code\nAnnotated section 21-9-301 violates the Arkansas constitution.4 The district court\n\n\n\n\n 4\n Section 21-9-301 provides that school districts “shall be immune from liability\nand from suit for damages except to the extent that they may be covered by liability\ninsurance.”\n\n -6-\n\fdenied her motion as futile.5 “We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of\ndiscretion and questions of futility de novo.” United States ex rel. Roop v. Hypoguard\nUSA, Inc., 559 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2009). “Denial of a motion for leave to amend\non the basis of futility means the district court has reached the legal conclusion that\nthe amended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\nof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 850 (8th Cir.\n2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n reviewing a denial of leave to amend\nwe ask whether the proposed amended complaint states a cause of action under the\n[Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),] pleading standard . . . .” Id.\nat 850-51. Under the Twombly standard, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss\nif it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that\nis plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal\nquotation marks omitted).\n\n We agree with the district court that Doe’s negligence claim is futile. As the\ndistrict court correctly noted, Dardanelle’s insurance policy includes an exclusion for\nclaims or suits “alleging Sexual Abuse and Molestation,” and Doe does not contest\nthat the policy contains an exclusion against such lawsuits. The court therefore\nconcluded that the plaintiff’s proposed amendment to add a direct claim against the\ninsurer is futile.\n\n Doe argues that the district court “erred by drawing inferences in [Dardanelle’s]\nfavor.” This argument is not persuasive. Though the district court must take her\nfactual allegations as true and draw all inferences in her favor, see Braden v. Wal-\nMart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594-95 (8th Cir. 2009), Doe offered no factual basis\n\n\n\n\n 5\n Doe’s motion to amend also included a request to substitute the “parental claim\non behalf of Jane Doe with Jane Doe herself.” The district court granted that portion\nof her motion.\n\n -7-\n\fto support the possibility that the policy exclusion does not exist or does not apply.\nThus, we agree with the district court that Doe’s negligence claim is futile.\n\n Likewise, the district court correctly determined that Doe’s Arkansas\nconstitutional claim is futile. It relied on an Arkansas Supreme Court decision holding\nthat Ark. Code Ann. section 21-9-301 is consistent with the same Arkansas\nconstitutional provisions to which Doe points. See White v. City of Newport, 326 Ark.\n667, 672 (1996). Doe nevertheless claims that the Arkansas Supreme Court “signaled\na sea change” in Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Arkansas v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12 (2018).\nShe contends that Andrews “singled out [the court’s] 1996-era caselaw,” which\nincludes White, “for failing to strictly construe and enforce constitutional provisions.”\nBut Andrews involved sovereign immunity, and we see no reason why its dicta affects\nthe holding in White. Thus, we agree with the district court that this claim is likewise\nfutile.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Jane DOE, (Originally Named as John Doe Individually and as a Parent and Next Friend to Jane Doe, a Minor) Plaintiff - Appellant v. DARDANELLE SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2816\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Jane Doe, (originally named as John Doe individually and as a parent and next\\n friend to Jane Doe, a minor)\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Dardanelle School District\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 18, 2019\\n Filed: June 27, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jane Doe appeals the district court’s1 grant of Dardanelle School District’s\\n(“Dardanelle”) motion for summary judgment and its partial denial of her motion for\\nleave to amend her complaint. We affirm.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Arkansas.\\n\\f While Doe was a student at Dardanelle, she claims that another student, R.C.,\\nsexually assaulted her at least twice. The first incident took place in October 2014\\nduring a kickball game. While running the bases, R.C. ran into Doe, who was\\nstanding on second base. Doe testified that R.C.’s upper arm “bump[ed]” her breast\\nand that he called her a bitch. Doe said she did not know why R.C. called her a bitch\\nbut that she may have been “blocking his way” and that the comment may have been\\n“out of frustration.”\\n\\n The second incident took place in October 2015. Doe and R.C. were seated\\nnext to each other while watching a movie with the lights off in a home economics\\nclass. Doe testified that R.C. reached up her shorts and touched the outside of her\\n“private parts.” After Doe pushed him away, R.C. attempted to force Doe to touch his\\ngroin. Doe pulled her arm away, and R.C. “grabbed” Doe’s breast over her shirt. Doe\\ntestified that nobody else at the table at which she and R.C. sat saw or heard what\\nhappened.\\n\\n Doe reported both incidents to Dardanelle administrators, who discussed them\\nwith R.C. Alleging that Dardanelle was deliberately indifferent, Doe filed a complaint\\nunder 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in May 2017. Doe\\nlater moved to amend the complaint, and the district court denied her motion in part.\\nDardanelle moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted its motion.\\nDoe appeals both orders.\\n\\n We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, considering the facts “in the\\nlight most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC v.\\nNat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 847 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 2017). A\\nmotion for summary judgment will be granted where “the movant shows that there is\\nno genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as\\na matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthe outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of\\nsummary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).\\n\\n The district court explained that Title IX and § 1983 have the same deliberate\\nindifference standard and concluded that Dardanelle was not deliberately indifferent.2\\nIt reasoned that the first incident did not put Dardanelle on notice that R.C. might\\nsexually assault Doe and that though Dardanelle might have taken more “prudent”\\nsteps after the second incident, it is not liable for “failing to take the most reasonable\\ncourse of action or even for responding negligently.” Doe v. Dardanelle School\\nDistrict, No. 4:17cv00359, 2018 WL 3795235, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 9, 2018). It\\nadditionally observed that even if Dardanelle were deliberately indifferent, the\\nharassment was not “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” that it deprived\\nDoe “of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”\\nId. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 650). The district court therefore granted Dardanelle’s\\nmotion for summary judgment.\\n\\n “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault that cannot be predicated\\nupon mere negligence.” Doe v. Flaherty, 623 F.3d 577, 584 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal\\nquotation marks and citation omitted). Under Title IX, Dardanelle is liable only if its\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Doe does not argue that the district court erroneously applied the same\\ndeliberate indifference standard to her Title IX and § 1983 claims. Thus, we do not\\naddress whether the district court should have separately considered whether\\nDardanelle was deliberately indifferent to unconstitutional conduct and the rights of\\nstudents under Doe’s § 1983 claim and to student-on-student harassment under her\\nTitle IX claim. Compare Plamp v. Mitchell School Dist. No. 17-2, 565 F.3d 450, 459,\\n461 (8th Cir. 2009) (requiring deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of\\nunconstitutional misconduct for § 1983 failure-to-act claims and deliberate\\nindifference to the rights of students for § 1983 failure-to-train claims), with Davis\\nNext Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)\\n(requiring “deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in . . . programs or\\nactivities” for Title IX student-on-student harassment claims).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f“deliberate indifference effectively ‘cause[d]’ the discrimination.” Davis, 526 U.S.\\nat 642-43 (alteration in original). We “should refrain from second-guessing the\\ndisciplinary decisions made by school administrators.” Id. at 648. Summary\\njudgment is proper unless Dardanelle was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known\\ncircumstances.” Id. at 648-49.\\n\\n First, Doe claims that Dardanelle was deliberately indifferent because it had\\n“received at least one other report from a second student, T.R., complaining that R.C.\\nhad attempted to touch her inappropriately.” R.C. said that he sometimes hit T.R. on\\nthe arm. Vice Principal Lynn Balloun discussed T.R.’s complaint with R.C., who\\npromised that he would stop. The record does not indicate when T.R. made the\\ncomplaint. Even if we assume the complaint came before the first incident with Doe\\nas she claims, we cannot say that Dardanelle’s response to the complaint “effectively\\ncaused” the first incident with Doe. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 642.\\n\\n Doe next argues that Dardanelle’s “inaction in the face of” the first incident\\ninvolving Doe “led to the second, more severe assault.” But Dardanelle did take\\naction after the first incident. Doe reported the first incident to a teacher and to\\nPrincipal Marcia Lawrence. In response, Balloun and Counselor Cynthia Hutchins\\ndiscussed the incident with R.C. Both Balloun and Hutchins “sternly” talked to R.C.\\n“about proper behavior.”\\n\\n While Balloun’s notes from his discussion with R.C. after the first incident\\nindicate that he believed R.C. had touched Doe several times, Doe testified in\\ndeposition and without reservation that R.C. had never touched her before the kickball\\nincident. She also testified that, according to her memory of the 2014 school year,\\nthere was only one incident when R.C. touched her. Accepting Doe’s statement is not\\na “failure to apply the proper summary judgment standard,” as Doe contends. Rather,\\nthe unambiguous testimony of the only witness with firsthand knowledge\\ndemonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of fact. Cf. Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We have held that a party cannot avoid summary\\njudgment by contradicting his own earlier testimony.”)\\n\\n Dardanelle’s response to the allegation that R.C. ran into Doe during a kickball\\ngame, hitting her breast with his upper arm and calling her a bitch, is not “clearly\\nunreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-49.\\nIndeed, the “clearly unreasonable standard is intended to afford flexibility to school\\nadministrators.” Estate of Barnwell by and through Barnwell v. Watson, 880 F.3d\\n998, 1007 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Dardanelle’s\\nalleged deliberate indifference did not effectively cause the second incident.\\n\\n Doe additionally argues that Dardanelle’s response to the second incident\\n“exacerbated [her] injuries.” Dardanelle again took steps to address R.C.’s\\nmisconduct. Immediately after the incident, Doe went to the school office to speak\\nwith Lawrence. According to Lawrence, Doe did not tell her at that time that R.C. had\\ntried to touch her vagina, but Doe testified that she had told Lawrence.3 During the\\nconversation, Lawrence asked Doe whether she was “feeling more upset about this\\nthan [she was] showing” and called a school counselor to talk with Doe.\\n\\n Lawrence referred the incident to Balloun, who met with R.C. and the school\\nresource officer, the school’s police officer. Balloun testified that he and the resource\\nofficer questioned R.C. “extensively,” and R.C. denied the incident. Lawrence and\\nBalloun also talked with the home economics teacher “about keeping a light on”\\nduring movies and informed her that some “inappropriate touching” had been alleged.\\nThey told the teacher to separate Doe and R.C. in her class. R.C. was eventually\\nmoved to a different class in April 2016. Balloun testified that after the second\\n\\n\\n 3\\n We view the facts “in the light most favorable to” Doe, giving her “the benefit\\nof all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record.” Pedersen v. Bio-Med.\\nApplications of Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 1053 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fincident, he “tried to pay particular attention, as it was warranted,” to R.C. and that\\nLawrence likewise “was trying to keep an eye on” Doe. In light of the fact that R.C.\\ndenied the second incident and nobody else in the home economics class witnessed\\nit, Dardanelle’s response was not “clearly unreasonable in light of the known\\ncircumstances.” See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-49.\\n\\n Doe claims that Dardanelle’s response to the incidents led to depression, self-\\nharm, and isolation, as evidenced by her counselor’s notes. Doe told her counselor\\nthat she was afraid that R.C. would “harm her again” and that R.C. “calls her names.”\\nBut Doe testified that after the October 2015 incident she only interacted with R.C.\\nonce and sometimes saw him at Walmart. Further, we agree with the district court\\nthat, even if Dardanelle were deliberately indifferent, it was not “deliberately\\nindifferent to sexual harassment . . . that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively\\noffensive that it can be said to [have deprived Doe] of access to the educational\\nopportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. Doe’s\\ngrade point average increased in both her junior and senior years, and she graduated\\non time. See also id. at 652 (“Damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and\\nname-calling among school children, however, even where these comments target\\ndifferences in gender.”). In sum, the district court properly granted Dardanelle’s\\nmotion for summary judgment.\\n\\n Finally, Doe argues that the district court should have granted her motion to\\namend her complaint in full. Doe sought to add a negligence claim against Dardanelle\\nthrough a direct action against its insurance provider and a claim that Arkansas Code\\nAnnotated section 21-9-301 violates the Arkansas constitution.4 The district court\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Section 21-9-301 provides that school districts “shall be immune from liability\\nand from suit for damages except to the extent that they may be covered by liability\\ninsurance.”\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fdenied her motion as futile.5 “We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of\\ndiscretion and questions of futility de novo.” United States ex rel. Roop v. Hypoguard\\nUSA, Inc., 559 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2009). “Denial of a motion for leave to amend\\non the basis of futility means the district court has reached the legal conclusion that\\nthe amended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\\nof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 850 (8th Cir.\\n2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n reviewing a denial of leave to amend\\nwe ask whether the proposed amended complaint states a cause of action under the\\n[Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),] pleading standard . . . .” Id.\\nat 850-51. Under the Twombly standard, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss\\nif it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that\\nis plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted).\\n\\n We agree with the district court that Doe’s negligence claim is futile. As the\\ndistrict court correctly noted, Dardanelle’s insurance policy includes an exclusion for\\nclaims or suits “alleging Sexual Abuse and Molestation,” and Doe does not contest\\nthat the policy contains an exclusion against such lawsuits. The court therefore\\nconcluded that the plaintiff’s proposed amendment to add a direct claim against the\\ninsurer is futile.\\n\\n Doe argues that the district court “erred by drawing inferences in [Dardanelle’s]\\nfavor.” This argument is not persuasive. Though the district court must take her\\nfactual allegations as true and draw all inferences in her favor, see Braden v. Wal-\\nMart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594-95 (8th Cir. 2009), Doe offered no factual basis\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Doe’s motion to amend also included a request to substitute the “parental claim\\non behalf of Jane Doe with Jane Doe herself.” The district court granted that portion\\nof her motion.\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fto support the possibility that the policy exclusion does not exist or does not apply.\\nThus, we agree with the district court that Doe’s negligence claim is futile.\\n\\n Likewise, the district court correctly determined that Doe’s Arkansas\\nconstitutional claim is futile. It relied on an Arkansas Supreme Court decision holding\\nthat Ark. Code Ann. section 21-9-301 is consistent with the same Arkansas\\nconstitutional provisions to which Doe points. See White v. City of Newport, 326 Ark.\\n667, 672 (1996). Doe nevertheless claims that the Arkansas Supreme Court “signaled\\na sea change” in Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Arkansas v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12 (2018).\\nShe contends that Andrews “singled out [the court’s] 1996-era caselaw,” which\\nincludes White, “for failing to strictly construe and enforce constitutional provisions.”\\nBut Andrews involved sovereign immunity, and we see no reason why its dicta affects\\nthe holding in White. Thus, we agree with the district court that this claim is likewise\\nfutile.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2697,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4633561,"string":"4,633,561"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Federated Mutual Insurance Com v. FedNat Holding Com"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-27"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2430"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2430\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Federated Mutual Insurance Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n FedNat Holding Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 13, 2019\\n Filed: June 27, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n FedNat Holding Company (“FedNat”) appeals the district court’s judgment\\nconfirming an arbitration award in favor of Federated Mutual Insurance Company\\n(“Federated Mutual”). We conclude that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction\\nover FedNat, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand with instructions to\\ndismiss.\\n\\f Federated Mutual is a Minnesota insurance company that owns various\\ntrademarks containing the word “Federated.” FedNat, a Florida insurance company,\\nwas previously known as 21st Century Holding Company. In 2012, it adopted the\\nname Federated National Holding Company. Federated Mutual was concerned that\\nthis new name was confusingly similar to its own. In 2013, the two companies\\nentered into a Co-Existence Agreement (the “Agreement”) under which Federated\\nNational Holding Company promised to take steps to minimize confusion and adopt\\na new name within seven years. It also agreed to give Federated Mutual a chance to\\nobject to its new name.\\n\\n In 2014, Federated National Holding Company began using the name FedNat.\\nIt did not notify Federated Mutual as required by the Agreement, and it continued to\\nuse the phrase “Federated National” in conjunction with its new name. Federated\\nMutual stated that it received “hundreds of misdirected calls and correspondence”\\nfrom confused customers each year, and it initiated arbitration to enforce the\\nAgreement. The arbitrator allowed FedNat to continue using the name “FedNat” but\\nruled that it must cease using the term “Federated” within ninety days.\\n\\n Federated Mutual filed a petition to confirm the arbitrator’s award in the U.S.\\nDistrict Court for the District of Minnesota, and the court entered judgment in its\\nfavor. See 9 U.S.C. § 9. On appeal, FedNat argues that the district court lacked\\nsubject-matter and personal jurisdiction and that the arbitrator exceeded his\\nauthority.1\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n In its brief on appeal, Federated Mutual argued that FedNat’s compliance with\\nthe arbitrator’s award rendered this appeal moot. Federated Mutual filed a motion to\\nsupplement the record with supporting documentation, which FedNat opposed.\\nFedNat filed a motion to strike Federated Mutual’s addendum and the portions of its\\nbrief relying on that material, and FedNat also sought to toll its reply brief deadline\\npending this court’s ruling on its motion. At oral argument, Federated Mutual\\nconceded that the appeal is not moot. Because these motions do not affect the\\noutcome of this appeal, we deny them.\\n -2-\\n\\f Because FedNat’s arguments concerning subject-matter jurisdiction raise\\ncomplicated questions, we first consider whether the district court had personal\\njurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999)\\n(allowing a court to consider personal jurisdiction before subject-matter jurisdiction\\nwhere “the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel\\nquestion”). We review personal jurisdiction de novo. K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach\\n& CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n Federated Mutual alleges that FedNat is subject to specific personal jurisdiction\\nin Minnesota. “Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of action\\narising from or related to a defendant’s actions within the forum state . . . .” Bell\\nPaper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1994). A district court\\nmay exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only to the extent\\npermitted by the state’s long-arm statute and the Constitution’s due process clause.\\nCoen v. Coen, 509 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2007). Because Minnesota’s long-arm\\nstatute extends as far as the Constitution allows, we must determine whether the\\ndistrict court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process. See id.\\n\\n The due process clause requires that “the defendant purposefully established\\n‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.\\n462, 474 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment\\nComp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A defendant’s contacts with the\\nforum state must be “such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court\\nthere.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).\\n“Sufficient minimum contacts requires some act by which the defendant purposely\\navails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus\\ninvoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs.\\nCorp., 760 F.3d 816, 821 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under\\nour five-factor test for assessing the sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts, we\\nconsider “(1) the nature and quality of contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest\\nof the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the\\nparties.” Burlington Indus. v. Maples Indus., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996).\\nThe first three factors are the most important. Id.\\n\\n In finding personal jurisdiction over FedNat, the district court cited three\\nfeatures of the parties’ Agreement: its Minnesota choice-of-law provision, its\\nbenefits to Federated Mutual in Minnesota, and its requirement that FedNat “regularly\\ncommunicate” with Federated Mutual in Minnesota during a seven-year term. We\\ndisagree that these considerations subject FedNat to personal jurisdiction in\\nMinnesota.\\n\\n First, “choice-of-law provisions specifying that the forum state’s laws govern\\nare insufficient on their own to confer personal jurisdiction.” K-V Pharm. Co., 648\\nF.3d at 594. Thus, while relevant to the analysis, the Agreement’s Minnesota choice-\\nof-law provision alone does not establish personal jurisdiction.\\n\\n Second, the fact that the Agreement affected Federated Mutual in Minnesota\\ndoes not subject FedNat to personal jurisdiction there. Federated Mutual stated that\\n“it receives hundreds of misdirected calls and correspondence each year due to the\\nsimilarity of the names.” But the Supreme Court has explained that the “proper\\nquestion is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but\\nwhether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”\\nWalden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014). The relationship between Federated\\nMutual and Minnesota “must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates\\nwith the forum State,” and our “analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the\\nforum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id.\\nat 284-85 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the fact that the Agreement\\naffected Federated Mutual’s business in Minnesota does not support the district\\ncourt’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over FedNat.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Finally, our five-factor test shows that FedNat did not “enter[] a contractual\\nrelationship that ‘envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts’” in Minnesota.\\nSee id. at 285 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-80). FedNat conducts no\\nbusiness in Minnesota and lacks a physical presence there, see id. (pointing out the\\nrelevance of physical entry into a state), and it negotiated the Agreement with\\nFederated Mutual by mail and email through its counsel located in Florida, see\\nFastpath, 760 F.3d at 824 (“Although letters and faxes may be used to support the\\nexercise of personal jurisdiction, they do not themselves establish jurisdiction.”). The\\ndistrict court nonetheless concluded that the Agreement contemplated regular\\ncommunications between FedNat and Federated Mutual in Minnesota. But the\\nAgreement simply required that FedNat give Federated Mutual notice and an\\nopportunity to object to its new name. It is silent as to where this exchange of\\ninformation was to take place, and directing a few emails or letters to Federated\\nMutual in Minnesota is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction there. See id.\\nat 823-24. While the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision weighs in favor of\\npersonal jurisdiction, the overall nature, quality, and quantity of FedNat’s contacts\\nwith Minnesota do not reflect the “meaningful” connection required by due process\\nto ensure that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair\\nplay and substantial justice.” See Walden, 571 U.S. at 283, 290 (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted); Burlington Indus., 97 F.3d at 1102. Moreover, Minnesota’s interest\\nin providing a forum for its residents and the convenience to Federated Mutual in\\nbringing its action there “cannot make up for the absence of minimum contacts.”\\nFastpath, 760 F.3d at 824.\\n\\n For these reasons, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over FedNat.\\nWe vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4410814/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"GRUENDER\": \", Circuit\", \"BENTON\": \", Circuit\", \"GRASZ\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633561/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Federated Mutual Insurance Com v. FedNat Holding Com\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2430\n ___________________________\n\n Federated Mutual Insurance Company\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n FedNat Holding Company\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota\n ____________\n\n Submitted: March 13, 2019\n Filed: June 27, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\n\n FedNat Holding Company (“FedNat”) appeals the district court’s judgment\nconfirming an arbitration award in favor of Federated Mutual Insurance Company\n(“Federated Mutual”). We conclude that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction\nover FedNat, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand with instructions to\ndismiss.\n\f Federated Mutual is a Minnesota insurance company that owns various\ntrademarks containing the word “Federated.” FedNat, a Florida insurance company,\nwas previously known as 21st Century Holding Company. In 2012, it adopted the\nname Federated National Holding Company. Federated Mutual was concerned that\nthis new name was confusingly similar to its own. In 2013, the two companies\nentered into a Co-Existence Agreement (the “Agreement”) under which Federated\nNational Holding Company promised to take steps to minimize confusion and adopt\na new name within seven years. It also agreed to give Federated Mutual a chance to\nobject to its new name.\n\n In 2014, Federated National Holding Company began using the name FedNat.\nIt did not notify Federated Mutual as required by the Agreement, and it continued to\nuse the phrase “Federated National” in conjunction with its new name. Federated\nMutual stated that it received “hundreds of misdirected calls and correspondence”\nfrom confused customers each year, and it initiated arbitration to enforce the\nAgreement. The arbitrator allowed FedNat to continue using the name “FedNat” but\nruled that it must cease using the term “Federated” within ninety days.\n\n Federated Mutual filed a petition to confirm the arbitrator’s award in the U.S.\nDistrict Court for the District of Minnesota, and the court entered judgment in its\nfavor. See 9 U.S.C. § 9. On appeal, FedNat argues that the district court lacked\nsubject-matter and personal jurisdiction and that the arbitrator exceeded his\nauthority.1\n\n\n\n 1\n In its brief on appeal, Federated Mutual argued that FedNat’s compliance with\nthe arbitrator’s award rendered this appeal moot. Federated Mutual filed a motion to\nsupplement the record with supporting documentation, which FedNat opposed.\nFedNat filed a motion to strike Federated Mutual’s addendum and the portions of its\nbrief relying on that material, and FedNat also sought to toll its reply brief deadline\npending this court’s ruling on its motion. At oral argument, Federated Mutual\nconceded that the appeal is not moot. Because these motions do not affect the\noutcome of this appeal, we deny them.\n -2-\n\f Because FedNat’s arguments concerning subject-matter jurisdiction raise\ncomplicated questions, we first consider whether the district court had personal\njurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999)\n(allowing a court to consider personal jurisdiction before subject-matter jurisdiction\nwhere “the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel\nquestion”). We review personal jurisdiction de novo. K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach\n& CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2011).\n\n Federated Mutual alleges that FedNat is subject to specific personal jurisdiction\nin Minnesota. “Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of action\narising from or related to a defendant’s actions within the forum state . . . .” Bell\nPaper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1994). A district court\nmay exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only to the extent\npermitted by the state’s long-arm statute and the Constitution’s due process clause.\nCoen v. Coen, 509 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2007). Because Minnesota’s long-arm\nstatute extends as far as the Constitution allows, we must determine whether the\ndistrict court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process. See id.\n\n The due process clause requires that “the defendant purposefully established\n‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.\n462, 474 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment\nComp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A defendant’s contacts with the\nforum state must be “such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court\nthere.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).\n“Sufficient minimum contacts requires some act by which the defendant purposely\navails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus\ninvoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs.\nCorp., 760 F.3d 816, 821 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under\nour five-factor test for assessing the sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts, we\nconsider “(1) the nature and quality of contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity\n\n -3-\n\fof such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest\nof the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the\nparties.” Burlington Indus. v. Maples Indus., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996).\nThe first three factors are the most important. Id.\n\n In finding personal jurisdiction over FedNat, the district court cited three\nfeatures of the parties’ Agreement: its Minnesota choice-of-law provision, its\nbenefits to Federated Mutual in Minnesota, and its requirement that FedNat “regularly\ncommunicate” with Federated Mutual in Minnesota during a seven-year term. We\ndisagree that these considerations subject FedNat to personal jurisdiction in\nMinnesota.\n\n First, “choice-of-law provisions specifying that the forum state’s laws govern\nare insufficient on their own to confer personal jurisdiction.” K-V Pharm. Co., 648\nF.3d at 594. Thus, while relevant to the analysis, the Agreement’s Minnesota choice-\nof-law provision alone does not establish personal jurisdiction.\n\n Second, the fact that the Agreement affected Federated Mutual in Minnesota\ndoes not subject FedNat to personal jurisdiction there. Federated Mutual stated that\n“it receives hundreds of misdirected calls and correspondence each year due to the\nsimilarity of the names.” But the Supreme Court has explained that the “proper\nquestion is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but\nwhether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”\nWalden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014). The relationship between Federated\nMutual and Minnesota “must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates\nwith the forum State,” and our “analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the\nforum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id.\nat 284-85 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the fact that the Agreement\naffected Federated Mutual’s business in Minnesota does not support the district\ncourt’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over FedNat.\n\n -4-\n\f Finally, our five-factor test shows that FedNat did not “enter[] a contractual\nrelationship that ‘envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts’” in Minnesota.\nSee id. at 285 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-80). FedNat conducts no\nbusiness in Minnesota and lacks a physical presence there, see id. (pointing out the\nrelevance of physical entry into a state), and it negotiated the Agreement with\nFederated Mutual by mail and email through its counsel located in Florida, see\nFastpath, 760 F.3d at 824 (“Although letters and faxes may be used to support the\nexercise of personal jurisdiction, they do not themselves establish jurisdiction.”). The\ndistrict court nonetheless concluded that the Agreement contemplated regular\ncommunications between FedNat and Federated Mutual in Minnesota. But the\nAgreement simply required that FedNat give Federated Mutual notice and an\nopportunity to object to its new name. It is silent as to where this exchange of\ninformation was to take place, and directing a few emails or letters to Federated\nMutual in Minnesota is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction there. See id.\nat 823-24. While the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision weighs in favor of\npersonal jurisdiction, the overall nature, quality, and quantity of FedNat’s contacts\nwith Minnesota do not reflect the “meaningful” connection required by due process\nto ensure that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair\nplay and substantial justice.” See Walden, 571 U.S. at 283, 290 (internal quotation\nmarks omitted); Burlington Indus., 97 F.3d at 1102. Moreover, Minnesota’s interest\nin providing a forum for its residents and the convenience to Federated Mutual in\nbringing its action there “cannot make up for the absence of minimum contacts.”\nFastpath, 760 F.3d at 824.\n\n For these reasons, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over FedNat.\nWe vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Federated Mutual Insurance Com v. FedNat Holding Com\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2430\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Federated Mutual Insurance Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n FedNat Holding Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 13, 2019\\n Filed: June 27, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n FedNat Holding Company (“FedNat”) appeals the district court’s judgment\\nconfirming an arbitration award in favor of Federated Mutual Insurance Company\\n(“Federated Mutual”). We conclude that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction\\nover FedNat, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand with instructions to\\ndismiss.\\n\\f Federated Mutual is a Minnesota insurance company that owns various\\ntrademarks containing the word “Federated.” FedNat, a Florida insurance company,\\nwas previously known as 21st Century Holding Company. In 2012, it adopted the\\nname Federated National Holding Company. Federated Mutual was concerned that\\nthis new name was confusingly similar to its own. In 2013, the two companies\\nentered into a Co-Existence Agreement (the “Agreement”) under which Federated\\nNational Holding Company promised to take steps to minimize confusion and adopt\\na new name within seven years. It also agreed to give Federated Mutual a chance to\\nobject to its new name.\\n\\n In 2014, Federated National Holding Company began using the name FedNat.\\nIt did not notify Federated Mutual as required by the Agreement, and it continued to\\nuse the phrase “Federated National” in conjunction with its new name. Federated\\nMutual stated that it received “hundreds of misdirected calls and correspondence”\\nfrom confused customers each year, and it initiated arbitration to enforce the\\nAgreement. The arbitrator allowed FedNat to continue using the name “FedNat” but\\nruled that it must cease using the term “Federated” within ninety days.\\n\\n Federated Mutual filed a petition to confirm the arbitrator’s award in the U.S.\\nDistrict Court for the District of Minnesota, and the court entered judgment in its\\nfavor. See 9 U.S.C. § 9. On appeal, FedNat argues that the district court lacked\\nsubject-matter and personal jurisdiction and that the arbitrator exceeded his\\nauthority.1\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n In its brief on appeal, Federated Mutual argued that FedNat’s compliance with\\nthe arbitrator’s award rendered this appeal moot. Federated Mutual filed a motion to\\nsupplement the record with supporting documentation, which FedNat opposed.\\nFedNat filed a motion to strike Federated Mutual’s addendum and the portions of its\\nbrief relying on that material, and FedNat also sought to toll its reply brief deadline\\npending this court’s ruling on its motion. At oral argument, Federated Mutual\\nconceded that the appeal is not moot. Because these motions do not affect the\\noutcome of this appeal, we deny them.\\n -2-\\n\\f Because FedNat’s arguments concerning subject-matter jurisdiction raise\\ncomplicated questions, we first consider whether the district court had personal\\njurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999)\\n(allowing a court to consider personal jurisdiction before subject-matter jurisdiction\\nwhere “the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel\\nquestion”). We review personal jurisdiction de novo. K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach\\n& CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n Federated Mutual alleges that FedNat is subject to specific personal jurisdiction\\nin Minnesota. “Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of action\\narising from or related to a defendant’s actions within the forum state . . . .” Bell\\nPaper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1994). A district court\\nmay exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only to the extent\\npermitted by the state’s long-arm statute and the Constitution’s due process clause.\\nCoen v. Coen, 509 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2007). Because Minnesota’s long-arm\\nstatute extends as far as the Constitution allows, we must determine whether the\\ndistrict court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process. See id.\\n\\n The due process clause requires that “the defendant purposefully established\\n‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.\\n462, 474 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment\\nComp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A defendant’s contacts with the\\nforum state must be “such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court\\nthere.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).\\n“Sufficient minimum contacts requires some act by which the defendant purposely\\navails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus\\ninvoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs.\\nCorp., 760 F.3d 816, 821 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under\\nour five-factor test for assessing the sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts, we\\nconsider “(1) the nature and quality of contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest\\nof the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the\\nparties.” Burlington Indus. v. Maples Indus., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996).\\nThe first three factors are the most important. Id.\\n\\n In finding personal jurisdiction over FedNat, the district court cited three\\nfeatures of the parties’ Agreement: its Minnesota choice-of-law provision, its\\nbenefits to Federated Mutual in Minnesota, and its requirement that FedNat “regularly\\ncommunicate” with Federated Mutual in Minnesota during a seven-year term. We\\ndisagree that these considerations subject FedNat to personal jurisdiction in\\nMinnesota.\\n\\n First, “choice-of-law provisions specifying that the forum state’s laws govern\\nare insufficient on their own to confer personal jurisdiction.” K-V Pharm. Co., 648\\nF.3d at 594. Thus, while relevant to the analysis, the Agreement’s Minnesota choice-\\nof-law provision alone does not establish personal jurisdiction.\\n\\n Second, the fact that the Agreement affected Federated Mutual in Minnesota\\ndoes not subject FedNat to personal jurisdiction there. Federated Mutual stated that\\n“it receives hundreds of misdirected calls and correspondence each year due to the\\nsimilarity of the names.” But the Supreme Court has explained that the “proper\\nquestion is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but\\nwhether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”\\nWalden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014). The relationship between Federated\\nMutual and Minnesota “must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates\\nwith the forum State,” and our “analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the\\nforum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id.\\nat 284-85 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the fact that the Agreement\\naffected Federated Mutual’s business in Minnesota does not support the district\\ncourt’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over FedNat.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Finally, our five-factor test shows that FedNat did not “enter[] a contractual\\nrelationship that ‘envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts’” in Minnesota.\\nSee id. at 285 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-80). FedNat conducts no\\nbusiness in Minnesota and lacks a physical presence there, see id. (pointing out the\\nrelevance of physical entry into a state), and it negotiated the Agreement with\\nFederated Mutual by mail and email through its counsel located in Florida, see\\nFastpath, 760 F.3d at 824 (“Although letters and faxes may be used to support the\\nexercise of personal jurisdiction, they do not themselves establish jurisdiction.”). The\\ndistrict court nonetheless concluded that the Agreement contemplated regular\\ncommunications between FedNat and Federated Mutual in Minnesota. But the\\nAgreement simply required that FedNat give Federated Mutual notice and an\\nopportunity to object to its new name. It is silent as to where this exchange of\\ninformation was to take place, and directing a few emails or letters to Federated\\nMutual in Minnesota is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction there. See id.\\nat 823-24. While the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision weighs in favor of\\npersonal jurisdiction, the overall nature, quality, and quantity of FedNat’s contacts\\nwith Minnesota do not reflect the “meaningful” connection required by due process\\nto ensure that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair\\nplay and substantial justice.” See Walden, 571 U.S. at 283, 290 (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted); Burlington Indus., 97 F.3d at 1102. Moreover, Minnesota’s interest\\nin providing a forum for its residents and the convenience to Federated Mutual in\\nbringing its action there “cannot make up for the absence of minimum contacts.”\\nFastpath, 760 F.3d at 824.\\n\\n For these reasons, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over FedNat.\\nWe vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2698,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4633562,"string":"4,633,562"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Clay Irwin THOMAS Plaintiff - Appellant v. Scott ESCHEN; Kathy Eschen; Greg Ort; Garry Keller Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Clay Thomas v. Scott Eschen"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-27"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3385"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Grasz, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3385\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Clay Irwin Thomas\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Scott Eschen; Kathy Eschen; Greg Ort; Garry Keller\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\\n Filed: June 27, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Clay Thomas, an Iowa state prisoner, claims that prison officials violated his\\nEighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they had him civilly committed and\\nforcibly medicated. Because Thomas’s wrongful-commitment claim “is not\\ncognizable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983,” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994),\\n\\fand his forced-medication claim lacks evidentiary support, we affirm the district\\ncourt’s 1 grant of summary judgment dismissing both claims.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Iowa prison officials successfully applied to have Thomas civilly committed\\nin 2013. See In re C.I.T. (Thomas I), No. 14-0760, 2015 WL 576172, at *1–2 (Iowa\\nCt. App. Feb. 11, 2015) (unpublished). Since then, Iowa courts have repeatedly\\nextended his civil commitment based on evidence that he is “seriously mentally\\nimpaired” and poses a danger to himself and others. See, e.g., id.; In re C.I.T.\\n(Thomas II), 885 N.W.2d 830, 2016 WL 4036244, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 27,\\n2016) (unpublished); cf. In re C.T. (Thomas III), No. 18-0320, 2018 WL 6706242,\\nat *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2018) (unpublished) (affirming on procedural\\ngrounds). In particular, these decisions have emphasized Thomas’s misbehavior in\\nprison, including incidents in which he “stood up and pushed a table at a staff\\nmember,” Thomas I, 2015 WL 576172, at *1, and “was involved in a physical\\naltercation with another inmate,” Thomas II, 2016 WL 4036244, at *1.\\n\\n Meanwhile, in 2016, Thomas brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\\nagainst several prison officials for “improperly civilly committ[ing]” him. His\\ntheory was that they misrepresented what he did in prison and, at certain points, had\\nactually “encouraged” him to misbehave, which they then used to justify his civil\\ncommitment. Once he was committed, Thomas alleges, the officials had him\\nforcibly medicated, which has “caused . . . significant emotional and mental harm.”\\nThe district court dismissed Thomas’s claims on summary judgment. Our review of\\nits decision is de novo. See Allard v. Baldwin, 779 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the\\nSouthern District of Iowa.\\n -2-\\n\\f II.\\n\\n Thomas’s principal claim is that civilly committing him violated his\\nconstitutional rights. Although Thomas does not challenge the constitutionality of\\nIowa’s civil-commitment system in the abstract, he complains that prison officials\\nhad him wrongfully committed through deception and manipulation.\\n\\n Thomas’s claim, however, collides with the rule from Heck v. Humphrey. In\\nHeck, the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages is “not cognizable under\\n§ 1983” if it would undermine a still-valid state criminal judgment. 512 U.S. at 486–\\n87. To be sure, Thomas’s claim involves a civil-commitment order, not a criminal\\nconviction, and neither this court nor the Supreme Court has applied Heck in this\\nparticular context, at least in a published decision.2 Cf. id. at 486 (invoking “the\\nhoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the\\nvalidity of outstanding criminal judgments” (emphasis added)). Even so, Heck’s\\nlogic reaches Thomas’s wrongful-commitment claim too.\\n\\n Heck addressed a state prisoner’s allegations that officials involved in his\\nprosecution had conducted an unlawful investigation, destroyed exculpatory\\nmaterials, and introduced illegal evidence at his trial. Id. at 479. Relying on the\\npremise that “the common law of torts . . . provide[s] the appropriate starting point\\nfor the inquiry under [section 1983],” the Supreme Court “analog[ized] [the\\nprisoner’s] claims” to the closest “common-law cause of action” it could find:\\nmalicious prosecution. Id. at 483–84 (citation omitted); cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.\\n\\n 2\\n Cf. Taft v. Branstad, 754 F. App’x 503, 504 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019) (unpublished\\nper curiam) (applying Heck to claims that “might be construed as an attempt to\\nobtain discharge from [civil commitment]”); Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 406\\n(8th Cir. 2017) (discussing Heck in the context of civil commitments, but then\\nholding that it did not apply because the plaintiffs were not attacking the validity of\\ntheir commitments or asking for immediate release); Coffman v. Blake, 156 F. App’x\\n863, 863–84 (8th Cir. 2005) (unpublished per curiam) (applying Heck to claims by\\na civilly committed person); Carter v. Bickhaus, 142 F. App’x 937, 938 (8th Cir.\\n2005) (unpublished per curiam) (same).\\n -3-\\n\\f30, 34 (1983) (interpreting section 1983 in light of both modern tort law and tort law\\nas it existed in 1871—the year Congress enacted the statute). It then reasoned that,\\nbecause “[o]ne element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution\\naction is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused,” the\\nprisoner’s still-valid conviction meant that his claims were “not cognizable under\\n§ 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 487. A contrary rule, the Court explained, posed\\nthe risk of having “parallel litigation” leading to “two conflicting resolutions arising\\nout of the same or identical transaction,” which would undermine both “finality and\\nconsistency.” Id. at 484–85 (citation omitted).\\n\\n The same is true in this case. Iowa courts have extended Thomas’s\\ncommitment several times since he filed his section 1983 action, so the risk of\\nparallel litigation is not just hypothetical here. See, e.g., Thomas II, 2016 WL\\n4036244, at *1; Thomas III, 2018 WL 6706242, at *1. And as in Heck, Thomas is\\ntrying to use section 1983 to bring what is essentially a malicious-prosecution claim.\\n\\n Courts have long recognized that individuals like Thomas can sue those who\\npursue “unfounded proceedings . . . to have [them] declared insane” for malicious\\nprosecution, even if the proceedings are “not criminal in their nature.” Thomas M.\\nCooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 188 (1879); accord 1 Fowler V. Harper et\\nal., Harper, James and Gray on Torts 525–26 (3d ed. 2006); W. Page Keeton et al.,\\nProsser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 890 (5th ed. 1984); see also, e.g., Lockenour\\nv. Sides, 57 Ind. 360, 364–65 (1877) (authorizing an action against defendants who,\\n“maliciously and without probable cause,” brought “proceedings to procure the\\nplaintiff to be found insane”).3 Those who “institute[] and carr[y] on” such\\n\\n\\n 3\\n There is a longstanding split involving whether an individual can sue over\\nany malicious civil prosecution, or just one that inflicts a “special injury.” Keeton\\net al., supra, at 889–90; see also Cooley, supra, at 187; Kolka v. Jones, 71 N.W. 558,\\n559 (N.D. 1897) (collecting cases). This debate is immaterial here, however,\\nbecause even those jurisdictions that require a special injury recognize that a\\nmalicious civil-commitment proceeding creates one. Keeton et al., supra, at 890 &\\nn.7; see also Cooley, supra, at 188; cf. Kolka, 71 N.W. at 559 (noting a widely\\n -4-\\n\\fproceedings are liable for any false representations they make about the victim’s\\ncompetency. Lockenour, 57 Ind. at 360, 364; accord Keeton et al., supra, at 893\\n(explaining that the victim may sue anyone who “play[ed] a major role in instigating\\nthe [malicious] action”); see also, e.g., Reade v. Halpin, 193 A.D. 566, 569–70 (N.Y.\\nApp. Div. 1920) (highlighting allegations that the defendants provided “false\\ninformation” to the “medical examiners [who] certified to the lunacy of the\\nplaintiff”), appeal dismissed, 130 N.E. 905 (N.Y. 1921) (per curiam).\\n\\n To bring such an action, however, the plaintiff ordinarily has to “prove the\\ntermination of the former proceeding in his favor.”4 Keeton et al., supra, at 892;\\naccord Harper et al., supra, at 515–16 (noting that “[t]he same conditions necessary\\nto support a tort action for the malicious prosecution of criminal proceedings are\\ngenerally required in the case of civil proceedings”); cf. Cooley, supra, at 187–88.5\\n\\naccepted cause of action for wrongful civil proceedings that involve “the arrest of\\nthe person,” “the seizure of property,” or “other special circumstances”).\\n 4\\n Courts have recognized an exception to the favorable-termination\\nrequirement when the underlying civil proceeding was “an ex parte one [in which]\\nrelief [was] granted without an opportunity for the party against whom it [was]\\nsought to be heard.” Keeton et al., supra, at 892; accord Harper et al., supra, at 515–\\n16; cf. Cooley, supra, at 188. This carveout is not relevant here because Thomas\\ndoes not claim that he lacked an opportunity to argue against civil commitment. To\\nthe contrary, his complaint alleged that he “was able to challenge the civil\\ncommitment . . . and call[] witnesses to testify.” See also, e.g., Thomas I, 2015 WL\\n576172, at *1 (considering and rejecting Thomas’s objections); Thomas II, 2016 WL\\n4036244, at *1 (same).\\n 5\\n See also, e.g., Barton v. Woodward, 182 P. 916, 917 (Idaho 1919) (mem.)\\n(referencing the favorable-termination requirement); Lockenour, 57 Ind. at 361,\\n364–65 (same); Fowle v. Fowle, 140 S.E.2d 398, 401–02 (N.C. 1965) (explaining\\nthat another court had already determined that the plaintiff was “being improperly\\nrestrained [and had] ordered her release”); Straka v. Voyles, 252 P. 677, 678 (Utah\\n1927) (noting that the plaintiff was “adjudged . . . not insane”). But cf. Fisher v.\\nPayne, 113 So. 378, 380–81 (Fla. 1927) (suggesting, in dicta, that this requirement\\ndoes not apply when a plaintiff has been committed under a statutory “inquisition”\\nprocess rather than an adversarial “criminal prosecution or a civil action”); Kellogg\\n -5-\\n\\fGiven that Thomas has not done so, we have little trouble concluding that his claim\\n“is not cognizable under § 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. To hold otherwise would\\nundermine “finality and consistency” and encourage “parallel litigation.” Id. at 484–\\n85 (citation omitted).\\n\\n Thomas argues that Heck does not apply because his wrongful-commitment\\nclaim is based on the underlying “conduct” of prison officials, not on the “fact of\\n[his] civil commitment itself.” He reasons that, because Heck does not apply to\\nconstitutional claims that, “if successful, would not necessarily imply that the . . .\\nconviction was unlawful,” Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir. 2000) (per\\ncuriam) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7), his claim may proceed. His theory is\\nthat facts other than the deceptive and manipulative conduct of prison officials led\\nto his commitment, particularly the extent of his mental illness.\\n\\n But Thomas’s attempt to distinguish this case from Heck conflicts with both\\nhis theory of the case and the description of the injury he allegedly suffered. He\\ndoes not claim that encouraging him to misbehave, by itself, violated his\\nconstitutional rights or injured him. Rather, he alleges that relying on his\\nmisbehavior to civilly commit him is what gave rise to his cause of action. Indeed,\\nas Thomas told the district court, his “constitutional rights were violated because\\n[prison officials] obtained a civil commitment against him.” (Emphasis added).\\n\\n In short, Thomas’s real complaint is that he never should have been committed\\nin the first place. This has also been his central argument throughout the Iowa\\nproceedings, and each time the Iowa courts have disagreed with him. As long as\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nv. Cochran, 25 P. 677, 679 (Cal. 1890) (dispensing with this requirement because,\\nunder California law, the initial judicial commitment order was “only preliminary”\\nand “the final determination[] as to whether the person committed is insane . . . [was]\\nto be made . . . by the resident physician of the asylum”).\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fthose judgments stand, he cannot proceed with his wrongful-commitment claim. 6\\nHeck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; cf. Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007)\\n(explaining that the favorable-termination requirement applies even after the\\nplaintiff has been released from custody).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Thomas also claims that forcibly medicating him violated his constitutional\\nrights. This type of allegation is different from his wrongful-commitment claim\\nbecause “requests for relief turning on [the] circumstances of confinement” do not\\nnecessarily affect the “validity of [the] confinement” itself. Muhammad v. Close,\\n540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam) (emphases added). If officials forced Thomas\\nto take drugs having no connection to his mental illness or intentionally injured him\\nwhile treating him, for example, then Thomas could have a viable damages claim\\nunder section 1983. See, e.g., Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 697–98 (8th Cir.\\n1997) (considering a forced-medication claim and explaining that the Due Process\\nClause requires this sort of treatment to be “in the [individual’s] medical interest”\\n(citation omitted)).\\n\\n But here, even though the case advanced to summary judgment, Thomas never\\npresented evidence that would have allowed a reasonable factfinder to conclude that\\nhis constitutional rights had been violated. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477\\nU.S. 242, 248 (1986). The record is silent about when or how the drugs were\\nadministered. And we do not even have an idea about what kinds of drugs he was\\nallegedly forced to take. Cf. Morgan, 128 F.3d at 698 (evaluating particular\\n“instances when [the plaintiff] was forcibly injected”).\\n\\n\\n 6\\n The district court did not specify whether it dismissed Thomas’s wrongful-\\ncommitment claim with or without prejudice. The appropriate disposition under\\nHeck is to dismiss it without prejudice, which will allow Thomas to refile it if he can\\nsatisfy the favorable-termination requirement at some point. See Schafer v. Moore,\\n46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (modifying the dismissal of a Heck-\\nbarred claim “to be without prejudice”).\\n -7-\\n\\f It was Thomas’s burden, as the plaintiff, to introduce evidence supporting his\\nclaims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986) (explaining that\\nsummary judgment is proper when the party with the burden of proof “has failed to\\nmake a sufficient showing on an essential element”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Instead, he\\noffered only threadbare allegations, including that he was “medicated . . . for the\\nwrong reasons.” But this does not tell us what, when, where, why, or how drugs\\nwere administered. Cf. Morgan, 128 F.3d at 697–98 (reviewing specific details in\\nthe record). So even though no one argues that we should affirm on this particular\\nground, we still think that Thomas’s lack of proof dooms his forced-medication\\nclaim. See Hohn v. BNSF Ry. Co., 707 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining\\nthat we “may affirm [summary] judgment on any basis supported by the record”).\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n We accordingly affirm the grant of summary judgment, except that we clarify\\nthat the dismissal of Thomas’s wrongful-commitment claim is without prejudice.\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4410815/\", \"author_raw\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633562/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Clay Irwin THOMAS Plaintiff - Appellant v. Scott ESCHEN; Kathy Eschen; Greg Ort; Garry Keller Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3385\n ___________________________\n\n Clay Irwin Thomas\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Scott Eschen; Kathy Eschen; Greg Ort; Garry Keller\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\n Filed: June 27, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\n\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\n\n Clay Thomas, an Iowa state prisoner, claims that prison officials violated his\nEighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they had him civilly committed and\nforcibly medicated. Because Thomas’s wrongful-commitment claim “is not\ncognizable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983,” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994),\n\fand his forced-medication claim lacks evidentiary support, we affirm the district\ncourt’s 1 grant of summary judgment dismissing both claims.\n\n I.\n\n Iowa prison officials successfully applied to have Thomas civilly committed\nin 2013. See In re C.I.T. (Thomas I), No. 14-0760, 2015 WL 576172, at *1–2 (Iowa\nCt. App. Feb. 11, 2015) (unpublished). Since then, Iowa courts have repeatedly\nextended his civil commitment based on evidence that he is “seriously mentally\nimpaired” and poses a danger to himself and others. See, e.g., id.; In re C.I.T.\n(Thomas II), 885 N.W.2d 830, 2016 WL 4036244, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 27,\n2016) (unpublished); cf. In re C.T. (Thomas III), No. 18-0320, 2018 WL 6706242,\nat *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2018) (unpublished) (affirming on procedural\ngrounds). In particular, these decisions have emphasized Thomas’s misbehavior in\nprison, including incidents in which he “stood up and pushed a table at a staff\nmember,” Thomas I, 2015 WL 576172, at *1, and “was involved in a physical\naltercation with another inmate,” Thomas II, 2016 WL 4036244, at *1.\n\n Meanwhile, in 2016, Thomas brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\nagainst several prison officials for “improperly civilly committ[ing]” him. His\ntheory was that they misrepresented what he did in prison and, at certain points, had\nactually “encouraged” him to misbehave, which they then used to justify his civil\ncommitment. Once he was committed, Thomas alleges, the officials had him\nforcibly medicated, which has “caused . . . significant emotional and mental harm.”\nThe district court dismissed Thomas’s claims on summary judgment. Our review of\nits decision is de novo. See Allard v. Baldwin, 779 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the\nSouthern District of Iowa.\n -2-\n\f II.\n\n Thomas’s principal claim is that civilly committing him violated his\nconstitutional rights. Although Thomas does not challenge the constitutionality of\nIowa’s civil-commitment system in the abstract, he complains that prison officials\nhad him wrongfully committed through deception and manipulation.\n\n Thomas’s claim, however, collides with the rule from Heck v. Humphrey. In\nHeck, the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages is “not cognizable under\n§ 1983” if it would undermine a still-valid state criminal judgment. 512 U.S. at 486–\n87. To be sure, Thomas’s claim involves a civil-commitment order, not a criminal\nconviction, and neither this court nor the Supreme Court has applied Heck in this\nparticular context, at least in a published decision.2 Cf. id. at 486 (invoking “the\nhoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the\nvalidity of outstanding criminal judgments” (emphasis added)). Even so, Heck’s\nlogic reaches Thomas’s wrongful-commitment claim too.\n\n Heck addressed a state prisoner’s allegations that officials involved in his\nprosecution had conducted an unlawful investigation, destroyed exculpatory\nmaterials, and introduced illegal evidence at his trial. Id. at 479. Relying on the\npremise that “the common law of torts . . . provide[s] the appropriate starting point\nfor the inquiry under [section 1983],” the Supreme Court “analog[ized] [the\nprisoner’s] claims” to the closest “common-law cause of action” it could find:\nmalicious prosecution. Id. at 483–84 (citation omitted); cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.\n\n 2\n Cf. Taft v. Branstad, 754 F. App’x 503, 504 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019) (unpublished\nper curiam) (applying Heck to claims that “might be construed as an attempt to\nobtain discharge from [civil commitment]”); Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 406\n(8th Cir. 2017) (discussing Heck in the context of civil commitments, but then\nholding that it did not apply because the plaintiffs were not attacking the validity of\ntheir commitments or asking for immediate release); Coffman v. Blake, 156 F. App’x\n863, 863–84 (8th Cir. 2005) (unpublished per curiam) (applying Heck to claims by\na civilly committed person); Carter v. Bickhaus, 142 F. App’x 937, 938 (8th Cir.\n2005) (unpublished per curiam) (same).\n -3-\n\f30, 34 (1983) (interpreting section 1983 in light of both modern tort law and tort law\nas it existed in 1871—the year Congress enacted the statute). It then reasoned that,\nbecause “[o]ne element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution\naction is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused,” the\nprisoner’s still-valid conviction meant that his claims were “not cognizable under\n§ 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 487. A contrary rule, the Court explained, posed\nthe risk of having “parallel litigation” leading to “two conflicting resolutions arising\nout of the same or identical transaction,” which would undermine both “finality and\nconsistency.” Id. at 484–85 (citation omitted).\n\n The same is true in this case. Iowa courts have extended Thomas’s\ncommitment several times since he filed his section 1983 action, so the risk of\nparallel litigation is not just hypothetical here. See, e.g., Thomas II, 2016 WL\n4036244, at *1; Thomas III, 2018 WL 6706242, at *1. And as in Heck, Thomas is\ntrying to use section 1983 to bring what is essentially a malicious-prosecution claim.\n\n Courts have long recognized that individuals like Thomas can sue those who\npursue “unfounded proceedings . . . to have [them] declared insane” for malicious\nprosecution, even if the proceedings are “not criminal in their nature.” Thomas M.\nCooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 188 (1879); accord 1 Fowler V. Harper et\nal., Harper, James and Gray on Torts 525–26 (3d ed. 2006); W. Page Keeton et al.,\nProsser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 890 (5th ed. 1984); see also, e.g., Lockenour\nv. Sides, 57 Ind. 360, 364–65 (1877) (authorizing an action against defendants who,\n“maliciously and without probable cause,” brought “proceedings to procure the\nplaintiff to be found insane”).3 Those who “institute[] and carr[y] on” such\n\n\n 3\n There is a longstanding split involving whether an individual can sue over\nany malicious civil prosecution, or just one that inflicts a “special injury.” Keeton\net al., supra, at 889–90; see also Cooley, supra, at 187; Kolka v. Jones, 71 N.W. 558,\n559 (N.D. 1897) (collecting cases). This debate is immaterial here, however,\nbecause even those jurisdictions that require a special injury recognize that a\nmalicious civil-commitment proceeding creates one. Keeton et al., supra, at 890 &\nn.7; see also Cooley, supra, at 188; cf. Kolka, 71 N.W. at 559 (noting a widely\n -4-\n\fproceedings are liable for any false representations they make about the victim’s\ncompetency. Lockenour, 57 Ind. at 360, 364; accord Keeton et al., supra, at 893\n(explaining that the victim may sue anyone who “play[ed] a major role in instigating\nthe [malicious] action”); see also, e.g., Reade v. Halpin, 193 A.D. 566, 569–70 (N.Y.\nApp. Div. 1920) (highlighting allegations that the defendants provided “false\ninformation” to the “medical examiners [who] certified to the lunacy of the\nplaintiff”), appeal dismissed, 130 N.E. 905 (N.Y. 1921) (per curiam).\n\n To bring such an action, however, the plaintiff ordinarily has to “prove the\ntermination of the former proceeding in his favor.”4 Keeton et al., supra, at 892;\naccord Harper et al., supra, at 515–16 (noting that “[t]he same conditions necessary\nto support a tort action for the malicious prosecution of criminal proceedings are\ngenerally required in the case of civil proceedings”); cf. Cooley, supra, at 187–88.5\n\naccepted cause of action for wrongful civil proceedings that involve “the arrest of\nthe person,” “the seizure of property,” or “other special circumstances”).\n 4\n Courts have recognized an exception to the favorable-termination\nrequirement when the underlying civil proceeding was “an ex parte one [in which]\nrelief [was] granted without an opportunity for the party against whom it [was]\nsought to be heard.” Keeton et al., supra, at 892; accord Harper et al., supra, at 515–\n16; cf. Cooley, supra, at 188. This carveout is not relevant here because Thomas\ndoes not claim that he lacked an opportunity to argue against civil commitment. To\nthe contrary, his complaint alleged that he “was able to challenge the civil\ncommitment . . . and call[] witnesses to testify.” See also, e.g., Thomas I, 2015 WL\n576172, at *1 (considering and rejecting Thomas’s objections); Thomas II, 2016 WL\n4036244, at *1 (same).\n 5\n See also, e.g., Barton v. Woodward, 182 P. 916, 917 (Idaho 1919) (mem.)\n(referencing the favorable-termination requirement); Lockenour, 57 Ind. at 361,\n364–65 (same); Fowle v. Fowle, 140 S.E.2d 398, 401–02 (N.C. 1965) (explaining\nthat another court had already determined that the plaintiff was “being improperly\nrestrained [and had] ordered her release”); Straka v. Voyles, 252 P. 677, 678 (Utah\n1927) (noting that the plaintiff was “adjudged . . . not insane”). But cf. Fisher v.\nPayne, 113 So. 378, 380–81 (Fla. 1927) (suggesting, in dicta, that this requirement\ndoes not apply when a plaintiff has been committed under a statutory “inquisition”\nprocess rather than an adversarial “criminal prosecution or a civil action”); Kellogg\n -5-\n\fGiven that Thomas has not done so, we have little trouble concluding that his claim\n“is not cognizable under § 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. To hold otherwise would\nundermine “finality and consistency” and encourage “parallel litigation.” Id. at 484–\n85 (citation omitted).\n\n Thomas argues that Heck does not apply because his wrongful-commitment\nclaim is based on the underlying “conduct” of prison officials, not on the “fact of\n[his] civil commitment itself.” He reasons that, because Heck does not apply to\nconstitutional claims that, “if successful, would not necessarily imply that the . . .\nconviction was unlawful,” Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir. 2000) (per\ncuriam) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7), his claim may proceed. His theory is\nthat facts other than the deceptive and manipulative conduct of prison officials led\nto his commitment, particularly the extent of his mental illness.\n\n But Thomas’s attempt to distinguish this case from Heck conflicts with both\nhis theory of the case and the description of the injury he allegedly suffered. He\ndoes not claim that encouraging him to misbehave, by itself, violated his\nconstitutional rights or injured him. Rather, he alleges that relying on his\nmisbehavior to civilly commit him is what gave rise to his cause of action. Indeed,\nas Thomas told the district court, his “constitutional rights were violated because\n[prison officials] obtained a civil commitment against him.” (Emphasis added).\n\n In short, Thomas’s real complaint is that he never should have been committed\nin the first place. This has also been his central argument throughout the Iowa\nproceedings, and each time the Iowa courts have disagreed with him. As long as\n\n\n\n\nv. Cochran, 25 P. 677, 679 (Cal. 1890) (dispensing with this requirement because,\nunder California law, the initial judicial commitment order was “only preliminary”\nand “the final determination[] as to whether the person committed is insane . . . [was]\nto be made . . . by the resident physician of the asylum”).\n\n -6-\n\fthose judgments stand, he cannot proceed with his wrongful-commitment claim. 6\nHeck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; cf. Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007)\n(explaining that the favorable-termination requirement applies even after the\nplaintiff has been released from custody).\n\n III.\n\n Thomas also claims that forcibly medicating him violated his constitutional\nrights. This type of allegation is different from his wrongful-commitment claim\nbecause “requests for relief turning on [the] circumstances of confinement” do not\nnecessarily affect the “validity of [the] confinement” itself. Muhammad v. Close,\n540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam) (emphases added). If officials forced Thomas\nto take drugs having no connection to his mental illness or intentionally injured him\nwhile treating him, for example, then Thomas could have a viable damages claim\nunder section 1983. See, e.g., Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 697–98 (8th Cir.\n1997) (considering a forced-medication claim and explaining that the Due Process\nClause requires this sort of treatment to be “in the [individual’s] medical interest”\n(citation omitted)).\n\n But here, even though the case advanced to summary judgment, Thomas never\npresented evidence that would have allowed a reasonable factfinder to conclude that\nhis constitutional rights had been violated. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477\nU.S. 242, 248 (1986). The record is silent about when or how the drugs were\nadministered. And we do not even have an idea about what kinds of drugs he was\nallegedly forced to take. Cf. Morgan, 128 F.3d at 698 (evaluating particular\n“instances when [the plaintiff] was forcibly injected”).\n\n\n 6\n The district court did not specify whether it dismissed Thomas’s wrongful-\ncommitment claim with or without prejudice. The appropriate disposition under\nHeck is to dismiss it without prejudice, which will allow Thomas to refile it if he can\nsatisfy the favorable-termination requirement at some point. See Schafer v. Moore,\n46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (modifying the dismissal of a Heck-\nbarred claim “to be without prejudice”).\n -7-\n\f It was Thomas’s burden, as the plaintiff, to introduce evidence supporting his\nclaims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986) (explaining that\nsummary judgment is proper when the party with the burden of proof “has failed to\nmake a sufficient showing on an essential element”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Instead, he\noffered only threadbare allegations, including that he was “medicated . . . for the\nwrong reasons.” But this does not tell us what, when, where, why, or how drugs\nwere administered. Cf. Morgan, 128 F.3d at 697–98 (reviewing specific details in\nthe record). So even though no one argues that we should affirm on this particular\nground, we still think that Thomas’s lack of proof dooms his forced-medication\nclaim. See Hohn v. BNSF Ry. Co., 707 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining\nthat we “may affirm [summary] judgment on any basis supported by the record”).\n\n IV.\n\n We accordingly affirm the grant of summary judgment, except that we clarify\nthat the dismissal of Thomas’s wrongful-commitment claim is without prejudice.\n\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Clay Irwin THOMAS Plaintiff - Appellant v. Scott ESCHEN; Kathy Eschen; Greg Ort; Garry Keller Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3385\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Clay Irwin Thomas\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Scott Eschen; Kathy Eschen; Greg Ort; Garry Keller\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\\n Filed: June 27, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Clay Thomas, an Iowa state prisoner, claims that prison officials violated his\\nEighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they had him civilly committed and\\nforcibly medicated. Because Thomas’s wrongful-commitment claim “is not\\ncognizable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983,” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994),\\n\\fand his forced-medication claim lacks evidentiary support, we affirm the district\\ncourt’s 1 grant of summary judgment dismissing both claims.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Iowa prison officials successfully applied to have Thomas civilly committed\\nin 2013. See In re C.I.T. (Thomas I), No. 14-0760, 2015 WL 576172, at *1–2 (Iowa\\nCt. App. Feb. 11, 2015) (unpublished). Since then, Iowa courts have repeatedly\\nextended his civil commitment based on evidence that he is “seriously mentally\\nimpaired” and poses a danger to himself and others. See, e.g., id.; In re C.I.T.\\n(Thomas II), 885 N.W.2d 830, 2016 WL 4036244, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 27,\\n2016) (unpublished); cf. In re C.T. (Thomas III), No. 18-0320, 2018 WL 6706242,\\nat *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2018) (unpublished) (affirming on procedural\\ngrounds). In particular, these decisions have emphasized Thomas’s misbehavior in\\nprison, including incidents in which he “stood up and pushed a table at a staff\\nmember,” Thomas I, 2015 WL 576172, at *1, and “was involved in a physical\\naltercation with another inmate,” Thomas II, 2016 WL 4036244, at *1.\\n\\n Meanwhile, in 2016, Thomas brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\\nagainst several prison officials for “improperly civilly committ[ing]” him. His\\ntheory was that they misrepresented what he did in prison and, at certain points, had\\nactually “encouraged” him to misbehave, which they then used to justify his civil\\ncommitment. Once he was committed, Thomas alleges, the officials had him\\nforcibly medicated, which has “caused . . . significant emotional and mental harm.”\\nThe district court dismissed Thomas’s claims on summary judgment. Our review of\\nits decision is de novo. See Allard v. Baldwin, 779 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the\\nSouthern District of Iowa.\\n -2-\\n\\f II.\\n\\n Thomas’s principal claim is that civilly committing him violated his\\nconstitutional rights. Although Thomas does not challenge the constitutionality of\\nIowa’s civil-commitment system in the abstract, he complains that prison officials\\nhad him wrongfully committed through deception and manipulation.\\n\\n Thomas’s claim, however, collides with the rule from Heck v. Humphrey. In\\nHeck, the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages is “not cognizable under\\n§ 1983” if it would undermine a still-valid state criminal judgment. 512 U.S. at 486–\\n87. To be sure, Thomas’s claim involves a civil-commitment order, not a criminal\\nconviction, and neither this court nor the Supreme Court has applied Heck in this\\nparticular context, at least in a published decision.2 Cf. id. at 486 (invoking “the\\nhoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the\\nvalidity of outstanding criminal judgments” (emphasis added)). Even so, Heck’s\\nlogic reaches Thomas’s wrongful-commitment claim too.\\n\\n Heck addressed a state prisoner’s allegations that officials involved in his\\nprosecution had conducted an unlawful investigation, destroyed exculpatory\\nmaterials, and introduced illegal evidence at his trial. Id. at 479. Relying on the\\npremise that “the common law of torts . . . provide[s] the appropriate starting point\\nfor the inquiry under [section 1983],” the Supreme Court “analog[ized] [the\\nprisoner’s] claims” to the closest “common-law cause of action” it could find:\\nmalicious prosecution. Id. at 483–84 (citation omitted); cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.\\n\\n 2\\n Cf. Taft v. Branstad, 754 F. App’x 503, 504 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019) (unpublished\\nper curiam) (applying Heck to claims that “might be construed as an attempt to\\nobtain discharge from [civil commitment]”); Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 406\\n(8th Cir. 2017) (discussing Heck in the context of civil commitments, but then\\nholding that it did not apply because the plaintiffs were not attacking the validity of\\ntheir commitments or asking for immediate release); Coffman v. Blake, 156 F. App’x\\n863, 863–84 (8th Cir. 2005) (unpublished per curiam) (applying Heck to claims by\\na civilly committed person); Carter v. Bickhaus, 142 F. App’x 937, 938 (8th Cir.\\n2005) (unpublished per curiam) (same).\\n -3-\\n\\f30, 34 (1983) (interpreting section 1983 in light of both modern tort law and tort law\\nas it existed in 1871—the year Congress enacted the statute). It then reasoned that,\\nbecause “[o]ne element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution\\naction is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused,” the\\nprisoner’s still-valid conviction meant that his claims were “not cognizable under\\n§ 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 487. A contrary rule, the Court explained, posed\\nthe risk of having “parallel litigation” leading to “two conflicting resolutions arising\\nout of the same or identical transaction,” which would undermine both “finality and\\nconsistency.” Id. at 484–85 (citation omitted).\\n\\n The same is true in this case. Iowa courts have extended Thomas’s\\ncommitment several times since he filed his section 1983 action, so the risk of\\nparallel litigation is not just hypothetical here. See, e.g., Thomas II, 2016 WL\\n4036244, at *1; Thomas III, 2018 WL 6706242, at *1. And as in Heck, Thomas is\\ntrying to use section 1983 to bring what is essentially a malicious-prosecution claim.\\n\\n Courts have long recognized that individuals like Thomas can sue those who\\npursue “unfounded proceedings . . . to have [them] declared insane” for malicious\\nprosecution, even if the proceedings are “not criminal in their nature.” Thomas M.\\nCooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 188 (1879); accord 1 Fowler V. Harper et\\nal., Harper, James and Gray on Torts 525–26 (3d ed. 2006); W. Page Keeton et al.,\\nProsser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 890 (5th ed. 1984); see also, e.g., Lockenour\\nv. Sides, 57 Ind. 360, 364–65 (1877) (authorizing an action against defendants who,\\n“maliciously and without probable cause,” brought “proceedings to procure the\\nplaintiff to be found insane”).3 Those who “institute[] and carr[y] on” such\\n\\n\\n 3\\n There is a longstanding split involving whether an individual can sue over\\nany malicious civil prosecution, or just one that inflicts a “special injury.” Keeton\\net al., supra, at 889–90; see also Cooley, supra, at 187; Kolka v. Jones, 71 N.W. 558,\\n559 (N.D. 1897) (collecting cases). This debate is immaterial here, however,\\nbecause even those jurisdictions that require a special injury recognize that a\\nmalicious civil-commitment proceeding creates one. Keeton et al., supra, at 890 &\\nn.7; see also Cooley, supra, at 188; cf. Kolka, 71 N.W. at 559 (noting a widely\\n -4-\\n\\fproceedings are liable for any false representations they make about the victim’s\\ncompetency. Lockenour, 57 Ind. at 360, 364; accord Keeton et al., supra, at 893\\n(explaining that the victim may sue anyone who “play[ed] a major role in instigating\\nthe [malicious] action”); see also, e.g., Reade v. Halpin, 193 A.D. 566, 569–70 (N.Y.\\nApp. Div. 1920) (highlighting allegations that the defendants provided “false\\ninformation” to the “medical examiners [who] certified to the lunacy of the\\nplaintiff”), appeal dismissed, 130 N.E. 905 (N.Y. 1921) (per curiam).\\n\\n To bring such an action, however, the plaintiff ordinarily has to “prove the\\ntermination of the former proceeding in his favor.”4 Keeton et al., supra, at 892;\\naccord Harper et al., supra, at 515–16 (noting that “[t]he same conditions necessary\\nto support a tort action for the malicious prosecution of criminal proceedings are\\ngenerally required in the case of civil proceedings”); cf. Cooley, supra, at 187–88.5\\n\\naccepted cause of action for wrongful civil proceedings that involve “the arrest of\\nthe person,” “the seizure of property,” or “other special circumstances”).\\n 4\\n Courts have recognized an exception to the favorable-termination\\nrequirement when the underlying civil proceeding was “an ex parte one [in which]\\nrelief [was] granted without an opportunity for the party against whom it [was]\\nsought to be heard.” Keeton et al., supra, at 892; accord Harper et al., supra, at 515–\\n16; cf. Cooley, supra, at 188. This carveout is not relevant here because Thomas\\ndoes not claim that he lacked an opportunity to argue against civil commitment. To\\nthe contrary, his complaint alleged that he “was able to challenge the civil\\ncommitment . . . and call[] witnesses to testify.” See also, e.g., Thomas I, 2015 WL\\n576172, at *1 (considering and rejecting Thomas’s objections); Thomas II, 2016 WL\\n4036244, at *1 (same).\\n 5\\n See also, e.g., Barton v. Woodward, 182 P. 916, 917 (Idaho 1919) (mem.)\\n(referencing the favorable-termination requirement); Lockenour, 57 Ind. at 361,\\n364–65 (same); Fowle v. Fowle, 140 S.E.2d 398, 401–02 (N.C. 1965) (explaining\\nthat another court had already determined that the plaintiff was “being improperly\\nrestrained [and had] ordered her release”); Straka v. Voyles, 252 P. 677, 678 (Utah\\n1927) (noting that the plaintiff was “adjudged . . . not insane”). But cf. Fisher v.\\nPayne, 113 So. 378, 380–81 (Fla. 1927) (suggesting, in dicta, that this requirement\\ndoes not apply when a plaintiff has been committed under a statutory “inquisition”\\nprocess rather than an adversarial “criminal prosecution or a civil action”); Kellogg\\n -5-\\n\\fGiven that Thomas has not done so, we have little trouble concluding that his claim\\n“is not cognizable under § 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. To hold otherwise would\\nundermine “finality and consistency” and encourage “parallel litigation.” Id. at 484–\\n85 (citation omitted).\\n\\n Thomas argues that Heck does not apply because his wrongful-commitment\\nclaim is based on the underlying “conduct” of prison officials, not on the “fact of\\n[his] civil commitment itself.” He reasons that, because Heck does not apply to\\nconstitutional claims that, “if successful, would not necessarily imply that the . . .\\nconviction was unlawful,” Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir. 2000) (per\\ncuriam) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7), his claim may proceed. His theory is\\nthat facts other than the deceptive and manipulative conduct of prison officials led\\nto his commitment, particularly the extent of his mental illness.\\n\\n But Thomas’s attempt to distinguish this case from Heck conflicts with both\\nhis theory of the case and the description of the injury he allegedly suffered. He\\ndoes not claim that encouraging him to misbehave, by itself, violated his\\nconstitutional rights or injured him. Rather, he alleges that relying on his\\nmisbehavior to civilly commit him is what gave rise to his cause of action. Indeed,\\nas Thomas told the district court, his “constitutional rights were violated because\\n[prison officials] obtained a civil commitment against him.” (Emphasis added).\\n\\n In short, Thomas’s real complaint is that he never should have been committed\\nin the first place. This has also been his central argument throughout the Iowa\\nproceedings, and each time the Iowa courts have disagreed with him. As long as\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nv. Cochran, 25 P. 677, 679 (Cal. 1890) (dispensing with this requirement because,\\nunder California law, the initial judicial commitment order was “only preliminary”\\nand “the final determination[] as to whether the person committed is insane . . . [was]\\nto be made . . . by the resident physician of the asylum”).\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fthose judgments stand, he cannot proceed with his wrongful-commitment claim. 6\\nHeck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; cf. Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007)\\n(explaining that the favorable-termination requirement applies even after the\\nplaintiff has been released from custody).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Thomas also claims that forcibly medicating him violated his constitutional\\nrights. This type of allegation is different from his wrongful-commitment claim\\nbecause “requests for relief turning on [the] circumstances of confinement” do not\\nnecessarily affect the “validity of [the] confinement” itself. Muhammad v. Close,\\n540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam) (emphases added). If officials forced Thomas\\nto take drugs having no connection to his mental illness or intentionally injured him\\nwhile treating him, for example, then Thomas could have a viable damages claim\\nunder section 1983. See, e.g., Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 697–98 (8th Cir.\\n1997) (considering a forced-medication claim and explaining that the Due Process\\nClause requires this sort of treatment to be “in the [individual’s] medical interest”\\n(citation omitted)).\\n\\n But here, even though the case advanced to summary judgment, Thomas never\\npresented evidence that would have allowed a reasonable factfinder to conclude that\\nhis constitutional rights had been violated. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477\\nU.S. 242, 248 (1986). The record is silent about when or how the drugs were\\nadministered. And we do not even have an idea about what kinds of drugs he was\\nallegedly forced to take. Cf. Morgan, 128 F.3d at 698 (evaluating particular\\n“instances when [the plaintiff] was forcibly injected”).\\n\\n\\n 6\\n The district court did not specify whether it dismissed Thomas’s wrongful-\\ncommitment claim with or without prejudice. The appropriate disposition under\\nHeck is to dismiss it without prejudice, which will allow Thomas to refile it if he can\\nsatisfy the favorable-termination requirement at some point. See Schafer v. Moore,\\n46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (modifying the dismissal of a Heck-\\nbarred claim “to be without prejudice”).\\n -7-\\n\\f It was Thomas’s burden, as the plaintiff, to introduce evidence supporting his\\nclaims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986) (explaining that\\nsummary judgment is proper when the party with the burden of proof “has failed to\\nmake a sufficient showing on an essential element”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Instead, he\\noffered only threadbare allegations, including that he was “medicated . . . for the\\nwrong reasons.” But this does not tell us what, when, where, why, or how drugs\\nwere administered. Cf. Morgan, 128 F.3d at 697–98 (reviewing specific details in\\nthe record). So even though no one argues that we should affirm on this particular\\nground, we still think that Thomas’s lack of proof dooms his forced-medication\\nclaim. See Hohn v. BNSF Ry. Co., 707 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining\\nthat we “may affirm [summary] judgment on any basis supported by the record”).\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n We accordingly affirm the grant of summary judgment, except that we clarify\\nthat the dismissal of Thomas’s wrongful-commitment claim is without prejudice.\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":2699,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8444031,"string":"8,444,031"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. FEDNAT HOLDING COMPANY"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fednat Holding Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-06-27"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-2430"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Grasz, Gruender\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415468/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444031/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. FEDNAT HOLDING COMPANY\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. FEDNAT HOLDING COMPANY\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-06-27\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":26,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":2600,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSJ9.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc3ODgzMTkzMiwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3Nzg4MzU1MzIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.I9IufMlA5td41f2alArgDzqUFYjPPfXWRkqbFEdw3GLSA8adYtUMXm2SW6M_eugUk50tCHAY9nEPiwlx0GliDQ","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
id int64 | name string | name_abbreviation string | decision_date string | docket_number string | court string | casebody string | judge1 string | judge2 string | judge3 string | exactly_three_caps int64 | extra_judges string | judge_designations string | opinions_count int64 | majority_count int64 | dissent_count int64 | concurrence_count int64 | other_count int64 | primary_citation string | reporter string | volume null | resource_url string | precedential_status string | 010combined_count int64 | 020lead_count int64 | 030concurrence_count int64 | 035concurrenceinpart_count int64 | 040dissent_count int64 | year int64 | month int64 | messages list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4,631,325 | City of Chicago v. Robbin L. Fulton | 2019-06-19 | 18-2527 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\n\n\n\nNo. 18‐2527\nIN RE: ROBBI... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631325/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,631,358 | City of Chicago v. Timothy Shannon | 2019-06-19 | 18-3023 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\n\n\n\nNo. 18‐2527\nIN RE: ROBBI... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631358/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,631,365 | City of Chicago v. Robbin L. Fulton | 2019-06-19 | 18-2527 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\n\n\n\nNo. 18‐2527\nIN RE: ROBBI... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631365/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,631,512 | United States v. William Block | 2019-06-20 | 18-2128 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2128\nUNITED STATES OF... | BAUER | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631512/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,631,529 | United States v. William Block | 2019-06-20 | 18-2128 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2128\nUNITED STATES OF... | BAUER | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631529/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,631,555 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William BLOCK, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. William Block | 2019-06-20 | 18-2128 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Manion, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2128\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631555/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,631,989 | Steven KLIKNO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. Joseph Van Sach, Petitioner-Appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-Appellee. Ernest D. Shields, Petitioner-Appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-Appellee. Tony Lipscomb, Petitioner-Appellant, v. United States... | Tony Lipscomb v. United States | 2019-06-21 | 16-2312; 17-1824; 17-1929; 17-2233; 17-2339; 17-2514 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Flaum, Kanne", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-2312\nSTEVEN KLIKNO,\n ... | WOOD | FLAUM | KANNE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631989/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,632,030 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roberto MACIAS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Roberto Macias | 2019-06-21 | 18-1981 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Manion, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1981\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632030/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,632,031 | Tony Lipscomb v. United States | 2019-06-21 | 17-2233 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and KANNE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-2312\nSTEVEN ... | WOOD | FLAUM | KANNE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632031/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,632,106 | United States v. Roberto Macias | 2019-06-21 | 18-1981 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1981\nUNITED STATES OF... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632106/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,632,444 | Deandre J. BEASON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Matthew MARSKE, Respondent-Appellee. | Deandre Beason v. Matthew Marske | 2019-06-24 | 18-3575 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3575\nDEANDRE J. BEASON,\n ... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632444/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,632,456 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ishaihu HARMELECH, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Ishaihu Harmelech | 2019-06-24 | 18-2169 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Rovner, Hamilton, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2169\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | ROVNER | HAMILTON | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632456/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,632,458 | Deandre Beason v. Matthew Marske | 2019-06-24 | 18-3575 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3575\nDEANDRE J. BEAS... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632458/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,632,478 | United States v. Ishaihu Harmelech | 2019-06-24 | 18-2169 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2169\nUNITED STAT... | ROVNER | HAMILTON | BRENNAN | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632478/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,632,480 | Deandre Beason v. Matthew Marske | 2019-06-24 | 18-3575 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3575\nDEANDRE J. BEAS... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632480/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,632,573 | SELECTSUN GMBH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PORTER, INC., D/B/A Thunderbird Products, Defendant-Appellee. | SelectSun GmbH v. Porter, Inc. | 2019-06-25 | 18-3149 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Hamilton, Barrett, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3149\nSELECTSUN GMBH,\n ... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632573/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,632,697 | SelectSun GmbH v. Porter, Inc. | 2019-06-25 | 18-3149 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3149\nSELECTSUN GM... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632697/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,632,698 | Donald FESSENDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. and Oracle USA, Inc., Group Long Term Disability Plan, Defendants-Appellees. | Donald Fessenden v. Reliance Standard Life Insura | 2019-06-25 | 18-1346 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Sykes, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1346\nDONALD FESSENDEN,\n ... | WOOD | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632698/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,632,885 | Donald Fessenden v. Reliance Standard Life Insura | 2019-06-25 | 18-1346 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1346\n... | WOOD | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632885/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,633,236 | Joseph S. MCGREAL, Plaintiff, v. VILLAGE OF ORLAND PARK, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees, Appeal Of: John P. DeRose, Counsel for the Plaintiff, Appellant. | Joseph McGreal v. Village of Orland Park | 2019-06-26 | 18-3342 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Brennan, Kanne, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3342\nJOSEPH S. MCGREAL,\n ... | BRENNAN | KANNE | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633236/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,260 | Leroy PALMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Craig P. FRANZ, RN, Defendant-Appellee. | Leroy Palmer v. Craig Franz | 2019-06-26 | 18-1384 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Hamilton, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18‐1384\n\nLEROY PALMER,\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\... | BAUER | HAMILTON | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633260/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,261 | Joseph McGreal v. Village of Orland Park | 2019-06-26 | 18-3342 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3342\nJOSEPH S. MCGREA... | KANNE | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633261/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,633,266 | Leroy Palmer v. Craig Franz | 2019-06-26 | 18-1384 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18‐1384\n\nLEROY PALMER,\n ... | BAUER | ROVNER | HAMILTON | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633266/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,633,267 | Kimberly BILINSKY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee. | Kimberly Bilinsky v. American Airlines, Inc. | 2019-06-26 | 18-3107 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Hamilton, Kanne", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888807/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | KANNE | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633267/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,268 | Joseph McGreal v. Village of Orland Park | 2019-06-26 | 18-3342 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3342\nJOSEPH S. MCGREA... | KANNE | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633268/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,633,269 | J.K.J. and M.J.J., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. POLK COUNTY and Darryl L. Christensen, Defendants-Appellants. | J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin | 2019-06-26 | 18-1498; 18-1499; 18-2170 & 18-2177 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Brennan, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18‐1498, 18‐1499, 18‐2170, & 18‐2177\nJ.K.J. and M.J.J.,\n ... | BAUER | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633269/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,306 | Leroy Palmer v. Craig Franz | 2019-06-26 | 18-1384 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18‐1384\n\nLEROY PALMER,\n ... | BAUER | ROVNER | HAMILTON | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633306/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,633,307 | Kimberly Bilinsky v. American Airlines, Inc. | 2019-06-26 | 18-3107 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3107\nKIMBERLY BI... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633307/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,633,308 | J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin | 2019-06-26 | 18-2170 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18‐1498, 18‐1499, 18‐2170, & 18‐2177\nJ.K.J. and M... | BAUER | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633308/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,633,553 | ESSEX INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BLUE MOON LOFTS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION and the Structural Shop, Ltd., Defendants-Appellants. | Essex Insurance Company v. Structural Shop, Ltd. | 2019-06-27 | 18-3443 & 18-3530 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-3443 & 18-3530\nESSEX INSURANCE COMPANY,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633553/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,670 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jacob D. LICKERS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Jacob Lickers | 2019-06-27 | 18-2212 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Scudder, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2212\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | WOOD | SCUDDER | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633670/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,633,671 | Essex Insurance Company v. Structural Shop, Ltd. | 2019-06-27 | 18-3530 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-3443 & 18-3530\n... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633671/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,279 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paris YANCEY, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Paris Yancey | 2019-06-27 | 18-2935 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Sykes, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2935\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | KANNE | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634279/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,634,280 | United States v. Jacob Lickers | 2019-06-27 | 18-2212 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-22... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Cir cuit", "ST EVE": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634280/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,281 | Gloria D. FIELDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO & Chad P. Weiden, Defendants-Appellees. | Gloria Fields v. Board of Education of the City | 2019-06-27 | 17-3136 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17‐3136\nGLORIA D. ... | WOOD | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634281/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,634,282 | DIVISION SIX SPORTS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, the FINISH LINE, INC., Defendant-Appellee. | Division Six Sports, Inc. v. Finish Line, Incorporated | 2019-06-27 | 19-1070 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Manion, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1070\nDIVISION SIX SPORTS, INC.,\n ... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634282/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,634,779 | United States v. Paris Yancey | 2019-06-27 | 18-2935 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2935\nUNITED STATES O... | KANNE | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634779/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,780 | Nicole D. NELSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREAT LAKES EDUCATIONAL LOAN SERVICES, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Nicole Nelson v. Great Lakes Educational Loan S | 2019-06-27 | 18-1531 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Hamilton, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1531\nNICOLE D. NELSON,\n ... | KANNE | HAMILTON | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634780/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,781 | Gloria Fields v. Board of Education of the City | 2019-06-27 | 17-3136 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17‐3136\nGLORIA D. ... | WOOD | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634781/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,782 | Division Six Sports, Inc. v. Finish Line, Incorporated | 2019-06-27 | 19-1070 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1070\nDIVISION SIX SP... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634782/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,805 | United States v. Paris Yancey | 2019-06-27 | 18-2935 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2935\nUNITED STATES O... | KANNE | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634805/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,806 | In RE: Devan DENNIS and Tyeane Halbert, Debtors-Appellees, Appeals Of: Illinois Department of Human Services and James T. Dimas. | Tyeane Halbert v. James T. Dimas | 2019-06-27 | 18-2899 & 18-2952 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNos. 18‐2899 & 18‐2952\n\nIN RE: DEVAN DENNIS and\nTYEANE HALBERT,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634806/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,807 | Nicole Nelson v. Great Lakes Educational Loan S | 2019-06-27 | 18-1531 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1531\nNICOLE D. NELSON... | KANNE | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634807/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,808 | Gloria Fields v. Board of Education of the City | 2019-06-27 | 17-3136 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17‐3136\nGLORIA D. ... | WOOD | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634808/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,809 | Division Six Sports, Inc. v. Finish Line, Incorporated | 2019-06-27 | 19-1070 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1070\nDIVISION SIX SP... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634809/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,916 | Tyeane Halbert v. James T. Dimas | 2019-06-27 | 18-2952 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNos. 18‐2899 & 18‐2952\n\nIN RE: DEVAN DENNIS and\nTYEANE H... | WOOD | BAUER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634916/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,634,917 | Nicole Nelson v. Great Lakes Educational Loan S | 2019-06-27 | 18-1531 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1531\nNICOLE D. NELSON... | KANNE | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4634917/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,635,209 | John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PURDUE UNIVERSITY, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | John Doe v. Purdue University | 2019-06-28 | 17-3565 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Sykes, Barrett, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3565\nJOHN DOE,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\... | SYKES | BARRETT | 0 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635209/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,635,350 | John Doe v. Purdue University | 2019-06-28 | 17-3565 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3565\nJOHN DOE,\n ... | SYKES | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635350/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,635,352 | AUTO DRIVEAWAY FRANCHISE SYSTEMS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUTO DRIVEAWAY RICHMOND, LLC, and InnovAuto USA, LLC, Defendants, and Jeffrey Corbett, Defendant-Appellant. | Auto Driveaway Franchise Sys., LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC | 2019-06-28 | 18-3402 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Easterbrook, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3402\nAUTO DRIVEAWAY FRANCHISE SYSTEMS, LLC,\n ... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635352/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,635,441 | Auto Driveaway Franchise Syste v. Jeffrey Corbett | 2019-06-28 | 18-3402 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4412694/", "author_raw": "Diane Pamela Wood"}]} | WOOD | WOOD | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635441/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||
4,635,813 | Auto Driveaway Franchise Syste v. Jeffrey Corbett | 2019-06-28 | 18-3402 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3402\... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635813/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,625,578 | Kathy FISCHER, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Josh HOVEN, in His Individual Capacity; Barry Hillestad, in His Individual Capacity; Day County, a South Dakota Political Subdivision, Its Agents, Subsidiaries and Employees, Defendants - Appellees | Kathy Fischer v. Josh Hoven | 2019-06-03 | 18-2061 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Benton, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4625578/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,625,579 | Eric Roshaun THURAIRAJAH, Plaintiff - Appellee v. CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS ; Sebastian County, Arkansas ; State of Arkansas; Bill Hollenbeck, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff for the County of Sebastian, Defendants Trooper Lagarian Cross, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a State Troo... | Eric Thurairajah v. Bill Hollenbeck | 2019-06-03 | 17-3419 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3419... | SMITH | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4625579/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,625,876 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Devon GUICE, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Devon Guice | 2019-06-04 | 18-1327 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KELLY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1327... | BENTON | MELLOY | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4625876/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,625,878 | Derrick ESTELL, Petitioner - Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee. | Derrick Estell v. United States | 2019-06-04 | 18-2550 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Gruender, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-... | COLLOTON | GRUENDER | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4625878/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,625,880 | Alexander Y. USENKO, Derivatively on Behalf of the SunEdison Semiconductor Ltd. Retirement Savings Plan, Plaintiff - Appellant v. MEMC LLC; The Investment Committee of the SunEdison Semiconductor Ltd. Retirement Savings Plan, Hemant Kapadia; Penny Cutrell; Steve Edens; Karen Steiner; Cheng Yang; Ben Llorico, Defendants... | Alexander Usenko v. MEMC LLC | 2019-06-04 | 18-1626 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KELLY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1626\n ... | BENTON | MELLOY | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4625880/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,626,860 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Antonio Avila MEDRANO, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Antonio Medrano | 2019-06-06 | 18-1070 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Colloton, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LOKEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1070\n ... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4626860/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,627,358 | Derrick TAYLOR Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America Respondent - Appellee | Derrick Taylor v. United States | 2019-06-07 | 17-1760 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Colloton, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LOKEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-1760\n ... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4627358/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,627,359 | Alexander FAULKNER, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee | Alexander Faulkner v. United States | 2019-06-07 | 18-1984 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Benton, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1984\... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4627359/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,627,844 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Calvin ROBINSON, Jr., Defendant - Appellant. | United States v. Calvin Robinson, Jr. | 2019-06-10 | 18-1420 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Colloton, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1420\n ... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4627844/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,628,229 | Tina SMITH, Individually, and a Natural Mother and Lawful Heir of Raymond A. Smith, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Michael KILGORE, Member Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners; Alvin Brooks, Member Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners; Angela Wasson-Hunt, Member Kansas City Board of Police Commissioner... | Tina Smith v. Michael Kilgore | 2019-06-11 | 18-1040 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Benton, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1040\n ... | SMITH | BENTON | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4628229/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,628,694 | Yasin Ahmed FARAH, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Heather WEYKER, in Her Individual Capacity as a St. Paul Police Officer Defendant-Appellant the City of St. Paul; John Does 1-5, in Their Individual Capacities as St. Paul Police Officers; Richard Roes 1-5, in Their Individual Capacities as Federal Law Enforcement Officers, Defe... | Yasin Ahmed Farah v. Heather Weyker | 2019-06-12 | 17-3207; 17-3208; 17-3209; 17-3210; 17-3212; 17-3213 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3207\n ... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4628694/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,628,695 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Willie Earl CLARK, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Willie Clark | 2019-06-12 | 18-1172 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Benton, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1172\n ... | SMITH | BENTON | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4628695/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,628,697 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Michael Tryance ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Michael Anderson | 2019-06-12 | 18-1640 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Wollman, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-16... | GRUENDER | WOLLMAN | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4628697/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,628,700 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Christopher J. KESSLER, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Christopher Kessler | 2019-06-12 | 18-1796 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Benton, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1796\n ... | SMITH | BENTON | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4628700/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,628,701 | Jacquie ALBRIGHT, AS Parent and NEXT Best FRIEND OF Child DOE, Plaintiff - Appellant v. MOUNTAIN HOME SCHOOL DISTRICT; Debbie Atkinson, Director of Special Education; Susanne Belk, BCBA Consultant, Defendants - Appellees | Jacquie Albright v. Mountain Home School District | 2019-06-12 | 17-3298 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-32... | SMITH | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4628701/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,629,229 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Trudale Raymond WILLIAMS, Defendant - Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Demario Jaqun Jefferson, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Trudale Raymond Williams | 2019-06-13 | 18-1273; 18-1274 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Colloton, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KELLY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1273\n ___________________________\n\n United States ... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629229/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,629,233 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Chase Logan GUZMAN, Defendant-Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Justin Thomas Morales, Also Known as Speedy, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Chase Logan Guzman | 2019-06-13 | 18-1506; 18-2202 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Colloton, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KELLY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1506\n ___________________________\n\n United States ... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629233/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,629,236 | Gregory CLARK, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Austin CLARK, Deputy, in His Individual Capacity Only, Defendant - Appellee | Gregory Clark v. Austin Clark | 2019-06-13 | 18-1324 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888712/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629236/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,629,237 | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION; State of North Dakota, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. SANFORD HEALTH; Sanford Bismarck; Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., Defendants - Appellants. State of Minnesota; State of Alaska; State of California; State of Delaware; State of Hawaii; State of Idaho; State of Iowa; State of Mississippi; State of Mass... | Federal Trade Commission v. Sanford Health | 2019-06-13 | 17-3783 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3783\n... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629237/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,629,238 | Dan CHARLESTON, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Bill MCCARTHY, in His Individual and Official Capacity as Polk County Sheriff, Defendant - Appellee Helen Youngs, in Her Individual Capacity; Florence Buhr, in Her Individual Capacity; Bill Hansen, in His Individual Capacity; Victor J. Munoz, in His Individual Capacity, Defendan... | Dan Charleston v. Bill McCarthy | 2019-06-13 | 18-1965 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Wollman, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1965... | GRUENDER | WOLLMAN | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629238/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,629,738 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Stephen GUSTUS, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Stephen Gustus | 2019-06-14 | 18-2303 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888731/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/... | BENTON | MELLOY | KELLY | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629738/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,629,741 | Sherry DESPAIN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee | Sherry Despain v. Nancy A. Berryhill | 2019-06-14 | 18-1927 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Grasz, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1927\n ... | LOKEN | GRASZ | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629741/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,629,742 | National Union Fire Insurance v. Federal Insurance Company | 2019-06-14 | 18-1063 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | SHEPHERD | ARNOLD | ERICKSON | 1 | {"SHEPHERD": ", Circuit", "ARNOLD": ", Circuit", "ERICKSON": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629742/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,629,743 | Cheryl J. Schwandt v. Nancy A. Berryhill | 2019-06-14 | 17-3406 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {"COLLOTON": ", Circuit", "SHEPHERD": ", Circuit", "STRAS": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629743/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,629,744 | Ahmed SOUEIDAN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY, Defendant - Appellee | Ahmed Soueidan v. St. Louis University | 2019-06-14 | 18-2124 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2124\n ... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4629744/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,630,133 | United States v. Brandon Cloud | 2019-06-17 | 18-1170 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KELLY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {"LOKEN": ", Circuit", "COLLOTON": ", Circuit", "KELLY": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4630133/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,630,134 | Dorian JOHNSON Plaintiff - Appellee v. CITY OF FERGUSON, MISSOURI; Thomas Jackson; Darren Wilson Defendants - Appellants National Police Association Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) | Dorian Johnson v. City of Ferguson | 2019-06-17 | 16-1697 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wollman, Loken, Murphy, Melloy, Colloton, Gruender, Benton, Shepherd, Kelly, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n... | SMITH | WOLLMAN | LOKEN | 2 | MURPHY; MELLOY; COLLOTON; GRUENDER; BENTON; SHEPHERD; KELLY; ERICKSON | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4630134/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||
4,631,057 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Donald Thomas PERRIN, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Donald Thomas Perrin | 2019-06-19 | 18-1503 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Arnold, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18... | SHEPHERD | ARNOLD | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631057/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,631,410 | United States v. Sergio Diaz-Ortiz | 2019-06-20 | 18-2948 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MELLOY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | SHEPHERD | MELLOY | GRASZ | 1 | {"SHEPHERD": ", Circuit", "MELLOY": ", Circuit", "GRASZ": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631410/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,631,485 | Paulette Barbee v. Big River Steel LLC | 2019-06-20 | 18-2255 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | SHEPHERD | MELLOY | GRASZ | 1 | {"SHEPHERD": ", Circuit", "MELLOY": ", Circuit", "GRASZ": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631485/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,631,513 | Oscar Rivera-Guerrero v. William P. Barr | 2019-06-20 | 18-1234 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | SHEPHERD | MELLOY | GRASZ | 1 | {"SHEPHERD": ", Circuit", "MELLOY": ", Circuit", "GRASZ": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4631513/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,444,011 | Oscar RIVERA-GUERRERO v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States | Rivera-Guerrero v. Barr | 2019-06-20 | No. 18-1234 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Grasz, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415446/", "author_raw": ""}]} | GRASZ | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444011/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,444,024 | Adam LANE v. Adam NADING, Probation and Parole Office Joseph M. Boyd, Corporal, Police Officer 4338, Sebastian County Sheriff's Office - Fort Smith Police Department Probation and Parole Office Adam Lane v. Adam Nading, Probation and Parole Office - Joseph M. Boyd, Corporal, Police Officer 4338, Sebastian County Sherif... | Lane v. Nading | 2019-06-20 | No. 18-2194; No. 18-2426 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415460/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BENTON | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444024/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,444,025 | Paulette BARBEE, Administrator of the Estate of Kimberly Hope Gillock v. BIG RIVER STEEL, LLC | Barbee v. Big River Steel, LLC | 2019-06-20 | No. 18-2255 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Grasz, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415461/", "author_raw": ""}]} | GRASZ | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444025/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,444,026 | UNITED STATES of America v. Sergio DIAZ-ORTIZ | United States v. Diaz-Ortiz | 2019-06-20 | No. 18-2948 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Grasz, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415462/", "author_raw": ""}]} | GRASZ | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444026/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,632,272 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tywin BENDER, Defendant - Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tywin Bender, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Tywin Bender | 2019-06-24 | 17-3819; 17-3820 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Arnold, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3819\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\... | SMITH | ARNOLD | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632272/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,632,275 | United States v. Israel Angeles-Moctezuma | 2019-06-24 | 18-3227 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | LOKEN | KELLY | ERICKSON | 1 | {"LOKEN": ", Circuit", "KELLY": ", Circuit", "ERICKSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632275/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,632,639 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Kalil Wesley DUNN Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Kalil Dunn | 2019-06-25 | 18-2393 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Erickson, Kobes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-239... | SHEPHERD | ERICKSON | KOBES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4632639/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,049 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Melvin PRYOR Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Melvin Pryor | 2019-06-26 | 18-2627 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Beam, Colloton, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BEAM, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2627\... | BEAM | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633049/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,050 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Meamen Jean NYAH, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Meamen Nyah | 2019-06-26 | 17-3730 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-373... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633050/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,053 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Gregorio RAMIREZ-MALDONADO; Alejandro Llamas-Delgado; Erick Parra-Salazar, Defendants-Appellants | United States v. Gregorio Ramirez-Maldonado | 2019-06-26 | 18-2068; 18-2088; 18-2090 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {"GRUENDER": ", Circuit", "BENTON": ", Circuit", "GRASZ": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633053/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,056 | Paula Christy L. SCHMIDT; Holly Woprice Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Richard NEWLAND, Trustee of the Michael Allen Lasiter Trust, Amended and Restated February 19, 2016; John Doe, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Allen Lasiter, Deceased Defendants Newland & Associates PLLC, Trustee of the Michael Allen... | Paula Schmidt v. Newland & Associates PLLC | 2019-06-26 | 18-2083 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Grasz, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2083\n ... | GRASZ | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633056/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,557 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dominic L. SMITH Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Dominic Smith | 2019-06-27 | 17-3760 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Grasz, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3760\n ... | LOKEN | GRASZ | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633557/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,559 | Jose Luis MENDEZ-GOMEZ, Also Known as Julio Cesar Estrada-Escobar, Also Known as Jose Aul Torres-Santiago, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent | Jose Luis Mendez-Gomez v. William P. Barr | 2019-06-27 | 18-2109 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Arnold, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-21... | SHEPHERD | ARNOLD | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633559/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,560 | Jane DOE, (Originally Named as John Doe Individually and as a Parent and Next Friend to Jane Doe, a Minor) Plaintiff - Appellant v. DARDANELLE SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee | Jane Doe v. Dardanelle School District | 2019-06-27 | 18-2816 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Gruender, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-... | COLLOTON | GRUENDER | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633560/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,633,561 | Federated Mutual Insurance Com v. FedNat Holding Com | 2019-06-27 | 18-2430 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {"GRUENDER": ", Circuit", "BENTON": ", Circuit", "GRASZ": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633561/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,633,562 | Clay Irwin THOMAS Plaintiff - Appellant v. Scott ESCHEN; Kathy Eschen; Greg Ort; Garry Keller Defendants - Appellees | Clay Thomas v. Scott Eschen | 2019-06-27 | 17-3385 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Grasz, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3385\n ... | LOKEN | GRASZ | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4633562/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,444,031 | FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. FEDNAT HOLDING COMPANY | Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fednat Holding Co. | 2019-06-27 | No. 18-2430 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Grasz, Gruender", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415468/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BENTON | GRASZ | GRUENDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444031/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 6 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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